CVD20 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1781

1. On 19 June 2020, the applicant lodged an application for judicial review, pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act), of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) dated 26 May 2020. The IAA affirmed the decision of a delegate of the first respondent refusing to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) (subclass 790) visa (SHEV) under s 65 of the Act.
2. For the reasons that follow, the application to this Court is dismissed.

1. In October 2012, the applicant, a citizen of Sri Lanka with Tamil ethnicity, arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival.
2. On 23 March 2017, the applicant lodged an application for a SHEV, claiming to fear harm if he returned to Sri Lanka.
3. On 17 April 2020, a delegate of the first respondent, following an interview with the applicant on 29 July 2019, made a decision refusing to grant the applicant a SHEV.
4. On 22 April 2020, the matter was referred to the IAA for review under Part 7AA of the Act (as it then was).
5. On 12 May 2020, the applicant provided to the IAA a written submission and additional evidence.
6. On 26 May 2020, the IAA made a decision affirming the delegate's decision not to grant the applicant a SHEV.

1. The IAA at [5]-[7] considered, with reference to s 473DD of the Act, whether it could consider the additional evidence provided by the applicant to the IAA on 12 May 2020. The IAA at [7] concluded that it could consider the additional evidence.
2. As explained by the IAA at [8], "there is no audio recording available of the SHEV interview [on 29 July 2019] due to a malfunction of the voice recorder", and the delegate relied on a "contemporaneous written record of interview of the Department's interviewing officer when considering this aspect of the applicant's evidence". The IAA at [9]-[11] considered whether it could rely on the written record of interview. The IAA at [11], after considering the applicant's comments about the written record (see CB 231) which was provided to the applicant on 27 April 2020 (see CB 225), concluded that the written record of interview could be "relied upon as an accurate reflection of the applicant's oral evidence in the SHEV interview" and the IAA could "give weight to the written record of interview".
3. The IAA at [12] considered a request by the applicant for the IAA to exercise its power under s 473DC of the Act to invite the applicant to give further evidence at an interview. The IAA concluded that "the applicant has had ample opportunity to present his case" and "decided not to exercise my discretion and invite the applicant to attend an interview or hearing in order to provide further information".
4. The IAA at [15]-[70] considered whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution if required to return to Sri Lanka. The IAA at [70] concluded that the applicant "does not have a well-founded fear of persecution within the meaning of s 5J" of the Act. In general, the IAA "accept[ed] the applicant's broadly consistent account of events in Sri Lanka up until the end of the [civil war] conflict in May 2009" (at [41]), but did not accept the applicant's claims concerning events experienced by the applicant and family members after May 2009.
5. The IAA at [72]-[79] considered whether the applicant satisfied the complementary protection criterion for a protection visa in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. The IAA at [79] concluded that "the applicant does not meet s 36(2)(aa)".

Judicial review application and steps up to hearing on 27 October 2025

1. On 19 June 2020, the applicant lodged in this Court an application for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision.
2. On 1 October 2025, the applicant filed an amended application (Amended Application) which contained four grounds as follows (as written):

Ground 1

Jurisdictional Error. The Immigration Assessment Authority's (the "Authority") review pursuant to s473CC of the Migration Act, miscarried because the Authority unreasonably proceeded with the review without notifying the Applicant as required by s 473DE(1) that it did not have before it a complete and accurate record of the SHEV interview. The failure to notify the applicant of the absence of the audio recording undermined the Applicant's participation in the review process.

Particulars

1. The Applicant requested a copy of the Audio Recording of the SHEV interview on 27th April 2020 [CB224] and in his submissions of 12th May 2020.

2. The Authority's purported and failed attempt on 27 April 2020 [CB267] to notify the Applicant by phone only that there was no audio recording of the SHEV interview did not satisfy the requirements of s.473DE(1).

3. The Authority failed to notify the Applicant on 12 May 2020 that there was no audio recording, when he contacted to the IAA by phone [CB268]

4. The fact that the Audio Recording had failed was "relevant new information" for the purpose of s.473DE of the Migration Act 1958.

5. The Authority unreasonably failed to consider informing the Applicant in writing under s.473DE(1)(a) and (b) of the failure of the audio recording in the SHEV interview; and and to consider inviting information from the Applicant under 473DE(1)(c) addressing the written record of interview having regard to that fact.

