Dematos & Burellis [2025] FedCFamC1F 471 (18 July 2025)

M v B [2001] FamCA 894

Marriage of Mahony & McKenzie (1993) 16 Fam LR 803; [1993] FamCA 78

Pickford & Pickford (2024) FLC 94-230; [2024] FedCFamC1A 249

Reynolds & Sherman (2015) 297 FLR 349; [2015] FamCAFC 128

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)

1. All former orders relating to the child X, born in 2021, are discharged.
2. The parties shall each retain parental responsibility for the child as conferred by law, but in respect of whom the mother has sole decision-making authority for all "major long-term issues" as defined in s 4(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
3. The child shall live with the mother.
4. The parties shall take all reasonable steps to ensure the child spends time with the father:

(a) Until the commencement of the first school term in 2027:

(a) each Wednesday from 11.00 am until 6.00 pm;

(b) each alternate weekend from 6.00 pm Friday until 6.00 pm on Sunday, commencing on the next Friday after these orders (but such time is suspended between 9.30 am and 6.00 pm on Mother's Day 2026, for which purpose the child must be returned to the mother);

(c) from 9.30 am until 6.00 pm on Father's Day;

(d) from 3.00 pm on Christmas Day until 6.00 pm on Sunday 28 December 2025.

(b) From the child's commencement of school in the first school term of 2027:

(a) each Wednesday in school term, from the conclusion of school until 6.00 pm, but confined to an area of 10 kilometres radial distance from the child's residence.

(b) each alternate weekend from the conclusion of school (or 3.00 pm if not a school day) on Friday until the commencement of school (or 9.00 am if not a school day) on Monday, commencing on the first Friday of each school term (but such time is suspended between 9.30 am and 6.00 pm on Mother's Day each year, for which purpose the child must be returned to the mother);

(c) from 9.30 am until 6.00 pm on Father's Day;

(d) in the Autumn, Winter and Spring school holidays, from 9.30 am on the first Saturday of the holidays until 6.00 pm on the second Saturday of the holidays;

(e) in the Summer school holidays commencing in 2027 and in odd years thereafter:

(i) from 9.30 am on Christmas Eve until 3.00 pm on Christmas Day; and

(ii) from 9.30 am on 7 January until 6.00 pm on 21 January.

(f) in the Summer school holidays commencing in 2028 and in even years thereafter, from 3.00 pm on Christmas Day until 6.00 pm on 8 January.

1. For the purpose of implementing Orders 3 and 4:

(a) the father shall ensure the child's collection from school, whenever the child is due to spend time with him at the conclusion of school during school term, or otherwise from the mother or her nominee at the McDonald's Restaurant at Suburb B, NSW; and

(b) the father shall ensure the child's delivery to school, whenever the child ceases spending time with him prior to the commencement of school during school term, or otherwise to the mother or her nominee at the McDonald's Restaurant at Suburb C, NSW.

1. Each party is restrained from denigrating the other in the presence or hearing of the child and from permitting the child to remain in the presence or hearing of another person denigrating the other.
2. The parties shall forthwith take all reasonable steps to ensure that the Births, Deaths and Marriages Register kept by the Registrar pursuant to the provisions of the Births, Deaths, and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW) is amended to disclose the child's middle name as "[Burellis]", so that his full name is "[X and both parents' surnames]", and that a fresh birth certificate issues for the child in that name.
3. Upon compliance with Order 7, the parties are restrained from using any other name for the child.
4. The parties are at liberty to provide a sealed copy of these orders to the Registrar appointed under the Births, Deaths, and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW).
5. The mother shall authorise and request the principal of any school attended by the child to provide to the father, at his expense, copies of all school reports and school photograph order forms relating to the child.
6. Each party shall forthwith inform the other, and keep the other informed, in writing of their respective current residential address, mobile telephone number, and email address.
7. Pursuant to s 65DA(2) and s 62B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), particulars of the obligations that these orders create, particulars of the consequences that may follow contravention of these orders, and details of assistance to comply with these orders are set out in the attached Fact Sheet, which forms part of these orders.
8. The Independent Children's Lawyer is discharged upon the latter of the determination of any appeal or the expiration of the applicable appeal period.
9. Costs are reserved for 28 days.
10. Any and all other outstanding applications are dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Dematos & Burellis has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. These proceedings are brought under Pt VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") in respect of a child, now four years of age.
2. The father sought to seize the child's residence from the mother, but without good reason as it transpired. The mother proposed the child spend extensive amounts of time with the father, but needlessly adduced evidence of his past misconduct when the evidence was not used to try and restrict the child's interaction with him.
3. The child's best interests are served by him living with the mother and spending extensive amounts of time with the father. The parties' inability to communicate constructively means the mother, as the primary carer, will have sole-decision making power in respect of all "major long-term issues" for the child, but both parties will retain the parental responsibility for him vested in them by law.
4. The child's name should be changed, but not in the way for which the mother applied.

