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[2025] ACTCA 26
respondent. The application for leave to appeal out of time was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the application.
De Maine applied about eight months late for permission to appeal a judgment against him. He said he had thought an appeal required him to pay $1 million, after misunderstanding an email about possible security for costs. The judge accepted that as just enough to explain the delay. But the proposed appeal mainly repeated his claim that Kizmann had lied and that the trial result would have been different if De Maine had given oral evidence. The judge found no identified appeal error, no relevant fresh evidence, and no demonstrated miscarriage of justice. Leave was refused, and De Maine was ordered to pay the costs of the application.
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2,484 words · generated 06/10/2026
De Maine sought leave to appeal out of time from the decision in Kizmann v De Maine (No 2) [2024] ACTSC 139. Elkaim AJ sat as a single judge constituting the Court of Appeal under s 37J of the Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) ([1]–[2]). The application was opposed.
1 cited instrument linked from this judgment.
The notice of appeal was due by 6 June 2024. De Maine filed his application and a draft notice of appeal on 20 February 2025, about eight months after the deadline. The judge described that as a significant delay ([3]–[4]). De Maine was self-represented in the leave application. The judge allowed some latitude in the way he presented his application, while noting that this could not unfairly prejudice Kizmann and that an amended notice would be needed if leave were granted ([5]–[6]).
The underlying dispute concerned loans Kizmann had made following negotiations with De Maine, a longstanding friend. The question at trial was whether the loans were made to De Maine personally or to his now-defunct company, Shostko Systems Pty Ltd. As recounted in the reasons on costs, the primary judge found in favour of Kizmann against De Maine personally ([8]). The appeal judgment does not revisit the loan evidence in detail. Its focus is whether the proposed appeal should be allowed to proceed despite the late filing.
At the primary hearing, each side had filed affidavit evidence. Kizmann was cross-examined; De Maine was not. De Maine's account was that he expected to give evidence or otherwise have a chance to respond orally to statements he considered false ([7], [20]–[22]). The earlier judge's reasons, quoted in the appeal judgment, recorded that De Maine's affidavit contained material ruled inadmissible, that he had foreshadowed oral evidence in written submissions, but that this course was not pursued at the hearing ([21]). Those are recounted features of the primary proceeding, not fresh findings made in this appeal about the underlying loan dispute.
De Maine said his delay arose from believing that he needed to pay $1 million into court to appeal. He relied on an email from his counsel, which referred to the prospect of an application for security for costs, in light of the judgment amount, evidence about his capacity to pay, and the anticipated prospects of an appeal ([12]–[15]). Elkaim AJ explained that the email did not say a $1 million payment was required. Security for costs, if ordered, would relate to costs, not the verdict sum. The judge nevertheless accepted that the email had likely prompted the misunderstanding and that the delay was just adequately explained ([14]–[15], [33]).
The proposed appeal did not identify a specific error of law or fact. Its draft ground alleged that Kizmann had deliberately lied under oath. De Maine also sought to have the matter dismissed or reheard so that he could defend himself against what he called false allegations ([16]–[18]). The court found that this material amounted to allegations and explanations, rather than identified error by the primary judge or genuinely new evidence ([24]–[25], [32]).
Elkaim AJ dismissed the application and ordered De Maine to pay Kizmann's costs of it ([34]).
The court drew on the extension-of-time principles summarised in Aulich Civil Law Pty Ltd v Pappas [2022] ACTSC 345, which in turn confirmed the application to civil matters of principles stated in Kelly v Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT) [2015] ACTCA 15 ([9]). The considerations included the importance of observing time limits, finality and timeliness, the appeal's merits, and whether refusing an extension would cause a miscarriage of justice. The court stressed that the decision was not to be made by reciting a verbal formula; it depended on the demands of justice in the circumstances ([9]–[10]).
Elkaim AJ distilled the considerations into three propositions: there must be an explanation for delay, the appeal's merits must be considered, and the court must consider whether refusal would cause a miscarriage of justice ([10]). The judgment did not treat an adequate explanation as sufficient by itself. De Maine's misunderstanding explained why he had not filed in time, but it did not establish that the proposed appeal should proceed.