6. The Authority misconstrued the claims of the Applicant and disabled itself from assessing the Applicants claims by failing to notify him that there was not an audio recording of the SHEV interview, in spite of the Applicant making two requests to the Authority to provide it to him.

7. The Applicant was materially disadvantaged because of not being notified that there was no audio recording, and awaiting a response to his request for an audio recording.

8. The failure to notify the Applicant of the new information that there was a failure of recording in the SHEV Interview prejudiced the Applicant in his ability to respond, identify and address the mistakes in the written record of interview.

9. The written record of interview was unclear as to what the Applicant claimed, and was open to different interpretations, in particular through discussion of different events by the Applicant and their conflation in the written record.

10. The written record of interview erroneously recorded that the Applicant claimed to have been detained in 2010.

11. The written record of interview erroneously recorded that the Applicant claimed to have been detained along with both his father and uncle at the same time, a purported claim which led to adverse credibility finding against the Applicant.

12. The written record of interview erroneously recorded the Applicant to have claimed to have been detained in 2010.

13. The SHEV interview was adversely affected by communication error in that the Interpreter did not speak the Applicant's dialect (appearing to the Applicant to have been an Indian Tamil speaker).

14. The Applicant repeats the matters in Ground 2.

Ground 2

Jurisdictional Error. The Authority failed to exercise its discretionary power in s473DC (3) within the legal bounds of reasonableness so as to grant the Applicant an interview in circumstances where the Authority knew that it did not have a complete and accurate record of the PV interview but the applicant was not informed of this, contrary to s.473DE. The Authority's failure to exercise the discretion positively was plainly unjust lacking an evident and intelligible justification.

Particulars

a) The Applicant requested the Audio recording of the SHEV interview by email of 27 April 2020 [CB224] but did not receive any response to this request. In the Applicant's IAA submission dated 12 May 2020, (the "Submission") the Applicant submitted "There are so many questions that I answered which were not recorded in this statement" Subsequently, the Applicant asked the Authority to provide him with a hearing so that he can properly give his evidence.

b) Despite the issues and concerns raised by the Applicant in the Submission and in relation to the loss of audio recording, the Authority found, albeit erroneously that "he has not identified what concerns he has that were not addressed in the IAA submission or why a hearing or interview is the preferable manner in which he can provide the information he wants to provide .... " [Paragraph 12, Decision Record}

c) the Authority failed to act reasonably in its expectations for the Applicant to be able to communicate precisely about his experiences through an interpreter, in a Departmental interview, without having consideration for how his capacity to give evidence was affected by the fact that he was a survivor of the most horrendous forms of torture and recounting that experience and events surrounding it.

d) the Authority failed to consider the effect of the loss of the benefit of having a decision maker observe the Applicant's demeanor. (Having regard to the fact that a different officer conducted the interview, and that she was not the Delegate who made the primary decision).

e) The Authority failed to have regard to the possibility of confusion in the writing of the notes, such that it did not acknowledge that it was not assessing the Applicant's claims directly, but rather the case officers' understanding of what the interpreter had said.

f) The Applicant repeats the matters in Ground 1.

Ground 3: The Authority's premises used to identify and assess the Applicant's claims, or what it understood to be the Applicant's claims, was unreasonable:

1. The Authority worked on an unwarranted, unsafe, and unfounded premise that complex narratives given by the Applicant or witnesses on his behalf were always given in chronological, linear and coherent form.

2. The Authority worked on an unwarranted unsafe and unfounded premise that every inconsistency was indicative of embellished claims without considering the applicant's circumstances, in particular as a torture survivor, and communication difficulties.

3. The Authority's premise that the Applicant's mother (and the former MP) had said that the Applicant's father was released before the body of the Applicant's uncle was discovered, was unwarranted, and unsafe.

4. The Authority ought to have considered other interpretations of how the statement was written, such that the word "subsequently" in the interpretation his mother's statement referred to a substantive time after the uncle was kidnapped, rather than referring to the Applicant's father's release in the preceding sentence.

5. The Authority did not bring the necessary level of inquiry to assess whether the Applicant was referring to multiple events conjoined.

6. The Authority did not consider the possibility that the Applicant had not claimed been detained in 2010 but was referring to his earlier torture.