1. The parties separated in June 2021, after their child was born in 2021. Their prior relationship was relatively brief.
2. Since separation, the mother and child have lived with the maternal grandparents in Sydney, while the father has lived with the paternal grandmother in a region of NSW.
3. The father's interaction with the child after separation was ad hoc and, evidently dissatisfied by an inability to negotiate with the mother a mutually suitable arrangement for his engagement with the child, the father began these proceedings in September 2022.
4. Interim orders were made in February 2023, providing for the child to live with the mother and to spend professionally supervised time with the father on a graduating basis. At that time, the child was only an infant and his relationship with the father was relatively rudimentary, so their visits began tentatively.[1] However, the contemporaneous supervision records reveal the development of a "positive and safe connection" between them during those visits.[2]
5. More interim orders were made in August 2023, providing for the child to live with the mother and to spend an expanding amount of unsupervised time with the father, reflecting the recommendation of the court child expert.[3] The mother admitted to the court child expert in November 2023 how the child's unsupervised time with the father was "progressing reasonably well".[4]
6. The child attained three years of age in 2024, from which point the interim orders required him to spend time with the father on Wednesday afternoons and alternate weekends from Saturday morning until Sunday afternoon. Those orders prevailed until trial in July 2025.
7. Both parties have alleged a relatively recent deterioration of the child's behaviour,[5] but both seemed ignorant of the likelihood that such deterioration was due to the overt conflict between the paternal and maternal family members at changeovers, which are tense affairs, exacerbated by at least the paternal grandmother videotaping the changeovers. Nonetheless, the parties have been compliant with the orders.

1. The father pressed for the orders set out within his Amended Initiating Application filed on 3 February 2025.[6] He wanted the child to live primarily with him until he starts school, but thereafter to live with the parties for equal time in weekly rotations. He wanted to share parental responsibility for the child with the mother. He proposed that the child spend expansive amounts of time with her before the regime moves to equal time.
2. Before final submissions commenced, the father tendered a minute of proposed orders setting out his fall-back position if his residence application fails.[7] He maintained the parties should retain their respective parental responsibility and have joint decision-making authority for the child. He proposed the child should spend time with him pursuant to a regime much like those proposed by the mother and the ICL.
3. The mother pressed for the orders set out within her Amended Response filed on 17 January 2025. She wanted the child to remain living with her and for her to have sole decision-making authority (not sole parental responsibility) for him in respect of all "major long-term issues", as that term is defined in the Act (s 4(1)). She proposed the child spend liberal amounts of time with the father - in effect, a short mid-week visit in alternate weeks, alternate weekends, portions of school holidays, and other special occasions.
4. The ICL foreshadowed a preliminary view which generally aligned with the mother's proposal, which was affirmed by the tender of a minute of proposed orders before final submissions commenced.[8] However, the ICL confirmed she proposed the mother have sole parental responsibility for the child, not just sole decision-making authority as set out in the minute of proposed orders.[9]

(a) his affidavit filed on 30 May 2025 (together with annexures);

(b) the affidavit of the paternal grandmother filed on 30 May 2025; and

(c) the affidavit of the father's friend, Ms D, filed on 4 February 2025.

(a) her affidavit filed on 28 May 2025 (together with annexures); and

(b) the affidavit of the maternal grandmother filed on 27 May 2025.

(a) the Child Impact Report dated 24 March 2023;

(b) the Family Report incorrectly dated 25 January 2018 ("the first family report"), which should be correctly dated 25 January 2024; and

(c) the Family Report dated 5 September 2024 ("the second family report").