On the merits, the judge found the draft notice unhelpful. Its central assertion was that Kizmann had lied, but it did not identify how the primary judge had erred in reaching the decision ([16]–[19], [25]). The judge asked De Maine to explain orally what his complaint was. He said he had assumed he would be called to give evidence and would then be able to rebut Kizmann's evidence ([20]). The court considered the history of the hearing, including the discussion recorded in the transcript about the choice not to cross-examine De Maine ([22]).
The court also considered the claim that “the truth” was fresh evidence. It rejected that characterisation: an assertion that the appellant's account is true is not, without more, fresh evidence that emerged or was discovered after the hearing ([24]). The commentary De Maine provided offered explanations of matters in the case, but did not identify evidence that was unavailable at trial or demonstrate error by the primary judge ([25], [32]).
The complaint about De Maine not giving oral evidence did not establish a miscarriage of justice on the material before Elkaim AJ. The judgment described the conduct of the original hearing as involving forensic decisions made on advice and after discussion. It found no evidence that the lawyers had acted without discussing the conduct of the case with De Maine, or contrary to his instructions ([23], [27]–[30]). The court noted that a lawyer's conduct capable of giving rise to injustice would require, at least, some evidence of gross incompetence. It found that threshold was not approached on the material presented ([27]).
The court's conclusion was consequently two-part: the delay was just adequately explained, but the proposed appeal disclosed no identifiable merit and refusal would not cause a miscarriage of justice ([33]). The fact that De Maine faced a large judgment did not itself amount to a miscarriage of justice. The judgment characterised that financial consequence as following from the primary decision, which it described as well reasoned and based on the evidence before the court ([33]).
The judgment presented its approach as an application and concise restatement of existing extension-of-time principles, rather than as a new general rule. At [9], Elkaim AJ referred to Aulich Civil Law Pty Ltd v Pappas [2022] ACTSC 345. That decision, as described in the judgment, confirmed that the principles in Kelly v Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT) [2015] ACTCA 15 applied to civil matters. The listed principles included the importance of time limits, finality, timeliness, appeal merits, and the possibility of a miscarriage of justice.
At [10], Elkaim AJ condensed those considerations into three practical questions. First, is there an explanation for the delay? Second, is there merit in the proposed appeal? Third, would refusing leave cause a miscarriage of justice? This formulation should be read with [9], which says the court's task remains a broader assessment of the demands of justice, not the mechanical application of a verbal formula.
The decision therefore illustrates that an explanation for lateness and the justification for allowing an appeal are distinct matters. The mistaken belief about a $1 million payment accounted for the delay, but did not supply an appeal ground. The merits and miscarriage-of-justice considerations remained independently important ([13]–[15], [33]).
The judgment also addressed attempts to rely on an omitted opportunity to give evidence. It did not establish a general rule that a party's decision not to give evidence can never support an appeal. Rather, on the record before it, De Maine had not shown that the decision was made without discussion, contrary to instructions, or through sufficiently serious lawyer conduct. Nor had he identified new evidence or a specific error by the primary judge ([24]–[30]). The court's stated concern was that forensic choices made in the original proceeding should not be manipulated after the event to permit a new case to be run ([28]).
Nothing in the judgment purports to overrule or displace Kelly or Aulich. It applies the principles attributed to those decisions and explains their relevance to this particular application. The outcome turned on the inadequacy of the proposed appeal grounds and the absence of a demonstrated miscarriage of justice, not on a change to the governing principles.
At [10], the court says: “Time limits have a purpose; there must be an explanation for the delay.” In plain English, missing an appeal deadline calls for an account of why it happened. The court accepted De Maine's explanation as just adequate because he misunderstood an email about possible security for costs, but did not treat that explanation as resolving the whole application ([13]–[15], [33]).
Also at [10], the court says: “The merits of the appeal must be taken into account.” That means an extension application is not assessed only by asking whether the delay has been explained. The proposed appeal must disclose something capable of supporting an appeal. Here, an allegation that the respondent lied did not identify an error in the primary judge's reasoning ([16]–[19], [25], [33]).
At [24], De Maine described his proposed fresh evidence as “the truth”. Elkaim AJ explained that this was not fresh evidence in the relevant sense: it was not evidence shown to have emerged or been discovered since the original hearing. The passage highlights the difference between disagreeing with the opposing party's account and identifying material that is genuinely new to the appeal application.
