DCN19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 554

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

1. By application filed on 14 August 2019 the applicants seek judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal[1] (the Tribunal) dated 25 July 2019. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate (the delegate) of the first respondent (the Minister) in refusing to grant the applicants Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visas (the protection visas) under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).

1. The first and second applicants are husband and wife. The third applicant is their minor daughter.
2. The first and second applicants arrived in Australia on 23 December 2007 and 10 December 2007, respectively, as the holders of student visas. Those visas expired on 15 March 2010 and they remained in Australia as unlawful non-citizens until they were granted bridging visas in connection with their application for protection. The third applicant was born in Australia in March 2015. She was included in her parents' protection visa application and was granted a bridging visa on that basis.
3. The second and third applicants did not make any claims for protection in their own right to the Department. They applied for the visas as members of the same family unit of the first applicant. Any reference to the applicant in these Reasons is a reference to the first applicant.
4. In her visa application, the applicant claimed protection as follows (as summarised by the Tribunal):
   • She is from Fujian Province. Her parents and other relatives were all Christians and attended a house Church. Their Church advocated preaching the Gospel and freedom of faith which the Patriotic Church did not do. That was the reason that they did not go to the Patriotic Church.
   • Their village administration had their house Church under strict surveillance. They made "bloody money" through blackmail and extortion. They set up a secret hoard to hide their illegally gotten money. They ordered those who attended house Churches to be investigated and whoever was found organizing house Churches was summonsed for inquiries and penalised.
   • When she was in her third year of Middle School her family and extended family were reported for holding unauthorized gatherings and penalized by the local government. She was cautioned by the security Police and was suspended from attending classes by the school authority. Her uncle was arrested by the Police for preaching the gospel in places away from their hometown. When he was sent back his liberty was restricted by the local government and he was forbidden to leave his residence without permission.
   • In 2007, after she came to Australia to study, she found a Church but had difficulty adapting because of the language barrier. She joined some "countrymen" and set up their own Church. This lasted for 2 years. In 2010, she and the second named applicant started attending the Asian Christian Church in Cabramatta.
   • She discovered that she was pregnant and expecting a child in March 2015. She decided to apply for protection because she is afraid to return to China as she will be persecuted on religious grounds. On Easter Sunday 2014, her parents and uncles were arrested for attending an unauthorised gathering. She shudders at the thought of returning to China and continuing her religious practices.
   • They are Christians who long for the freedom to choose their faith and preach the gospel. They have "initiated many an infidel" into the Christian Church. At the beginning of July 2014, one of her fellow sisters in China was arrested for preaching the gospel and several house Churches were outlawed by the local government.
   • She decided to apply for protection because she and the second named applicant had a child outside of wedlock. They will be penalised for violating the birth control policy if they return to China. They are heavily in debt and cannot pay the penalty so their child will be discriminated against in almost all social aspects such as medical care and education if they return to China. Her maternal uncle was arrested for failing to pay the penalty and detained. He was not released until he paid off the penalty. Her maternal aunt-in-law was forced to have an abortion.
   • She and the second named applicant could not get married because of his family's objections. If they return to China they will not be able to register their marriage there because his parents will not allow them to use their residence book (hukou).
   • She had to stop studying in Australia because her family had economic difficulties. When she first came to Australia she did not know about Protection visas and no one told her she was entitled to apply for one. Shortly after her previous visa became invalid she consulted some overseas student agents but none of them told her to choose this visa category. If not for a series of incidents that happened recently in China she would not have applied for a Protection visa as she was reluctant to do so.
   • She consulted some immigration professionals and was told that Australia is a country where religious freedom is protected. Her family is being persecuted in China for religious reasons and she will also face prosecution if she returns to China. She is expecting protection from the Australian government.
5. On 4 March 2016, the delegate refused to grant the visas.
6. On 31 March 2016, the applicants applied to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate's decision. A copy of the delegate's decision record was provided to the Tribunal with the application for review. The applicants provided additional supporting documents to the Tribunal on review.
7. On 23 November 2018, the Tribunal invited the applicants to attend a hearing before it scheduled for 15 January 2019.
8. On 15 January 2019, the first and second applicant and a supporting witness, Pastor Daniel Chi-Kwong Tam, appeared at the hearing before the Tribunal.
9. On 25 July 2019, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate to refuse to grant the applicants the visas.

