[2008] AATA 1075
General information, not legal advice.
Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia
2008-11-26
Original judgment source is linked above.
(1) Within one month after the end of each reporting period (see subsection (5)), the Secretary must give the Minister a report in accordance with subsection (2).
(2) The report must contain the information set out in subsection (3) that has been provided to the Secretary during the reporting period in relation to the carriage of live-stock on any voyage to a port outside Australia (whether or not during the reporting period).
(3) The information is to be based on reporting by the master of the ship under the Marine Orders (see subsection (5)) and is to set out the following:
(b) the month and year in which the completion of the loading of the live-stock occurred;
(c) the port or ports at which the loading took place;
(d) the port or ports at which the live-stock were discharged;
(e) the month and year in which the completion of the discharge of the live-stock occurred at each port;
(h) the number of each type of live-stock loaded;
(i) the total mortality for each type of live-stock;
(j) the percentage mortality for each type of live-stock;
(k) any action taken by the Secretary in relation to the exporter as a result of the reporting by the master of the ship.
(4) The Minister must arrange for a copy of the report to be tabled in each House of the Parliament within 15 sitting days of the House after the report is given to the Minister.
Marine Orders means orders under subsection 425(1AA) of the Navigation Act 1912.
(a) the period of 6 months starting on 1 July or 1 January (whichever occurs first) after the commencement of this section; and
(1) A document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act would disclose:
(c) information (other than trade secrets or information to which paragraph (b) applies) concerning a person in respect of his or her business or professional affairs or concerning the business, commercial or financial affairs of an organization or undertaking, being information:
(i) the disclosure of which would, or could reasonably be expected to, unreasonably affect that person adversely in respect of his or her lawful business or professional affairs or that organization or undertaking in respect of its lawful business, commercial or financial affairs; or
(ii) the disclosure of which under this Act could reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of information to the Commonwealth or an agency for the purpose of the administration of a law of the Commonwealth or of a Territory or the administration of matters administered by an agency.
It is not contended that any of the further sub-sections of s 43 have any relevance to
'Subject to this Act, a person's right of access is not affected by:
(b) the agency's or Minister's belief as to what are his or her reasons for seeking access.'
It was submitted for the respondent that the effect of this provision was that conjectures by the applicant as to what may be the reasons for the joined party seeking access could not be taken into account by the agency (the respondent) to form a belief to be taken into account in determining the joined party's right of access.
"However, the word "unreasonably" should be given its ordinary meaning. Section 43(1)(c)(i) poses the issue whether disclosure of the information would unreasonably affect a person adversely. The issue is not whether "the effect is of substance rather than incidental or trivial", as stated by the Tribunal in par.67.
If it would be in the public interest that certain information be disclosed, that would be a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether a person would be unreasonably affected by the disclosure; the effect, though great, may be reasonable under the circumstances. To give two examples: if the relevant information showed that a business practice or product posed a threat to public safety or involved serious criminality, a judgment might be made that it was not unreasonable to inflict that result though the effect on the person concerned would be serious. Of course, the extent and nature of the effect will always be relevant, often decisive. Whether the effect of the disclosure is unreasonable cannot be assessed without taking into account all relevant factors: see Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corp (1991) 29 FCR 429 at 438,441".
In relation to these voyages a note was appended in the report to Parliament in which it was stated:
I certify that the 28 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Hon Robert Nicholson
Re Livestock Transport and Trading Co KFC and Australian Maritime Safety Authority [1991] AATA 340
(1991) 29 FCR 429
(1992) 108 ALR 163