[2004] FCA 1226
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Federal Court of Australia
2004-09-20
Marshall J
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 The applicant, Mr David Cucanic, has applied to the Court pursuant to s 170CP of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ("the Act") for an order under s 170CR in respect of an alleged contravention of s 170CK(2)(f). 2 Mr Cucanic alleged that his employment was terminated by the respondent, IGA Distribution (Vic) Pty Ltd, ("IGA") for reasons which included the reason that he suffered from a physical disability. IGA conceded, through its counsel, that it terminated Mr Cucanic's employment for that reason, but alleged that that reason was based on the inherent requirements of the particular position occupied by Mr Cucanic; see s 170CK(3) of the Act.
The issues 3 The questions for determination by the Court are:
Factual context 4 IGA conducts a warehousing and distribution service from its premises at North Laverton, a western suburb of Melbourne. From about October 2000 until 4 May 2001, IGA employed Mr Cucanic as a storeperson at its North Laverton premises on a series of casual and short, fixed term contracts. 5 On 4 May 2001, IGA offered, and Mr Cucanic accepted, "a Permanent Full-time Position effective from the 04/05/01 as a Storeperson at the Laverton Distribution Center." From his first casual engagement until May 2001, Mr Cucanic worked in the dry groceries area and the general merchandising area of IGA's distribution centre. After becoming a full-time permanent employee in May 2001, and until suffering an injury to his back on 31 October 2001, Mr Cucanic spent a majority of his working time in the dry groceries area. 6 The terms and conditions of Mr Cucanic's employment were in part governed by an enterprise bargaining agreement ("EBA") which contained a classification structure. When first engaged by IGA, Mr Cucanic was classified as a Storeworker Grade I but progressed at least as at 31 October 2001 to a Storeworker Grade II. 7 Under the classification structure provided for in the EBA, a new employee commences as a Storeworker Grade I. The various "Job Titles" within the classification are: "Order Assember, Filler, Pick-Ups, Stretch Wrapping, Cleaner (Promotion to Grade 2 may be achieved before 2 years based upon performance)." Included as "indicative of the tasks which an employee at this level may perform" were the following:
· weights handled range from 100 grams to 20 kg-packs of flour, dog food etc. Each employee per shift picks an average of 18 pallets, i.e. 2 pallets per hour. Some items are bulky and awkward to handle, employees are required to pick from floor level to above shoulder height. Intermittent force required manoeuvring goods from shelving to pallet."
The same document referred to the "skills required" as, amongst others: "…
The particular position 17 The particular position which Mr Cucanic occupied at IGA's distribution centre in North Laverton was a storeperson Grade II that was "the level or rank" from which he performed his tasks: see Qantas Airways Ltd v Christie (1998) 193 CLR 280 at 304 per McHugh J. However that is not the entire description of the particular position of Mr Cucanic. As McHugh J said in Christie at 304: "A person's position…is primarily concerned with the level or rank from which he or she performs those tasks. Position concerns rank and status. What is required of a person's position, however, will usually require an examination of the tasks performed from that position. That is because the capacity to perform those tasks is an inherent requirement of the particular position." 18 McHugh J considered at 304 to 305 that the requirements of a particular "position" may be different from those of a particular "job" and that in some cases the distinction "will be of little significance". 19 In the instant case, Mr Cucanic's position was his job. Before his injury, his job was to perform the tasks of a Storeworker Grade II in the dry grocery and general merchandising areas of the distribution centre as an order assembler. His position or job was not the post-injury, lighter duties, employment, which he engaged in as part of a rehabilitation program. His "job" or "position" was not any work IGA may find for him to do within his classification without aggravating his back injury. But for the injury to his back, Mr Cucanic would have been expected to continue to perform storeworker duties in the dry grocery area for a majority of his working time with the remainder of the time spent in the general merchandising area, performing tasks within the competencies of a Storeworker Grade II. That is what his particular position was for the purposes of s 170CK(3) of the Act, which provides a defence to an application based on s 170CK(2)(f) if: "…the reason for terminating employment…is based on the inherent requirements of the particular position concerned."
"The inherent requirements of the particular position" 20 It was an inherent requirement of Mr Cucanic's position, that is, "his actual duties" (see Cosma v Qantas Airways (2002) 124 FCR 504 at 512) and Christie at [1] per Brennan CJ, that he be required to regularly lift more than 15 and up to 20 kilograms in weight in the dry grocery area and engage in repetitive bending and twisting. He was unable, after 31 October 2001, to perform the inherent requirements of his particular position. 21 The inherent requirements of a particular position refer, at least, to the physical ability to perform the characteristic skill of the employment: see McHugh J in X v Commonwealth (1999) 200 CLR 177 at [11]. A requirement will be "inherent" if it is an "essential element" of the particular employment or position: see X at [31] per McHugh J and at [102] per Gummow and Hayne JJ. 22 At [102] in X, Gummow and Hayne JJ said: "The reference to "inherent" requirements invites attention to what are the characteristic or essential requirements of the employment as opposed to those requirements that might be described as peripheral. Further, the reference to "inherent" requirements would deal with at least some, and probably all, cases in which a discriminatory employer seeks to contrive the result that the disabled are excluded from a job. But the requirements that are to be considered are the requirements of the particular employment, not the requirements of employment of some identified type or some different employment modified to meet the needs of a disabled employee or applicant for work." 23 It was an essential requirement of Mr Cucanic's pre-injury position that he regularly lift up to 20 kilograms in weight and engage in repetitive bending and twisting. These tasks were not peripheral to his position but central to the performance of what IGA required him to do. 24 As Gummow and Hayne JJ made clear in X the inherent requirements of a particular position or employment are not judged by performance of work modified from that originally performed by an employee to assist his rehabilitation needs. Further the possibility that a position may be moulded to suit the needs of Mr Cucanic on a permanent basis begs the questions examined above.
Conclusion 25 Having regard to the foregoing I answer the questions for determination as follows: · Mr Cucanic occupied the position of Storeworker Grade II in the performance of order assembler, filler, pick ups and stretch wrapping work in the dry grocery and general merchandising areas of IGA's distribution centre at North Laverton ("the position").
· The inherent requirements of the position included all essential components of the position, that is, all the major tasks required to be performed by someone occupying the position.
· Mr Cucanic, because of his physical disability (being an injury to his back) was unable to carry out the inherent requirements of the position. 26 Consequently, as IGA has made out its defence under s 170CK(3), the Court will order that the application be dismissed. I certify that the preceding twenty-six (26) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Marshall.
Associate: Dated: 20 September 2004 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr I Fehring
Solicitor for the Respondent: Legal Employment Solutions
Date of Hearing: 13 and 14 September 2004
Cucanic
IGA Distribution
(1998) 193 CLR 280
(2002) 124 FCR 504
(1999) 200 CLR 177