CVB21 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2026] FedCFamC2G 517

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).

1. The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) dated 27 May 2021 by which the Tribunal confirmed its earlier decision, dated 12 May 2021, to summarily dismiss the applicant's review application for non-appearance at a hearing. She requires an extension of time under s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) and sought that extension in her application filed on 17 August 2021 (Application).
2. References in these reasons to CB pages are references to the court book that was tendered and admitted as evidence at the hearing on 18 March 2026 before this Court and designated exhibit R1.
3. For the reasons set out below, it is in the interests of the administration of justice that an extension of time be granted, and the proceeding be timetabled towards a final hearing.

1. The applicant is a citizen of Thailand who last arrived in Australia on 11 November 2016 as the holder of a Visitor (Class FA) (Subclass 600) visa (CB 28, 34, 71).
2. On 14 March 2018, the applicant lodged an application for a Protection (Class XA) visa (Visa) (CB 19-53). The applicant was assisted by an authorised recipient (Authorised Recipient) (expressly indicated not to be a migration agent) (CB 24, 48-49), and whose email address "sun*****@gmail.com" was provided for the purpose of receiving communications (CB 49). No email address or phone number was provided for the applicant personally (CB 30, 48).
3. On 18 July 2018, a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) refused to grant the applicant the visa (CB 71-80). The delegate noted that the applicant's claim to fear persecution was not due to a reason under s 5J(1)(a) of the Act, and so the applicant was not owed protection under s 36(2)(a) (CB 73). As to the s 36(2)(aa) complementary protection criterion, the delegate relied on country information to find that the applicant could access effective protection from the authorities if returned to Thailand (CB 73-75) such that she did not face a real risk of significant harm. The delegate's decision was sent by email addressed to the Authorised Recipient but at a different email address, "a*****visa@gmail.com" (Gmail address) (CB 67-70). The court book does not disclose when or in what circumstances the Gmail address was provided to the Department of Home Affairs (Department).
4. On 26 July 2018, an application was made to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision (CB 81-92). The application form did not disclose the existence of any representative but asked that all correspondence be directed to the applicant at the Gmail address (CB 82).
5. On 22 April 2021, the Tribunal emailed the applicant at the Gmail address an invitation to attend a hearing at 11:00 am on 12 May 2021 (CB 101-114). The invitation to the hearing expressly stated the following (CB 104):

If you do not appear at the scheduled hearing, we may make a decision on the review without taking any further action to allow or enable you to appear before us or may dismiss your application for review without any further consideration of the application or the information before us. ...

A dismissed case can be reinstated if the Member considers it appropriate to do so and the application is made within 14 days of receiving notice of the dismissal. If the Member confirms the dismissal, the decision under review is taken to be affirmed.

1. The Tribunal conducted a hearing on 12 May 2021. The applicant did not appear and at 11:10 am, the Tribunal declared a "no show" (CB 116-119).
2. The Tribunal dismissed the applicant's application on 12 May 2021 pursuant to s 426A(1A)(b) of the Act after the applicant failed to appear (CB 124). The Tribunal noted, in its decision, that it was satisfied the applicant was properly invited to a hearing pursuant to s 441A(5) of the Act, and that the invitation had not been returned to sender. The Tribunal noted no satisfactory reason for the non-appearance had been given (CB 124, [2]).
3. The applicant was notified of that decision by email to the Gmail address sent on 12 May 2021 (CB 120-124). The Tribunal's notification letter contained the following (CB 121):

You may apply to us, in writing, for reinstatement of the application by 26 May 2021. In a reinstatement application you should set out why you failed to appear at the hearing and provide any other information you want the Tribunal to take into consideration when deciding whether your reinstatement application should be granted.

1. A fact sheet attached to the Tribunal's email included the following details (CB 122):

Within 14 days after receiving notice of the dismissal decision you may apply, in writing, for reinstatement of the application. In a reinstatement application you should set out why you failed to appear at the hearing and provide any other information you want the Tribunal to take into consideration when deciding whether your reinstatement application should be granted.

On receiving an application for reinstatement, we may reinstate the application for review if we consider it appropriate to do so.