1. The dispositive issue in the review was whether the applicants were persons in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations under s 36 of the Act.
2. The Tribunal identified the criteria for a protection visa; that the applicant must either satisfy the 'refugee' criterion or meet the 'complementary protection' grounds for protection. The relevant definition of 'refugee' and the provisions relevant to the complementary protection grounds under the Act were also set out.
3. The Tribunal identified that it must have regard to Ministerial Direction No. 56 made under s 499 of the Act, and that it must take into account the policy guidelines titled PAM3 Refugee and Humanitarian - Complementary Protection Guidelines, and PAM3 Refugee and Humanitarian - Refugee Law Guidelines and any relevant country information assessments.
4. The Tribunal set out the applicant's claims for protection as provided in her visa application and summarised the documents she provided to the Department and Tribunal in support of her claims for protection.
5. The Tribunal summarised the oral evidence the applicant gave at the hearing before it and found that she was not a credible witness, giving eleven reasons for that finding:

(a) First, her evidence about an incident in 2014 relating to the arrest of persons in China participating in Christian activities was inconsistent.

(b) Second, the applicant provided inconsistent evidence and a lack of corroborating evidence about her setting up a church in Australia for two years after her arrival in 2007.

(c) Third, the applicant's claim that she had been attending the Sydwest Asian Christian Church in Cabramatta from 2010 contradicts a document from Pastor Ma of the church which stated that she attended from late 2014 and regularly since April 2015 which was after the visa applications were filed.

(d) Fourth, the letter by Pastor Sim provided to the Tribunal was problematic. First, Pastor Sim made claims as to events that occurred before he met the applicants, and the Tribunal did not speak to him and was unable to ascertain the source of this information. Second, Pastor Sim's account of when the applicants started attending the church was inconsistent with Pastor Ma's account and the applicants' explanation of this was unsatisfactory. The Tribunal placed no weight on the evidence of Pastor Sim and preferred Pastor Ma's account that the applicants had started attending regularly from 2015.

(e) Fifth, the applicant's own evidence about the regularity of her attendance at the church was inconsistent.

(f) Sixth, the applicant gave evidence that she was born into a Christian family and baptised in China, but she provided copies of certificates of baptism for herself which indicate she was baptised in November 2017. If she was baptised in China, this raised concerns as to why she was baptised again in Sydney and even if it was a common practice to be baptised more than once, it raised concerns that the applicant was baptised in 2017 when her claims were that she had been attending the church since 2010.

(g) Seventh, the applicant's claims and evidence about her evangelism were problematic. They were made for the first time at the Tribunal hearing and were inconsistent with the account of the second applicant. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant had been evangelising as claimed.

(h) Eighth, the applicant's conduct in overstaying her student visa, remaining as an unlawful non-citizen for over four years before applying for the visas, was not consistent with her account of persecution in China. The Tribunal was not persuaded by the responses given by the first and second applicants when this concern was put to them.

(i) Ninth, the timing of the visa application and the applicants' evidence suggested that they were motivated to apply for the visa to access the public health care system during the pregnancy of the applicant and the birth of the third applicant.

(j) Tenth, the applicant originally claimed that she and the second applicant were not able to marry due to his family's objections and this formed part of the claims for protection, but they married on 8 September 2018 which raised concerns that the claim was fabricated for the purposes of the protection visa application, and when the delegate refused the application they proceeded to get married.

(k) Eleventh, the second applicant did not make any claims for protection before the Tribunal despite him claiming to be a Christian and this raised concerns as to whether he was genuinely a convert to Christianity and whether he may not actually have any concerns about practising Christianity in China. In either case, the second applicant's failure to make his own claim for protection reflected poorly on the applicant's credibility and the veracity of her claims.

