[2009] AATA 415
General information, not legal advice.
Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia
2009-06-05
Original judgment source is linked above.
THE RELEVANT LEGISLATION - "MEMBER OF A COUPLE"
" 4(1) In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears:
...
member of a couple has the meaning given by subsection (2), (3), (3A), (6) and 6A);
...
Member of a couple - general
4(2) Subject to subsection (3), a person is a member of a couple for the purposes of this Act if:
(a) the person is legally married to another person and is not, in the Secretary's opinion (formed as mentioned in subsection (3)), living separately and apart from the other person on a permanent or indefinite basis; or
(b) all of the following conditions are met:
(i) the person has a relationship with a person of the opposite sex (In this paragraph called the 'partner');
(ii) the person is not legally married to the partner;
(iii) the relationship between the person and the partner is, in the Secretary's opinion (formed as mentioned in subsections (3) and (3A)), a marriage-like relationship;
(iv) both the person and the partner are over the age of consent applicable in the State or Territory in which they live;
(v) the person and the partner are not within a prohibited relationship for the purposes of section 23B of the Marriage Act 1961.
...
Member of a couple - criteria for forming opinion about relationship
4(3) In forming an opinion about the relationship between 2 people for the purposes of paragraph (2)(a) or subparagraph (2)(b)(iii), the Secretary is to have regard to all the circumstances of the relationship including, in particular, the following matters:
(a) the financial aspects of the relationship, including:
(i) any joint ownership of real estate or other major assets and any joint liabilities; and
(ii) any significant pooling of financial resources especially in relation to major financial commitments; and
(iii) any legal obligations owed by one person in respect of the other person; and
(iv) the basis of any sharing of day-to-day household expenses;
(b) the nature of the household, including:
(i) any joint responsibility for providing care or support of children; and
(ii) the living arrangements of the people; and
(iii) the basis on which responsibility for housework is distributed;
(c) the social aspects of the relationship, including:
(i) whether the people hold themselves out as married to each other; and
(ii) the assessment of friends and regular associates of the people about the nature of their relationship; and
(iii) the basis on which the people make plans for, or engage in, joint social activities;
(d) any sexual relationship between the people;
(e) the nature of the people's commitment to each other, including:
(i) the length of the relationship; and
(ii) the nature of any companionship and emotional support that the people provide to each other; and
(iii) whether the people consider that the relationship is likely to continue indefinitely; and
(iv) whether the people see their relationship as a marriage-like relationship."
" 9. The relationship broke down so far as I recall when [child No 2] was about a year old in mid 1999. At the time, I believed he was having an affair because at the Christmas 1998 work party, there was a girl there who was all over him. [Mr B] was drunk but he didn't particularly respond, but then for the next six months or so before I moved out this girl would ring constantly and was quite rude to me if I answered the phone, she would simply say put [Mr B] on. During this period after [child No 2]'s birth and until I left, [Mr B] was at home less and less, he would generally not be home until 11 o'clock at night. He ceased to show any affection towards or interest in me. He would say, I am working, but I believed he was having an affair. He had always been pretty distant but this was much worse. [Mr B] and I were still living in Coral Street in Craigie at this time before I moved back to my Mum.
"Financials, Centrelink and Child Support 1999-2007
Contact with [Mr B] and the time he spent at the home 1999 - 2007
Co-operation with [Mr B] relating to [the 2 children]
Care of my sister ...'s 2 daughters ... and the DCD( Department for Community Development)
Changes that occurred in 2007 because Centrelink payments ceased and I commenced work
The applicant said that she did not write or sign that letter and that she presumed that it was Mr B's handwriting and signature. She added that Mr B was not giving evidence in this matter because "he doesn't care" and because he regards it as her "problem".
" To Whom It May Concern:
I have known Tracy Day for approximately thirteen years and have been in a relationship with her for the past six years.
I spend most weekends with Tracy at her place and also attend Motocross to watch the boys and help out when it is held at Wanneroo.
Tracy's ex partner [Mr B], who shares his house with Tracy, is amicable with our relationship.