At [28], Elkaim AJ observed that “forensic decisions were taken, on advice and after discussion, which cannot now be effectively manipulated to permit a new case to be run.” In plain English, a party cannot ordinarily turn dissatisfaction with choices made in the original hearing into an opportunity to run a different case later, without evidence showing a relevant injustice. The court applied that reasoning to the claim that De Maine should have given oral evidence ([28]–[30]).
Finally, at [33], the court summarised its conclusion: the delay was just adequately explained, but there was “no identifiable merit in the appeal” and no miscarriage of justice if leave were refused. This captures the decisive distinction in the judgment: the explanation accounted for lateness, but the proposed appeal did not satisfy the other central considerations.
The decision is relevant to applications for leave to appeal after the applicable appeal deadline has passed, particularly where the applicant relies on a misunderstanding to explain the delay. Here, the court accepted a mistaken reading of counsel's email as an adequate explanation, while still assessing appeal merits and miscarriage of justice separately ([13]–[15], [33]).
It is also relevant where an applicant says that the trial would have had a different outcome if they had personally given evidence or had a chance to respond orally to the other party. The judgment indicates that the court will examine what occurred at the original hearing, including whether the choice not to call or cross-examine a witness was a forensic decision made after discussion and on advice ([20]–[23], [27]–[30]).
The case may be pertinent where proposed appeal material consists mainly of accusations that the opposing party lied, a commentary on the primary judgment, or a general assertion that the applicant's own account is the truth. Elkaim AJ treated those features as insufficient on the facts before the court because they did not identify an error or evidence that was unavailable at the original hearing ([16]–[19], [24]–[25], [32]).
The judgment does not establish that all late appeals involving allegations of dishonesty, omitted evidence, or dissatisfaction with legal representation will fail. Its reasoning depends on what the applicant actually identified and supported. The court noted that De Maine did not establish that his lawyers acted without discussing the hearing choices or contrary to his instructions, and that he acknowledged it was not that the lawyers had “done the wrong thing” ([28]–[30]). Different evidence about the hearing, the instructions given, the availability of evidence, or the alleged error would need to be assessed on its own record.
The judgment was delivered on 25 July 2025. The provided judgment text contains no account of later decisions applying, distinguishing, or otherwise treating De Maine v Kizmann. Accordingly, no claim about subsequent judicial treatment can be grounded in this source.
Within the judgment itself, the authorities it discusses are Kelly v Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT) [2015] ACTCA 15 and Aulich Civil Law Pty Ltd v Pappas [2022] ACTSC 345. Elkaim AJ records that Aulich confirmed the application of Kelly's principles to civil matters, then refines those considerations into three propositions for the application before the court ([9]–[10]). This is the judgment's stated relationship to the earlier authorities, not evidence of how later courts have treated De Maine.
The judgment also refers to the primary decision, Kizmann v De Maine (No 2) [2024] ACTSC 139, and the costs decision, Kizmann v De Maine (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 171 ([2], [8]). Those references provide procedural and factual context. They are not later treatment of the Court of Appeal's decision.
The judgment does not provide a detailed test for deciding when a misunderstanding of legal advice or an email will adequately explain delay. It decides only that De Maine's particular misunderstanding, about a possible security-for-costs application, just adequately explained his delay ([13]–[15], [33]). The judgment does not state that all misunderstandings about appeal costs or security will be adequate.
Nor does it specify a comprehensive test for when a lawyer's conduct in the original proceeding might establish an injustice relevant to an extension application. At [27], the judge said there would need to be, “at least, some evidence of gross incompetence” for the suggested lawyer-related injustice. The judgment applies that observation to De Maine's material; it does not resolve the range of circumstances in which representation-related conduct might matter.
The decision also leaves open how a different evidentiary record might affect an application involving an omitted opportunity to give evidence. The court had before it its understanding that decisions about the hearing had been discussed and made on advice, and that De Maine did not allege his lawyers acted contrary to instructions ([23], [28]–[30]). It did not decide a case where evidence established a materially different account.