1. The Tribunal then considered relevant country information as to Christianity in China and the applicants' evidence in response to it. It referenced the source of the country information and quoted extracts from it. It also recounted the other evidence in support of the visa applications. This included written and oral evidence of Daniel Tam, who attended the Sydwest Asian Christian Church and a letter from Pastor Sim.
2. The Tribunal gave little weight to the evidence of Daniel Tam because it did not consider that he was an 'independent witness' and was of the view that he 'had a vested interest in [the applicants] remaining in Australia.'
3. The Tribunal also gave limited weight to the evidence of Pastor Sim:

[75] The Tribunal has a number of concerns in relation to Pastor Sim's evidence. Firstly, as stated previously, Pastor Sim has not indicated how he is aware that the first and second named applicants have been attending Church since 2010 considering that he has only known them since April 2016. This statement is most likely based on what they have told him. Secondly, as he has only known the first named applicant since April 2016 he would have no personal knowledge of whether she was born into a Christian family and this evidence is most likely based on what she has told him. Thirdly, his evidence that the second named applicant attends Bible study group occasionally is not consistent with the second named applicant's evidence that he has never attended Bible study classes.

[76] Fourthly, Pastor Sim's assertion that children are banned from attending Church in China is not supported by any country information. Further, this is not a claim made by the first named applicant in her own right or on behalf of the third named applicant. In view of the above, the Tribunal places little weight on Pastor Sim's evidence.

1. The Tribunal then turned its attention from the applicant's claims for protection relating to her Christian faith to her claims that the applicants would be persecuted because they had a child out of wedlock and in violation of China's Family Planning Policy. The Tribunal summarised the applicant's claim in this respect, referred to relevant country information and recounted the applicant's response to this country information. The Tribunal's findings in respect of this claim (having a child out of wedlock) were not the subject of any objections made by the applicants in their judicial review application. Nor is any error apparent from the decision record of the Tribunal's consideration of this claim.
2. The Tribunal concluded by making findings, with the first such finding being that the applicant was not a witness of truth and that she had fabricated claims for the purpose of obtaining the visas. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant was a Christian in China or faced any persecution in that regard prior to coming to Australia. It found that the applicants applied for the visas for the purpose of finding a way to pay for the costs associated with the applicant's pregnancy, delivery and baby and that she started attending church at the end of 2014 and regularly from April 2015 with the sole initial view of enhancing their prospects of obtaining the visas. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant was a genuine convert to Christianity but that she does not evangelise and would not do so if she returned to China. It was not satisfied that she would be unable to practise her faith in a house church in China if she wished to do so and was not satisfied that she would suffer significant harm if she did so.
3. Despite him not making claims in his own right, the Tribunal made findings in respect of the second applicant as if he had made implied claims for protection. It had 'serious doubts he is a genuine convert to Christianity but is prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt.' It did not accept that he would evangelise or that he would be unable to practise Christianity in a house church in China and that if he chose to do so he would not suffer serious or significant harm.
4. As to the applicant's claims relating to China's Family Planning Policy, the Tribunal accepted the applicants may have to pay a social compensation fee but that this could be paid in instalments if required. It found that the third applicant could access social services and did not accept that she would be discriminated against in 'almost all social aspects such as medical care and education' on return to China.
5. In light of the above findings the Tribunal found that the applicants were not refugees or that there was any real risk that they would suffer significant harm if they returned to China. The Tribunal affirmed the decision under review.

1. On 14 August 2019, the applicants filed the originating application with this Court which advanced nine 'grounds' of judicial review and also contained various statements which largely repeated the applicant's claims for protection. Also filed on the same day was an affidavit of the applicant which annexed the Tribunal's decision. It was not necessary for the Court to take this affidavit into evidence as the Tribunal's decision was included in the Court Book filed by the Minister which was tendered at the hearing and marked Exhibit CB.
2. On 12 March 2025, the Minister filed written submissions. The applicant confirmed at the hearing before the Court that she received a copy of those submissions and had read them.
3. The matter was listed for final hearing on 26 March 2025 at the Parramatta Registry of the Court and a notice of listing was sent to the parties on 21 January 2025.
4. At the hearing on 26 March 2025, the first and second applicants appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter in the English and Mandarin languages. The applicant informed the Court that she would be speaking on behalf of all the applicants. The Minister was represented by Mr Taverniti of Sparke Helmore Lawyers.
5. Being mindful that the applicants were unrepresented, I explained to them how the hearing would proceed and the role and powers of the Court in judicial review proceedings.
6. The applicants were guided through their application and were invited to make oral submissions in support of the grounds of review raised in the application, which the applicant did on behalf of the applicants.

