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[2020] FWC 5942
respondent. Application for unfair dismissal dismissed because the Commission found the dismissal to be a genuine redundancy; Commission held it had no jurisdiction to hear the merits (see [24]–[25]).
The Commission found that the applicant was dismissed because the employer lost the main contract that made the applicant's specific job necessary. The employer consulted, sought to redeploy the employee (including offering work in a sister company), and the employee declined. Applying a narrower construction of the employee's 'job' (centred on Schweppes deliveries), the Commission held the dismissal was a genuine redundancy under s 389 of the Fair Work Act and dismissed the unfair dismissal application.
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1 cited instrument linked from this judgment.
1,733 words · generated 11/08/2026
This is a Fair Work Commission (FWC) decision by Deputy President Lake in an unfair dismissal application brought by Mr Cyril Doolah against his employer, Jassar & Manesh Pty Ltd trading as RockTrans ([1]). Mr Doolah was employed from 25 March 2019 until his employment ended on 15 April 2020 ([1]). He worked as a heavy rigid driver and principally performed deliveries under a Schweppes contract, although he also undertook other driving duties when Schweppes work was insufficient ([8]).
In or around February 2020 the Respondent lost the Schweppes contract ([9]). Around the same time the Respondent obtained a Linfox contract; to drive on that contract drivers had to be approved through Linfox's own process. Mr Doolah submitted the required documentation to Linfox, but Linfox did not accept him through that process, a decision the Respondent could not control ([10]–[11]). The Respondent sought to offer Mr Doolah alternative work, including through a sister company; the Applicant declined the offer and the Respondent paid him four weeks' pay as redundancy and terminated his employment ([12], [21]–[23]).
Mr Doolah applied for remedy under s 394 (unfair dismissal) within the statutory 21 day period and the Commission heard the matter on 18 August 2020. The Respondent raised a jurisdictional objection that the dismissal was a 'genuine redundancy' under s 389 of the Fair Work Act, which, if established, removes the Commission’s jurisdiction to determine an unfair dismissal claim ([3]–[5]). Deputy President Lake accepted the Respondent's contention and dismissed the application on the ground that the dismissal was a genuine redundancy ([24]–[25]).
The statutory test the Commission applied is s 389 of the Fair Work Act, which provides that a person's dismissal is a genuine redundancy if (1) the employer no longer required the person's job to be performed by anyone because of changes in the operational requirements of the enterprise, and (2) the employer complied with any consultation obligations in an applicable modern award or enterprise agreement. Section 389(2) also says a dismissal is not a genuine redundancy if it would have been reasonable to redeploy the person within the employer's enterprise or an associated entity.
The decision turns on two linked findings of fact and construction:
Factual finding that the operational change, loss of the Schweppes contract, was a change in operational requirements that removed the need for the applicant's particular job. Deputy President Lake concluded that "almost the entirety of the Applicant's job itself was the provision of services with respect to the Schweppes contract" and that, once lost, the job "was no longer required to be performed by anyone" ([16]). That factual assessment satisfies s 389(1)(a).
Constructional choice to treat the Applicant's 'job' narrowly. The Commission considered, as a possible alternative, a broader construction of the 'job' (i.e. a generic driver who could do Linfox work), but preferred a narrower, evidentiary construction focused on the actual duties the Applicant had been doing. The Commission reasoned that adopting a broad construction might unduly narrow the operation of s 389 in practice; therefore the narrower construction was applied and supported the conclusion that no one was required to perform that specific job after the contract was lost ([17]–[18]).
Turning to consultation and redeployment, the Commission accepted evidence that the Respondent consulted the Applicant about the contract loss, sought his qualification for Linfox (which was outside the Respondent’s control), identified alternate work (including in a sister company), and offered that work to the Applicant who declined it. Deputy President Lake found these steps satisfied the consultation and redeployment obligations under the applicable enterprise agreement clauses and s 389(1)(b) and s 389(2) ([20]–[23]).
Because both limbs of s 389 were satisfied on the evidence, the dismissal was a genuine redundancy and the Commission had no jurisdiction to consider the merits of the unfair dismissal claim ([24]–[25]).
Before this decision, the statutory framework for genuine redundancy was the same: s 389 sets out the two-limbed test (operational change removing need for the job and compliance with award/agreement consultation obligations), and s 389(2) raises redeployment as a potential bar to genuine redundancy. This decision applies that statutory framework to a common factual scenario in the transport industry, reliance on particular client contracts for an individual employee's role.
This decision emphasises two interpretative points about the operation of s 389:
The 'job' for s 389(a) may be properly construed narrowly and factually, focusing on the tasks the employee actually performed; that construction can lead to a genuine redundancy finding even where there remains other work in the business that a different worker (or a differently qualified driver) could do ([17]–[18]).
Evidence that an employer consulted, sought to redeploy and offered suitable alternative employment (including in related or sister entities), and that the employee declined, may satisfy s 389(1)(b) and s 389(2) and sustain a genuine redundancy finding ([21]–[23]).