If we decide not to reinstate the application, or if you fail to apply for reinstatement within the 14 day period, we must confirm the decision to dismiss the application.

1. On 27 May 2021, the Tribunal made its decision confirming the dismissal of the applicant's application (CB 127-128). The decision record includes the following (CB 128, [2]-[4]):

On 12 May 2021 the Tribunal dismissed the application under s 426A(1A)(b) of the Act as the applicant did not appear before it to give evidence and present arguments at the time and date of the scheduled hearing.

The applicant was notified of the dismissal decision and given a copy of a written statement setting out the decision and the reasons for the decision, in accordance with s 426B(5). The applicant was advised that reinstatement of the application could be sought within 14 days of receiving the dismissal statement and that a failure to apply for reinstatement within the 14 day period would result in confirmation of the dismissal decision.

As the applicant did not apply for reinstatement of the application within the 14 days period, the Tribunal must confirm the decision to dismiss the application. In these circumstances, the decision under review is taken to be affirmed.

1. The applicant was notified of that decision by email to the Gmail address sent on 31 May 2021 (CB 125-126).

1. The applicant filed her Application on 17 August 2021, supported by an affidavit deposed on 26 July 2021 which annexed the Tribunal's decisions as well as various correspondence with the Department and Tribunal (CVB21 Affidavit).
2. On 14 October 2021, the Minister filed a response seeking that the Application be dismissed with costs.
3. The Minister filed a court book on 29 November 2023.
4. On 20 March 2024, a law firm came on the record as acting for the applicant.
5. On 23 May 2024, the parties were notified by the Court that the previously listed first Court date, on 19 June 2024, would be vacated and that standard procedural orders would be made and emailed to the parties in due course.
6. Orders were not made at that time but on 5 March 2025 the parties were notified by email that the matter was listed for a callover on 18 March 2025.
7. According to the notations to the orders made that day, the applicant (not her lawyers) attended the callover via telephone and confirmed she had a copy of the court book. Orders were otherwise made changing the first respondent's name, listing the Application for hearing on a date to be advised, and requiring that the applicant and Minister file their written submissions 28 and 14 days ahead of the hearing, respectively.
8. On 3 December 2025 the parties were notified by email that the Application had been listed for hearing before another Judge of this Court on 29 January 2026 at 10:00 am.
9. The applicant did not file any materials in accordance with the orders made on 18 March 2025. On 15 January 2026, the Minister filed written submissions and an affidavit of Miriam Edith Williams affirmed that day (Williams Affidavit) which annexed an extract of the Tribunal's "Case Notes" inadvertently excluded from the court book.
10. On 19 January 2026, the Associate to the Judge to whom the matter was previously docketed emailed the parties reminding them of the date, time and manner of the hearing.
11. After close of the Registry on 27 January 2026, the applicant's lawyers filed a Notice of Intention to Withdraw as Lawyer. That notice included the applicant's last known contact details and the date of the hearing. The Court wrote to the applicant's lawyers, copied to the Minister's representatives, twice on 28 January 2026 confirming that the hearing on 29 January 2026 would proceed and noting that the applicant's lawyers appeared not to have complied with r 4.05 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) (Rules), and were expected to attend the hearing.
12. Despite that communication, it appears from the orders made that day that the applicant's lawyers did not appear at the hearing on 29 January 2026. Instead, the applicant attended on her own behalf, and the Minister by a solicitor. While the orders made that day are not accompanied by written reasons, the Judge adjourned the matter to be heard on a date to be fixed.
13. The matter was re-docketed to me on 9 February 2026, and the parties (the applicant in person) were notified by email that day of the date, time and manner of the hearing.
14. I note that the applicant's former lawyers have still not complied with r 4.05(1)(a) of the Rules. However, it appears uncontroversial that the applicant is now representing herself and that the contact details on the Notice of Intention to Withdraw are correct.
15. On 11 March 2026 my Associate emailed the parties reminding them of the date, time and manner of the hearing.
16. At 5:30 pm on 13 March 2026 the applicant emailed my chambers requesting:

(a) an adjournment of the hearing to an unspecified date on the basis that she was trying to locate lawyers and was talking with Legal Aid; and

(b) a pro bono referral on the basis that she was a victim of fraud.