1. The Court can only grant relief if it can be established that the decision of the Tribunal is affected by a jurisdictional error: Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476.
2. In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 264 CLR 421 (SZMTA) at [81], the High Court, per Nettle and Gordon JJ explained that:

The categories of jurisdictional error are not closed. Jurisdictional error by a statutory decision-maker includes identifying a wrong issue; asking the wrong question; ignoring relevant material; relying on irrelevant material; in some cases, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion; and failing to observe some applicable requirement of procedural fairness.

1. To constitute jurisdictional error, the error must be material, in the sense that it could have realistically deprived the applicant of the opportunity of a successful outcome: SZMTA at [2]; LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 418 ALR 152 at [32].
2. Further, as explained to the applicant at the hearing, it is not for the Court to review the merits of the Tribunal decision: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272.

1. The application for judicial review raises the following grounds (without alteration):
   • Tribunal erred in its finding without supporting evidence that the applicant was not a committed Christian or "believer" at her only visit to Australia as a student in 2007.
   • The Tribunal failed to provide the basis in its finding that there have concerns about the applicant's motivations and the genuineness of her claimed Christian faith. Tribunal's assessment based on the inconsistence between the Department s Decision Record dated 4 March 2016 and the evidence given by the applicant in hearing was neither inconsiderable or short of fairness. Tribunal should consider all the relevant evidences given by the applicant especially the pastor (Sim and Ma)'s witness provided by the church she served. Tribunal failed to consider the applicant's psychological condition and its impact on her memory and expression in the stressful and tensed interview and hearing process that may affect the understanding and expression to the translated questions.
   • Tribunal's claim that the Tribunal places no weight on the evidence given by Paster Sim is not pervasive, biased and unacceptable (paragraph 32).
   • The Tribunal failed to consider that there is no requirement to satisfy the Tribunal the applicant was involved in the direct adverse action taken by the police in China. The profound fear of being persecuted is sufficient.
   • Tribunal failed to give a fair and reasonable consideration on applicant's commitment of religion. Tribunal's assessment in applicant's religion such as the issue (sixth and seventh) of her baptism and historical practice is groundless, unconvincing and unacceptable.
   • Tribunal failed to disclose the country information on which it relied. The country information provided by Tribunal is irrelevant to the applicants' live and special circumstance and less persuasive and unconvincing.
   • The Tribunal failed to provide an opportunity for the applicant to respond the adverse information put to her in the hearing.
   • Tribunal failed to thoroughly consider the applicant's commitment in her religion especially the devotion of missionary which is risky and periled against the current declining religious situation in China.
   • Tribunal failed to give a fair consideration for the applicant's entire family as committed Christians and their commitment in house church practice and religious freedom. Tribunal neglected or ignored the fact that neither house church nor missionary conducts are legitimately permitted or tolerated by government in China and religious persecution is undisputable reality according to the political need. Religious freedom becomes a propaganda or slogan under the harsh law and policy implemented by the Chinese government at current stage at all levels except the participation of patriotic church dominated by the Chinese Communist regime and is highly and politically affected.
2. The application also contains the following statements which repeat the applicant's claims for protection:
   • I came from the countryside of Fujian Province. Among my family members and relatives, my parents, grandmother, paternal and paternal uncles were all Christians and attended the house church. Our house church advocated gospel preaching and faith freedom, which the Patriotic Church couldn't do. That was the reason why we wouldn't' t go to the Patriotic Church.
   • My family and my fraternal and maternal uncles' families had all been reported by someone for holding unauthorized gatherings and penalized by the local government.
   • When I was in my third year of middle school, my family was reported to the police and was penalized, because so many people came to attend the praying service held by my family. I was also involved - I was cautioned by the security police and suspended for class by the school authority. My uncle was arrested by the police for preaching gospel in other places from our hometown. When he was sent back, his liberty was restricted by the local government and he was forbidden to leave his residence without permission, otherwise, his family members would be punished and penalized.
   • In 2007 after I came to study in Australia, I had found a certain church, but soon I found it hard to adapt myself to it because of the language barrier. So I joined some of my countrymen in setting up a house gathering of our own. Our gathering lasted until two years later fewer and fewer people came. In 2010, I and my boyfriend Suncheng LIN went to attend the Asian Christian Church in West Sydney [Cabramatta]
   • We are Christians and are longing for the freedom to choose our faith and preach gospel. Actually, we have initiated many an infidel into Christian church and some of them into baptism.
   • I was a student but I had to quit school because of the economical difficulties in my family. I'm longing to resume my education, as I find I will have no future in China; a place where there is no freedom of faith. So I'm expecting protection from the Australian Government.
3. Whilst the application does not number the grounds, the Court, for convenience will number each of the nine paragraphs as grounds one to nine.

