• [9] On 23 September 2025, Mr Parker requested a further extension to file his material until 29 September 2025. I advised the parties that I would deal with Mr Parker's request at a further case management conference which I proposed to list on 25 September 2025. After the Notice of Listing was issued, Mr Parker contacted my Chambers on 24 September 2025 to advise that he was not available to attend the conference because it was at the same time as a specialist appointment he was required to attend. Later that day, I instructed my Associate to send an email to the parties which relevantly provided:

Deputy President Wright will not be considering Mr Parker's further request for an extension without giving the Respondent a proper opportunity to be heard. The Deputy President proposes to do this by way of a case management conference.

As Mr Parker is not available to attend the case management conference scheduled for tomorrow, it will be cancelled.

For the purpose of considering whether Mr Parker will be permitted to file his material outside of the timeframes ordered by the Commission, Deputy President Wright requires Mr Parker to file all of the material which he wishes to rely upon by 4pm on Monday 29 September 2025. The Deputy President will then make a decision about whether to accept this material at a case management conference which will be scheduled on a date to be advised.

• [10] At 7:13pm and 11:07pm on 29 September 2025, Mr Parker submitted material in a format which was inconsistent with the requirements of the directions issued by the Commission, and which could not be accessed by the Commission. Mr Parker was made aware of this and requested to provide his material as Word or PDF attachments to an email as soon as possible and by no later than 1pm that day. My Chambers sent the parties an email advising that I intended to list the matter for a case management conference at 2pm on 1 October 2025 and to advise my Chambers if that time and date was not suitable. My Chambers did not hear back from either party so a Notice of Listing confirming the case management conference at 2pm on 1 October 2025 was issued.

• [11] The case management conference was listed at 2pm on 1 October 2025. Mr Parker did not attend and provided no reason for his non-attendance. At this time, Mr Parker had not provided any material in the form required by the Commission, so it was not possible to make a decision at the conference whether to accept that material after the date specified in the directions which I issued on 22 September 2025. After hearing from Readinow, I decided to list the matter for hearing at 3:30pm on 2 October 2025 in relation to whether I should extend time for the filing of Mr Parker's application.

• [12] Later on 1 October 2025, at 8:21pm, after the Notice of Listing for the hearing on 2 October 2025 was issued, Mr Parker requested that the hearing be adjourned 'due to travel coinciding with the full time care of [his] sons on school holidays where [he has] travel commitments'. Mr Parker also sent six emails to my Chambers with 29 documents attached. These documents mainly comprised of screenshots of text messages between Mr Parker and Readinow and other documents generated either prior to or during the period that Mr Parker was employed by Readinow. There was also a communication between Mr Parker and Readinow on the day of Mr Parker's dismissal and some documents about Mr Parker's medical conditions which are referred to below. Mr Parker did not file any witness statements or submissions as required by the directions issued on 25 August 2025 and 22 September 2025.

• [13] At 9:52am on 2 October 2025, my Associate sent the following email to Mr Parker in response to his adjournment request:

The hearing was set down at the case management conference yesterday which you did not attend. You have not provided any reason for your non-attendance.

The hearing will proceed as scheduled today, 2 October 2025 at 3:30pm and will not be adjourned. At this hearing, Deputy President Wright will determine whether to extend the time for you to make the application under s.366(1)(b) beyond the 21-day time limit.

• [14] The hearing commenced at 3:30pm on 2 October 2025 as listed. Mr Parker did not attend the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, I dismissed Mr Parker's application as I was not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account the matters in s.366(2) I provide the following reasons for my decision.

When must an application for the Commission to deal with a dismissal dispute be made?

• [15] Section 366(1) of the FW Act provides that such an application must be made:

(a) within 21 days after the dismissal took effect; or

(b) within such further period as the Commission allows.

• [16] It is a matter of record that the application was made on 14 July 2025.

• [17] There is no dispute between the parties that the dismissal took effect on 10 October 2024.

Was the application made within 21 days after the dismissal took effect?

• [18] As the Full Bench has stated, "[t]he 21 day period prescribed... does not include the day on which the dismissal took effect."[2]

• [19] As I found above, the dismissal took effect on 10 October 2024. The final day of the 21 day period was therefore 31 October 2024 and ended at midnight on that day. The application was made on 14 July 2025. The application was made 256 days late.

• [20] The application having not been made within 21 days of the date on which the dismissal took effect, I need to consider whether to allow a further period for the application to be made.

Should the Commission a further period for the application to be made?

• [21] Under section 366(2) of the FW Act, the Commission may allow a further period for a dismissal dispute application to be made if the Commission is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:

(b) any action taken by the Applicant to dispute the dismissal; and

(c) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and

(e) fairness as between the Applicant and other persons in a similar position.

• [22] Each of the above matters must be considered in assessing whether there are exceptional circumstances.[3]

• [23] I set out my consideration of each matter below.

• [24] For the application to have been made within 21 days after the dismissal took effect, it should have been made by midnight on 31 October 2024. The delay is the period commencing immediately after that time until 14 July 2025, although circumstances arising prior to that delay may be relevant to the reason for the delay.[4]

• [25] The reason for the delay is not in itself required to be an exceptional circumstance. It is one of the factors that must be weighed in assessing whether, overall, there are exceptional circumstances.[5]

• [26] An applicant does not need to provide a reason for the entire period of the delay. Depending on all the circumstances, an extension of time may be granted where the applicant has not provided any reason for any part of the delay.[6]

• [27] In the application, Mr Parker cited the following reasons for the delay:

1. Mr Parker has been diagnosed with Complex Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Complex PTSD), which significantly impaired his ability to engage with and pursue his legal rights following his dismissal. He was hospitalised for psychiatric care and required ongoing therapy, during which time he was unable to function effectively or participate in any legal processes.
2. Mr Parker engaged in good faith efforts to resolve this matter directly with Readinow, following the dismissal and prior to lodging this claim, including multiple written requests to Mr. Warwick Kirby, the CEO, and verbal communications seeking a resolution to the non-payment of owed entitlements, unlawful deductions, and breach of contract.
3. Readinow's ongoing refusal to resolve the matter in a timely manner directly resulted in the delay in lodging the claim. Mr Parker relied on verbal and written assurances from Mr. Kirby and Readinow's management that the matter would be settled without the need for external intervention. However, Readinow's failure to act in accordance with its own policies, coupled with the misleading nature of the communication, caused significant confusion and distress, which contributed to Mr Parker's failure to lodge the claim in the requisite time frame.