1. The Minister opposed the grant of an adjournment, noting the previous hearing was adjourned after the applicant's former lawyers withdrew to give the applicant an opportunity to review the materials before the Court. Further, the Minister submitted that there were no records indicating that Victoria Legal Aid was representing the applicant, and the applicant had not provided any evidence with respect to her allegation of fraud.
2. On 16 March 2026 my Associate communicated to the parties that I was not minded to grant an adjournment of the hearing, having considered both parties' positions and noting the absence of evidence supporting the application. The parties were reminded that the hearing was listed to proceed on 18 March 2026 and that the parties should be ready to proceed on that date. The email noted it would be open to the applicant to renew their adjournment application at the hearing, but that any such renewal should have regard to the Minister's reasons for opposing the adjournment and should be supported by evidence.
3. Later that day the applicant emailed the Court, copied to the Minister, attaching a letter containing allegations of fact to support the fraud allegation, a further request for an adjournment, and submissions with respect to the substantive visa application (Letter). Emails from Victoria Legal Aid, and a copy of one page extracted from the court book (CB 121), were attached. My Associate emailed the parties confirming the matter would proceed on 18 March 2026.

1. The applicant appeared before the Court unrepresented with the assistance of an interpreter in the Thai language.
2. At the commencement of the hearing, I explained that the Court's role was limited to undertaking judicial review, not merits review, and that I was unable to grant the applicant a Visa nor consider the merits of her Visa application. I set out the issues the Court would consider in relation to the extension of time application consistent with [45] below. I also explained the procedure by which the hearing would be undertaken.
3. The Minister relied on his written submissions and the court book previously filed and tendered as exhibit R1, and read the Williams Affidavit. No objection was made by the applicant.
4. The applicant read the CVB21 Affidavit (to which no objection was raised by the Minister) and sought to tender the Letter and the attached documents. I explained to the parties that when considering the extension of time application, the possible merits of the underlying application are only assessed at an impressionistic level. I therefore indicated my intention to consider the Letter as a submission, including a submission as to the evidence the applicant might lead at a final hearing. The Minister had no objection to the Letter being received on that basis.
5. As to the attachments, the extracted page from the court book did not require tender as the same page was tendered in the court book itself. I asked the applicant if she relied on the emails from Victoria Legal Aid for anything other than the previous adjournment request. The applicant advised that she did not, but that she did seek to renew her application for an adjournment. I therefore invited the applicant to make submissions in support of her adjournment application. She appeared somewhat distressed and emotional at that request, stating she did not know what to say. I provided a brief explanation as to what I understood of the applicant's position, including her allegations of fraud and seeking of legal assistance, and advised that I would be considering the merits of the applicant's grounds at a superficial level. I then noted that I had several questions for both the applicant and the Minister's representative with respect to the extension of time application, which might impact how the matter proceeded. I therefore proposed that it might be easier on the applicant if I were to pose those questions and then, depending on how the hearing proceeded, we could, if necessary, come back to any adjournment application she sought to make. The applicant agreed with that course.
6. To the extent necessary for these reasons, my discussions with the applicant and the Minister's representative, and the submissions each made, are set out in my consideration below.
7. Given the allegations raised by the applicant were not in evidentiary form, I gave some consideration to whether the applicant should be invited to give evidence from the witness box. I flagged that this might be a possibility with the parties. However, noting the limitations of the merits assessment to be undertaken on an extension of time application, and the risk that the applicant may potentially have to give evidence twice on the same matters if her extension of time application was granted, I did not do so.
8. At the conclusion of the hearing, the applicant again requested an adjournment of the hearing. She explained that she had not heard anything further from Victoria Legal Aid as to whether they could represent her since the most recent email dated 2 March 2026, and that she had not pursued them for an answer but was waiting for a phone call. I was not minded to grant an adjournment of the hearing of the extension of time application in those circumstances. I was of the view that I had sufficient information to enable me to determine the extension of time application and there was no material to suggest when or if Victoria Legal Aid would decide to assist the applicant. I noted the Application had already been on foot for over four and a half years.
9. In considering the adjournment application, I took into account the use of Court resources thus far, the implications on the use of public funds and availability of the Court to other litigants, and consequentially the administration of justice. As set out in my consideration, there are evidentiary gaps for both parties in the material before me at the extension of time hearing. Some of those gaps (although not all) were occasioned by the late preparation by the applicant of her Letter, leaving the Minister at somewhat of a disadvantage. While a hearing might ordinarily be adjourned to enable both parties to put on further material to overcome any such disadvantage, doing so in this instance would lead to a third hearing date being set aside for the extension of time.
10. Given my conclusion on the extension of time application, the applicant will have a further opportunity to attempt to engage with Victoria Legal Aid, or any other legal representative, to prepare her evidence and submissions ahead of a final hearing. As a result, she will have suffered no disadvantage by the refusal to grant the adjournment. Likewise, the Minister will have the opportunity to meet the fraud allegation as it is put and to correct any evidentiary gaps in their material.