1. By ground one, the applicants allege that the Tribunal erred when it found that the applicant was not a committed Christian or a believer when she visited Australia as a student in 2007.
2. At the hearing before the Court the applicants submitted that the Tribunal did not treat the applicant's case seriously enough, that the Tribunal failed to properly assess and weigh the evidence of Pastor Tam and erred when it considered that Pastor Tam had an interest in the applicants remaining in Australia. In reply submissions, the applicants said Pastor Tam had nothing to benefit from them remaining in Australia.
3. A fair reading of the Tribunal's reasons demonstrates that the Tribunal considered the evidence before it when assessing the applicant's claims for protection. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant was a genuine convert to Christianity but did not accept she had evangelised in Australia or would do so in China. These findings were open to the Tribunal on the evidence before it and for the reasons it gave. I accept the Minister's submission that the Tribunal's credit findings, which were comprehensive, were rational and logical: CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146.
4. I also accept the Minister's submission that the Tribunal was under no duty to accept the applicant's claims uncritically or to possess rebutting evidence before rejecting them: Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 1253; (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451.
5. The Tribunal's reasons plainly demonstrate that it had regard to the supporting evidence given by Pastor Tam. The Tribunal's assessment of that evidence was comprehensive and cogent, and the weight it gave to it was entirely a matter for it. No error is disclosed in the Tribunal's consideration of Pastor Tam's evidence.
6. Ground one does not disclose any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.

1. By ground two, the applicants allege that the Tribunal erred when it considered the inconsistencies in the applicant's claims and evidence and that in so doing, failed to consider the relevant evidence of Pastors Sim and Ma. The applicants also allege that the Tribunal failed to consider the applicant's psychological condition and its impact on her memory during the Tribunal hearing.
2. At the hearing before the Court the applicants submitted that the Tribunal may have considered there was an inconsistency in the applicant's account because in the Mandarin language there are two words for a maternal and paternal uncle respectively. The applicants also said the Tribunal hearing was long, that the applicant was tired during the hearing and needed to go to the toilet. The applicants also took issue with the Tribunal's finding that the applicant had not commenced attending church in 2010 and she said could remember attending then and that the church kept records of newcomers. In this regard, the applicants submitted that the evidence of Pastor Ma may have been incorrect (when he said that the applicant started attending at the end of 2014). In reply submissions the applicants further alleged that the Tribunal did not put to the applicants the issue it had with Pastor Ma's evidence or her attendance at church in 2010 and 2014.
3. The Tribunal's decision demonstrates that it considered the evidence before it in support of the applicant's claims, including the evidence of Pastors Sim and Ma at [15], [17], [28] - [32] and [73] - [76]. The Tribunal comprehensively set out the concerns it had with the inconsistencies in that evidence, including those relating to when the applicants started attending church and concerns it had with Pastor Ma's supporting evidence. The decision (at [22] - [62]) demonstrates that the Tribunal raised with the applicants its concerns, which included the inconsistencies in the evidence before it, and that the applicants were given an opportunity to respond to those concerns. The Tribunal had regard to the applicant's responses in its consideration and I am satisfied that its findings in respect of the applicant's credit were open to it for the reasons it gave. No error is disclosed in the Tribunal's assessment of the evidence, the weight it attributed to the supporting evidence of Pastor Ma or its findings and reasons.
4. As to the further issues raised by the applicant, to the extent that this is an allegation of a failure to provide a real and meaningful hearing, or that there may have been a breach of s 425(1) of the Act, this is not made out. The evidence before Court (at CB 135 - 136) indicates that the Tribunal hearing commenced at 9:20 am and was completed at 1:37 pm, which was just over four hours. It is not clear from the records whether any breaks were taken during the hearing. There is no evidence before the Court which suggests that the applicant had requested any breaks during the hearing. There is also no evidence before the Court which suggests that the applicant being tired or needing to go to the bathroom had affected her ability to give oral evidence. There is also no evidence before the Court which suggests that the applicant had a psychological condition at the time of the Tribunal hearing which affected her ability to give evidence and present arguments in support of her case. I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that the applicants were not afforded a real and meaningful opportunity to participate in the hearing before the Tribunal.
5. As to the issue with the translation of the word 'uncle', there is no evidence before the Court about the error or how the interpretation/translation of that word may have materially impacted the Tribunal's understanding of the applicant's evidence. The Tribunal's decision record at 13], [23] and [24] refers to the applicant's 'uncle' or 'uncles' in China who were arrested. There was no reference to 'maternal' or 'paternal' uncle in those paragraphs and it is not clear what difference it would have made to the Tribunal's findings given the reasons it gave for not accepting that the applicant was a Christian in China or that her parents or relatives in China were Christian and attended a house church: [88]. No error in translation has been established and nor has the applicant explained how that error, if it had occurred, was material.
6. Ground two does not disclose any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.

