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Category: Principal judgment

Parties: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (plaintiff)
Larah Bekas (defendant)

Representation: Counsel:
D M Jay (plaintiff)
Solicitors:
Australian Taxation Office (plaintiff)

File Number(s): 2025/00188101

Publication restriction: Nil

JUDGMENT

1. The proceedings concern a claim by the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (the Deputy Commissioner) to recover unpaid personal income taxation liabilities from Ms Larah Bekas (Ms Bekas) in respect of:

(a) Personal income tax liabilities for the income tax years 2013 to 2019 inclusive (the Income Tax Years). (b) Shortfall interest charges (SIC) for the Income Tax Years. (c) Administrative penalties imposed for making false and misleading statements leading to taxation shortfalls in the Income Tax Years (the Statement Penalties). (d) Administrative penalties for failing to lodge income tax returns for the income tax years 2021 to 2023 (the FTL Penalties). (e) General Interest Charges (GIC) accrued in respect of the unpaid income tax, failure to lodge income tax returns, shortfall interest charges and the Statement Penalties.

2. The Deputy Commissioner relied on two affidavits of Ms Andrea Keys filed 7 November 2025 and 18 August 2026 (the Keys First and Second Affidavit****s respectively). The Keys Second Affidavit attached four certificates which became Exhibit A in the proceeding.

3. Ms Bekas filed her defence out of time on 23 July 2025. Leave was granted (and later extended by the Court) for Ms Bekas to file an amended defence but she has not done so. Ms Bekas has filed no evidence in support of her defence. I note, however, that there was attached to a copy of the defence an unfiled affidavit by Ms Bekas’ daughter Ms Balsam Haydar Ali Shehab which explains the delay in filing the defence. Ms Bekas has also failed to file any submissions.

No appearance by Ms Bekas

4. When the hearing was called there was no appearance by Ms Bekas.

5. For the following reasons, I am satisfied that Ms Bekas was informed that the Deputy Commissioner’s application was listed for hearing on 20 August 2026 at 10 am.

6. As noted above, on 23 July 2025, Ms Bekas filed a defence signed by her at a time when she was apparently unrepresented. By a notice of appointment of solicitor filed 14 August 2025, Ms Bekas subsequently appointed Mr Ammar Jamal-Eddine from Concordia Legal as her solicitor.

7. By a notice of removal of solicitor filed 31 July 2026, Ms Bekas stated that she had terminated Mr Jamal-Eddine’s retainer.

8. In her unfiled affidavit dated 23 July 2025, Ms Shehab deposed that her mother was from a non-English speaking background and relied on Ms Shehab to assist her with official and legal communications. Ms Shehab deposed that her mother had legal representation from late 2024 until mid-2025 and that both she and her mother understood that those legal representatives were actively handling her case. Those legal representatives were replaced after service of the Deputy Commissioner’s statement of claim. Ms Shehab deposed that both she and her mother believed that the new legal representatives were handling her case but they learnt on 26 June 2025 that the lawyer handling the matter had misunderstood the dates and failed to file a defence within time.

9. Ms Shehab deposed that the second law firm ceased to act and Ms Bekas proceeded as a litigant in person.

10. As noted above, Ms Bekas was legally represented by Mr Jamal-Eddine during the period 14 August 2025 to 31 July 2026.

11. I was informed by Mr Jay of counsel (who appeared for the Deputy Commissioner) that another law firm has recently started to act for Ms Bekas but was not the solicitor on the record for the purpose of this proceeding. He said that the new solicitor had asked the Deputy Commissioner’s solicitors for the proceedings to be adjourned but that informal application had been rejected.

12. It is necessary to now outline relevant procedural steps leading up to the hearing today.

13. The first directions hearing was held on 21 August 2025 and a copy of the directions was emailed to Mr Jamal-Eddine. Directions were made, inter alia, for Ms Bekas to file and serve any amended defence and for the parties to file evidence. The matter was listed for further directions on 15 December 2025.

14. By an email dated 7 October 2025, the parties were advised of amended directions listing the matter for further directions on 2 February 2026 at which time hearing dates would be considered.

