austlii:qld/QICmr/2025/22
General information, not legal advice.
QICmr
2025-04-30
Hoeben J
Original judgment source is linked above.
D83 and Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2025] QICmr 22 (30 April 2025)
Queensland Building and Construction Commission
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - RIGHT TO INFORMATION - APPLICATION OUTSIDE SCOPE OF ACT - ENTITIES TO WHICH ACT DOES NOT APPLY IN RELATION TO A PARTICULAR FUNCTION - application requesting documents concerning an agency's processing of prior access applications - whether the application is to an entity to which the Act does not apply - section 32 and schedule 2, part 2, item 7 of the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld)
1. All documents related to each of our requests for the Delegations Manual (including any legal services engagement/advice costs). To assist with locating these requests they were made on:
09/08/21 as part of RTI-1014 (to the RTI Unit including [Officer B] & [Officer S])
01/03/22 as part of the Internal Review of RTI-1014 ([Officer C])
12/04/23 by QCAT Notice to Produce (refused to date by NRF & the QBCC Officers instructing NRF)
09/08/23 to the Commissioner & CLO (no response)
10/08/23 refused by the CLO
22/08/23 to the Commissioner (still no response)
25/08/23 to the CLO & Commissioner (still no response)
25/08/23 to [Officer S]/[Officer M]/[Officer D]
25/09/23 refused by the RTI Director
2. All documents related to our RTIs (RTI-2013 & RTI-2014)
3. All documents related to our RTI-1014 made on 9/8/21 including but not limited to:
a) documents related to the Internal Review of 1/3/22
b) documents related to the complaint of 25/8/23.
4. All documents related to our Privacy Complaint #1045 made 2/9/21 including but not limited to:
a) documents related to the follow up & complaint begun on 19/12/23.
NOTE: "documents" includes any and all information related to the above items but excludes any documents & emails that were provided to us directly. Examples of this inclusion could be correspondence to/from ancillary units such as Legal, ICB, CSU, ESU.
... the section does not provide that, if the notice is not given within time, an application outside the scope of the Act becomes one inside the scope of the Act. Indeed, the IP Act provides no consequences for the failure to give the notice, within the time limit or at all. The position is simply that, if an entity gets a notice which it considers is outside the scope of the Act, it is supposed to tell the applicant that promptly.
any document created by an agency and stored within the Agency is obviously a document of the Agency. Nowhere in the RTI Act is there any attempt to carve out certain types of documents within an Agency as "not documents of the Agency". It is also arguable that documents collected under a previous RTI represent Public Records of the RTI processing.
OIC notified the applicant that the External Review Application had been accepted and invited the applicant to remove parts of the access application.
OIC notified QBCC that the External Review Application had been accepted and requested information from QBCC.
OIC requested additional information from QBCC, including copies of certain document requests nominated in Item 1 of the Access Application.
At QBCC's request, OIC granted an extension of time for provision of requested information.
OIC requested additional information from QBCC, including about the types of information that would be captured by the various components of the Access Application.
At QBCC's request, OIC granted an extension of time for provision of requested information.
OIC received the requested information from QBCC. QBCC also agreed to disclose documents located as relevant to item 1(d), Item 1(f), Item 1(d) and Item 4 of the Access Application.
OIC asked QBCC to send a copy of the documents it had agreed to disclose to the applicant.
OIC received QBCC's confirmation that documents had been sent to the applicant.
At the applicant's request, OIC granted an extension of time for the applicant's response.
At the applicant's request, OIC granted a further extension of time for the applicant's response.
OIC received the applicant's response which disagreed with the preliminary assessment and requested the issue of a formal decision.
OIC wrote to the applicant to confirm the matters remaining for consideration; convey a preliminary view to the applicant about those matters; and note the findings in Stella. The applicant was invited to provide any further submission he wished to make by 15 April 2025.
**[1] Access application dated 18 January 2024 (Access Application).
[2] QBCC's email dated 20 February 2024.
[3] These Guidelines are titled 'Can I apply for RTI processing documents' and 'Applications outside the scope of the Act'. The second Guideline outlined that, where an access application includes both documents of an agency and documents excluded from the Act under schedule 1 or schedule 2, part 2 of the RTI Act (that is, a mixed application) and the applicant does not agree to remove the documents excluded from the Act, the agency is entitled to give a decision under section 32 of the RTI Act in respect of the entire application.
[4] Applicant's email dated 20 February 2024.
[5] [2022] QICmr 10 (4 March 2022). This decision applied the comments made by Hoeben J of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) in Carmody v Information Commissioner & Ors (5) [2018] QCATA 18 (Carmody) regarding applications that seek access to documents created or received by an agency decision maker in the course of processing and deciding an access application under the RTI Act. It decided that such an application is outside the scope of the RTI Act because:
• in undertaking an external review under the RTI Act or the IP Act, the Information Commissioner is a quasi-judicial entity exercising quasi-judicial functions; and
• an agency decision maker who processes an access application and makes a reviewable decision on the application is 'connected with' the Information Commissioner in relation to the Information Commissioner's quasi-judicial functions.