1. By ground three the applicants allege that the Tribunal erred when it placed no weight on Pastor Sim's evidence, which the applicants contended was 'biased and unacceptable'. At the hearing before the Court, the applicants submitted that the Tribunal erred when it raised concerns that Pastor Sim had said that the applicants had attended church from 2010 despite only knowing the applicants from 2016. The applicants submitted that the church had records of when people attended, that this would have been visible to Pastor Sim and that the applicant did not tell Pastor Sim what to say in his statement.
2. The applicants' complaint appears to be a strong disagreement with the Tribunal's assessment of Pastor Sim's evidence and the weight it gave to that evidence. No error is disclosed in the Tribunal's consideration of the evidence given by Pastor Sim. The records of church attendance that the applicants refer to were not before the Tribunal when it made its decision, and Pastor Sim did not indicate where he had obtained the information about the applicants' church attendance. In the circumstances, it was not unreasonable or illogical for the Tribunal to have concerns about the evidence of Pastor Sim, as set out at [29] - [30], [32] and [75] and to give his evidence no weight.
3. No bias is disclosed on the part of the Tribunal in its assessment of Pastor Sim's evidence and the weight it gave to it. It was open to the Tribunal to make the findings it made on the basis of the evidence before it and for the reasons it gave, which were comprehensive and cogent.
4. Ground three does not disclose any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.

1. By ground four the applicant alleges that the Tribunal erred by considering that the applicant had to be involved in the 'direct adverse action' taken by the police in China and that fear of persecution was sufficient.
2. In her submissions to the Court, the applicant said that evangelism in China was prohibited and that it was something God had asked her to do and that she must and would fulfil this duty. The applicants contended that the Tribunal did not understand this part of the religion and did not understand that in China it was not permissible to do this.
3. I am not satisfied that any of the matters raised in respect of ground four have been made out.
4. First, nowhere in its decision did the Tribunal indicate that the applicants had to be involved (or be the subject of) adverse police action in China to be owed protection. The Tribunal's decision discloses that it considered the applicant's claims and evidence, including adverse events which she claimed had occurred in China, and found at [88] that '[it] does not accept that [the applicant] was a Christian when she was in China. [It] does not accept that her parents and relatives were all Christians and attended a house church.' Consequently, the Tribunal did not accept any of the claims (which included adverse interactions with the police in China) 'which flowed from that': [88]. These findings were open to the Tribunal on the evidence before it and for the comprehensive reasons it gave.
5. Second, the Tribunal also considered the applicant's claim to fear persecution in China, but it was not satisfied that the fear was well founded: [103]. The Tribunal's conclusion was open to it and no error is disclosed in its reasoning or the conclusion it arrived at in that regard.
6. Third, the Tribunal's decision demonstrates that it understood and considered the applicant's claims regarding evangelism. At [39], the Tribunal expressed the concern that the applicant had 'made new claims that she evangelises in Australia and will not be able to do so if she returns to China'. At [39] and [40], the Tribunal set out its discussion with the applicants regarding the applicant's claims about evangelism. At [41] - [43], the Tribunal put to the applicants its concerns with the evidence given about the applicant's evangelism claim. In considering the evidence before it, the Tribunal concluded that it was not satisfied that the applicant had been evangelising in Australia or that she would have the desire to do so if she returned to China. This conclusion was open to it for the reasons it gave. It cannot be said that the Tribunal did not understand or properly consider the applicant's claims about evangelism. The Tribunal's decision plainly demonstrates that it did.
7. Ground four does not disclose any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.