7. The Authority's expectation that the word TANA would appear in the registration plate was unreasonable, given that the Applicant explained that this was common to all registration plates and indicative of the Administrative Region Tamil Eelam. [The obvious analogy is that all NSW registration plates include the letters NSW but it would not be expected to be written in a form].

Ground 4: The Authority failed to have regard to the Refugee Law Guidelines and Protection Processing Guidelines before the Delegate [at CB212], with necessary consideration (of its acceptance) that he had been subjected to the most horrendous forms of torture, when assessing the Applicant's consistency and capacity to give evidence in a coherent way.

1. On 30 September 2025, the applicant filed a written submission (AS).
2. On 20 October 2025, the first respondent filed a written submission (RS).

1. At the hearing in this Court on 27 October 2025, Daniel Taylor from Sydney West Legal and Migration appeared for the applicant. Aaron Taverniti from Sparke Helmore Lawyers appeared for the first respondent.
2. Mr Taverniti tendered a Court Book (CB) which contained the IAA's decision and documents before the IAA.
3. Mr Taylor stated that he did not press grounds 1 and 4 in the Amended Application.
4. In relation to the remaining grounds 2 and 3 in the Amended Application, Mr Taylor and Mr Taverniti made oral submissions. I address the submissions below.

(1) Subject to this Part, the Immigration Assessment Authority may, in relation to a fast track decision, get any documents or information (new information) that:

(a) were not before the Minister when the Minister made the decision under section 65; and

(2) The Immigration Assessment Authority does not have a duty to get, request or accept, any new information whether the Authority is requested to do so by a referred applicant or by any other person, or in any other circumstances.

(3) Without limiting subsection (1), the Immigration Assessment Authority may invite a person, orally or in writing, to give new information:

(a) in writing; or

(b) at an interview, whether conducted in person, by telephone or in any other way.

1. The applicant, in his submission to the IAA dated 12 May 2020, asked the IAA to exercise its power in s 473DC(3) to invite the applicant to give further evidence at an interview. The IAA at [12] declined to exercise this power. The applicant complains to this Court that the IAA's decision not to invite the applicant to give further evidence at an interview was legally unreasonable.
2. To consider the applicant's complaint to this Court, it is useful to consider:

(a) the context of the applicant's request in his submission dated 12 May 2020; and

(b) the reasons given by the IAA for declining to invite the applicant to attend an interview.

1. On 12 May 2020, the applicant provided a written submission and further evidence to the IAA. (CB 228-232) In summary, the applicant:

(a) identified findings in the delegate's decision dated 17 April 2020 with which he disagreed;

(b) explained why he disagreed with the delegate's findings;

(c) where relevant, provided further written evidence in support of his claims;

(d) in relation to a written transcript of the SHEV interview on 29 July 2019 (see CB 145-157) which the IAA provided to the applicant on 27 April 2020 (see CB 225), provided comments in relation to the written transcript; and

(e) then asked the IAA to invite him to attend an interview to permit him to give further evidence.

1. In relation to that part of the applicant's submission concerning the written transcript of the SHEV interview and the request to attend an interview, the applicant wrote: (CB 231)

As a result, I made a request to get my SHEV... interview recording from the IAA. However, I was only provided with a typed transcript...

I would like to point out firstly, the SHEV interview was conducted by an officer of DHA named Ms. Anita, but the decision was written by an officer named Mr. James. I am not sure on what basis Mr. James was able to come to the conclusion that I provided a different name and other information that I have provided to the department. The pronunciation of the name incorrectly by the interpreter could have happened during the translation process to the officer.

Secondly, I urge the presiding reviewer to examine carefully the written transcript provided by the DHA to IAA. There are so many questions that I answered which were not recorded in this statement. Just to provide the IAA with one example please look at "Interview Closing section" Some parts of the transcript only show the questions which were asked but my answers were not recorded. This is crucial. I state that this is an incomplete interview transcript and furthermore, it was not signed by the officer concerned. These notes were relied upon by officer James to write his findings. I further state that this is not the accurate record of what I have mentioned during the SHEY interview. I have been denied procedural fairness.

Thirdly, even though the transcript states that my interview is being recorded, I did not receive any recordings to verify what I had said during the SHEV interview.

I humbly request the IAA to provide me with a hearing so that I may properly give my evidence.....