Finally, the decision does not determine the substantive merits of the original loan dispute afresh. It records the issue and result of the primary proceedings to explain the appeal application, then decides only whether leave to appeal out of time should be granted ([1]–[3], [8], [33]–[34]). The conclusions should therefore be kept to the procedural question decided.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on or relying on this analysis, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
Source: the ACT Courts (www.courts.act.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY COURT OF APPEAL
Case Title: De Maine v Kizmann
Citation: [2025] ACTCA 26
Hearing Date: 25 July 2025
Decision Date: 25 July 2025
Before: Elkaim AJ
Decision: See [34]
Catchwords: APPEAL – APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT – Application for leave to appeal out of time – where basis of delay is a mistaken belief that $1,000,000 is to be paid to the court to hear the appeal – delay adequately explained – where appellant was not cross-examined at hearing – where appellant believes outcome of hearing would have been different had he been cross-examined – no fresh evidence to be adduced – forensic decision not to be manipulated to permit a re-hearing – appeal dismissed Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT), s 37J Legislation Cited: Aulich Civil Law Pty Ltd v Pappas [2022] ACTSC 345 Cases Cited: Kelly v Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT) [2015] ACTCA 15 Kizmann v De Maine (No 2) [2024] ACTSC 139 Kizmann v De Maine (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 171 Parties: Gregory John De Maine (Appellant) Ivan Gerad Kizmann (Respondent)
Representation: Counsel Self-represented (Appellant) S Baker-Goldsmith (Respondent)
Solicitors Self-represented (Appellant) Legal on London (Respondent)
File Number: AC 1 of 2025 ELKAIM AJ:
Introduction:
I am sitting in this matter as a single judge constituting the Court of Appeal pursuant to s 37J of the Supreme Court Act 1933. The application before me is for leave to appeal out of time from a final judgement. The application was filed on 20 February 2025. It is opposed.
The decision which the applicant wishes to appeal is Kizmann v De Maine (No 2) [2024] ACTSC 139. It is a decision of the Chief Justice.
The application was filed on 20 February 2025 together with a draft notice of appeal. The notice of appeal should have been filed by 6 June 2024. Accordingly it is about eight months late. This is a significant period.
The application is supported by an affidavit of Mr Gregory De Maine (the applicant) dated 20 February 2025. There is also another document dated 20 February 2025 addressed to the Chief Justice in which the applicant provides a commentary on assorted paragraphs in the judgment.
The applicant is self-represented so that it is necessary to give him some leeway but not so much as to unfairly prejudice the respondent.
The respondent has pointed out the many court rules that the applicant has either contravened, or failed to obey, in the drafting of his application and supporting documents. I think the leeway that I have mentioned above enables me to allow him to present his application in the way he has prepared it. Obviously if he were to obtain leave he would need to, at the very least, amend his notice of appeal.
I note that the hearing was completed within one day and the applicant was represented by counsel and solicitors. Each side had filed affidavit evidence, but only the respondent was cross-examined.
In her reasons on costs (Kizmann v De Maine (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 171) the Chief Justice summarised the dispute between the parties:
1․ In these proceedings, Mr Ivan Kizmann sought to enforce loans made through negotiation with a longstanding friend, Mr Gregory De Maine. The single issue in the proceedings by the time it was heard by me was whether the loans were made to Mr De Maine personally or instead to his now defunct company, Shostko Systems Pty Ltd. 2․ In a judgment published on 9 May 2024, I found in favour of Mr Kizmann against Mr De Maine personally; see Kizmann v De Maine (No 2) [2024] ACTSC 139. I ordered that the first defendant pay the plaintiff's costs. However, upon being informed that there was an application by the plaintiff for a different order as to costs, I stood the matter over to today for determination of that application.
a. Time limits are important and must prima facie be obeyed. b. An application to extend time should only be granted if, having regard to the important value of finality in litigation and the need for timeliness to be respected, it is proper to do so. c. The mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify an extension of time. d. The merits of the appeal must be taken into account in deciding whether to extend time. e. The application should be determined by the court’s view of the demands of justice in accordance with a broader judicial discretion and not by the application of a verbal formula. f. The court should determine whether if leave is refused there would be a miscarriage of justice.
• Time limits have a purpose; there must be an explanation for the delay.
• The merits of the appeal must be taken into account.
• A miscarriage of justice would arise if leave was refused.
In his affidavit, the applicant concentrates on asserting that the respondent was personally involved in the financial woes suffered by the applicant, that the respondent was a “liar” and there is “critical information” that was not presented during the hearing.