1. A few documents were separately tendered.[10]

1. Orders in respect of children are made under Part VII of the Act, where the meaning of a "parenting order" is defined (s 64B). The Court may make such parenting orders as it thinks proper (s 65D), within the context of the objects of the legislation (s 60B).
2. When making parenting orders, the Court is mandated to regard the child's best interests as the paramount consideration (s 60CA and s 65AA) and the Act specifies the criteria which must be considered when determining the form of orders which meets and promotes the child's best interests (s 60CC).
3. Parental responsibility for children is vested in their parents (s 61C(1)), regardless of whether they live together or are separated (s 61C(2)), but that situation only applies whilst ever no order is made to change it (s 61C(3) and s 61D). Parental responsibility is defined to encompass all duties, powers, responsibilities and authority conferred by law upon parents (s 61B).
4. When an order is made allocating parental responsibility for a child or children in relation to "major long-term issues" to more than one person, the order may prescribe whether those persons have joint or sole decision-making authority in relation to all or only specified issues (s 61D(3)). The Act defines "major long-term issues" to include those such as the child's education, religion, culture, health, name, and changed living arrangements (s 4(1)) and defines what "joint decision-making" requires in respect of decisions about such issues (s 61DAA). One person allocated with parental responsibility for a child need not be consulted by another person allocated with parental responsibility in respect of minor decisions made for the child which fall outside "major long-term issues" (s 61DAB).
5. Since amendments were made to the Act, operable as from 6 May 2024, parental responsibility orders no longer have any bearing upon determinations made about with whom a child should live or spend time.

1. The child is not indigenous, so s 60CC(1)(b) and s 60CC(3) of the Act do not apply.

1. These statutory provisions are concerned with the advancement of a child's best interests by keeping the child and his carers safe from family violence, abuse and neglect.
2. No issue of abuse or neglect was raised by the parties, but they made reciprocal allegations of family violence, which they each denied.
3. It is unnecessary to traverse the allegations of family violence to make definitive findings as they would not authentically influence the determination of the dispute (Pickford & Pickford [2024] FedCFamC1A 249; (2024) FLC 94-230 at [41] and [87]-[88]). While both parties sought the child's residence, they each proposed that he spend substantial time with the non-residential parent. Inevitably then, neither party could plausibly contend that either they or the child require future protection from family violence perpetrated by the non-residential parent, because it would be impossible to reconcile such a contention with their respective parenting proposals.
4. The mother was content to abandon the prosecution of her allegations of family violence against the father as now being irrelevant, but he was not prepared to reciprocate. As was explicated by his counsel, the need to traverse the allegations of the mother's family violence was not to demonstrate the need for orders to keep him or the child safe from her, but rather for the alternate purpose of vindicating his case theory that the mother's allegations against him were fabricated and motivated only by her past desire to alienate the child from him. Even if that originally was the mother's motive, she abandoned the artifice as long ago as November 2023 when conferring with the court child expert,[11] from which point in time she has consistently advocated for the child to spend expanding time with the father.[12]
5. In an exercise of discretion, the parties were prohibited from cross-examining one another about their respective historical allegations of family violence. To have allowed them to do so with impunity would almost certainly have destroyed any remaining vestige of the working parental relationship they retain. They will need to salvage and draw upon any remaining reserves of trust and respect they possess to navigate the remaining years of the child's minority without the spectre of more conflict and litigation. It was counter-intuitive to permit the father to speculatively cross-examine the mother about his case theory on her motives when, logically, her past alleged motivations are no longer germane to the outcome of the dispute.
6. The evidentiary ruling precluding cross-examination on the issue was both permissible and justified (ss 95, 97(3), 102NE, 102NH(1)(c), 102NN(1) and 102NN(2) of the Act). In the face of the ruling, the father then sensibly elected not to rely upon the evidence of Ms D.

1. The child is young and has not expressed any view.

1. There was no dispute about the child's developmental, physical, intellectual and cultural needs being met by the parties. However, unless and until they and their extended family members can find a way to abate their raw conflict, the child's psychological and emotional needs will not be optimally fulfilled.

