DCO20 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 450

1. By application filed on 6 July 2020, the applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) dated 1 June 2020. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate (the delegate) of the First Respondent (the Minister) not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) (subclass 866) visa (the visa) under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).

1. The following background is derived from the Minister's written submissions and information in the Court Book which, unless otherwise indicated, is not in dispute.
2. The applicant is a citizen of China who last arrived in Australia on 8 December 2017 as the holder of a Visitor visa.
3. On 25 December 2017, the applicant applied for the visa on the basis of the following claims for protection (errors in original):

(a) the applicant had pressure from a government officer because she was an 'Ethnic Evangelical churches';

(b) if she returned to China, then she risked going to jail and 'they will take control over' and her family, and would keep her in 'full custody', and take advantage of her and her family;

(c) the government officer tried to get 'us' out of church meetings because they did not want her to have a friendly meeting for her belief; and

(d) if 'they' found out she had left China, 'they' would keep her in custody, take advantage of her and her family and not accept her as a normal person.

1. On 28 March 2019, the applicant was invited to attend an interview before the Department of Home Affairs (the Department). The applicant failed to attend the interview, nor explain her lack of attendance.
2. On 15 April 2019, the delegate refused to grant the applicant the visa on the basis they were not a person or of a class of persons to whom Australia owed protection obligations. The delegate cited independent country information concerning the freedom to practice Protestant and Catholic religions in China, and information concerning China's entry and exit immigration procedures. The delegate accepted the applicant was an Evangelical Christian, however, given the independent country information and that the applicant was able to depart China on her own passport, the delegate found that the applicant was of no profile or interest to the Chinese authorities. On the same day, the applicant was notified of the refusal by way of an email sent to her nominated address.
3. On 29 April 2019, the Department sent another email to the applicant resending the delegate's refusal decision dated 15 April 2019, however, providing on the cover letter the following notice:

"attached decision record - with minor correction - provides more detailed information about this decision and the applicant(s) it applies to".

1. The difference between the decision record sent on 15 April 2019 and the decision record sent on 29 April 2019 only concerned the addition of the following paragraph:

The applicant is not a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations as outlined in s36(2)(a) or s36(2)(aa) and is not a member of the same family unit as a noncitizen in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations and who holds a Protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant (s36(2)(b) and s36(2)(c) of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act)).

1. On 29 April 2019, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision.
2. On 13 May 2020, the applicant was invited to attend a hearing scheduled for 28 May 2020 to give evidence and present arguments. The matter was originally listed for a virtual hearing to be conducted by Microsoft Teams, however, on 18 May 2020, the Tribunal wrote again to the applicant and confirmed the hearing would instead be conducted by telephone. The invitation noted the telephone number that the Tribunal had on record for the applicant.
3. On 28 May 2020, the applicant attended the hearing by telephone with the assistance of an interpreter in the Mandarin and English languages. At the hearing, the applicant made the following amended claims:

(a) despite claiming in her visa application to have never been married, she confirmed that she was married but divorced in 1997 and has an adult son: at [7];

(b) she departed China lawfully on her own passport without difficulty: at [8];

(c) she participated in two events in September 2017 and, as a result, her church was shut down by the authorities, and some church leaders were detained and persecuted. Since then, the authorities have been pursuing the applicant. She was afraid the Chinese authorities were monitoring her and her family and she claimed they made her 'quit the group' and give up her faith: at [17];

(d) she and other members of the church group attempted to stop the government from demolishing a house when staff from the Public Security Bureau (the PSB) attended and the group ran away in fear: at [17];

(e) she was required to recruit members by charging them a fee on the promise of becoming wealthy. She attended the church for approximately 20 days before it was shut down: at [17];

(f) she and other members of the church sat in a room and read a 'big book'. She did not know what was in the 'big book'. The group would also play gospel on shuffle mode, and she claimed it was a 'brainwashing organisation'. The group was an anti-social organisation, and she was required to 'scam' money from people by telling her friends how much money she made: at [17]-[18]; and

(g) the PSB went to her house and questioned her parents. As a result, the applicant was on a list, and they would persecute her if she were to return: at [19].

