3. There was involved in this process a road closure apparently because the title searches demonstrated the subject property is a road. This is not a real issue between the parties because as was indicated in the affidavit of Jennifer Mary Thompson sworn 26 June 2003 and who is the respondent's property leasing officer, the title should be corrected to show the true position, namely that it is a reserve and not a road. This is necessary regardless of whether the leasing proceeds.

4. Following this request Thompson spoke to one Drummond, the respondent's manager for Property and Valuations, and then sought advice from solicitors Russell Kennedy with regard to the proposal in general.

5. Documents 1 and 2 is in fact one letter dated 30 May 2002 from Thompson to Russell Kennedy.

6. Document 3 is an email from Drummond to Russell Kennedy with regard to clarification of the leasing terms.

7. Documents 4, 5 and 6 are further emails between Drummond and Russell Kennedy on the same subject matter and deal with the usual queries with regards to a proposed lease.

8. Documents 7 to 10 is in fact one document namely, Document Statement by the Landlord of a Retail Premises. The author of this document is not known. It contains information concerning the proposed lease including rental and outgoings. It is not completed by either the landlord or the tenant.

9. Documents 11, 12 and 13 are dated 28 June 2002 and again they are from Russell Kennedy to Thompson and contain legal advice as to the lease and its terms.

10. The final document is No. 18 which are calculations generated within the agency and which are designed to establish an appropriate rental should the lease proceed.

11. The schedule before the Tribunal claims that with the exception of document No. 18 all of the other documents are exempt on the grounds of legal professional privilege.

12. Legal professional privilege protects communications passing between a client and his legal adviser. The principle applies not only to litigation contemplated or in process but also encompasses communications which are designed to enable the client to obtain or the adviser to give, legal advice.

13. Having regard to the above test, documents Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12 and 13 are clearly subject to legal professional privilege and are therefore exempt.

14. Document No. 7 is also claimed to be exempt on this basis. However, given the fact that its author is not known, it is difficult to determine if it is subject to legal professional privilege. If it is from Russell Kennedy and Cook, Solicitors, which I presume it is, then it would clearly be exempt for the reasons which I have outlined above. However, if it is a document brought into existence by the Shire then its exemption will arise not by reason of s.32 but by the internal working documents s.30.

15. Document 18 is a document which falls within s.30, that is, it is an exempt document which would disclose matter in the nature of opinion, advice or recommendation prepared by an officer in the course of and for the purpose of the deliberative processes involved in the functions of an agency and which would be contrary to the public interest to release.

16. The calculations made by an officer of an agency with regard to possible rentals that could be charged in respect of a lease which may be negotiated in my view falls squarely within s.30 and would be contrary to the public interest to release.

17. The final matter for determination is whether s.50(4) of the Act applies. This section, which is known as the public interest override, is only to apply in cases which involve significant issues - see DPP v Smith (1991) 1 VR63 The circumstances in which a Council enters into a lease with a childcare centre and which involves use of public land does not meet the criteria which is set out in the authorities.

18. For the above reasons the decision of the respondent not to release the above documents is affirmed in the ruling.