1. The father contended the mother lacks the desirable capacity to provide adequately for the child's psychological and emotional needs because she is intent on destroying, or at least impairing, the child's relationship with him. While there might have been some substance to the father's suspicions in the past, that time has long since passed.
2. The child was only an infant when the parties separated in 2021, so the mother was understandably protective of him, particularly when she was still breastfeeding. She permitted the father to see the child sporadically in her presence, but she decided to stop the child from seeing the father in late 2021 due to her "anxiety" and "concerns" about him.[13] Thereafter, save for a single supervised visit in March 2022, the father did not see the child until March 2023 after interim parenting orders were made in February 2023.[14] Consequently, at that early stage, the child had no attachment relationship with the father and their supervised visits had to be very short.[15]
3. The mother filed a Response in December 2022 proposing that the child spend no time at all with the father. When speaking with the court child expert in March 2023, the mother was observed to be "extremely vulnerable, anxious and...extremely distressed" when discussing her concerns about the father. The court child expert was convinced the mother was unable to facilitate the child's relationship with the father and was worried she would not comply with Court orders requiring her to do so.[16]
4. The court child expert explained how it is generally beneficial for any child to have healthy and loving relationships with both parents, without which the child is likely to experience developmental detriment.[17] After the Child Impact Report was released to the parties, the father sought variation of the interim orders. The mother agreed the orders could be varied, though she baulked at the extent of the variation sought by the father. More interim orders were made in August 2023 by the registrar, enabling the child to spend an expanding amount of unsupervised time with the father, reflecting the recommendation of the court child expert.[18]
5. The court child expert's advice must have been heeded by the mother because, by November 2023 when she next spoke to the court child expert, she admitted the child's unsupervised time with the father was "progressing reasonably well" and she was amenable to the child spending more time with the father as he matured.[19] The court child expert was satisfied the mother was insightful about the benefit of the child enhancing his relationship with the father and was motivated to achieve that outcome.[20] Since November 2023, the mother's attitude has not deviated.
6. At the next consultation in July 2024, she told the court child expert she was satisfied with the parenting arrangements then in place under the existing interim orders.[21] By that stage, the child was spending Wednesday afternoons and alternate weekends with the father. Six months later, in January 2025, she filed an Amended Response formally proposing a gradual expansion of the child's time with the father, including short mid-week visits, alternate weekends, school holiday periods, and other special occasions.
7. True enough, the mother retains misgivings about the father[22] and she envisages the child spending less time overall with the father than he imagines, but the father cannot sensibly maintain a complaint that she has been intent on spoiling the child's relationship with him since at least late 2023. Significantly, the father now feels he has a strong relationship with the child, which relationship could not likely have flourished in the face of overt or covert pressure from the mother to suppress their relationship.
8. The parties have certainly been irascible with one another at changeovers, which rancour has spilled over into interaction between members of the maternal and paternal families. In particular, the maternal and paternal grandmothers seem to have invested as much emotion in the dispute as the parties themselves and their animosity hangs over the families like a pall. Their intervention has been inflammatory rather than calming.
9. But such personal dislike between the parties and their families is not synonymous with, and should not be mistaken for, the mother's alleged desire to sabotage the child's relationship with the father. The father's belief that the mother's denigration of him to the child is the cause of the child's adverse reaction at and about the time of changeovers is rejected as being misconceived.[23] The child is most likely reacting to the stress he feels at the parental conflict he witnesses when exchanged between the families.[24]
10. Both parties and their extended family members most probably have criticised and denigrated one another in the child's presence, which is regrettable, but probably inevitable in the face of their conflict.
11. By comparison with the mother, the father is entirely untested as a primary carer, which is not to imply he lacks capacity to care adequately for the child. He runs his own business so, in the event the child lives with him, he would need to juggle his child-care and business responsibilities. Necessarily, a substantial proportion of the child-care load would fall upon the paternal grandparents, with whom the father lives. It is likely the paternal family could, in a collective effort, satisfactorily care for the child, but the evidence does not suggest they would do a better job than the mother does already.

1. There was no dispute the child should enjoy relationships with both parties and their extended families. It is safe for him to do so.