1. On 1 June 2020, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate refusing to grant the visa.

1. The issue before the Tribunal was whether the applicant was a person with respect of whom Australia owed protection obligations. The Tribunal found the applicant's evidence was lacking in detail, frequently incoherent, implausible, and generally unpersuasive: at [9].
2. At [17], the Tribunal noted the following issues with the applicant's evidence in concluding that she did not have a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of her religion or membership in an Ethnic Evangelical Church, or for any other reason:

(a) despite claiming to have a well-founded fear of persecution as a member of the Ethnic Evangelical Church, the applicant was unable at the hearing to: provide any further details about the alleged church she was involved in; could not identify whether the church was Protestant, Baptist, Catholic, or any other church; and whilst maintaining that the church was evangelical, she could not tell the Tribunal what that meant;

(b) the applicant was unable to give any further details about the name and location of the group or church she was involved with beyond stating it was called the 'National evangelical association'. The applicant was unable to provide any details about the events she was involved in or what happened at those events;

(c) the applicant was unable to tell the Tribunal what 'big book' the group read or what stories the book contained. When asked whether the book contained stories about Jesus Christ or Christianity, the applicant was 'nonplussed' and could not provide a coherent answer; and

(d) the applicant was unable to discuss any aspect of Christianity or what aspects of her religion she believed in. The applicant described the group as an anti-social organisation who were required to 'scam' members for money.

1. At [18], the Tribunal noted it put to the applicant that it had difficulty accepting her claims without additional submissions or documentary evidence.
2. At [22], the Tribunal considered the applicant's claim that her involvement in scam activities would cause her to suffer persecution in China. However, the Tribunal found that the information provided by the applicant was so brief and lacking in detail that it was unsatisfied that she was truthfully involved in such a scam, or that it was illegal, or of interest to the Chinese authorities.
3. At [23], the Tribunal found it was not satisfied the applicant was a member of an evangelical or any other church, or that she was a Christian. It found that there was no evidence before it that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution, or that she was involved in any activity that would attract any adverse attention from the Chinese authorities. The Tribunal noted that the applicant was able to lawfully obtain a passport, a visa, and depart China without any obstruction or interest from the Chinese authorities. The Tribunal was not satisfied the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution for the purposes of s 36(2)(a).
4. At [24], the Tribunal found that it was not satisfied the applicant met the complimentary protection criteria for the purposes of s 36(2)(aa).
5. At [25]-[28], after considering all of the applicant's claims, the Tribunal was not satisfied that if the applicant were to return to China, she would face a real chance of harm, or was a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations, or that there was a real risk that she would suffer significant harm. Accordingly, the Tribunal affirmed the decision refusing to grant the visa.

1. The originating application advanced three grounds of judicial review. The applicant also filed an affidavit containing documents provided in the Court Book and restates the applicant's claim that she was persecuted in China, as such, the affidavit was not taken into account.
2. On 15 September 2020, the Minister filed the Court Book. On 10 December 2020, the Minister filed their written submissions. The applicant did not file written submissions.
3. The parties appeared at the final hearing on 12 March 2026 at the Parramatta Registry of the Court.
4. At the hearing, the Court Book was tendered into evidence and marked Exhibit CB.
5. The applicant appeared in person and was assisted by an interpreter in the Mandarin and English languages. The Minister was represented by Mr T Qian of Mills Oakley.
6. Being mindful that the applicant was unrepresented, the Court explained to her how the hearing would proceed and the matters that would normally be considered by the Court, when determining an application for judicial review.

1. The Court can only grant relief if it can be established that the decision of the Tribunal is affected by a jurisdictional error: Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476.
2. In LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 280 CLR 321 (LPDT) at [3] the High Court per Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson, and Jagot JJ, explained that:

... Jurisdictional error on the part of a statutory decision-maker in making a decision can include: misunderstanding the applicable law; asking the wrong question; exceeding the bounds of reasonableness; identifying a wrong issue; ignoring relevant material; relying on irrelevant material; in some cases, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion; or failing to observe some applicable requirement of procedural fairness. [citations omitted]

1. To constitute jurisdictional error, the error must be material, in the sense that it could have realistically deprived the applicant of the opportunity of a successful outcome: LPDT at [32].
2. Further, as explained to the applicant at the hearing, it is not for the Court to review the merits of the Tribunal decision: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 (Wu Shan Liang).

1. The grounds of judicial review advanced by the applicant were as follows (without alteration):

Jurisdictional errors exist.

1. Tribunal does not rely on substantiated information to reject my claims.
2. Tribunal member does not consider all relevant information.
3. Some Tribunal's reasoning is subjective and does not have information to support it.

1. At the hearing, I invited the applicant to make submissions in support of her grounds of review, however, she indicated that she had nothing further to say and relied on her written application.