LAW RELATING TO AN APPLICATION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME

(1) An application to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) for a remedy to be granted in exercise of the court's original jurisdiction under section 476 in relation to a migration decision must be made to the court within 35 days of the date of the migration decision.

(2) The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) may, by order, extend that 35 day period as the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) considers appropriate if:

(a) an application for that order has been made in writing to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) specifying why the applicant considers that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order; and

(b) the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order.

1. In considering whether to grant an extension of time, there are no mandatory relevant considerations. In SZTES v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 719 Wigney J held the following matters to be relevant considerations as to whether an extension of time should be granted:

(a) the extent of the delay;

(b) the explanation for the delay;

(c) prejudice to the respondent due to the delay; and

(d) the merits of the proposed application.

1. The High Court majority held in Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 276 CLR 579; [2022] HCA 28 (Tu'uta Katoa) at [12]:

On its face, the power conferred by s 477A(2) is unfettered except by the requirements of a written application in conformity with s 477A(2)(a) and the Court's satisfaction that an order extending time "is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice". Other than the "interests of the administration of justice", there are no mandatory relevant considerations, whether express or to be implied from the "subject-matter, scope and purpose" of the Act. The focus of s 477A(2)(b) is not on the interests of the applicant, but the broader interests of the administration of justice. So framed, the paragraph allows the Court to look at a myriad of facts and circumstances, including the length of the applicant's delay, reasons for the delay, prejudice to the respondent, prejudice to third parties and the merits of the underlying application. The level of satisfaction for the Court to reach is not low: the Court must be satisfied not just that an extension of time is desirable, but that it is needed in the interests of the administration of justice.

1. At [17] and [19] of Tu'uta Katoa, the majority explained that "in determining what is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for the purposes of s 477A(2) (or s 477(2)), it will often be appropriate to assess the merits of the proposed grounds of review at a 'reasonably impressionistic level'" but that ultimately the provision "entrusts to the [Court] the function of identifying and formulating the interests of the administration of justice and how they should be weighed and assessed, including by reference to the merits of the proposed application".
2. In considering the merits of the proposed grounds of review it is, as stated by Mortimer J (as her Honour then was) in CAL15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1344 at [4] in relation to a different discretionary procedural power, "not fair to exercise a discretion favourably to an applicant if the Court is not satisfied there is an arguable case ". However, the appropriate standard of assessment should also be borne in mind, as stated by Given J in CTF21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 309 at [52]:

When examining the relative merits of a proposed substantive application at an impressionistic level the standard of assessment, whether described as being arguable, reasonably or sufficiently arguable or having a reasonable prospect of success, is a low bar: DHX17 (supra) at [76] per Collier, Rangiah and Derrington JJ, SZRIQ v Federal Magistrates Court of Australia [2013] FCA 1284; (2013) 236 FCR 442 at [47] and Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348 to 349 per Wilcox J.