1. No other factor was promoted by the parties or the ICL as being relevant.

1. The child should continue to live with the mother. She is the child's primary attachment figure and has proven her competence as a parent. The court child expert recommended against any change of residence because it would cause "extreme levels of distress" for the child to be removed from her primary care.[25]
2. The court child expert opined the father lacked the insight to realise the significant adverse influence upon the child's short and long term "mental health and emotional wellbeing" caused by the reversal of his residence,[26] which opinion is accepted. The way in which he conducted this litigation vindicates the opinion evidence. He conducted a case demanding that the child live with him because the mother was intent on harming the child's relationship with him. First, he fell short of proving the mother possessed such a motive but, secondly, even if he had proven her motive, the court child expert did not consider that was enough to justify the reversal of the child's residence in this instance.[27] The court child expert was neither driven nor enticed away from that view during cross-examination. The father remained staunchly oblivious to the evidence of the child's emotional fragility, which showed a marked lack of sagacity.
3. The court child expert recommended allocating parental responsibility for the child exclusively to the mother,[28] but that opinion is rejected. The parties can retain the parental responsibility which is conferred upon them by law. The mother told the court child expert she understood the benefit of maintaining communication with the father and was interested in improving their parental relationship for the child's benefit.[29] She was willing to resort to the use of an App for their parental communication,[30] which the parties have since implemented with a degree of success. However, due to the difficulty they have experienced in communicating courteously over the last few years, to avert the prospect of their deadlock over an important issue in the child's life, such as his school enrolment which is on the horizon, the mother is conferred with sole-decision making authority in respect of decisions related to the child's "major long-term issues" (as that term is defined in s 4(1) of the Act). There is no need to overlay the conferral of such authority upon the mother with anterior obligations of notification and consultation.[31]
4. The child should spend time with the father, which will graduate over time. There is no science to the speed of the incremental steps. The orders provide for two incremental stages over the next 18 months. The first stage applies immediately and will expand the regime which exists under the interim orders made in August 2023. The second stage will begin in early 2027, when the child starts school. The court child expert considered the regime increase should be in place by the start of school.[32] The father proposed coinciding the change of regime with the start of school, albeit in reverse,[33] though he belatedly changed his mind about dissociating the timing of the last step in the regime from the child's start of school.[34]
5. From now until early 2027, the child will visit the father every Wednesday for several hours, every alternate weekend for two nights, and on other special occasions like Christmas, Mother's Day and Father's Day. That regime is not dissimilar from the mother's proposal.[35]
6. From early 2027, when the child starts school, he will visit the father every Wednesday afternoon for a few hours, alternate weekend for three nights, for two weeks in the Summer holidays, for one week in the other school holidays, and on special occasions like Christmas, Mother's Day and Father's Day.
7. The driving distance between the parties' homes is a potential impediment to continuation of the mid-week visits once the child starts school and while he is young,[36] but they are not problematic in the meantime. The mid-week visits are suitable for the father because he does not work on Wednesdays, but they could fatigue the child during the school week over the first few years. The court child expert was quite uncertain, both in the family reports and in cross-examination, about whether a mid-week visit with the father in alternate weeks would be beneficial once the child starts school.[37]
8. Nonetheless, the mother and the ICL both proposed continuation of the mid-week visits after the child commences school, but only for confined hours in alternate weeks.[38] The father proposed mid-week visits continue every week and extend to overnight stays.[39] The orders strike a balance. Once the child commences school, he will spend time with the father every Wednesday, but only for a few hours and only in the area near to the child's home. That will avoid the child's return car journey from regional NSW to Sydney every Wednesday afternoon just for a couple of hours at the father's home.
9. The court child expert spoke to the benefits of the child enjoying a safe and loving relationship with the father,[40] about which proposition there was no debate. The court child expert said, without contradiction, that the child should spend "regular and consistent" time with the father for their relationship to develop beneficially.[41] The orders are intended to meet that objective, whilst catering for the emotional frailties of the child, which have so far made him acutely reticent and uncomfortable about leaving the mother.[42]
10. No special provision is made for the child's birthday, the parties' birthdays, or Easter,[43] the imputed importance of which was not the subject of a word in evidence or submissions. Unnecessary fragmentation of the routine should be avoided. The program of visits is otherwise sufficiently comprehensive for those events to be overlooked.
11. The child will be exchanged between the parties at the two public venues they already use, though the child's school will be used as a changeover venue once he starts school. The orders require the travel burden to be shared between the parties.
12. No order is made restraining the parties from using the grandmothers as their proxies at changeovers, as was proposed by the father and the ICL.[44] Both parties live with the grandmothers and circumstances may arise where they are needed to help with the child's exchange. Hopefully, their cross-examination as witnesses at the trial alerted them to the destructive consequences of their former adversarial conduct in the child's presence and they have the maturity to improve their performance.
13. No orders are made concerning the child's communication with the parties. He will spend time with the father regularly enough that intervening telephone calls are unnecessary. No order regulating the child's communication was sought by the parties.
14. The parties disputed the proposed change of name for the child. The mother wanted the child's surname changed to a hyphenated amalgamation of the parties' surnames, with her surname first in order. The father objected, though he was content for the mother's surname to be used as the child's middle name.
15. Any decision about the name by which a child should be known is dictated by the child's best interests (Reynolds & Sherman [2015] FamCAFC 128; (2015) 297 FLR 349 at [54]-[55]). There is no onus of proof. The decision is discretionary and is informed by such considerations as the degree of the child's identification with the existing surname and any difficulty or embarrassment the child may experience by using the same or a different surname. The list of factors is not exhaustive (Flanagan v Handcock [2000] FamCA 150; (2001) FLC 93-074 at [19]-[38]; M v B [2001] FamCA 894 at [35]‑[37]; Marriage of Mahony & McKenzie [1993] FamCA 78; (1993) 16 Fam LR 803; Chapman v Palmer [1978] FamCA 86; (1978) 4 Fam LR 462).
16. The mother's motivation for the name change is to exhibit some recognition of the maternal family in the child's name, as his current surname is the father's surname and his first name is a derivation of the paternal grandfather's first name. The use of the mother's surname as the child's middle name should assuage the mother's objective, albeit not as publicly as she may want. Given the child is young and has not started school, he does not yet have an affinity with his current surname, but he should not be burdened with a hyphenated surname that would be as long as the amalgamation of the parties' surnames. It would be unnecessarily unwieldy, even though the court child expert did not think so. That issue is entirely factual and beyond the court child expert's field of expertise.
17. An order is made requiring the parties to ensure the change of the child's name on the NSW Births, Deaths and Marriages Register. The Court has power to make an order to that effect binding either the Registrar or the parties to whom parental responsibility for the child is allocated (ss 22(3), 28(2) and 28(5) of the Births Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW)).
18. All other orders either coincide with orders sought by the parties or the ICL or, alternatively, could not be the subject of reasonable opposition.
19. No orders are made concerning the procurement of information about the child from school or medical providers,[45] because such orders are unnecessary when both parties retain parental responsibility for the child.
20. No order is made restraining the parties' decision about where they wish to live.[46] Their choice of place of residence will be confined by the orders which regulate the time the child spends with the father and where the child is exchanged between them.
21. No order is made compelling the parties to communicate by an App.[47] They already do so by choice. Unforeseen circumstances may arise which warrants them contacting each other in a different way.
22. No order is made compelling the parties to obtain a mental health care plan for the child.[48] They can exercise their parental responsibility for him.

