It seems unnecessary to set out more of the circumstances of the present case. They raise more than one difficulty. At the outset there is the question whether the transfer of the land at Chermside into the joint names and the subsequent erection of the matrimonial home upon the land amounted to a settlement. The acquisition of the land at Burleigh presents a similar question. A very wide meaning has been given in England to the provision standing in Queensland as s. 9 of The Matrimonial Causes Act of 1875; the authorities by which this was done are collected and discussed in the judgment of Philp J. in Pattison v. Pattison [1] , who following the reasoning in Court v. Court [2] and in Gilbert v. Gilbert [3] held that land acquired by husband and wife as joint tenents for the purpose (which was carried out) of building a home was "settled" within the meaning of s. 9. The English decisions however upon which this conclusion was based together with the decision of Hubbard v. Hubbard [4] , which in the past has been considered perhaps to be out of line with them, have since been reviewed by the Court of Appeal in Prescott (formerly Fellowes) v. Fellowes [1] . That case tends no doubt to narrow the application of the word "settlement" in s. 9. It must be conceded that in applying the provision the conception of "settlement" had been carried to lengths which might seem a little surprising. But it must be borne in mind that the essential purpose of s. 9 is to enable the Court to inquire into post-nuptial and ante -nuptial dispositions of property in favour of one or other or both of the parties to the marriage which because of the dissolution of that marriage should be reconsidered and to empower the Court to make orders for what appears in the changed circumstances a just application of the property. In a case such as the present there are no trusts, no successive interests and no express limitations tending against mere alienation. But joint ownership in itself means a fetter upon the alienation of the entirety. For it can be done only by both parties. It means, unless it be severed, inheritance by survivorship. The surrounding circumstances show that the land was bought and the house built as a future or continued provision for them both and that joint ownership was adopted as the appropriate expression for the provision. Upon such facts it does not seem to go too far to regard the transfer to joint ownership as a "settlement" within the intendment of s. 9. In any case it is not desirable that the decisions of the Supreme Court to that effect should be reconsidered in the present case. For the final conclusion we have reached in the appeal makes it unnecessary to decide the question. Moreover it must not be forgotten that at first the fact that the dispositions formed settlements was admitted so that it was not considered by Mack J. Perhaps a further consideration is that s. 86 (2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 of the Commonwealth and not s. 9 of The Matrimonial Causes Act of 1875 Q. will very soon be the operative provision upon which the jurisdiction to review settlements will depend. On the assumption which we accordingly make that the two properties are the subjects of "settlements" within the meaning of s. 9 it becomes necessary to consider the effect of the order appealed from and the question whether upon the materials before the Court it forms a satisfactory adjustment of the interests of the former husband and wife and of the children of the marriage. It will be seen from the terms of the order that its operation depends upon the consent in writing of the Director of War Service Homes. It is evident that the respondent must be an "eligible person" within the definition of that expression in s. 4 of the War Service Homes Act 1918-1956. Section 4A of that Act enables the Director to treat the wife of an eligible person and the eligible person as together forming an eligible person: they may be in that character joint tenants (sub-s. (3)) and if the land which they own as joint tenants is subject to a mortgage under the Act a transfer of any interest or share of the husband or wife shall not have any force or effect unless it is made with the consent of the Director (sub-s. (4)). Section 35 (1) contains a more general provision which may also apply but, assuming the respondent to be an eligible person it perhaps adds nothing to the reasons for inserting the condition in the order. Unfortunately there is no report before this Court of the reasons of Mack J. for making the order. It is apparent however that as to the property at Chermside the order depends upon the manner in which the Director exercises his discretion. But the order as to the land at Burleigh is not so dependent. Apparently whatever the Director may decide, the appellant is to receive £100 for her interest in the land at Burleigh, whereupon her interest would be extinguished; but whether she loses her interest in the matrimonial home at Chermside and receives for it £250 rests with the Director. This seems anything but satisfactory. But what creates a greater difficulty is the fact that there is nothing to secure the occupancy of the house by the appellant and her children and yet the amount fixed for their maintenance is based on the supposition that they will continue to occupy the house as their home. The amount of £250 or for that matter £350 is not adequate as the value of the appellant's interest and it certainly would not make up what she would lose if she and her children were turned out of the dwelling. It is not possible, at all events in the present proceedings, to increase the amount of maintenance. Considering all these elements in the case the operation or possible operation of the order upon the appellant and her children seems to leave her in a position of greater insecurity than she is entitled to expect and indeed to put her interests in real jeopardy. After all, the transfer into the joint names of the respondent and herself was for the purpose of giving her protection against the mischances of life, and the mischance that has occurred is the result of the matrimonial wrong that he committed.