1. The applicant's Application was lodged on 17 August 2021, some 47 days outside of the specified 35 day timeframe provided under s 477 of the Act with respect to the dismissal decision. The extent of the delay is not insignificant (the Minister described it as "moderate") but not of a length to require an exceptional explanation: cf Vella v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 90 ALJR 89; [2015] HCA 42at [3].
2. An explanation for the delay is set out in the Application as follows:
   1. I was not aware that my application for a protection visa was refused and an appeal was lodged with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal without my knowledge with the email address: [Gmail address].
   2. I was not aware that I was supposed to attend a hearing with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
   3. I only found out that my application was refused by the Department of Home Affairs and the appeal lodgement with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal after I noticed that I could not access my visa status with My VEVO and upon enquiring with the Department of Home Affairs.
   4. It was already over the 35 days allowable time frame to lodge an application with the Federal Circuit Court after I received the Documents from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
   5. I found out about the Dismissal of the appeal with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal after I requested the details with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal through my request for access under the Freedom of Information Act 1982.
   6. I was unable to seek advise and certification of my Affidavit due to the Lockdown 5 in Victoria after receiving the documents from the Administrative Appeals tribunal.
3. The Minister's written submissions assert this explanation fails on the facts: the annexure to the Williams Affidavit contains apparently contemporaneous case notes taken by Tribunal officers of telephone contact from the applicant in both March 2020 and March 2021. In both telephone calls, the case notes record that the applicant sought a Medicare letter and gave all the correct contact details on file, save for the Gmail address, which the applicant referred to either as possibly her lawyer's email address (March 2020) or her friend's email address (March 2021). The case notes indicate that on both occasions the Tribunal officer informed the applicant of the need to update her email address with the Tribunal and explained how that could be done. Nothing in the court book suggests that the applicant took up that opportunity. Accordingly, the Minister submits, the applicant was clearly aware of the Tribunal application and any issues in not receiving correspondence was due to her not provided updated contact details to the Tribunal. The Minister's position was that while the extent of the delay is only moderate, the explanation provided by the applicant is not adequate.
4. At the hearing on 18 March 2026, the applicant was invited to further expand upon the reason for her delay in applying for judicial review. She reiterated she did not know about the Tribunal application and that the contact details were not hers, and that the first she knew of the Tribunal application and decision was after the prescribed period had expired. When taken to the case notes annexed to the Williams Affidavit and having them interpreted to her, the applicant asserted that her former Authorised Recipient had called to tell her that the Authorised Recipient was unable to obtain a Medicare letter for the applicant herself. The Authorised Recipient then gave the applicant the telephone number, case number and other details she would need to call and ask for a Medicare letter. The essence of that assertion appeared to be that the applicant did not know about the Tribunal application but simply called the number she was given to ask for a Medicare letter, without understanding to whom she was speaking or what that meant.
5. I consider - for the same reasons set out in my consideration of the merits of the underlying Application, and particularly the fraud allegation - that the applicant's explanation for the delay has at least some merit. For the reasons set out by the Minister, there may be factual difficulties with at least part of the applicant's grounds (noting the same grounds arise in part for the substantive application).
6. Overall however, the evidence annexed to the applicant's affidavit supports that she did not in fact become aware of the Tribunal's decision until after the time frame in s 477 of the Act had passed, regardless of whether she was deemed to have received it at an earlier date and regardless of whether, as the Minister asserts, the evidence shows she was aware of the Tribunal application. While that would not necessarily be compelling on its own, the materials pointed to by the applicant (as discussed below) suggested that, at least at an impressionistic level, there is an arguable case that the applicant might be able to establish that she is a victim of a fraud on the Tribunal in the sense discussed in SZFDE v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2007) 232 CLR 189; [2007] HCA 35.
7. On that basis, and given the fraud, if established, would also satisfy the need for an explanation for the delay to at least 15 July 2021 (when the applicant was informed by the Department of the Tribunal's decision, albeit not provided a copy), the explanation provided is considered sufficient.