15. By an email dated 29 January 2026 to the parties, the Registrar emailed consent orders that the proceedings be listed for directions on 9 March 2026 (pending negotiations).

16. The consent orders were made following an email also dated 29 January 2026 to the Registrar from Mr Jamal-Eddine.

17. Mr Jamal-Eddine emailed the Registrar again on 5 March 2026, noting that Ms Bekas had made a settlement proposal to the Commissioner and that there were ongoing negotiations. Consequently, on 6 March 2026, the Registrar listed the matter for directions on 4 May 2026.

18. There was a directions hearing before the Registrar on 4 May 2026. Ms Bekas was represented by Mr Schatz. The Registrar noted that Ms Bekas had not filed any evidence. Directions were made for the plaintiff to file written submissions by 30 July 2026 and Ms Bekas to file submissions by 6 August 2026. The Registrar’s record of proceedings also notes the possibility that Ms Bekas might file a notice of motion seeking a stay. The matter was listed for hearing on 20 August 2026, with an estimate of half a day.

19. In all these circumstances I am satisfied that Ms Bekas had notice of the hearing listed on 20 August 2026. As previously noted, she failed to file any evidence or written submissions. In circumstances where Ms Bekas failed to appear when the matter was called on 20 August 2026, the Court may either proceed with the trial generally or adjourn the trial (see r 29.7 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR)). Mr Jay applied for the hearing to proceed. I considered it appropriate to do so, noting that under r 36.16(2)(b) of the UCPR, the Court is empowered to set aside or vary a judgment or order after it has been entered if “it has been given or made in the absence of a party, whether or not the absent party had notice of the relevant hearing or of the application for the judgment or order”.

20. For completeness, I should also emphasise that, despite Ms Bekas’ non-appearance, the plaintiff must prove its claim where the burden of proof lies upon it (see Re Ant**om Fabrications Pty Ltd & Bently (2011) 248 FLR 384; [2011] NSWSC 186 at [11] per Ward J).

The Deputy Commissioner’s claim

21. By a statement of claim filed 16 May 2025 (SOC) the Deputy Commissioner seeks to recover from Ms Bekas an amount which represents Ms Bekas’ tax related liabilities, comprising income tax liabilities, administrative penalties, SIC and GIC.

(a) Relevant provisions of taxation legislation summarised

(i) Prima facie evidence provisions

22. In a proceeding to recover an amount of a tax-related liability, statements or averments about a matter in the plaintiff’s complaint is prima facie evidence of that matter: s 350-20(1) of Sch 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (TAA 1953).

23. The Commissioner’s use of evidentiary certificates and reliance on the prima facie evidentiary provisions in Commonwealth taxation legislation have been accepted by the Courts: see e.g. Lee v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation*; Silverbrook v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation* (2020) 102 NSWLR 825; [2020] NSWCA 95 at [75]-[79] per Payne JA, McCallum JA and Simpson AJA agreeing.

24. The Deputy Commissioner can proceed by way of affidavit and prima facie evidentiary certificate to prove the matters referred to therein, including service of assessments, quantum of assessments and the total amount owed: see ss 350-12, 350-25(a) of Sch 1 to the TAA 1953; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Lewer [2001] VSC 114 at [6] per Bongiorno J.

(ii) Liability for income tax

25. Section 170 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (ITAA 1936) empowers the Commissioner of Taxation to amend assessments of income tax. An amended assessment is an “assessment” for the purposes of the ITAA 1936: see s 173 of the ITAA 1936.

26. By s 174(1) of the ITAA 1936, the Commissioner must serve a notice of assessment as soon as convenient after an assessment is made. Service of the notice of assessment on the taxpayer fixes the ascertainment of the amount of the taxable income and the amount of the tax payable by the taxpayer and brings to an end the process of assessment: Batagol v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 243 at 252; [1963] HCA 51 per Kitto J.

27. Section 5-5 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) (ITAA 1997) specifies when income tax is due and payable. When income tax that is due and payable remains unpaid, GIC accrues on the unpaid amount: s 5-15 of the ITAA 1997 and Pt IIA of the TAA 1953.

