Court's power to appoint a special purpose liquidator
60 Sections 472 and 473 were amended by the Insolvency Law Reform Act 2016 (Cth) ("ILR Act"), with the amendments coming into force on 1 September 2017. Section 511 of the Act has been repealed and replaced by the ILR Act, with the repeal also being effective on 1 September 2017. Given that these proceedings were commenced on 20 January 2017, before these changes come into effect, ss 472, 473 and 511 continue to apply to the proceeding in the form that they were in force on that date: s 1617 of the Act.
61 Section 472(1) of the Act states:
On an order being made for the winding up of a company, the Court may appoint a registered liquidator to be liquidator of the company.
62 Section 473(8) of the Act, as it was in force when the proceedings were commenced, stated:
If more than one liquidator is appointed by the Court, the Court must declare whether anything that is required or authorised by this Act to be done by the liquidator is to be done by all or any one or more of the persons appointed.
63 Section 511 of the Act relevantly stated:
(1) The liquidator, or any contributory or creditor, may apply to the Court:
(a) to determine any question arising in the winding up of a company; or
(b) to exercise all or any of the powers that the Court might exercise if the company were being wound up by the Court.
…
(2) The Court, if satisfied that the determination of the question or the exercise of power will be just and beneficial, may accede wholly or partially to any such application on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit or may make such other order on the application as it thinks just.
64 Section 511(1)(b) of the Act empowered the Court to appoint a special purpose liquidator in a creditors' voluntary winding up or a winding up following a voluntary administration if it would be "just and beneficial" to do so: Gusdote Pty Ltd v North Queensland Land Development Pty Ltd (No 4) [2012] FCA 759 ("Gusdote") at [6]-[8]; Lo v Nielsen & Moller Autoglass (NSW) Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 407; (2008) 26 ACLC 497 ("Lo") at [29]-[31], citing Re Cobar Mines Pty Ltd (unreported, NSWSC, Santow J, 22 June 1998).
65 In Gusdote at [8], Emmett J explained that the Court should approach an order under s 511 on the assumption that the liquidator of a company in a voluntary winding up is to be regarded as having been appointed by the Court for the purposes of the operation of a provision such as s 473(8). Under s 472(1), on an order being made for the winding up of a company, the Court may appoint an official liquidator to be liquidator of the company. Thus, a creditor of a company may apply under s 511(1)(b) to the Court asking it to appoint a liquidator to the company pursuant to s 472(1). If more than one liquidator is appointed, s 473(8) required the Court to declare the functions and powers of the liquidators. In any event, Emmett J noted that a liquidator appointed by the Court under s 511 would be an officer of the Court and the Court's inherent jurisdiction would extend to conferring specific powers on such a liquidator.
66 There is no dispute that the Court has jurisdiction to give the conduct of any particular matter arising in the course of a liquidation to one or more of several liquidators: cf. Re Obie Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 4) (1984) 8 ACLR 967.
67 As a creditor of EBS, the DCT has standing to apply to the Court for the appointment of a special purpose liquidator.
68 In Re Obie Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 4), Thomas J considered whether a special purpose liquidator should be appointed in respect of possible proceedings by the company against a firm of accountants. One of the liquidators was a partner in the firm and the other a former partner. Thomas J held that a special purpose liquidator should be appointed because of the nexus between the liquidators and the firm of accountants.
69 In Onefone Australia Pty Ltd v One.Tel Ltd (in liq) [2003] NSWSC 1228; (2003) 48 ACSR 562, two creditors sought the appointment of a special purpose liquidator in the winding up of One.Tel Limited to investigate the cancellation of a renounceable rights issue and to make recommendations to the creditors as to whether any rights of action exist against any party(s) and whether any action should be commenced in relation thereto, including an uncommercial transaction claim. There were already existing proceedings brought by ASIC on foot. Those proceedings were expected to consider, inter alia, the question of the company's solvency, which would have had a consequential impact on the merits of any potential claim in relation to the cancellation of the rights issue. However, the ASIC proceedings were due to conclude after the expiry of the limitation period for pursuing an uncommercial transaction claim. The primary liquidator had indicated that, rather than expend resources on investigating issues that would be dealt with as part of the ASIC proceedings, he was minded to wait for the conclusion of those proceedings before further exploring action in respect of the cancellation of the rights issue. Windeyer J inferred that the primary liquidator would not seek to have the limitation period extended.