1. The Minister properly conceded that no substantive prejudice would flow to them by the applicant's delay but noted delay itself does cause some prejudice. Prejudice to the applicant if the extension of time is not granted would follow, in that her Application will not be heard on its merits. However, the Court will have regard, at least at an impressionistic level, to those merits in assessing whether to grant the extension.
2. This factor is essentially neutral in my consideration, albeit noting that absence of prejudice to the Minister or third parties alone is not a basis to grant an extension: SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6].

Merits of the underlying judicial review application

1. The applicant's proposed grounds of review are in the following terms:
   1. Tribunal failed to take into consideration on the serious physical, mental and emotional harm that I will endure if I am to be repatriated back to Thailand and had erred in the decision of my review for my protection visa refusal.
   2. Administrative Appeals Tribunal to reconsider to accept my application for review of the refusal from the Department of Home Affairs in regard to my application for a Protection Visa (subclass 866).
   3. I was not aware that my application for a protection visa was refused and an appeal was lodged with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal without my knowledge with the email address: [Gmail address].
   4. I was not aware that I was supposed to attend a hearing with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal thus depriving me any opportunity to present my case with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
2. The applicant has more recently, in correspondence including the Letter, asserted that she is the victim of fraud by her representative. As that ground is arguably put at least implicitly in ground three, I have considered it as part of that ground.
3. The Letter also asserts the Tribunal's notification of its dismissal decision did not put the applicant on notice of the timeframe to apply for reinstatement, had she received that notification. I have addressed that assertion in considering ground four.
4. I will now address each individual ground.

1. As the Tribunal summarily dismissed the application, it was not required to consider the substantive merits of the applicant's visa application nor any alleged harm she might endure if returned to Thailand. Given the procedure adopted, those matters did not need to be considered. Ground one has no reasonable prospect of success.

1. Ground two is difficult to decipher and appears to set out the desired relief rather than an allegation of error. It does not raise any possible jurisdictional error and has no reasonable prospect of success.

1. To the extent ground three asserts the applicant was unaware of her Tribunal application at all, the Minister submits that this ground fails on the facts, having regard to the annexure to the Williams Affidavit. The applicant, as set out above at [52], maintained in oral submissions that she was unaware of the Tribunal application and was provided with the relevant phone number and case details and coached in what to request in order to obtain her Medicare letter. The applicant's explanation was made by submission rather than evidence, and was not tested in cross-examination, for the reasons canvassed at [40] above. I decline to make any finding as to the applicant's knowledge of the Tribunal application at this stage, as I consider that more appropriately addressed at final hearing in due course.
2. The applicant otherwise alleges that she was the victim of a fraud by her Authorised Recipient and that she did not personally sign the Visa application. The applicant was instead assured her claims would be made by the Authorised Recipient, who held herself out to be a lawyer. The applicant asserts that she was not advised of the delegate's decision, nor of the Tribunal application which did not contain her contact details, such that the Tribunal did not contact the applicant at all about the hearing or its decisions.
3. As set out above, the bar for an arguable case is low and the merits are to be assessed at an impressionistic level only. With that context, to the extent this ground (as supported by the Letter) comprises an allegation of fraud against the Authorised Recipient such as to stultify the Tribunal's exercise of its review powers, the following matters cause me some concern and lend evidentiary support, at least in part, to the applicant's allegation:

(a) The applicant was clearly represented by an Authorised Recipient in her Visa application. The Letter asserts the applicant did not sign the application nor the form appointing the Authorised Recipient, and provides what is said to be a screenshot of the applicant's signature, albeit it is not clear from where it was taken. Of more weight in my eyes is that the photocopy of the applicant's passport provided to the Department (CB 53) also contains the applicant's signature. It is notably different from the signature contained within the application documents (CB 19, 47 and 51). While there might be various explanations for the discrepancy, it does lend support for this part of the applicant's allegation.

(b) The Letter asserts the applicant was told by the Authorised Recipient that she was a lawyer. If the applicant can prove that assertion, the fact that the Authorised Recipient apparently completed both the Visa application and the associated Form 956A stating that she was not a migration agent gives rise to the possibility - that would need to be tested in evidence - of fraud at least on the applicant, if not on the Tribunal.