[7] QBCC also decided, on 29 February 2024, to waive processing and access charges in respect of the Access Application.
[8] On 14 March 2024 (External Review Application).
[9] Applicant's email dated 29 August 2024. I note that this email addressed a number of external review matters (including one where the applicant was not the access applicant).
[10] The date range of the application was specified as 'Broadly 01/01/2021-present; but limited to the specific date ranges where listed in each RTI Item'.
[11] The disclosure consent of this individual was attached to the Access Application.
[12] To avoid identifying the applicant, I cannot provide any further details of the external reviews which relate to these prior applications.
[13] Letter dated 24 April 2024, which enclosed a further copy of the OIC Guideline titled 'Can I apply for RTI processing documents'.
[14] Applicant's email dated 29 August 2024. I again note that this email addressed a number of external review matters (including one where the applicant was not the access applicant).
[16] It is the practice of OIC to convey a preliminary view, based on an assessment of the material before the Information Commissioner or her delegate at that time, to an adversely affected participant. This is to explain the issues under consideration to the participant and affords them the opportunity to put forward any further information they consider relevant to those issues. It also forms part of the Information Commissioner's processes for early resolution of external reviews.
[17] Applicant's email dated 28 March 2025.
[19] The applicant was also provided with a link to access the Stella decision (via the Supreme Court Library website).
[20] Applicant's email dated 6 April 2024. I note that this email addressed a number of external review matters (including one where the applicant was not the access applicant).
[21] The Court of Appeal noted in Commissioner of the Police Service v Shelton & Anor [2020] QCA 96 at [12] that section 118 of the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld) (IP Act) 'provides for the relevant form of review to be merits review'. Similarly, in Mokbel v Queensland Police Service [2023] QCATA 158 at [12] and O'Connor v Department of Child Safety, Seniors and Disability Services [2024] QCATA 34 at [2], Judicial Member DJ McGill SC confirmed that external review under the IP Act is a merits review process. While these decisions concerned access applications made under the IP Act, they are relevant to the external review process under the RTI Act.
[22] Applicant's email dated 6 April 2024. In the External Review Application, the applicant submitted that QBCC's decision-maker had 'authored a deliberately fraudulent document that purported that he had made an out of scope decision despite having no authority to make any decision (only authorised to provide documents) and having previously failed to comply with s32'. I again note that the applicant's 6 April 2024 email addressed a number of external review matters (including one where the applicant was not the access applicant).
[23] I also note section 27A(5) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) (AIA), which provides that 'The delegate may, in the performance of a delegated function or in the exercise of a delegated power, do anything that is incidental to the delegated function or power'.
[24] On this basis, I am satisfied that there was no deemed refusal under section 46 of the RTI Act, as contended by the applicant.
[25] Applicant's email dated 6 April 2024. I again note that this email addressed a number of external review matters (including one where the applicant was not the access applicant).
[26] In this matter, OIC confirmed acceptance of the External Review Application in letters sent to both the applicant and QBCC, dated 24 April 2024.
[28] XYZ v Victoria Police (General) [2010] VCAT 255 (16 March 2010) (XYZ) at [573]; Horrocks v Department of Justice (General) [2012] VCAT 241 (2 March 2012) at [111]. This approach, in the context of the IP Act and RTI Act, was endorsed by Judicial Member DJ McGill SC in Lawrence v Queensland Police Service [2022] QCATA 134 at [23], observing that the Information Commissioner 'was conscious [of the right to seek and receive information] and considered that the application of the Act gave effect to the requirements of the Human Rights Act. I see no reason to differ from that conclusion.'
[29] I note the following observations made by Bell J in XYZ at [573], on the interaction between equivalent pieces of Victorian legislation (namely, the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) and the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic)): 'it is perfectly compatible with the scope of that positive right in the Charter for it to be observed by reference to the scheme of, and principles in, the Freedom of Information Act'.
[30] In the External Review Application, the applicant alleged that QBCC's decision-maker had acted 'dishonesty' in processing his access application (however, the applicant provided no information supporting this allegation). The applicant subsequently referenced (in his email dated 29 August 2024) the Information Commissioner's power to review any agency decision made in relation to an access application and decide any matter in relation to the access application that could, under the RTI Act, have been decided by the agency (section 105(1) of the RTI Act). I note that this provision does not empower, or obligate, the Information Commissioner, in a decision issued pursuant to section 110 of the RTI Act, to address or make findings about alleged conduct deficiencies of agency officers in dealing with an access application. Apart from section 113 of the RTI Act (which empowers the Information Commissioner to give certain notifications to an agency at the completion of an external review), OIC's external review jurisdiction does not extend to investigating received complaints about an agency's conduct or processes, or the way it has handled a particular application. For completeness, I note that, I am satisfied that the information before me in this external review does not contain sufficient evidence to give rise to grounds for invoking the disciplinary powers under section 113 of the RTI Act.