1. By ground five, the applicants allege the Tribunal erred by failing to give fair and reasonable consideration to the applicant's commitment to her religion and its findings as to her baptism and her practice of the religion were unconvincing and unacceptable.
2. When given an opportunity at the hearing before the Court to speak to this ground, the applicants took issue with the Tribunal's finding that the applicant was a new Christian. It was submitted that the applicant had been involved in evangelism. The applicants also took issue with the Tribunal's consideration of the applicant's lack of religious study because, the applicants contended, her visa did not allow her to study, but she wanted to do this in the future.
3. The Tribunal's decision plainly demonstrates that it expressly considered all the evidence before it as to the applicant's claims about her faith, including her baptism and evangelism: at [35] - [44]. Whilst the Tribunal accepted that the applicant was baptised in 2017 and was a genuine convert to Christianity, it did not accept that she had evangelised or that she would do so if she returned to China. I accept the Minister's submission that the Tribunal's findings at [93] were open to it on the evidence before it. The Tribunal's reasons in that regard were detailed and comprehensive and it cannot be said that they were illogical or that the Tribunal's conclusion on this issue was legally unreasonable.
4. As to the issue of the applicant's religious study (or lack thereof because of visa condition), this was not a claim before the Tribunal and as such it did not have to consider it.
5. In reply submissions, the applicants also took issue with the Tribunal's concerns about the applicant's baptisms. The applicants contended that the applicant had been baptised for the first time in China and was baptised for a second time in Australia because her husband had never been baptised before and they wanted to be baptised together. This complaint seeks to engage the Court in review of the merits of the applicants' claims, which is not permissible in judicial review proceedings.
6. Ground five does not disclose any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.

1. By ground six, the applicants allege that the Tribunal erred by failing to disclose country information on which it relied, and that the country information relied upon was irrelevant to the applicant's circumstances and was otherwise not persuasive or unconvincing.
2. At the hearing before the Court, the applicants said the Tribunal had informed them that it had information before it from a web search which indicated that evangelism was not permitted in China, but that the applicants could attend church to sing and worship in China. The applicants submitted that evangelism was an important part of the faith, and that the applicant must evangelise.
3. The Tribunal's decision at [63] - [70] plainly demonstrates that it discussed with the applicants the country information it considered relevant to their claims. The applicants were given an opportunity to respond to the country information and the Tribunal had regard to their responses in its reasons. The applicants were clearly on notice of any country information which may not support their claims for protection, and it cannot be said that the Tribunal failed to afford the applicants procedural fairness in that regard.
4. While the applicants may emphatically disagree with the Tribunal's findings in respect of the applicant's evangelism claim, this is not of itself a basis for finding that the Tribunal erred. As found above, the Tribunal's finding at [93] that the applicant will evangelise in public or that she will have any desire to do so if she returns to China was open to it for the reasons it gave.
5. Further, I accept the Minister's submission that the choice and assessment of country information was a matter for the Tribunal. No error has been disclosed in the Tribunal's consideration of the country information or the applicants' responses to that information.
6. Ground six does not disclose any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.

1. By ground seven, the applicants allege that the Tribunal erred by not giving the applicant an opportunity to comment on adverse information put to her at the hearing.
2. At the hearing before the Court, the applicants submitted that the Tribunal had information related to evangelism in China and they were not given an opportunity to comment on this.
3. I accept as contended by the Minister that the Tribunal put to the applicants the information which it considered would be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review pursuant to s 424AA of the Act. The Tribunal's compliance with this provision is expressly stated at [41], [46] and [54] of its decision. There is no evidence before the Court which suggests that there was any non-compliance with s 424AA.
4. As to the country information about evangelism, this was not information that was required to be put to the applicants pursuant to s 424AA of the Act, as it fell within the exception of s 424A(3). The country information regarding evangelism in China was discussed with the applicants at the hearing. The Tribunal expressly stated this at [65], and the applicants were given an opportunity to comment on that information.
5. Ground seven does not disclose any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.