As to the reasons for delay the applicant states:
“I could not Appeal because I did not have over a $1M to lodge with the Court An Appeal opportunity was never really available to me Your Honour, which is why I am reaching out to you now. I am sorry Your Honour but there is no other avenue that I know for me to take to get the truth to you. At what opportunity do you get to Appeal if you don’t have a lazy $1M laying around…Appeal out of time?”
“If you were to appeal in your current circumstances I would anticipate an application for security for costs in circumstances where: a. the judgement including costs against your will exude $1,000,000 b. There is documentary evidence authored by you indicating an incapacity to pay c. The prospects of success of the appeal likely to poor”
I assume, in fact hope, the grammatical errors in the email as just recorded, have come about in their recording and were not present in the original email. I also note that the applicant used the word “counsel” to refer to his lawyers generally. Whatever the case, the email does not say there must be a payment of $1 million. It says no more than that an application for security for costs could be anticipated. Security for costs, if ordered, would never equal, or come close to, the verdict sum. The likely security would be referable to costs and not to the verdict.
The applicant did however read out an email, or a letter, dated 15 May 2024 in which his solicitor is told in unequivocal terms that he wished to appeal. This probably prompted the above email of 21 May 2024 which was misinterpreted by the applicant so that he thought he needed to pay $1 million into court. On this background I think there is an explanation for the delay, notwithstanding that it is derived from an erroneous reading of the 21 May 2024 email.
The draft notice of appeal is not particularly helpful in establishing even a foundation upon which merits of the appeal might be identified. The notice states:
“The grounds for the Appeal are to bring to the Judges attention that the Complainant deliberately lied under oath to pervert the Courts judgement of the case against me the Defendant.”
“(a) Once Her Honour is satisfied that the Judgement against me was made on false information, I ask for the matter to be thrown out of court…or (b) There being a new Hearing at the Supreme Court ACT to rehear the Case with, this time, me the Appellant (Defendant, Gregory De Maine) being allowed to stand in the dock and defend himself against these false allegations.”
Returning to the affidavit the suggestion seems to be that there will be a “submission of further critical information not presented during the Court Hearing that supports my case th that debunks the fabricated statements made by the plaintiff on the 10 July, 2023.” 10 July 2023 is the day when the matter was heard.
The affidavit then goes on to give an explanation of the “Main Points”. There is a commentary on various aspects of matters that arose during the case. The explanations are supplemented by the letter I referred to above which has a more extensive commentary related to various paragraphs in the decision.
Because of the unhelpful documentary material, and I do not mean to be critical of the applicant, I asked the applicant to tell me in the hearing what his complaint actually was. He responded that he had assumed that he would have been called to give evidence, by one side or the other, so that he would be given an opportunity to rebut the “lies” that had been given in evidence by the respondent.
As stated above, the applicant had not given evidence in chief, or been cross-examined, during the primary hearing. He was not required for cross-examination so that one would normally assume his affidavit evidence, which was before the court, was not challenged. Her Honour dealt with this point, at [14]:
The evidence was given by affidavit. Mr Kizmann’s primary affidavit was sworn on 15 July 2022. He also swore an affidavit in reply dated 23 November 2022. He was cross-examined at the hearing. Mr De Maine swore an affidavit dated 18 October 2022. Mr De Maine did not attempt to reproduce the relevant conversations in direct speech and much of the content of his affidavit was ruled inadmissible. In written submissions provided before the hearing, he foreshadowed giving oral evidence in addition to his affidavit evidence. However, that course was not pursued at the hearing and he was not required for cross-examination. His case rested principally on the existence of the signed written agreement and the contention that “the later advances were all on the same basis”.