Reasons given by IAA for declining to invite applicant to attend interview

1. In response to the applicant's request that the IAA exercise its power under s 473DC(3) to invite the applicant to give further evidence at an interview, the IAA stated at [12]:

The applicant requests a 'hearing' so that he may 'properly give [his] evidence'. However, aside from the SHEV interview issue already discussed, he has not identified what concerns he has that were not addressed in the IAA submission, or what additional information he wishes to provide, or why it was not provided with the submission, or why a hearing or interview is the preferable manner in which he can provide the information he wants to provide, or how such information would satisfy the provisions of s.473DD. The IAA provides a limited form of review which, as a general rule, does not involve accepting, getting, or requesting new information. The Practice Direction for Applicants, Representatives and Authorised Recipients {provided to the applicant on 23 April 2020) allows applicants to provide a written submission about why they disagree with the decision or about a claim or matter presented that was overlooked and to provide further information which can be considered in limited circumstances. While the IAA may get any information not before the Minister and which it considers relevant, including at an interview, it does not have a duty to do so. Furthermore, if it does get new information it can only consider that information in exceptional circumstances. The applicant has already provided information to the Minister and IAA about the issues for determination, which I have considered. I have also carefully considered the applicant's arguments about the written record of the SHEV interview and I am satisfied I can rely on it. Having regard to the above, I am satisfied that the applicant has had ample opportunity to present his case and I consider it is reasonable in these circumstances to proceed to make a decision. I have decided not to exercise my discretion [to] invite the applicant to attend an interview or hearing in order to provide further information.

Whether IAA's decision not to invite applicant to interview affected by jurisdictional error

1. For the following reasons, the applicant has not identified a jurisdictional error in the IAA's decision not to exercise its power in s 473DC(3) to invite the applicant to give further evidence at an interview.
2. First, despite the lengthy particulars to ground 2 of the Amended Application (which by virtue of particular (f) includes the particulars to ground 1), but for one matter, Mr Taylor did not (in the Amended Application or his written or oral submissions) challenge any part of the IAA's findings or reasons at [12]. The one matter Mr Taylor challenged, identified in particular (b) of ground 2, is the following finding at [12]:

However, aside from the SHEV interview issue already discussed, he has not identified what concerns he has that were not addressed in the IAA submission ... or why a hearing or interview is the preferable manner in which he can provide the information he wants to provide...

It is asserted in particular (b) that this finding is "erroneous". Mr Taylor did not explain in his written or oral submissions why this finding is erroneous. I disagree that the finding is erroneous. I consider that it was open to the IAA to find that the applicant did not identify in his letter dated 12 May 2020 "what concerns he has that were not addressed ..." or "why a hearing or interview is the preferable manner in which he can provide the information he wants to provide". It follows that Mr Taylor has not identified an error in any part of the IAA's finding or reasons at [12], let alone a jurisdictional error.

1. Second, as recorded in the opening paragraph of ground 2 of the Amended Application, ground 2 is based on the premise that, while the IAA "knew that it did not have a complete and accurate record of the PV interview", "the applicant was not informed of this contrary to s 473DE". The assertion that "the applicant was not informed" that the IAA did not have an audio recording of the SHEV interview on 29 July 2019 is not correct. The applicant was informed of this matter on two occasions as follows:

(a) The delegate stated in his decision dated 17 April 2020 at CB 194:

The applicant attended an interview in respect of his SHEV application on 29/07/2019. During the interview, the voice recorder malfunctioned and therefore notes were taken and relied upon in formulating this decision.

It follows that, when the applicant read the delegate's decision, which he must have read when he prepared his criticisms of the delegate's decision at CB 228-230, he would have become aware that, in respect of the SHEV interview on 29 July 2019, "the voice recorder malfunctioned and therefore notes were taken and relied upon in formulating" the delegate's decision.

(b) As recorded by the IAA at [8], on 27 April 2020 the IAA provided the applicant with a copy of the "written record of interview of the Department's interviewing officer": see CB 225. This document appears at CB 145-157. It is stated at the top of the first page of the document "Note - PV interview did not record as voice recorder malfunctioned". It follows that, when the applicant read the written record of interview, which he must have read when he prepared his criticisms of the written record of interview at CB 231, he would have become aware that, in respect of the SHEV interview on 29 July 2019, "PV interview did not record as voice recorder malfunctioned".