70 Windeyer J accepted that there was a reasonable apprehension of conflict in the position of the liquidator in connection with the cancellation of the rights issue. His Honour considered that there was a basis for ordering the appointment of a special purpose liquidator for the purpose of conducting investigations and making recommendations to the creditors on the uncommercial transaction question.
71 In Lo, Ms Lo, a creditor, applied for the appointment of special purpose liquidators for the purpose of, inter alia:
(1) investigating whether any uncommercial transactions were entered into by the company;
(2) investigating the incorporation of a new entity with the same directorship and the transfer of the company's assets and undertakings to that new entity; and
(3) taking steps, including legal proceedings, to ensure the preservation and protection of assets of the company, whether they be in the possession of the company or the new entity.
72 Ms Lo had sought, but failed, to have the existing liquidator (who was the former administrator) removed at the first creditors' meeting.
73 Ms Lo was willing to fund investigations only if the liquidator was someone other than the existing liquidator, primarily because:
(1) she believed that the existing liquidator had secured his role by reason of the support of the former director and creditors related to the former director (at [16]); and
(2) she lacked confidence in his ability to "objectively and dispassionately investigate the matters of concern to her" (at [20]).
74 None of the other creditors appeared willing to fund the investigations. Barrett J was satisfied that it would be beneficial to the administration of the winding up and the interest of the general body of creditors for the work envisaged for the special purpose liquidators to be undertaken. His Honour noted (at [22]) that any recoveries would benefit creditors as a whole.
75 In Hughes as Administrator of Westgem Investments Pty Ltd (Recs and Mgrs Apptd) v The Receivers and Managers of Westgem Investments Pty Ltd (Recs and Mgrs Appointed) (Admin Apptd) [No 3] [2012] WASC 360, Corboy J refused to appoint an additional administrator to Westgem Investments Pty Ltd (in liq) ("Westgem"). Corboy J found that there was no matter presently requiring investigation, and he was not satisfied that there was a reasonable apprehension that the administrator was in a position of conflict. His Honour noted (at [19]) that the mere fact that the administrator was funded by one creditor or a group of creditors would not, in itself, provide a basis for finding that there was a reasonable apprehension that the administrator was in a position of conflict.
76 In Mentha v Hughes [2014] WASC 478, Martin CJ refused an application for the appointment of a special purpose liquidator. At the time, the principal activity in the liquidation was a claim for damages in proceedings in which Mr Saraceni, the sole director of Westgem and a shareholder in Westgem, was also a plaintiff. The appointment of a special purpose liquidator was sought for the purpose of investigating any voidable transactions and insolvent trading by Westgem which may have given rise to claims against Mr Saraceni. The damages claim was said to depend, at least to some extent, upon the acceptance of Mr Saraceni's evidence.
77 The liquidator had decided to defer the further investigation of voidable transactions and insolvent trading (thereby obviating the complaint that the investigations would be conducted in a partisan way). Martin CJ concluded that this decision was commercially realistic and caused no significant disadvantage, in part because of the extent to which evidence relevant to the investigations would be canvassed in the course of preparation for the damages claim. The Chief Justice also concluded that there was a real risk that the appointment of a special purpose liquidator could interfere with the ordinary course of the liquidation which was then focussed upon the prosecution of the damages claim. Martin CJ was also not satisfied that there was a present basis for a public examination of Mr Saraceni, having regard to the issues in the damages claim, other proceedings on foot and the fact that Mr Saraceni's capacity to meet any claim would be very doubtful unless the damages claim succeeded.
78 In relation to the conflict of interest said to support the appointment of a special purpose liquidator, Martin CJ said:
28 This is a case in which the most that could be said is that while the damages claim is on foot there may be a tension, between the liquidator's interest in pursuing the damages claimed and a robust publication examination of Mr Saraceni. However, it has not been established that there is a pressing need for the conduct of any investigations other than those that have already been conducted by the liquidator to date. Nor has it been established that there are any investigations which ought to be undertaken prior to the further exploration of relevant issues through the course of preparation of the damages claim for trial.