[32] The 23 December 2024 letter also confirmed that, based on OIC 's interpretation of the access Application, no documents would be responsive to Item 1(c) and Item 1(e) of the Access Application. As the applicant did not contest the interpretation of these items, they were not in issue and are not dealt with in this decision.
[33] That is, the documents which were captured by Item 1(d), Item 1(f), Item 1(g) and Item 4 of the Access Application. The applicant did not identify any additional documents he considered would exist and be relevant to these components of the access application. Accordingly, the applicant's requests in Item 1(d), Item 1(f), Item 1(g) and Item 4 were not in issue and are not dealt with in this decision.
[35] Or the other individual whose disclosure consent was attached to the Access Application.
[37] In accordance with the 1 April 2025 letter, the applicant was taken to have excluded documents of this nature from Item 1(a), Item 1(b), Item 1(h) and Item 1(i) of the access application.
[38] Being the requests within Item 1(a), Item 1(b), Item 1(h), Item 1(i), Item 2 and Item 3 of the Access Application.
[39] Applicant's email dated 29 August 2024.
[40] To the extent the applicant's concern could be interpreted as raising any issue of apprehended bias, I am satisfied there is no basis for finding that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of this matter (paraphrasing the principles applying to the determination of apprehended bias-refer, for example, to Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337).
[44] Part 1 of that schedule lists the entities to which the RTI Act does not apply and part 2 mentions the entities to which the RTI Act does not apply in relation to particular functions.
[45] Schedule 5 of the RTI Act defines a quasi-judicial entity as an entity that exercises quasi-judicial functions.
[47] Applying the doctrine of statutory precedent or stare decisis which requires that a lower court must follow the binding precedent of a court higher than it in the same judicial hierarchy: Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd (1988) CLR 107 at [11]. See also TAJ (costs) [2023] QCAT 133 at [39] for a discussion of the application of the doctrine of precedent where the Appeal Tribunal decision is made by a judicial member of the Tribunal.
[48] In this regard, I note that the applicant did not provide any submissions about the findings in Stella.
[51] Applicant's email dated 29 August 2024.
[52] Applicant's email dated 29 August 2024.
[53] In the applicant's email dated 29 August 2024, he submitted 'Without going into full details, it is suffice to say the quasi-judicial entities are still judicial in nature. As the IC only provides a mediation service for Privacy Complaints (with QCAT being the judicial determiner) there is good basis that the IC is not quasi-judicial since if it were, then it would decide the complaints itself. Even the External Review service is directed under s90 of the RTI Act to attempt to resolve Reviews informally. Mediations and informal resolutions are certainly not judicial in nature'. In that email, he further submitted that: 'the OIC Officer conducting the External Review was likely not the Information Commissioner and therefore was highly unlikely to be exercising quasi-judicial functions since the OIC staff are administrative officers. Making an administrative decision does not elevate an administrative officer to being a quasi-judicial officer'.
[54] More specifically, in Stella at [94], Judicial Member McGill found that 'The proposition that the OIC is a quasi-judicial body is supported by authority, and in any case strikes me as obvious enough. If so, it is performing quasi-judicial functions when conducting reviews'.
[55] Applicant's email dated 29 August 2024. In this email, the applicant also referred to section 47(2) of the RTI Act in support of his position and submitted it was 'reasonable to conclude that it was Parliament's intention that provisions that oppose the primary object should always be interpreted narrowly lest otherwise the primary object would be diminished (and not complied with as explicitly required)'.
[56] Stella at [83]. I also note that, when considering the comments of Justice Hoeben in Carmody, Judicial Member McGill stated at [88]: 'The effect of that analysis is that Chapter 3 of the IP Act does not apply to information produced by processing a request for access to information under the IP Act. The person making the decision on the earlier application is regarded as excluded from the respondent agency, so information generated or gathered by that person is information outside the scope of the information of the respondent for the purposes of Chapter 3'. As Chapter 3 of the IP Act is in substantially the same terms as Chapter 3 of the RTI Act, I consider these comments are relevant here.
[57] Applicant's email dated 29 August 2024.
[58] For completeness, I also note that the word 'member' is not defined in the RTI Act or the AIA, however, the word 'holds' is relevantly defined in schedule 5 of the RTI Act as follows: holds, in relation to an office, includes performs the duties of the office.
[59] Section 110(1)(a) of the RTI Act.**
(2000) 205 CLR 337