I certify that the preceding sixty-eight (68) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Austin.

[5] Second Family Report at [15], [36], [53]; Father's affidavit at [85]; Mother's affidavit at [90], [96]

[6] Replicated in Ex F1 at Orders 1-10 on pages 1-3

[12] Second Family Report at [17]; Amended Response filed on 17/1/25

[15] Child Impact Report at [4]-[6]

[21] Second Family Report at [17] and [42]

[25] First Family Report at [83], [89]; Second Family Report at [62]

[26] Second Family Report at [41]; [54]

[28] First Family Report at [88]; Second Family Report at [61]

[32] First Family Report at [91]; Second Family Report at [64]

[33] Amended Initiating Application filed 3/2/25 at Order 5

[35] Amended Response filed 17/1/25 at Orders 5, 6

[37] First Family Report at [91]; Second Family Report at [64]

[38] Amended Response filed 17/1/25 at Order 7; Ex ICL2 at Order 9(a)

[40] First Family Report at [80]-[81]

[42] First Family Report at [13], [64]-[68]; Second Family Report at [10], [44]-[52]

[43] Amended Initiating Application filed 3/2/25 at Orders 11.2, 11.3, 11.4; Amended Response filed 17/1/25 at Orders 5, 6, 7

[44] Ex F1 at Order 13 on page 6; Ex ICL2 at Order 12

[45] Ex F1 at Order 9 on pages 5 and 6; Amended Response filed 17/1/25 at Orders 10, 11

[46] Amended Initiating Application filed 3/2/25 at Order 17; Ex F1 at Order 11 on page 6

[47] Amended Initiating Application filed 3/2/25 at Order 12; Ex F1 at Order 7; Amended Response filed 17/1/25 at Order 15

[48] Amended Initiating Application filed 3/2/25 at Order 15