1. By ground eight, the applicants allege that the Tribunal failed to consider the applicant's commitment to her religion and particularly her 'devotion' to missionary work which is dangerous in China.
2. At the hearing before the Court, the applicants contended that the applicant had been involved in missionary work and plans to be involved in it in the future as it is now happening more regularly.
3. As submitted by the Minister, this ground seeks impermissible merits review. The Tribunal's decision demonstrates that it considered the applicant's claims (as raised before it) and the country information regarding religious practice and evangelism in China. At [66] - [67] the Tribunal found the applicant could evangelise in China if she was a registered religious adherent and could proselytise in registered places of worship and in private settings. Having considered the evidence before it, the Tribunal concluded at [93] of its decision that it was not satisfied the applicant would be unable to practise Christianity in a house church in China if she wished and found that there was not a real chance that she would suffer harm for these reasons.
4. As to the applicants' submission regarding the applicant's 'missionary work', there is no evidence before the Court which suggests evidence was put before the Tribunal regarding missionary work undertaken by the applicant. To the extent that the term 'missionary work' may be a translation of evangelism or proselytising, the Tribunal considered and dealt with this claim (at [93]) and its findings in this regard were open to it for the reasons it gave. Further, any missionary work which may have been undertaken by the applicant since the Tribunal's decision (or any future missionary work the applicant intends to undertake) is not material that can be considered by the Court in judicial review proceedings.
5. In reply submissions the applicants restated the applicant's eagerness and willingness to evangelise and took issue with the Tribunal's finding that she could do so in China.
6. Ground eight does not disclose any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.

1. By ground nine, the applicants take issue with the Tribunal's assessment of the evidence relevant to the entire family's commitment to Christianity. They also take issue with the Tribunal's findings as to the level of religious practice that is permitted in China.
2. At the hearing before the Court, the applicants submitted that the Tribunal made its findings based on country information it had obtained from a website without properly understanding the impact or the consequences of those findings.
3. I am not satisfied that the Tribunal erred in the way it considered the country information. The Tribunal discussed with the applicant the country information relevant to the applicant's claims and there is nothing to suggest that it failed to understand that information or its significance in the context of the applicant's claims. The applicants were given the opportunity to comment on the country information; see [69] of the Tribunal's decision, and the Tribunal had regard to those responses.
4. As to the applicant's family members, the Tribunal expressly considered the second and third applicants' faith. The Tribunal gave the second applicant the benefit of the doubt and was prepared to accept he was a genuine convert to Christianity but found there was not a real chance he would suffer harm. The Tribunal was not satisfied the third applicant had formed any independent view as to her beliefs.
5. I am not satisfied that there was any failure on the part of the Tribunal to properly consider the applicant's claims regarding her family's commitment to the Christian faith. Nor am I satisfied that there was any failure on the part of the Tribunal in its understanding of the country information it relied upon when assessing the applicants' claims for protection.
6. Ground nine does not disclose any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.

1. I note that the paragraphs under the heading 'grounds of application' are not proper grounds of judicial review and appear to be a summary of the applicant's claims for protection. As explained to the applicants at the hearing before me, the Court on judicial review has no power to reconsider or reassess the merits of their claims for protection.

1. The Minister sought an order that the applicant pay the Minister's costs fixed in the sum of $5,000. When invited to make submissions the applicants took issue with the amount of costs sought stating that it was 'a lot' for them. An inability to pay or mere impecuniosity is not a ground for not making a costs order. Having regard to the work undertaken, the Court is satisfied that the costs sought in this matter are reasonable and that costs should follow the event and will so order.

1. For those reasons, I will order that the application is dismissed and that the first and second applicants pay the Minister's costs.

I certify that the preceding ninety-one (91) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Skaros.

[1] The Court notes that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal has been superseded by the Administrative Review Tribunal. Item 10, Part 2 of Schedule 16 to the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 provides that for any proceedings that were pending in any court or tribunal immediately before the transition time and to which the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was a party, the Administrative Review Tribunal is, after the transition time, substituted for the Tribunal as a party to the proceedings. Therefore, in these Reasons, reference to the Tribunal is a reference to the Administrative Review Tribunal.