I would prefer Tracy to live with me in my home but couldn't handle having her boys living with me too as they are pretty full on." (T38, p 522)
The applicant said that the signature in that letter was Mr M's signature, and that she did not write it. She added that she had never practised writing Mr M's signature.
I, my daughter Tracy (sic) Day and two other ladies holidayed in Bali from 11th to 19th February, 2007.
We were both part of a large group on a previous trip to Bali in 1999. [Mr B] was part of the group. Tracy (sic) and [Mr B] had been having problems with their relationship and tried, unsuccessfully, to resolve their problems.
I have a good relationship with [Mr B] and he is the father of my grandchildren. I also have no problems with his family who all live overseas and would contact them immediately. It made sense that I would be named as next of kin in the event of something unforeseen happening to him. I am also available for the children and capable of dealing with a traumatic situation should it occur.
..." (T46)
She confirmed that she had prepared that statutory declaration. She said that she had spelt the applicant's first name as "Tracy" - instead of the correct spelling, "Tracey" - because the applicant had told her to do so as it was a "legal document". She had earlier explained that the applicant's first name was incorrectly spelt as "Tracy" on her birth certificate.
" To whom it may concern
I am writing to advise you that my daughter, Tracy (sic) Day, is to my knowledge not involved in a sexual relationship with [Mr B].
They did have a relationship which deteriorated after the birth of their second son in 1998. Tracy (sic) and the two boys eventually moved in with me in late 1999 for approximately 4 or 5 weeks. After this they appeared to resolve their differences and began speaking civilly to each other. However I did notice that they ceased to display any physical affection toward each other. They do appear to respect each other and both work hard to give the kids a stable upbringing.
Through being a constant visitor I am also aware that they have their own bedrooms.
I would also like to add that, having been a single parent myself, I am very proud that both Tracy (sic) and [Mr B] have been able to put their own differences aside for the sake of the kids. ..." (T37, p 494)
She said that she agreed with the contents of that letter and explained that she had spelt the applicant's first name as "Tracy" because it was "a legal thing".
Did the applicant have a "marriage-like relationship" with Mr B in the relevant period?
" ...
Marriage-like relationships
Social security legislation has long been concerned to differentiate the rate of benefits payable between those who are single and those who enjoy the benefits of marriage or like relationships. Such distinctions were made in the Social Services Act 1947_(Cth) which preceded the Act._
An example of an earlier statutory formula giving effect to such a distinction was considered by the Full Federal Court in Lambe v Director-General of Social Services [1981] FCA 171; (1981) 57 FLR 262. The question was whether a single mother in receipt of a support parent benefit was 'living with ... a man as his wife on a bona fide domestic basis although not legally married to him'. In deciding whether such a relationship existed the Court held that it was necessary to take into account a variety of factors, albeit no factors were spelt out in the statute. The Court held that all facets of the interpersonal relationship of the two persons had to be taken into account. Importantly (at 271):
... the question of the financial support which [the man] provides is an important although not necessarily crucial consideration, but is only one of a number of relevant matters which the Tribunal should take into account in characterizing, as required by the definition, the nature of the relationship ...
The same statutory formula was considered by Fitzgerald J in Lynam v Director-General of Social Security (1983) 1 AAR 197. He applied Lambe and said, inter alia (at 200):
Each element of a relationship draws its colour and its significance from the other elements, some of which may point in one direction and some in the other. What must be looked at is the composite picture. Any attempt to isolate individual factors and to attribute to them relative degrees of materiality or importance involves a denial of common experience and will almost inevitably be productive of error. The endless scope for differences in human attitudes and activities means that there will be an almost infinite variety of combinations of circumstances which may fall for consideration. In any particular case, it will be a question of fact and degree, a jury question, whether a relationship between two unrelated persons of the opposite sex meets the statutory test.