1. Third, as correctly stated by the first respondent at RS [24], with reference to propositions from Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332, the IAA's reasons at [12] provide an evident and intelligible justification for its decision not to exercise its discretion under s 473DC(1) of the Act to invite the applicant to an interview, and there was nothing arbitrary, capricious or lacking in common sense about the IAA's reliance on the factors set out at [12] to refuse the applicant's request.
2. Fourth, I have considered the remaining particulars to ground 2, and the particulars to ground 1 picked up by particular (f) to ground 2. None identify a jurisdictional error in respect of the subject matter of ground 2.
3. For the above reasons, ground 2 does not identify a jurisdictional error in the IAA's decision.

1. There was a significant disconnect between Mr Taylor's oral submissions at the hearing on 27 October 2025 under the banner of ground 3, and the content of ground 3 of the Amended Application and Mr Taylor's written submission concerning ground 3.
2. It is appropriate to:

(a) initially address Mr Taylor's oral submissions which sought to identify three errors in the IAA's findings at [47]; and

(b) then briefly address the written materials concerning ground 3 which contain broad assertions not clearly connected to specified findings by the IAA.

Mr Taylor's oral submissions at hearing on 27 October 2025

Thirdly, while I am prepared to accept the applicant's uncle went missing and was found murdered in June 2019, I have several concerns with the applicant's claim that his father came to the adverse attention of the Sri Lankan authorities at this time. For example, the applicant's claim in his July 2019 statement was that his uncle had been taken by army officers and that his father had been questioned and forcibly taken by the CID. He also claimed that his mother spoke with the CID. However, this appeared to differ from his evidence in the SHEV interview that he didn't know who took his father and speculated it could have been the EPDP (Eelam People's Democratic Party), the CID, or groups working for the CID. I note correspondence provided to the IAA from the applicant's mother and aunt state that an unidentified paramilitary group was responsible for his abduction and indicated he had been taken by the same group as the uncle. I also find it difficult to accept the applicant was able to give a detailed account in his July 2019 statement about what his father told the CID and what they told him after his abduction in circumstances where at the time of writing that statement his father was still purportedly missing or held by his abductors. Then, without explanation, the applicant provides a letter to the IAA purportedly written by his father in 2020 which makes no reference to his abduction or release. I note both the applicant's mother and the ex-Parliamentarian indicate in their letters that the applicant's father was abducted after the body of the applicant's uncle had been found, which appears to differ from the applicant's and his aunt's evidence that he was taken only days after the uncle disappeared. I also note the police complaint published on vavuniyanet.com makes no mention that the applicant's uncle was kidnapped.

1. Mr Taylor contended at the hearing on 27 October 2025 that there were three errors in this paragraph. Mr Taylor did not clearly identify any of the errors in ground 3 of the Amended Application or in his written submission concerning ground 3. However, I permitted Mr Taylor to advance the contentions. I appreciated Mr Taverniti's ability to respond to the new contentions at the hearing.
2. Mr Taylor's contentions, and a response, are as follows.
3. First, Mr Taylor complained about the following sentences by the IAA at [47]:

For example, the applicant's claim in his July 2019 statement was that his uncle had been taken by army officers and that his father had been questioned and forcibly taken by the CID. He also claimed that his mother spoke with the CID. However, this appeared to differ from his evidence in the SHEV interview that he didn't know who took his father and speculated it could have been the EPDP (Eelam People's Democratic Party), the CID, or groups working for the CID.

1. Mr Taylor contended that the IAA's finding that the applicant's evidence in his July 2019 statement and in his evidence in the SHEV interview "appeared to differ" was wrong because, according to Mr Taylor, the applicant's evidence did not differ. I reject Mr Taylor's complaint. The applicant clearly stated in his lettter dated 24 July 2019 that in June 2019 his father was questioned and forcibly taken by the CID (see CB 143-144 where the applicant wrote "the CID interrogated my father" and "the CID arrested my father"), and then clearly stated at the SHEV interview a few days later that he did not know who took his father and speculated it could have been the EPDP, CID or groups working for the CID (see CB 148.5). It was clearly open to the IAA to find that the applicant's evidence "appeared to differ".
2. Second, Mr Taylor complained about the following sentence by the IAA at [47]:

I also find it difficult to accept the applicant was able to give a detailed account in his July 2019 statement about what his father told the CID and what they told him after his abduction in circumstances where at the time of writing that statement his father was still purportedly missing or held by his abductors.