28. As noted by Nettle JA (Redlich JA agreeing) in Trade World Enterprises Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2006) 64 ATR 316; [2006] VSCA 191 at [19]:

As the High Court stated in Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) [(1983) 48 ALR 545 at 547], the legislative scheme established in relation to tax recovery, as manifested in provisions like s 14ZZM of the Taxation Administration Act 1953, reflects a clear policy in favour of the Revenue against the taxpayer. The Commissioner is placed by the legislature in a position of special advantage and thus in general is free to pursue recovery proceedings, despite outstanding appeals and reviews against the disallowance of objections.

(iii) Recovery of income tax

29. Section 175 of the ITAA 1936 provides that the validity of an assessment shall not be affected by reason that any of the provisions of the Act have not been complied with. Item 2 of s 350-10(1) in Sch 1 to the TAA 1953 gives effect to s 175 of the ITAA 1936 by giving conclusive evidential force to notices of assessment under a taxation law.

30. Section 350-10 of Sch 1 to the TAA 1953 provides:

350**‑10 Evidence**

Conclusive evidence

(1) The following table has effect:

…

Prima facie evidence

(3) The production of a certificate that:

(a) is signed by the Commissioner, a *Second Commissioner, a *Deputy Commissioner or a delegate of the Commissioner; and

(b) states that, from the time specified in the certificate, an amount was payable under a *taxation law (whether to or by the Commissioner);

is prima facie evidence that:

(c) the amount is payable from that time; and

(d) the particulars stated in the certificate are correct.

31. Section 350-10(1) of Sch 1 to the TAA 1953 is substantively identical, in language and effect, to former s 177 of the ITAA 1936: Anglo American Investments Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2017) 347 ALR 134; [2017] NSWCA 17 at [40] per Payne JA, McColl and Meagher JJA agreeing.

32. In McAndrew v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1956) 98 CLR 263 at 281-282; [1956] HCA 62, Taylor J stated:

There seems no doubt that s. 177(1) was intended to make it impossible for a taxpayer, in proceedings other than appeal against it, to challenge an assessment on any ground ...

33. Where a notice of assessment is tendered the Court is precluded from considering the amounts and particulars contained in the document: Platypus Leasing Inc v Commissioner of Taxation (No 3) (2005) 189 FLR 441; [2005] NSWSC 388 at [76] per Gzell J.

34. As the Deputy Commissioner acknowledged, the operation of the conclusive evidence provisions may be harsh, but they implement a long-standing legislative policy to protect the interests of the revenue: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Broadbeach Properties Pty Ltd (2008) 237 CLR 473; [2008] HCA 41 at [44] per Gummow ACJ, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ.

35. A notice of assessment may be challenged in the very limited circumstances where it can be shown that the purported assessment does not answer the statutory description, such as where there was deliberate maladministration in its production: Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Limited (2008) 237 CLR 146; [2008] HCA 32 at [25], [66] per Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ. Futuris is consistent with a well-established line of authority to the effect that, absent jurisdictional error of the kind described in Futuris, s 177 of the ITAA 1936 (and by parity of reasoning, item 2 of s 350-10(1) of Sch 1 to the TAA 1953) will protect assessments from challenge outside of Pt IVC administrative proceedings: see FJ Bloemen Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 360; [1981] HCA 27 at 375-376 per Mason and Wilson JJ (citing Taylor J in McAndrew at 281-282).

36. Once the Deputy Commissioner takes advantage of s 350-10(1) of the TAA 1953 by producing the notices of amended assessment, Ms Bekas is precluded from contesting that the Commissioner has made an assessment or that in making that assessment he has complied with the relevant statutory requirements.

(b) Some additional relevant facts

(i) Income tax claim

37. Following an audit of her taxation affairs, Ms Bekas was assessed to pay income tax for the Income Tax Years ending 30 June 2013, 30 June 2014, 30 June 2015, 30 June 2016, 30 June 2017, 30 June 2018 and 30 June 2019.