29 I would also observe in this context that it is commonplace in insolvency situations for conflicts of interest of a general character to arise. It is commonplace for one person to be both creditor and debtor of the company, and it is commonplace for liquidators acting in the interests of all creditors to have to rely upon the testimony and assistance of former officers in order to collect debts and recover assets that were properly belonging to the company, while at the same time investigating the role of those former officers in relation to the insolvency of the company.
30 That general situation is not uncommon and does not, in the ordinary course, give rise to a need for a special purpose liquidator. The situation would be different in this case if it were credibly established that there were matters that required immediate investigation and in respect of which the failure to conduct such an investigation might prejudice the interests of creditors or the public interest, but for the reasons I have given I do not consider this is such a case.
(footnotes omitted)
79 In Re Ambient Advertising Pty Ltd (in liq) [2015] NSWSC 1079, an application was brought by a substantial creditor of the company seeking the appointment of a special purpose liquidator (funded by the sole director/shareholder of the creditor) to investigate, relevantly, transactions with related entities that may have involved the transfer or disposition of assets. The directors and shareholders of the related entities were the same as the directors and shareholders of the company and it was alleged the transferee may be a "phoenix" company. As in Lo, the creditor was only prepared to fund the special purpose liquidator to conduct the investigations, not the existing liquidators. Robb J noted, at [33], that the creditor believed that members of the liquidator's firm had some association with parties related to the parties who managed the company and the creditor was discontented with the level of energy with which the liquidators had to date pursued the matters in question.
80 At [40], Robb J was satisfied that it would be beneficial to the administration of the winding up, and in the interest of the general body of creditors, for a special purpose liquidator to be appointed.
81 Robb J considered (at [41]) that an additional reason for the court to make the order appointing a special purpose liquidator was that there was a possibility that the liquidators would institute proceedings against the creditor for the recovery of a preference.
82 In Victoria v Goulburn Administration Services (in liq) [2016] VSC 654 ("Goulburn Administration Services"), Sifris J considered an application by the applicant creditor, being the Victorian Government, to appoint special purpose liquidators to two insolvent vocational training providers, "GAS" and "FACTS". The Government had funded the insolvent companies in the amount of approximately $26.5 million in the period before the winding up. The Government had concerns that the sudden insolvency of GAS and FACTS was precipitated by the Government's decision to instigate quality reviews pursuant to its contractual rights. The Government undertook to fund the special purpose liquidators in full and was not willing to fund the existing liquidators, given they were appointed by the directors on the recommendation of the solicitor for the insolvent companies.
83 At [29], Sifris J considered that it would be beneficial to the administration of the winding up and the interests of the general body of creditors for the work envisaged for the special purpose liquidators to be undertaken. Any recoveries would benefit creditors as a whole. The two administrations, by the existing liquidators and the special purpose liquidators, were financially independent of one another.
84 Victoria v CTM Training Solutions Pty Ltd (in liq) [2017] VSC 47 is another relevant decision of Sifris J. As in Goulburn Administration Services, the Victorian Government was the applicant for the appointment of special purpose liquidators. Again, the Victorian Government was willing to fund the investigations, but only if liquidators other than the existing liquidators were appointed to conduct the investigations. That was, in part, because the liquidators were selected by the directors of the insolvent companies. The Government proposed to enter into a confidential funding deed with the special purpose liquidators.
85 Sifris J decided, at [41]-[42], that the proposed special purpose liquidators, rather than the existing liquidators, should undertake the investigations. His Honour made no adverse findings against the liquidators, but stressed, at [43], that it was of the first importance that liquidators are totally independent and are seen to be so. His Honour noted the importance of maintaining confidence in the integrity, objectivity and impartiality of an administration. At [44]-[46], his Honour took into account the following factors:
(1) it is preferable that the investigations be properly and fully funded;
(2) his Honour was a little concerned about the past engagement of the existing liquidators' firm by a former director and secretary of one of the insolvent companies in other creditors voluntary liquidations before the appointment of the liquidators; and
(3) it appeared that work in the nature of the investigations only started after the application for the appointment of special purpose liquidators was commenced.