The application is listed for a hearing and compulsory conference as detailed in the Tribunal's order of 19 December 2025.
For the avoidance of doubt, the parties are required to comply with all the requirements set out in paragraphs 4 - 13 (inclusive) of the Tribunal's order of 19 December 2025.
[2]
This proceeding was listed for a practice day hearing on 5 December 2025 to consider the following matters:
The applicant was required to provide a written submission addressing the purposes of the practice day hearing by 27 November 2025. A submission was received from the applicant.
The responsible authority and the respondent were required to provide their written submissions addressing the purposes of the practice day hearing by 12.00pm on 3 December 2025.
On 3 December 2025, the responsible authority informed the Tribunal that it did not have any objection to the joinder of David Bornstein as a joint applicant in this proceeding.
No written submission was provided by the respondent prior to the practice day hearing being conducted on 5 December 2025.
The applicant and the responsible authority appeared before me at the practice day hearing on 5 December 2025. The respondent did not and did not provide any reason for its failure to appear at the practice day hearing.
As a result of the failure of the respondent to appear at the practice day hearing and its failure to provide a written submission in accordance with the Tribunal's order of 24 November 2025, I provided the respondent with a further opportunity to be heard on the purposes of the practice day hearing by filing a written submission by 15 December 2025. I did so because on the material before the Tribunal, I was not satisfied that the respondent had knowledge of the practice day hearing given the change in its representation prior to 5 December 2025.
The Tribunal did not receive a written submission from the respondent by 15 December 2025.
On 16 December 2025, the Tribunal received the following email from Hasnain Ikram at Colliers Urban Planning ('Colliers') that incorporates Ethos Urban:
[3]
Could you please issue any future correspondence to Anthony Renzella (anthony@renzella.com)
A further response to this matter is not expected to be provided at this stage.
[4]
The email from Colliers was copied to Mr Bornstein, Planning and Property Partners (for the applicant) and the responsible authority. Anthony Renzella was not copied into that email and therefore there was nothing in the material before the Tribunal to demonstrate that Anthony Renzella was aware of the previous orders made by the Tribunal or of the further opportunity afforded to the respondent to make a submission regarding the joinder application.
Consequently, on 19 December 2025 the Tribunal ordered:[1]
[5]
[6]
On 21 Janaury 2026, having not received the required information from the respondent, the Tribunal's registry staff corresponded with the respondent (copied to all parties) seeking compliance with the Tribunal's order of 19 December 2025.
Later on 21 January 2026, Anthony Renzella confirmed in writing that he was the representative for the respondent and that the respondent had no objection to the joinder of David Bornstein as a joint applicant in the proceeding.
In addition, a statement of grounds was filed on 21 Janaury 2026 on behalf of 'Anthony Renzella'. This statement of grounds:
At item 11 stated:
[7]
No, I do not intend to participate in the hearing but want VCAT to consider my Statement of Grounds.
[8]
On 22 January 2026, the Tribunal enquired with Anthony Renzella as to whether the 'Renzella Group' was a legal entity and as to the identity of the registered owner of the subject land.
On 27 Janaury 2026, Anthony Renzella informed the Tribunal in writing that:
the Renzella Group was not a legal person or a registered entity;
the subject land was owned by Esquire Investments Pty Ltd;
he was a legal person acting as the respondent representative in this proceeding.
[9]
David Bornstein was recorded by the responsible authority as an original objector to the planning application. Having reviewed the original objection by David Bornstein it is clear to me that it was made on behalf of only David Bornstein.
I find that David Bornstein was an original objector to the planning application. I must now consider whether to grant leave for David Bornstein to be joined as joint applicant in this proceeding.
(1) The Tribunal may order that a person be joined as a party to a proceeding if the Tribunal considers that -
(a) the person ought to be bound by, or have the benefit of, an order of the Tribunal in the proceeding; or
(b) the person's interests are affected by the proceeding or
(c) for any other reason it is desirable that the person be joined as a party.