The criterion of marital relationship was considered O'Loughlin J (sic) in Staunton-Smith v Secretary, Department of Social Security [1991] FCA 513; (1991) 32 FCR 164. The question in that case was whether a woman claiming a sole parent's pension was 'a married person ... living separately and apart from her spouse'. Having separated from her husband she had returned home as a matter of convenience and because of his assistance in caring for their disabled child. O'Loughlin J referred to Lambe and Lynam. He endorsed the observations of Fitzgerald J quoted earlier. He said (at 173):
... it is not sufficient to merely note that a couple are sharing accommodation, nor is it sufficient to note that one is financially dependent on the other; it is necessary to delve deeper to find the reasons for those arrangements. Those reasons will be better indicators in determining the correct nature of their relationship.
In determining whether a marriage-like relationship exists under the present Act, the nature of the exercise is much the same as that required under the statutory formulas in use in the cases cited above.
...
Having regard to the current provisions of s 4(3) and the approaches discussed in the earlier authorities mentioned, a decision-maker concerned with whether an unmarried person is in a marriage-like relationship with another person of the opposite sex:
(1) Must have regard to their interpersonal relationship as a whole not limited by the factors listed in s 4(3).
(2) Must have regard to each of:
(a) the financial aspects of the relationship;
(b) the nature of the household;
(c) the social aspects of the relationship;
(d) any sexual relationship between the people; and
(e) the nature of the people's commitment to each other.
(3) In having regard to the preceding five matters, must have regard to all factors relevant to each and, in particular, must have regard to the factors listed under each heading in s 4(3).
(4) Must specifically consider the total picture of the relationship created by all of these factors bearing in mind that consideration must be given to those which weigh against a marriage-like relationship and those which weigh in favour of it.
(5) Must undertake the preceding consideration bearing in mind that a marriage-like relationship is not disclosed solely by any one of the following matters:
(a) financial cooperation;
(b) cohabitation;
(c) a sexual relationship;
(d) cooperative household arrangements; or
(e) mutual commitment.
The judgment to be made is difficult and, once out of the range of obvious cases falling within the core concept of 'marriage-like', will be attended by a degree of uncertainty. Indeed, it may be that different decision-makers on the same facts could quite reasonably come up with different answers.
..."
These apparent instances of dishonest behaviour on the part of the applicant cause the Tribunal to have grave reservations about the reliability of her evidence in general and, in particular, the reliability of her self-serving evidence in respect of matters which relate to the central issue in this case, namely, the nature and character of her relationship with Mr B in the relevant period.
" Tracy (sic) Day has been coming to my clinic with both [child No 1] and [child No 2] since March 2000 and in all this time I have known her to be a single mother.
I understand the father of [child No 2] and [child No 1] also resides at this address as a single parent. I feel it would be detrimental to both boys for them not to have this continued support from their father." (T38, p 513);
"I have known Tracy Day since she was a child. She is a caring, loving mother to her two boys. To my knowledge Tracy has had no intimate relationship with the boys' father [Mr B] since the youngest son was born. They are still living under the same roof to keep the boys in a safe environment to grow up in and their life is focused on the boys. Tracy came to Bali with me and her mother in February this year." (T38, p 514)
There is also objective evidence that Mr M departed Australia on 1 November 2005 and returned to Australia on 11 November 2005 (Exhibit R1, p 597).
" 57. Ms Day told the Tribunal that the only reason she travels with [Mr B] overseas is because of her concern that [Mr B] will take the boys away to New Zealand and not return them to her care. Ms Day said that she bases this concern on conversations she said that she overheard in 1999 in which she says that [Mr B's] mother tried to encourage [Mr B] to leave Ms Day and return to live in New Zealand with the boys.
In her oral evidence to this Tribunal the applicant said that she went on the abovementioned overseas trips because she "won't let [Mr B] take the kids out of the country without [her] because he won't bring them back".
The Tribunal infers that it is the applicant's evidence that, from the commencement of the relevant period, she has not regarded her relationship with Mr B as a marriage-like relationship, and that she considers that her relationship with Mr B, in the form in which it has existed from the commencement of the relevant period, is likely to continue at least until the children attain adulthood. The Tribunal, however, does not accept the applicant's (obviously self-serving) evidence. As previously noted, the Tribunal did not have the benefit of receiving any evidence directly from Mr B.
