Dasreef Proprietary Limited v Hawchar

(a) In my opinion, [Ms Griffiths'] symptoms are directly related to the cumulative impact of her experiences during the relationship and the disempowering impact of [Mr Shaw]'s sudden decision to leave and his ongoing efforts to prolong/control the settlement process.

(b) In my opinion, [Ms Griffiths'] symptoms of anxiety, stress and depression - stress, depression and post-traumatic stress disorder are associated with the financially coercive and emotionally abusive behaviour of [Mr Shaw] since they have been led - since they have led her to feeling disempowered and worthless. These feelings have been intensified by the settlement process that was felt unfair, imbalanced and prolonged"

(c) From paragraph 8 - "In my opinion, [Ms Griffiths] has had difficulty identifying her experience in terms of coercive control in the initial stages of treatment largely because she has been conditioned to expert and accept [Mr Shaw]'s behaviour in the context of what she believed at the time to be a committed relationship characterised by shared financial goals... and this has allowed to recognise the many ways in which [Mr Shaw]'s coercive behaviour was intended to control and diminish her."

(d) From paragraph 12 - "In my opinion, it is already clear that this process has had significant negative impacts on [Ms Griffiths'] employment and career pathway. The severity of her psychological symptoms has made it difficult for her to focus effectively on her work, and she has been forced to relocate interstate to secure employment and provide for her financial security. It remains to be seen what impact this will have on her longer-term career prospects."

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. At the commencement of the trial in these property proceedings, Mr Trezise, Counsel for the Respondent Husband, objected to certain parts of an affidavit filed by Ms B on 6 August 2025. Ms B is the Applicant Wife's psychologist. It was submitted that each of the alleged offending paragraphs in that affidavit fall outside the exception to the single expert rules found in rule 7.01 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) and, therefore, should not be received. Mr Havenstein, Counsel for the Wife, contended that they all fell within the stated exception.
2. Rule 7.01 of the rules states that a party must apply for the Court's permission to tender a report or adduce evidence at a hearing of a trial from an expert witness other than a single expert witness. Rule 7.02 sets out the purpose of the part and states that the purpose of the part is as follows:

(a) To ensure the parties obtain expert evidence only in relation to a significant issue in dispute;

(b) To restrict expert evidence to that which is necessary to resolve or determine the proceedings;

(c) To ensure that, if practicable, without compromising the interest of justice, expert evidence is given on an issue by a single expert witness;

(d) To avoid unnecessary costs arising from the appointment of more than one expert witness;

(e) To enable a party to apply for permission to tender a report or adduce evidence from an expert witness appointed by that party if that is necessary in the interests of justice.

1. Rule 7.01 reads:

(1) This part does not apply to any of the following:

(a) Evidence from a medical practitioner or other person who has provided or is providing treatment for a party or child if the evidence relates only to all to any or all of the following:

(i) The results of an examination, investigation made.

(ii) A description of any treatment carried out or recommended.

(iii) Expressions of opinion limited to the reasons for carrying out or recommending treatment, and the consequences of the treatment, including a prognosis.

1. In the decision of Biggs & Biggs [2014] FamCA 1033, which considered the then rule 15.4(1), which read in identical terms, Watts J stated at paragraph 16 and following:

Senior counsel for the father argued that the words, "A description of any treatment carried out or recommended is wide enough to allow the children's therapist and the father's clinical psychologist to provide opinion and recommendations about which orders should be made by the court and opinions about other issues in the case, including views about what might be in the best interest of the children." Senior counsel for the father invited me to look up the oxford English Dictionary for the definition of the word "treatment".

I did that. There are, of course, a number of different meanings of the word "treatment" (for example, the manager in which someone deals with another; the use of a chemical to preserve something). The context in which the word "treatment" is used in the rules means medical care given to a patient for an illness or applied medical care or attention to. Interpreted in that way, the words "treatment recommended" in rule 15.4(1)(a)(ii) of the Family Law Rules cannot be given the broad meaning proposed by senior counsel for the father.

To do so would mean that, in circumstances where expert evidence has been given on an issue by a single expert witness, any treating professional could be asked to express an opinion as to any issue in the case and what orders the court should make in the case, and there would be no need to seek permission to admit evidence pursuant to the rules. The dangers in doing so have been long recognised (see Re W & W abuse allegations, expert evidence [2001] FamCA 2016).

1. Turning now to the alleged offending paragraphs. The first is part of paragraph 5. The words objected to are:

In this context, it became clearer that her vulnerability to symptoms of PTSD was related to her lived experience during this relationship. My initial impression was that [Ms Griffiths] had been completely blindsided by his decision to leave the relationship and was feeling overwhelmed by feelings of loss and powerlessness.