[11]
David Bornstein resides proximate to the subject land and his original objector makes it clear as to how he says he will be affected by the grant of a planning permit. The applicant submitted that David Bornstein does not seek to raise any addition grounds to that raised by the applicant in the application for review.
The request to join David Bornstein was made on 21 November 2025, that is within the 28-day limit.
In Wade v Manningham CC[2004] VCAT 816, the Tribunal observed:
Under section 60 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act the tribunal may order that a person be joined as a party to a proceeding if the tribunal considers that the person ought be bound by, or have the benefit of, an order of the tribunal in the proceeding, or the person's interests are affected by the proceeding or for any other reason it is desirable that the person be joined as a party. There is no doubt there is power available to the tribunal to join Mr and Mrs Lanza to the proceeding initiated by Ms Wade. However I generally believe that, as a matter of discretion, the tribunal should not join additional objectors to an application for review by an objector. It is open for one objector to appeal against the decision of the council to grant a permit either jointly, whereby usually only one application free is payable, or separately. If an objector does not participate in a joint or separate appeal lodged within time, and then wishes to participate in the case, usually the correct mechanism for this will be to extend the time within which an appeal may be lodged; and then for the person seeking to be added to lodge an appeal in their own name. If section 60 was extensively used to join additional persons as objector appellants, it could defeat the purpose of the time limit. Moreover it would mean that persons would avoid the obligation to pay a fee on the lodgement of an appeal to the tribunal.
This observation was cited with approval by the Tribunal in Stuart v Boroondara CC[2024] VCAT 1221.
After considering the material before me, including the lack of objection by either the responsible authority or the respondent, I refuse to join David Bornstein as a joint applicant for the following reasons:
The application for review as filed was not intended to be a joint application and there was nothing in the applicant's submission or the material relied upon by the applicant to find otherwise;
No reason has been provided why David Bornstein has pursued joinder to this proceeding rather than commencing his own appeal within the relevant time period; and
To the extent that David Bornstein intends to pursue the same grounds as the applicant against the proposal, his interests (to the extent that they may be aligned with those of the applicant) are advanced by the applicant in this proceeding and it is not necessary for his involvement in the proceeding for those interests to be protected.
For these reasons, I refuse to exercise my discretion to grant leave to join David Bornstein as a joint applicant in this proceeding.
[12]
On the material before the Tribunal, I find that Esquire Investments Pty Ltd is the proper respondent in this proceeding because it is the registered proprietor of the subject land and 'Renzella Group'. Although noted as the permit applicant in the permit application before the responsible authority, 'Renzella Group' cannot be a party to this proceeding because it is not a legal person. The order changes the permit application, the Tribunal's records and the statement of grounds filed by Anthony Renzella to properly identify the respondent in this proceeding.
Further, as Anthony Renzella is not a director of the respondent or a professional advocate, he is required to provide the Tribunal with a certificate of authority to act on behalf of the respondent in this proceeding.
Finally, I note that the statement of grounds filed ostensibly on behalf of the respondent states that no submissions are advanced on behalf of the respondent nor does the respondent intend to appear at the hearing. In the circumstances, it is unclear to me how the Tribunal when making its final determination can take into account a statement of grounds that does not advance any grounds in support of the decision under review.
While the respondent does not have an onus to discharge in a proceeding commenced under s 82 of the PE Act, the respondent is required (just like any other party to a proceeding) to comply with the Tribunal's orders. Failure to comply with the Tribunal's orders in certain circumstances may amount to contempt of the Tribunal (under s 137 of the VCAT Act).
Finally, failure by a respondent that is a permit applicant to actively participate in a proceeding in which they seek the benefit of the decision under review brings with it attendant risks that should be carefully considered.
[13]
[1] Acknowledging and noting the inadvertent misspelling of David Bornstein's name in paragraph 3(b).
Parties
Applicant/Plaintiff:
Dempsey
Respondent/Defendant:
Port Phillip CC [2026] VCAT 53
Legislation Cited (2)
Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998
Environment Act 1987
Cases Cited (1)
Dempsey v Port Phillip CC [2026] VCAT 53 (28 January 2026)