(c) At some stage after the Visa application was acknowledged by the Department and before the delegate's decision was made, it appears that the Department recorded a change in email address for the applicant (or her Authorised Recipient) to the Gmail address. Nothing in the court book filed by the Minister gives a basis for that change. The Minister has not filed material to prove that the applicant was properly notified of the delegate's decision, noting her Application has, from the date it was filed, contained an allegation that she was not aware of that decision. On the face of the material available to me at the hearing of the extension of time application, I cannot be satisfied that the applicant was notified of the delegate's decision in the prescribed way: ss 66(1), 494C(5)(b) and (d), and 494D(1) of the Act, and reg 2.16(3) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). On the one hand, that might be considered immaterial given an application was made to the Tribunal, purportedly by the applicant, within the prescribed period. However, given I cannot be certain who was notified of the delegate's decision and, using the same email address, applied to the Tribunal, this provides some support to the applicant's fraud allegation in the absence of material from the Minister to explain. As the Minister's representative submitted when this was brought to their attention at the hearing, there may well be a simple explanation and evidence on the Department's file to explain the change in email address. However, if that is so, given the applicant's receipt of the delegate's decision has been in issue for the entirety of this proceeding, it is surprising that the evidentiary gap was not already closed.

(d) Annexed to the CVB21 Affidavit is an email exchange the applicant apparently had with the Department between 13 September 2018 and 15 October 2018 (that is, after the date of the delegate's decision). Relevantly, the applicant annexed an email purportedly from the applicant to a Departmental email address, which bore her personal details and Department file number associated with the Visa application, stating: "I would like to inform the Department that I have changed my email and address". A completed form was apparently attached to this email but was not annexed to the CVB21 Affidavit. The Department acknowledged that request and confirmed it had been processed by reply email on 15 October 2018. That email did not (and was not required to) notify the applicant of the delegate's decision nor suggest she should also update the Tribunal. The email address used in that exchange is not on its face similar to the applicant's personal details nor to either of the email addresses she has utilised in this proceeding. In oral submissions, she indicated it was the email of a male Singaporean who was assisting her as she did not, at that time, have a personal email address. In oral submissions, the Minister's representative noted that the change of email address did not affect the notification of the delegate's decision (which preceded it) nor the Tribunal's actions (as the change was not notified to the Tribunal). The Minister further posited that a review of the Department's files might provide further context for why the Department was advised of the change in email address, and that it could be in relation to a bridging visa. Without detracting from the strength of those points, I simply note that if nothing else, this exchange with the Department shows some engagement by the applicant with the responsibility to update her contact details, suggesting the applicant was not merely doing nothing with respect to the Visa application. Such a factor may well be relevant to assessing if the applicant was complicit in or recklessly indifferent to any fraud, were it made out. Again, this is a point that, in combination with other points of concern, give me cause to consider the applicant may have an arguable case with respect to her fraud allegation.

1. A further evidentiary gap in the material before me arises with respect to the case notes annexed to the Williams Affidavit; a case note of a phone enquiry made on 20 March 2020 refers to a previous request for a Medicare letter, and that the Tribunal sent that letter by email on 25 February 2020. Neither the request nor the email are in the court book or other material filed. It might be that those materials shed some light on the apparent communication by the applicant with the Tribunal in 2020. At this stage, it cannot be inferred if such evidence might assist or harm the applicant's case on fraud.
2. In order to succeed at a final hearing on her fraud allegation, the applicant would need to be able to prove that a fraud was perpetrated in which she was neither complicit nor recklessly indifferent. Further, such fraud must have had the effect of stultifying the Tribunal's processes. There are certainly evidentiary hurdles for the applicant to overcome to prove such an allegation, and the present state of the materials is inadequate. However, at least at an impressionistic level, her materials and the gaps in the Minister's materials support that she has at least some prospect of establishing at least some elements of a fraud that might have stultified the Tribunal's review. Cognisant of the limits of this extension of time application, and to avoid any risk of prejudgment ahead of the parties having the opportunity to put on materials to properly argue the fraud allegation, I do not put my views any higher than that. However, and again at the impressionistic level, I consider the applicant has at least an arguable case that she was the victim of a fraud that might have stultified the Tribunal's review function.