1. Ms B, with these words, was doing more that expressing an opinion limited to reasons for carrying out or recommending treatment and the consequences of treatment, including a prognosis. She was attempting to provide an expert opinion as to the cause of her client's vulnerability - shooting that cause home to the Husband. That type of opinion is the domain of a single expert, not Ms B. The words will be struck out.
2. The alleged offending parts of paragraph 7 read:

I understand that the court may or may not make certain findings about the experiences that [Ms Griffiths] has reported to me about her relationship with [Mr Shaw]; however, after providing ongoing treatment to [Ms Griffiths] since March 2023, it is my genuine belief/opinion that:

(a) In my opinion, [Ms Griffiths'] symptoms are directly related to the cumulative impact of her experiences during the relationship and the disempowering impact of [Mr Shaw]'s sudden decision to leave and his ongoing efforts to prolong/control the settlement process.

(b) In my opinion, [Ms Griffiths'] symptoms of anxiety, stress and depression - stress, depression and post-traumatic stress disorder are associated with the financially coercive and emotionally abusive behaviour of [Mr Shaw] since they have been led - since they have led her to feeling disempowered and worthless. These feelings have been intensified by the settlement process that was felt unfair, imbalanced and prolonged.[1]

1. Here, too, Ms B is attempting to provide an expert opinion as to the cause of her client's vulnerability. That is the domain of a single expert, not Ms B. The words will be struck out.
2. To be clear, Ms B reporting what her patient has told her and basing her opinions and treatment on that information is permissible information to provide to the Court, but Ms B goes further in the paragraph I have just read, and she is attempting to provide her belief as to the cause of the wife's issues when she does not have all of the necessary information to her to make such a statement.
3. As stated, the evidence will be struck out.
4. Paragraph 8 reads:

In my opinion, [Ms Griffiths] has had difficulty identifying her experience in terms of coercive control in the initial stages of treatment largely because she has been conditioned to expert and accept [Mr Shaw]'s behaviour in the context of what she believed at the time to be a committed relationship characterised by shared financial goals. Treatment has helped her to recognise her worth and identify healthy relationship parameters, and this has allowed to recognise the many ways in which [Mr Shaw]'s coercive behaviour was intended to control and diminish her.

1. Paragraph 8 suffers from the same issue as raised above. It proffers an opinion as to the cause without all the relevant information at hand. However, the words, "Treatment has helped her to recognise her worth and identify healthy relationship parameters" - those words do refer to the consequences of treatment, and I will retain those words but remove the balance. To be clear, the only part that can remain of paragraph 8 are the words, "Treatment has helped her to recognise her worth and identify healthy relationship parameters."
2. Paragraph 9 reads:

At the time of the initial presentation, [Ms Griffiths] met the diagnostic criteria for generalised anxiety disorder, panic disorder, adjustment disorder and anxiety and depressed mood and post-traumatic stress disorder in line with the criteria outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5 Edition, DSM-5.

1. In my view, this paragraph does not offend rule 7.01. It was an expression of opinion limited to the reasons for carrying out or recommending treatment and the consequences of treatment. And those consequences of the treatment are being set out in paragraphs 10 and 11, and I note there was no objection to paragraphs 10 and 11. Paragraph 9 will remain.
2. Finally, in relation to paragraph 12, paragraph 12 reads as follows:

In my opinion, it is already clear that this process has had significant negative impacts on [Ms Griffiths'] employment and career pathway. The severity of her psychological symptoms has made it difficult for her to focus effectively on her work, and she has been forced to relocate interstate to secure employment and provide for her financial security. It remains to be seen what impact this will have on her longer-term career prospects.

1. This, in my view, is a recitation of information provided by the Wife. It is hearsay and does not make the exception set out in 7.01. It will be struck out.
2. Even if I am wrong as to my determination in relation to the application of rule 7.01, I would decline to allow the information to be received in any event pursuant to section 135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), which reads under the heading 'General Discretion to Exclude Evidence':

The court may refuse to admit evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might:

(a) be unfairly prejudicial to a party; or

(b) be misleading or confusing; or

(c) cause or result in an undue waste of time.

1. The opinions expressed in the report are based solely upon information received by Ms B from the Wife. The opinions that I have referred to that are struck out are better expressed - as she does, in fact, express them to be - as her beliefs.
2. They were not an objective assessment. Nowhere in her report does Ms B refer to reading any affidavit or other material putting the Husband's case regarding the Wife's accusations. Her opinions are purely based on what the Wife has told her.
3. This is fine in a therapeutic setting, but inappropriate for the purpose of an expert opinion based on specialised knowledge as required by section 79 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). The logic of the conclusions expressed by Ms B are not underpinned by a chain of reasoning required for an expert, as set out in Dasreef Proprietary Limited v Hawchar (2011) HCA 21. The expressed opinions could carry so little weight that to allow them to be taken into evidence could result in the Court being misled or confused.
4. A further problem, if the information is allowed, is the undue waste of time and extra cost that would be created, as Ms B would need to be cross-examined at length in relation to the information that she had at hand when she formed her opinion. The information contained in the alleged offending paragraphs is prejudicial, and that prejudice is not outweighed by its probative value. The information will be struck from the document.

I certify that the preceding twenty-one (21) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Turnbull.

[1] Mr Trezise initially objected to a further paragraph, 7(c) however conceded that paragraph 7(c) should remain.