After this decision, the practical effect is to reinforce that loss of a dominant client contract that underpins an employee's specific duties will frequently satisfy s 389(1)(a) where the employer demonstrates consultation and reasonable redeployment efforts. The decision does not purport to alter or expand the statutory test; rather it demonstrates how to apply it factually.
Paragraph [16]:
Paragraph [17]–[18]:
Paragraph [10]–[11]:
Paragraph [22]:
This decision is most directly applicable where:
If these elements are present, the Commission in this decision was prepared to find a genuine redundancy under a narrower conception of the 'job'.
This FWC decision itself does not cite later authorities, nor does the text of the decision record any subsequent judicial treatment of it. The decision applies the statutory test in s 389 and is primarily fact-driven. To determine how later tribunals or courts have treated this particular decision, practitioners should consult an up-to-date case citator or legal database. The decision does, however, provide a clear example of applying a narrow, fact-based construction of 'job' and of what constitutes reasonable consultation and redeployment steps; later tribunals deciding similar fact patterns may find it persuasive.
The judgment leaves room for further development and debate on several points:
The boundary between narrow and broad constructions of 'job': While the Commission preferred a narrow, evidentiary approach here, the judgment recognises a plausible argument for a broader approach ([17]). Future cases will clarify when a court or tribunal should adopt the broader construction and how to weigh competing constructions on different fact matrices.
The role of external vetting/approval processes: The Commission accepted that Linfox’s vetting was outside the employer's control and that an employer can rely on an employee's failure to obtain external approval as a factual impediment to redeployment ([10]–[11]). Questions remain about how vigorously an employer must pursue external approvals on an employee's behalf and whether there are circumstances in which an employer should be expected to use influence to obtain approvals.
Redeployment across associated entities and what is 'reasonable': The Commission accepted redeployment to a sister company where the employee was suitable ([22]). The precise limits of what constitutes 'reasonable' redeployment, considering terms, location, duties, and industrial arrangements, will be a recurring factual and legal issue.
Quantifying redundancy entitlements when the line between specific-job and broad-role constructions is unclear: If a tribunal adopts a broad role and finds no redundancy, the employee's remedies differ; conversely, a narrow approach can yield redundancy outcomes. Future guidance would be useful on transitional cases.
Interaction with enterprise agreements and modern awards: This decision found compliance with the Rocktrans Enterprise Agreement clauses 2.9 and 2.10; different agreement language or award terms might lead to different outcomes, so the specific content of consultation/redeployment clauses will matter in future disputes.
This analysis is a statement of general legal information drawn from the cited decision. It is not legal advice. I can make mistakes. Before you act on, rely on, or use any part of this material or any draft, get a qualified Australian lawyer to check it.
s.394 - Unfair dismissal
Application for an unfair dismissal remedy - dismissal is a case of genuine redundancy - application dismissed.
[1] This decision concerns an unfair dismissal application made by Cyril Doolah (the Applicant) made under s 394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act). Mr Doolah was employed as a driver for Jassar & Manesh Pty Ltd trading as RockTrans (the Respondent). He was employed on 25 March 2019 until his position was made redundant and his employment ended on 15 April 2020. Mr Doolah contends that his dismissal was unfair and seeks compensation.
[2] The Respondent objected to the application on the basis that his dismissal was a genuine redundancy for the purposes of s 389 of the Act. They further contend that the Applicant's dismissal was not unfair.
[3] The matter was listed for hearing before me on 18 August 2020 where I heard the jurisdictional objection and the substantive claim. Mr Doolah was unrepresented and Mr Neil Rockley, the General Manager for the Respondent appeared on their behalf.
[4] The jurisdictional question of whether the Applicant's dismissal was a case of genuine redundancy must first be determined before considering the merits of an unfair dismissal application. I note that the Applicant did make his application within the 21 day period required by s 394(2) of the Act, that he was a person protected from unfair dismissal earning less than the high-income threshold, and that he had undertaken the minimum period of employment (s 382).
[5] Having considered the parties' submissions, and the evidence provided prior to and during the hearing, I have determined that the Applicant's dismissal was a case of genuine redundancy. Thus, the Commission is without the power to hear or determine the Applicant's claim for unfair dismissal. My reasons follow.
[6] The Respondent contends that Applicant's dismissal was a case of genuine redundancy and that the Commission has no jurisdiction to hear the merits of the application. Under s 385 of the Act, a dismissal cannot be unfair if it was a case of 'genuine redundancy', which is defined as follows by the Act at s 389:
(1) A person's dismissal was a case of genuine redundancy if:
(a) the person's employer no longer required the person's job to be performed by anyone because of changes in the operational requirements of the employer's enterprise; and
(b) the employer has complied with any obligation in a modern award or enterprise agreement that applied to the employment to consult about the redundancy.