1. By ground one, the applicant appears to allege that the Tribunal's rejection of her claims for protection was unreasonable or not supported by logically probative evidence.
2. The Minister submitted that the Tribunal rejected the applicant's claims on the basis of a strong adverse credibility finding, due to multiple issues and concerns with the applicant's claims and evidence. It was submitted that the concerns identified with the applicant's evidence were not minor or trivial, and the Tribunal's adverse credibility findings were open to it on the evidence before it.
3. While the Minister contended that credibility findings are matters for the Tribunal, it was acknowledged such findings may be amenable to judicial review on several grounds including: legal unreasonableness; reaching a finding without a logical, rational, or probative basis; failure to perform the required statutory task of review; and failure to take into account relevant material: AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 133; (2018) 266 FCR 83 at [41]. It was submitted, however, that the Tribunal's reasons provided a reasonable, rational, and probative basis for rejecting the applicant's claims, and accordingly, were without error.
4. I accept the Minister's submissions. A fair reading of the Tribunal's reasons as a whole demonstrates that the applicant's claims were rejected on the basis of substantial deficiencies in her evidence. The adverse credibility findings of the Tribunal arose from various concerns it had with the applicant's evidence including, her inability to provide coherent or consistent details about her claimed church involvement, her inability to discuss any aspect of Christianity, contradictory accounts of claimed religious activities, and the absence of documents to support her claims.
5. I accept that the concerns the Tribunal had with the applicant's evidence went to matters that were central to the applicant's claims for protection and that its adverse credibility findings were based on the evidence before it and were not peripheral.
6. It was open to the Tribunal, on the evidence before it, to reach the conclusions it did. The Tribunal's reasons provide a cogent and rational basis for its findings, and do not disclose any legal unreasonableness or illogicality, and nor were those findings made in the absence of probative material.
7. Ground one fails to establish jurisdictional error.

1. By ground two, the applicant contends the Tribunal failed to consider all the relevant information.
2. No particulars were provided in support of this ground nor was the applicant able to articulate at the hearing what material or information was before the Tribunal that it failed to consider.
3. The Minister submitted that the Tribunal comprehensively considered all claims and evidence put forward by the applicant and it was under no obligation to make further inquiries or supplement deficiencies in the applicant's case.
4. A fair reading of the Tribunal's reasons demonstrates that the Tribunal considered the claims made in her protection visa application and had regard to oral evidence given by the applicant at the hearing. The reasons disclose that the Tribunal, whilst noting the absence of documentary evidence to support the applicant's claims, had nevertheless addressed each material claim raised by the applicant.
5. As noted by the Minister, the Tribunal afforded the applicant an additional two weeks following the hearing to respond in writing to concerns raised during the hearing, however, no further material had been provided within that period. I accept that in this case no obligation arose on the Tribunal make further inquiries or obtain information beyond what had been provided to it by the applicant: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 259 ALR 429; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32; (2004) 207 ALR 12 at [17], [19], [43], and [124].
6. The applicant has failed to establish that the Tribunal overlooked any material information, failed to consider any claim advanced, or otherwise failed to consider the evidence before it.
7. Ground two does not disclose a jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.

1. By ground three the applicant again appears to contend that the Tribunal's reasons were illogical, irrational, or legally unreasonable and/or that its findings and conclusions were made without an evidentiary basis.
2. This ground substantially overlaps with complaints raised by ground one and adds nothing of substance beyond an assertion that the Tribunal's reasoning was unsupported or subjective.
3. For the reasons already given in relation to ground one, a fair reading of the Tribunal's reasons demonstrates that its conclusions were based on the deficiencies identified by the Tribunal in the applicant's evidence and were open on the material before it.
4. The Tribunal's reasons for rejecting the applicant's claims had a rational and logical basis, and its conclusion that the applicant was not a person in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations was neither illogical nor legally unreasonable.
5. Ground three fails to establish jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.

1. As none of the grounds raised establish jurisdictional error, the application for judicial review must be dismissed.

1. At the hearing, the Minister sought an order that the applicant pay their costs fixed in the amount of $6,180.00. In her submissions on the issue of costs, the applicant said she lacked the financial means to pay. Financial hardship, of itself, is not a sufficient basis to depart from the usual rule that costs follow the event. A costs order is intended to compensate the successful party for costs properly incurred, not to punish the unsuccessful party: Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; (1998) 193 CLR 72 at [67].
2. I am satisfied that costs should follow the event. Further, having regard to the work undertaken and the scale costs for a standard migration matter, I will order that the applicant pay the amount sought by the Minister.

I certify that the preceding fifty-three (53) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Skaros.