• [28] As noted above, Mr Parker provided 29 documents by email to the Commission on 1 October 2025. In relation to Mr Parker's PTSD diagnosis, these documents were:

• A medical certificate dated 8 October 2024 which referred to Mr Parker having PTSD, among other conditions;
• A referral from Mr Parker's GP to a psychiatrist dated 30 October 2024 which refers to Mr Parker having PTSD;
• One page of what appears to be discharge notes from St John of God Richmond Hospital dated 4 May 2025.

• [29] These documents were not properly before the Commission because:

• they were not filed in accordance with the timeframes provided in the directions issued on 25 August 2025 and 22 September 2025; and
• Mr Parker did not appear at the case conference 2pm on 1 October 2025 and had not provided the 27 documents in the form required by the Commission by that time, so it was not possible to make a decision at the conference whether to accept that material after the date specified in the directions.

• [30] Nevertheless, I observe that if these documents were properly before the Commission they are of limited probative value. While the documents appear to establish that Mr Parker has PTSD, they do not establish the extent to which he may have been incapacitated by PTSD or that PTSD directly or indirectly contributed to the delay in filing the application such that Mr Parker could not file the application prior to 14 July 2025.

• [31] In relation to the second reason for the delay, being Mr Parker's claim that Readinow refused to resolve the matter in a timely manner, I note that Mr Parker did not file any evidence in support of this claim. Further, none of the 29 documents provided by Mr Parker (assuming that these documents were properly before the Commission) support this claim.

• [32] Mr Parker has not filed any evidence in support of the reasons cited in his application for making the application 256 days outside of the 21-day limit. As such, there is no evidentiary basis for me to conclude that this matter weighs in favour of a finding of exceptional circumstances.

What action was taken by Mr Parker to dispute the dismissal?

• [33] In the application, Mr Parker claimed that he engaged in good faith efforts to resolve this matter directly with Readinow, following the dismissal and prior to lodging this claim, including multiple written requests to Mr Warwick Kirby, CEO Of Readinow, and verbal communications seeking a resolution to the non-payment of owed entitlements, unlawful deductions, and breach of contract.

• [34] Apart from a communication between Mr Parker and Readinow on the day of Mr Parker's dismissal (assuming that this document is properly before the Commission), there is no evidence before the Commission in relation to this matter. As such, there is insufficient evidence for me to conclude that this matter weighs in favour of a finding of exceptional circumstances.

What is the prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay)?

• [35] In the application, Mr Parker claimed that:

• There is no prejudice to Readinow as it has been fully aware of the issues raised in this claim and has had ample opportunity to resolve the matter before formal action was taken.
• There is no prejudice to Readinow in allowing this application to proceed, as it has had multiple opportunities to respond to my concerns and resolve the matter amicably.
• Given that Readinow was in full of all relevant information well before the statutory deadline, any delay in filing the claim will not result in it experiencing unfair prejudice or disadvantage.

• [36] Mr Parker did not file any evidence in support of these claims. As such, there is no evidentiary basis for me to conclude that this matter weighs in favour of a finding of exceptional circumstances.

• [37] In the application, Mr Parker claimed that he has a strong prima facie case for unlawful adverse action, discrimination, and unpaid entitlements. However, Mr Parker did not file any evidence in support of this claim. As such, there is no evidentiary basis for me to conclude that this matter weighs in favour of a finding of exceptional circumstances.

Fairness as between Mr Parker and other persons in a similar position

• [38] Mr Parker did not make any submissions about this matter. As such, there is no evidentiary or other basis for me to conclude that this matter weighs in favour of a finding of exceptional circumstances.

Is the Commission satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account the matters above?

• [39] I must now consider whether I am satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account my findings regarding:

(b) action taken by Mr Parker to dispute the dismissal; and

(c) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and

(e) fairness as between Mr Parker and other persons in a similar position

• [40] Briefly, exceptional circumstances are circumstances that are out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon but the circumstances themselves do not need to be unique nor unprecedented, nor even very rare.[7] Exceptional circumstances may include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors, or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together can be considered exceptional.[8]

• [41] Mr Parker has not established that any of the matters in s.366(2) either individually or collectively weigh in favour of a finding that there were exceptional circumstances.

• [42] Having regard to all of the matters provided in s.366(2) of the FW Act, I am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances so there is no basis to allow an extension of time. Mr Parker's application for the Commission to deal with a dismissal dispute is therefore dismissed.

[1] Lisha Herc v Hays Specialist Recruitment (Australia) Pty Limited [2022] FWCFB 234, [15]

[2] Singh v Trimatic Management Services Pty Ltd [2020] FWCFB 553, [10]. See also Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 36(1) as in force on 25 June 2009; Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 40A

[3] Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd [2018] FWCFB 901, [39]

[4] Shaw v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2015] FWCFB 287, [12] (Watson VP and Smith DP)

[5] Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd [2018] FWCFB 901, [39]

[7] Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd [2011] FWAFB 975, [13]

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