(2) A person's dismissal was not a case of genuine redundancy if it would have been reasonable in all the circumstances for the person to be redeployed within:
(a) the employer's enterprise; or
(b) the enterprise of an associated entity of the employer.
[7] The Respondent operates a trucking company that hauls goods on behalf of their clients. They have approximately 65 workers and operate depots in Cairns and Atherton in Far North Queensland. The clients generally have national contracts and it is common for the business to lose a contract for a particular client and gain work through negotiations.
[8] The Applicant drove heavy rigid vehicles, which in Queensland are classified as vehicles that have more than 2 axles and over a gross mass of more than 8,000kg. He principally delivered products for Schweppes but he also did other driving duties when this contract did not provide sufficient work.
[9] In or around February, the Respondent was informed that the Schweppes contract had been lost and they were no longer required to deliver for the client. As is the fickle nature of the transport industry, the Respondents fortuitously picked up work with Linfox around the same time.
[10] In order for the Applicant to drive for Linfox, it was a requirement that he submit documentation through the Linfox portal in order to become a driver approved for driving on behalf of Linfox. The Applicant submitted the requisite documentation including a federal police check and his driver history. The Respondent was informed that the Applicant was unsuccessful in becoming an approved driver for Linfox. This process is not one influenced or controlled by the Respondent.
[11] The Respondent now faced a dilemma: the Schweppes contract the Applicant had been performing was no longer in existence and the new work through Linfox could not be performed by the Applicant, owing to his failure to be a Linfox approved driver - a decision entirely outside the powers of the Respondent.
[12] The Respondent identified work that was being performed through its sister business and duly offered this work to the Applicant, who for a variety of reasons elected not to take up the offer. Following this, the Respondent then made the decision to make the Applicant redundant and payed him 4 weeks' pay, as was his entitlement.
[13] I consider that the Respondent no longer required the Applicant due to the loss of the only substantial work that the Applicant could perform. The work that was available was for a Linfox qualified driver. The Applicant did not fit this criteria and so the Respondent as per the legislation identified an alternative role to redeploy the Applicant into.
[14] The Respondent gave evidence that the Applicant was consulted during the process about the loss of the contract and the impact on his role and the requirement to submit documentation to become qualified. I accept the evidence of Rockley that the business experienced a loss of contract and did work to identify alternative opportunities for Mr Doolah.
[15] On the evidence before me it seems evident that the decision to make this position redundant occurred because the Respondent needed to reduce employment costs in the face of the downturn after having lost a significant contract which formed the majority of the Applicant's duties.
[16] In substance, almost the entirety of the Applicant's job itself was the provision of services with respect to the Schweppes contract. Once that contract was lost, the Applicant's job was no longer required to be performed by anyone. This loss clearly constitutes a change in operational requirements, given how fundamental its impact was upon the Respondent's business.
[17] Alternatively, the Applicant's "job" could be constructed more broadly to be a driver capable of doing any work within the Respondent. Section 389(a) of the Act indicates that the work must not be required to be performed by "anyone". Clearly with the acquisition of the new Linfox contract, there was work that was capable of being performed. Under this formulation, the Respondent still required someone to do the job and therefore there is an argument to be made that this could not be considered a genuine redundancy.
[18] Ultimately, I prefer the narrower construction which takes a more specific and evidentiary analysis of what constitutes the "job" of the Applicant. In this case, the job the Applicant performed was no longer required to be performed by anyone, due to the loss of the Schweppes contract, which was, in substance, almost the entirety of his work. A broader interpretation has the potential to render the scope of too narrow to perform its practical effect.
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Cyril Doolah
Jassar & Manesh Pty Ltd [2020] FWC 5942
Application for unfair dismissal dismissed because the Commission found the dismissal to be a genuine redundancy; Commission held it had no jurisdiction to hear the merits (see [24]–[25]).
[19] I now turn to the matter of whether the company complied with any modern award or agreement obligation to consult about the Applicant's redundancy under s 389(1)(b) of the Act.
[20] The company acknowledged that the Applicant's employment was covered by the Rocktrans Employees Enterprise Agreement 2010, the relevant clauses being 2.9 and 2.10.
[21] The company, as soon as it could, consulted with the Applicant about the loss of the Schweppes contract and also the acquisition of the new contract with Linfox. They sought to deploy him in the first instance to the Linfox work which required heavy rigid licensed drivers.
[22] Linfox required certain information to qualify as a sub-contractor driver and for an undisclosed reason the Applicant was not accepted by the Linfox process. The company then sought to deploy him into a role with a sister company for which he was suitable and had the relevant skills. He rejected this offer and was made redundant. I find that Rocktrans did follow the appropriate consultation process and endeavoured to redeploy Mr Doolah.
[23] The Applicant did not take up the redeployment opportunity. I find the Respondent complied with its obligation under s 389(2) of the Act.
[24] I conclude that the dismissal of Mr Doolah was a case of 'genuine redundancy'.
[25] The application is dismissed. I Order accordingly.