38. Notices of amended assessment were served on Ms Bekas on or about 20 September 2024 pursuant to s 174 of the ITAA 1936. The due date for payment of the income tax for the Income Tax Years was 14 October 2024.

39. Ms Bekas failed to pay the income tax due under each notice of amended assessment on or before the due date.

40. By reason of the failure to pay income tax by the relevant due dates, Ms Bekas became liable to pay GIC pursuant to s 5-15 of the ITAA 1997 and Pt IIA of the TAA 1953.

41. Liability for income tax and GIC as at 6 November 2025 (the date the First Keys Affidavit was sworn) was $902,006.39. The production of an evidentiary certificate signed by the Commissioner, a Second Commissioner, a Deputy Commissioner or a delegate of the Commissioner that states that, from the time specified in the certificate, an amount is payable under a taxation law to a Commissioner, is prima facie evidence that the amount is payable from that time and that the particulars stated in the certificate are correct: see ss 350-10(3) and 350-12 of Sch 1 to the TAA 1953.

42. Exhibited to the Keys First Affidavit is a s 350-10 certificate signed by the Deputy Commissioner, Julian Nicholas Roberts, in respect of Ms Bekas’ income tax liability and GIC liability.

(ii) Shortfall interest charge claim

43. As a result of the Commissioner issuing notices of amended assessment for the Income Tax Years, Ms Bekas became liable to pay SIC on the amended assessed amounts: s 280-100 of Sch 1 to the TAA 1953.

44. The amount and rate of SIC is calculated in accordance with s 280-105 of Sch 1 to the TAA 1953.

45. The Commissioner was required to give Ms Bekas a notice stating the amount of the SIC that she was liable to pay for the period applicable under s 280-110(1) of Sch 1 to the TAA 1953. That notice is prima facie evidence of the matters stated therein: s 280-110(3) of Sch 1 to the TAA 1953.

46. Pursuant to s 5-10 of the ITAA 1997, SIC is due and payable 21 days after the day on which the Commissioner gave Ms Bekas notice of the charge.

47. Ms Bekas failed to pay the SIC on or before the due date of 14 October 2024.

48. Where SIC that is due and payable remains unpaid, GIC accrues on the unpaid amount of the SIC pursuant to s 5-15 of the ITAA 1997 and Pt IIA of the TAA 1953.

49. The quantum of combined SIC and GIC owed as at 6 November 2025 is $408,542.53.

50. Ms Keys’ affidavits establish that:

(a) a notice for SIC was served (which forms a line item of the amended assessments) pursuant to s 280-110(1) of Sch 1 to the TAA 1953; and (b) an evidentiary certificate dated 6 November 2025 under s 350-10(3) of Sch 1 to the TAA 1953 in the sum of $431,144.51 was signed by Deputy Commissioner Julian Nicholas Roberts.

(iii) Failure to lodge income tax returns claim

51. Ms Bekas was required to lodge income tax returns as follows:

(a) for the year of income ended 30 June 2021 – on or before 8 June 2022; (b) for the year of income ended 30 June 2022 – on or before 31 October 2022; and (c) for the year of income ended 30 June 2023 – on or before 31 October 2023.

52. Ms Bekas failed to lodge the returns on or before the days on which they were required to be lodged.

53. By reason of the failure to lodge the returns by the relevant due dates, Ms Bekas became liable to pay administrative penalties pursuant to s 286-75 of Sch 1 to the TAA 1953.

54. Written notices of the FTL Penalties were given to Ms Bekas pursuant to s 298-10 of Sch 1 to the TAA 1953.

55. From the relevant due date, GIC became payable on unpaid FTL Penalties pursuant to s 298-25 of Sch 1 to the TAA 1953.

56. The quantum of the unpaid FTL Penalties and GIC is $4,379.05 as at 6 November 2025 (see the certificate under s 350-10(3) of Sch 1 to the TAA 1953 signed by Deputy Commissioner Julian Nicholas Roberts).