HER HONOUR: Well, we can have that debate. What about things that Mr Kizmann says Mr De Maine said that he hasn't addressed in his affidavit? Do you abandon those parts of your evidence? MR CONNELL: No, Mr De Maine has not addressed our affidavits. It's a classic …(inaudible)… situation. He's had the opportunity. There was an order of the court by the Registrar for exchange of affidavits. HER HONOUR: I'm talking about things that came out of Mr Kizmann’s mouth just now in his evidence, such as the statement about the reason the contract was in the name of the company. MR CONNELL: Your Honour, I'm not obliged to adduce evidence. HER HONOUR: I don't want to have an argument with you, Mr Connell. I just want to make sure that - - - MR CONNELL: Sorry, your Honour, I'm not trying to argue. I'm just trying to put a proposition. HER HONOUR: Yes. No, we'll deal with it in submissions. I just want to make sure that I'm understanding correctly that we're at the point of a deliberate forensic choice being made not to cross-examine Mr De Maine. And I think you're making that clear. MR CONNELL: We are, your Honour. It's an issue I anticipated in my written submissions, which I understand your Honour's just glanced on. We say it's a classic …(inaudible)… situation. The defendant did not traverse in any meaningful way the statement of the pleadings of the plaintiff. He did not traverse in any way the plaintiff's evidence when he had the opportunity to adduce an affidavit. He's left with effectively no evidence to contradict Mr Kizmann's version of events. There's nothing to cross-examine on. HER HONOUR: The first sentence might be correct without the second sentence being correct, that's my concern. But you made your position clear. We'll deal with it in submissions.
I asked the applicant if there had been any discussion between him and his lawyers about whether or not he would give oral evidence. I understood him to say there had been discussion but he had relied on the “instructions of counsel” who he thought had made an assumption that he would win the case.
In oral submissions, the applicant said the fresh evidence was “the truth”. Obviously, that is not fresh evidence in the sense of evidence that is relevant but has emerged, or been discovered, since the hearing.
In addition, the commentary, as described by the applicant, is a series of explanations. It is not an analysis or identification of error on her Honour’s part. On one understanding of the applicant’s complaints, he does not challenge her Honour’s findings, but rather says that they would have been different had she had the benefit of his own oral evidence.
In his Reply submissions the applicant makes allegations against the counsel that represented him at the hearing. He says:
“Unfortunately, my Counsel did not consult with me on the validity of the statements made by the Plaintiff. Such an opportunity would have allowed me to be cross-examined by my own Counsel, which would have, at the very least, allowed me to correct the blatantly false statements made by the Plaintiff.”
The applicant’s counsel would not have been allowed to cross examine his own client. If the applicant is suggesting incompetence on the part of his lawyers, the type of conduct of a lawyer which might give rise to an injustice is far from present in this matter. There would need to have been, at least, some evidence of gross incompetence.
Further, the overwhelming impression that I have of the manner in which the hearing was conducted is that forensic decisions were taken, on advice and after discussion, which cannot now be effectively manipulated to permit a new case to be run. The applicant may well be disappointed with his lawyers but he has not provided any evidence that would lead me to a conclusion that they had acted without discussing the manner in which the case was to be heard with him, in particular concerning his giving evidence, and there is no suggestion that his lawyers acted contrary to his instructions.
The applicant, even graciously stated in his oral submissions that “it’s not that they did the wrong thing” and then he said they simply made the wrong assumption about how the case would end.
In his final oral submissions, the applicant stressed that had he been given the opportunity to challenge the respondents “lies” the result would have been different. As I hope I have explained, his argument does not rely on fresh evidence and does not amount to an allegation of such bad conduct on the part of his lawyers that a different result might have emerged had they followed his instructions.
Finally, I note that although the hearing was on 10 July 2023, the decision date is 9 May 2024. This means the applicant had 10 months to apply to make further submissions or call fresh evidence. He did not do so.
I can well understand that a person who receives a judgement against him for over $850,000 will be aggrieved and anxious to right a perceived wrong. The commentary however does not provide grounds of appeal. If it is supposed to represent evidence that was not put forward at the hearing, there is no identification of any evidence that was not available at the hearing.
While I sympathise with the applicant, because I think he genuinely believes he was not given an opportunity to present his case, nevertheless the application must fail. The delay is just adequately explained, but there is no identifiable merit in the appeal and there is no miscarriage of justice that would arise if the application is refused. The fact that the applicant will now be faced with having to pay a large sum of money is not a miscarriage of justice; it is a consequence of a well-reasoned judgment against him based on the evidence that was before the court.
I make the following orders:
(1) The application for leave to appeal out of time is dismissed.
(2) The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the application.
I certify that the preceding thirty-four [34] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Acting Justice Elkaim.
Associate:
Date:
De Maine
Kizmann [2025] ACTCA 26
The application for leave to appeal out of time was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the application.