1. According to the applicant's letter dated 24 July 2019, on an unstated date between 10 June 2019 and 24 July 2019 "the CID arrested [the applicant's] father [and] forcibly took him away" (see CB 144.1), and the father continued to be detained when the applicant wrote the letter. Despite this, the letter (from about CB 143.7) contains a detailed account of communications and interactions between the applicant's father and the CID from about 10 June 2019 onwards. I consider that it was open to the IAA to be concerned that the applicant "was able to give a detailed account" about his father's communications with the CID "in circumstances where at the time of writing that statement his father was still purportedly missing or held by his abductors".
2. Mr Taylor's main complaint appeared to be based on a particular interpretation of part of the applicant's letter dated 24 July 2019. Specifically, the applicant appeared to say that on 8 June 2019 his uncle disappeared and on 10 June 2019 the applicant's father and uncle's family members made a complaint about the uncle's disappearance at a police station (CB 143.5), following which the CID "interrogated my father" and "assaulted my father". The applicant then wrote at CB 143.10 that his father and uncle's relatives made a complaint at the Vavuniya police station about the uncle's disappearance and "the CID arrested my father" and "forcibly took him away". Mr Taylor's main complaint appeared to be that:

(a) the date "the CID arrested my father" (CB 144.1) was later than the date of the assault and interrogation on 10 June 2019 described at CB 143.5 and following; and

(b) the IAA at [47] erroneously understood that the "abduction" occurred on the date of the assault and interrogation on 10 June 2019, when in fact the date of abduction was the later date of the "arrest".

1. I consider that it is unclear from the applicant's letter whether the date of the "arrest" was on the same day as, or alternatively a number of days after, the date of the interrogation and assault on 10 June 2019. I consider that it was open to the IAA to make the finding it made. Alternatively, even if the IAA misunderstood the applicant's evidence concerning the date of the arrest, a mere error of fact is not a jurisdictional error: see paragraphs 47-48 below.
2. Third, Mr Taylor complained about the following sentence by the IAA at [47]:

I note both the applicant's mother and the ex-Parliamentarian indicate in their letters that the applicant's father was abducted after the body of the applicant's uncle had been found, which appears to differ from the applicant's and his aunt's evidence that he was taken only days after the uncle disappeared.

1. The letters from the applicant's mother and the ex-Parliamentarian appear at CB 233 and 234. Mr Taylor contends that both witnesses indicate in their letters that the applicant's father was abducted before the body of the applicant's uncle was found, and therefore the IAA erred in finding that they indicated in their letters that "the applicant's father was abducted after the body of the applicant's uncle was found".
2. Mr Taverniti accepted that the IAA made an error of fact in summarising an aspect of the witnesses' evidence. However, a mere error of fact is not a jurisdictional error. In Acuna Plaza v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2019] FCA 424; 164 ALD 258 (Acuna Plaza) at [16]-[17] and [19] Allsop CJ stated:
   1. There is a growing volume of expressions by judges of the court... as to legal unreasonableness in the fact-finding process. As displayed in judgments of the High Court such as in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332, and of this Court, such as in the important decision of Robertson J in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT & Anor [2013] FCA 317; 212 FCR 99, neither findings of fact nor conclusions as to credit are immune from review for jurisdictional error. Both sides referred me to a number of cases. The most succinct, if I may respectfully say so, summary of the submissions before me was at [36] of the submissions of Mr Byrnes before Mr Colditz came into the case:

In essence, these grounds appear to raise a complaint as to illogicality infecting the Tribunal's decision. Findings of fact are the exclusive province of the Tribunal, subject to issues of unreasonableness. The first respondent accepts that illogicality "on the way" may amount to a jurisdictional error. However, such errors of fact will be within the Tribunal's jurisdiction if they are not critical to, or are immaterial, to the final outcome. The threshold is very high and it is useful to ask whether it was open to the Tribunal to engage in the process of reasoning it did and making the findings it did on the material before it. A decision may be illogical if it was simply not open on the evidence or if there is no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences or conclusions drawn.