(iv) Claim for administrative penalties for false or misleading statements

57. Pursuant to s 298-30 of Sch 1 to the TAA 1953, Ms Bekas was assessed for administrative penalties pursuant to s 284-75(1) of Sch 1 to the TAA 1953 for the years 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 (the Statement Penalties).

58. Section 284-75 of Sch 1 to the TAA 1953 provides:

284-75 Liability to penalty

(1) You are liable to an administrative penalty if:

(a) you make a statement to the Commissioner or to an entity that is exercising powers or performing functions under a taxation law (other than the Excise Acts); and

(b) the statement is false or misleading in a material particular, whether because of things in it or omitted from it. ...

59. The Commissioner gave written notice of the Statement Penalties to Ms Bekas on about 20 September 2024, in accordance with s 298-10 of Sch 1 to the TAA 1953. The due date for payment of the Statement Penalties was the day specified in the notice which must be at least 14 days after the notice was given: s 298-15 of Sch 1 to the TAA 1953. The due date for payment of the Statement Penalties specified in the relevant notices was 11 October 2024.

60. Pursuant to s 298-10 of Sch 1 to the TAA 1953, the Commissioner must give the reasons why Ms Bekas is liable to pay the penalty. The reason given in each of the notices was:

You have been assessed with an administrative penalty because you or your agent made a false or misleading statement, resulting in a shortfall amount.

61. Ms Bekas failed to pay the Statement Penalties by the due date and so became liable to pay GIC pursuant to s 298-25 of Sch 1 to the TAA 1953 and Pt IIA of the TAA 1953.

62. The quantum of the unpaid Statement Penalties and GIC is $810,873.13 as at 6 November 2025 (see certificate under s 350-10(3) of Sch 1 to the TAA 1953 signed by Deputy Commissioner Julian Nicholas Roberts).

Ms Bekas’ defence

63. Ms Bekas filed her defence on 23 July 2025. The defence does not traverse the SOC but pleads (relevantly):

(a) Paragraph 5 – I dispute the amount claimed in the Statement of Claim. (b) Paragraph 6 – I object to the default assessments issued for the 2013 to 2019 income years. (c) Paragraph 7 – I believe the assessments are based on incorrect or incomplete information. (d) Paragraph 8 – Many of the bank deposits included in the assessments were not income but instead gifts from family and friends, transfers between my own accounts, loan repayments, and refunds and reimbursements. (e) Paragraph 9 – I relied on a previous tax agent who misled me and failed to lodge correct returns. I trusted their advice and was unaware that my tax affairs were not properly managed. (f) Paragraph 10 – I believe the administrative penalties are unfair, and I respectfully request that they be remitted. (g) Paragraph 11 – I am currently finalising a forensic investigation with my nominated tax agent to justify all deposits and withdrawals from 2013 to 2019.

64. By ss 14ZZM and 14ZZR of the TAA 1953, the fact that a review or appeal is pending in relation to a taxation decision does not in the meantime interfere with, or affect, the decision and any tax, additional tax or other amount may be recovered as if no review was pending.

65. I accept the Deputy Commissioner’s submission that Ms Bekas must do more than simply plead that the quantum of the debt is incorrect: see Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Epov [2008] NSWSC 1085 at [32] per Harrison AsJ.

66. A certificate under s 350-10(3) of Sch 1 to the TAA 1953 is not conclusive evidence of the liability for the amount claimed and it does not alter the burden of proof, although it may be determinative where the taxpayer does not go into evidence on quantum: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Fayad [2024] NSWSC 1140 at [42] per N Adams J. That is the case here, in circumstances where Ms Bekas has not filed any evidence in support of her defence.

67. Ms Bekas’ defence is rejected. The plaintiff is entitled to judgment in the amount of $2,343,858.26, which figure is arrived at by reference to the certificates which became Exhibit B in the proceeding, evidencing Ms Bekas’ taxation liabilities as at 25 August 2026.

Conclusion

68. The Deputy Commissioner is entitled to judgment in the amount of $2,343,858.26. There is no reason why costs should not follow the event.

69. Accordingly, I make the following orders:

70. Judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $2,343,858.26.

71. The defendant to pay the plaintiff’s costs.

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