Conclusion regarding the nature of the relationship between the applicant and Mr B in the relevant period
Although certain aspects of the relationship between the applicant and Mr B in the relevant period - including some aspects of the financial circumstances such as the absence of any joint ownership of real estate or other significant assets and the absence of any pooling of financial resources and of any joint undertaking of major financial commitments, and (if the applicant's evidence is true) the absence of any sexual relationship between her and Mr B since 2003 - may not be indicative of the existence of a marriage-like relationship between them in that period, in the Tribunal's opinion no aspect or circumstance of their relationship necessarily militates conclusively against the existence of a marriage-like relationship between them in that period.
The applicant was a "member of a couple", for the purposes of the Act, for the whole of the relevant period
Should the debt due by the applicant to the Commonwealth be recovered from her?
" 1236(1) Subject to subsection (1A), the Secretary may, on behalf of the Commonwealth, decide to write off a debt, for a stated period or otherwise.
1236(1A) The Secretary may decide to write off a debt under subsection (1) if, and only if:
(a) the debt is irrecoverable at law; or
(b) the debtor has no capacity to repay the debt; or
(c) the debtor's whereabouts are unknown after all reasonable efforts have been made to locate the debtor; or
(d) it is not cost effective for the Commonwealth to take action to recover the debt.
1236(1B) For the purposes of paragraph (1A)(a), a debt is taken to be irrecoverable at law if, and only if:
(a) the debt cannot be recovered by means of deductions, or legal proceedings, or garnishee notice, because the relevant 6 year period mentioned in section 1231, 1232 or 1233 has elapsed; or
(aa) the debt cannot be recovered by means of deductions or setting off because the relevant 6 year period mentioned in section 86 of the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999 has elapsed; or
(b) there is no proof of the debt capable of sustaining legal proceedings for its recovery; or
(c) the debtor is discharged from bankruptcy and the debt was incurred before the debtor became bankrupt and was not incurred by fraud; or
(d) the debtor has died leaving no estate or insufficient funds in the debtor's estate to repay the debt.
1236(1C) For the purposes of paragraph (1A)(b), if a debt is recoverable by means of:
(a) deductions from the debtor's social security payment; or
(b) deductions under section 84 of the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999; or
(c) setting off under section 84A of that Act;
the debtor is taken to have a capacity to repay the debt unless recovery by those means would result in the debtor being in severe financial hardship.
..."
" 1237A(1) Subject to subsection (1A), the Secretary must waive the right to recover the proportion of a debt that is attributable solely to an administrative error made by the Commonwealth if the debtor received in good faith the payment or payments that gave rise to that proportion of the debt.
Note: Subsection (1) does not allow waiver of a part of a debt that was caused partly by administrative error and partly by one or more other factors (such as error by the debtor).
..."
" 1237AAD The Secretary may waive the right to recover all or part of a debt if the Secretary is satisfied that:
(a) the debt did not result wholly or partly from the debtor or another person knowingly:
(i) making a false statement or a false representation; or
(ii) failing or omitting to comply with a provision of this Act, the Administration Act or the 1947 Act; and
(b) there are special circumstances (other than financial hardship alone) that make it desirable to waive; and
(c) it is more appropriate to waive than to write off the debt or part of the debt."
Accordingly, the Commonwealth's right to recover the whole of the debt due by the applicant to it cannot be waived pursuant to s 1237A(1) of the Act.
The Tribunal, furthermore, is not satisfied that there are any special circumstances in the applicant's case that would make it desirable to waive the Commonwealth's right to recover the relevant debt from her. Paragraph (b) of s 1237AAD of the Act is, therefore, also not fulfilled in the applicant's case. Accordingly, the Commonwealth's right to recover the whole of the debt due by the applicant to it cannot be waived pursuant to s 1237AAD of the Act.
I certify that the 82 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Deputy President S D Hotop
Signed: E Jordan .....................................................................................
Pelka v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2006] FCA 735; (2006) 151 FCR 546
(2006) 151 FCR 546
(1981) 57 FLR 262
(1991) 32 FCR 164