1. Ground four asserts the applicant was not aware she was supposed to attend a Tribunal hearing. For the remainder of this ground, I have assessed it without having regard to the allegation of fraud made in ground three, and therefore note that the findings below are made for the purpose of the extension of time application only. Thus, I deliberately exclude the effect of any stultification of the Tribunal's procedures that might have resulted if the applicant's allegation of fraud is made out.
2. As the Minister's written submissions set out, the Tribunal's invitation to a hearing was sent to the Gmail address, being the last email address provided by the applicant to the Tribunal in connection with the review, in accordance with s 441A(5) of the Act. That invitation properly put the applicant on notice of the consequence of non-appearance. I am satisfied that the invitation complied with the Tribunal's legislative obligations.
3. Upon the applicant's non-appearance, the Tribunal satisfied itself that the applicant had been properly invited to the hearing and then utilised its available discretion to summarily dismiss the application for non-appearance, thus preserving the opportunity for the applicant to apply for reinstatement. The dismissal decision provided an evident and intelligible justification for the way in which the Tribunal proceeded. The applicant was then properly notified of the dismissal decision and her right to apply for reinstatement within the prescribed period. Contrary to the applicant's assertion in the Letter that the notification of the dismissal decision "has no mention of any date to request the hearing be reinstated", as set out at [11]-[12] above and discussed with the applicant at the hearing, the Tribunal's letter and enclosed factsheet both advised of the 14 day period and specific end date of the prescribed period in which the applicant could apply for reinstatement. That ground, if pressed, has no reasonable prospect of success.
4. I am satisfied the Tribunal did not err in making the dismissal decision nor in its communication to the applicant at the Gmail address of that decision and the applicant's ability to apply for reinstatement. That the applicant may not in fact have received those communications, as she asserts, does not overcome the effect of the deeming provision in s 441C(5) of the Act.
5. As the applicant then did not apply for reinstatement with the prescribed period, the Tribunal was bound, by s 426A(1E) of the Act, to confirm its dismissal decision. There was no error in it doing so and the Tribunal complied with its procedural fairness obligations.
6. I note the applicant does not appear to assert the Tribunal did not comply with its legislative obligations with respect to the hearing invitation or notification of the dismissal decision. Rather, her grounds assert that she was not aware of the hearing and that the Gmail address was not hers nor one of which she was aware. While the Tribunal was arguably on notice that the applicant might not have direct access to the Gmail address (Williams Affidavit), the Tribunal also had no alternative email address available to it, despite twice orally advising the applicant to update her email address and how to do so. The case notes suggested that the applicant knew the person in control of the email address. The Tribunal also had no phone number available to it. In those circumstances, there was no error in it using the Gmail address as the only form of communication. Nor is there any error in the Tribunal not considering an explanation for non-appearance that was not put to it.

Conclusion on merits of judicial review application

1. The applicant's proposed first, second and fourth grounds of review set out in her Application (assessed at a reasonably impressionistic level only) do not identify any arguable case of jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. However, again assessed at a reasonably impressionistic level only, the allegation of fraud made in ground three and expanded upon in the Letter and in oral submissions appears to have at least an arguable prospect of success, subject to the applicant's evidence being prepared in admissible form and any responsive evidence from the Minister. It is more appropriate that such evidentiary matters be the subject of a final hearing on the merits of the Application rather than assessed as part of an extension of time application.
2. This weighs heavily towards granting an extension of time.

1. The applicant has identified, at least at an impressionistic level, an arguable case of fraud that may have had the consequence of stultifying the Tribunal's procedures, such that its decisions ought be set aside. That fraud, if established, would also constitute an acceptable explanation for the applicant's relatively short delay in commencing the proceeding.
2. It is therefore in the interests of the administration of justice to grant the applicant an extension of time in which to seek judicial review of the Tribunal's decisions at this stage, so that those matters can be the subject of evidence and reasoned argument at a final hearing. Orders will be made accordingly.

I certify that the preceding seventy-eight (78) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Mitchell.