1. On behalf of the appellant, Mr Colditz referred in particular to a series of cases in this court, both single judge appeal and Full Court, which have sought to articulate the matter. I refer to the influential decision of Wigney J in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516; 69 AAR 210, as well as CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146; 253 FCR 496; Muggeridge v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 200; 255 FCR 81; Johnson v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1940 and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1, not to mention Li in the High Court and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW & Ors [2018] HCA 30; 357 ALR 408 in the High Court. Mr Colditz helpfully summarised the matter when he said that it is enough for the finding to have been carried into the decision, that it flowed into the decision or affected the decision in a not immaterial way, or is sufficiently part of the reasoning to the outcome, or is a finding on which the ultimate conclusion was predicated, not being severable for the decision to be seen as tainted jurisdictionally.

...

1. Thus, taking Mr Colditz's helpful articulation and distillation from the cases which was not substantively disagreed with by Mr Byrnes, I will turn to the reasons. Before doing so, when I say that it was not substantively disagreed with by Mr Byrnes, Mr Byrnes rightly, if I may say so, said that that was a matter of degree, and that the error that has admittedly been made had to be sufficiently central and sufficiently important or sufficiently material to the decision of the Tribunal such that it can be seen to be an exercise of decision-making power not in accordance with what is required under the statute.

1. I consider that the error of fact identified by Mr Taylor was not, with reference to Acuna Plaza at [19], "sufficiently central and sufficiently important or sufficiently material to the decision of the Tribunal such that it can be seen to be an exercise of decision-making power not in accordance with what is required under the statute". Among other reasons, the error of fact arose in one small part of the IAA's lengthy consideration at [45]-[49] of whether it accepted the applicant's claims first raised in the July 2019 letter. As part of the IAA's lengthy consideration:

(a) The IAA at [45], [46] and [47] identified three separate concerns commencing with the words "Firstly", "Secondly" and "Thirdly".

(b) The IAA's error of fact at [47] occurred during the IAA's explanation of the "Third" concern and arose during the IAA's explanation of one of "several concerns with the applicant's claim that his father came to the adverse attention of the Sri Lankan authorities at this time".

1. The applicant's written materials concerning ground 3 contain broad assertions not clearly connected to specified findings by the IAA. For example:

(a) Particular (i) of ground 3 asserts that the IAA "worked in an unwarranted, unsafe and unfounded premise that complex narratives given by the applicant or witnesses on his behalf were always given in chronological, linear or coherent form".

(b) The remaining particulars contain similarly broad assertions not clearly connected to specified findings by the IAA.

(c) Similarly, the applicant's written submission at AS [36]-[45] contain various broad assertions not clearly connected to specified findings by the IAA.

1. At the hearing in this Court on 27 October 2025, Mr Taylor did not make oral submissions about any errors in the IAA's findings other than the errors in [47] addressed in paragraphs 38 to 48 above. I understood that the specified errors of the IAA the subject of ground 3 were those explained by Mr Taylor at the hearing on 27 October 2025, and the broad assertions in the particulars to ground 3 and in the applicant's written submission were merely background to the specified errors raised by Mr Taylor at the hearing and addressed in paragraphs 38 to 48 above.
2. Alternatively, if the applicant continues to rely on some of these broad assertions beyond the specified errors addressed in paragraphs 38 to 48 above:

(a) I agree with the observations of the first respondent at RS [26] that:

Tellingly, the applicant's argument does not at any point suggest that the Authority's understanding, reading or interpretation of any piece of evidence was incorrect or not open. It advances no argument that the Authority engaged in some recognised, legally impermissible form of reasoning; instead, it posits different ways that certain pieces of evidence might have been understood. That the Authority understood them in a different way does not reveal error and it is plainly conceivable that another decision-maker would have understood them in the same way. These complaints do no more than invite the Court to engage in impermissible merits review.

(b) I have considered the broad assertions. None identify an error, let alone a jurisdictional error, in the IAA's decision.

1. For the above reasons, ground 3 does not identify a jurisdictional error in the IAA's decision.

1. At the conclusion of the hearing, I invited submissions from the parties on costs. Mr Taverniti sought costs in the scale amount of $9,097.93, which was less than the first respondent's solicitor/client costs. Mr Taylor did not oppose this amount. I will make an order in this amount.

I certify that the preceding fifty-three (53) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Zipser.