mixed. Orders: (1) Interim anti-suit injunction restraining the wife from proceeding with her application for property division in the City N Court (China) pending determination of the Family Court...
Key principles
The Family Court of Australia has jurisdiction to determine matrimonial property proceedings under the Family Law Act 1975 where the parties are present in, or ordinarily...
The correct test for staying proceedings in the Family Court in favour of foreign proceedings is whether Australia is a 'clearly inappropriate forum' to hear the dispute (the...
Relevant considerations in the 'clearly inappropriate forum' inquiry include, non-exhaustively: whether the foreign courts will recognise each other's orders; which forum can...
Family Court s 79 orders are in personam and the Court retains the capacity to adjust property interests including property located overseas; that orders operate in personam...
Issues before the court
Whether the Family Court should stay its property proceedings pending resolution of property proceedings in China
Whether an anti-suit injunction should be granted restraining the wife from proceeding with her Chinese property proceedings
Plain English Summary
Husband commenced Family Court property proceedings in Australia. Wife later started property proceedings in China and asked the Family Court to stay its proceedings. The Family Court held Australia was not a 'clearly inappropriate forum' because the Australian proceedings were first, both parties are in Australia, the Family Court can make in personam property orders including in respect of overseas assets, and the Chinese court would not consider Australian assets. The wife's stay was dismissed. The Court nevertheless granted an anti-suit injunction preventing the wife from proceeding with the property division element of her Chinese application (but did not restrain her Chinese divorce application). All remaining Australian applications were listed for allocation.
AI-generated legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Check the cited source, and for advice about your situation consult a qualified Australian lawyer.
Whether the Family Court has jurisdiction and power to adjust property interests that include assets located in China
Cited legislation
2 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
Deep Dive
2,131 words · generated 23/07/2026
What happened
Procedural background: Mr Teo (husband) filed an Initiating Application in the Family Court of Australia on 22 April 2020 seeking final property orders. The matter proceeded to case management hearings and interim orders (including asset restraint) in the Family Court. On 17 July 2020 the wife, Ms Ung, filed a Response to Initiating Application seeking, among other things, a stay of the Australian proceedings pending family law proceedings in China. The wife then commenced proceedings in the City N Court (C District, China) on 20 August 2020, seeking divorce and property division. The husband filed an Application in a Case on 2 August 2020 seeking dismissal of the wife's interim stay orders and an injunction restraining the wife from continuing the Chinese property proceedings. The contested interlocutory hearing was determined in the Judicial Duty List on 12 October 2020 before Johns J (reasons delivered 17 December 2020). See the timeline of filings and orders in the Reasons for Judgment.
Relief sought and outcome: The wife sought (inter alia) a stay of the Australian property proceedings pending Chinese proceedings. The husband sought an anti-suit injunction restraining the wife from continuing Chinese property proceedings. Johns J dismissed the wife's stay application, held Australia was not a 'clearly inappropriate forum' to hear the property dispute, and granted an injunction restraining the wife from proceeding with the property division claim in the City N Court. The injunction expressly did not extend to the wife's application for dissolution of the marriage in China. The wife's interim orders in the Family Court were dismissed and the parties' extant Australian proceedings were set to be allocated to a judicial docket.
Why the court decided this way
The judgment rests on two distinct but related strands of principle: the 'clearly inappropriate forum' test (when a court should stay local proceedings in favour of foreign proceedings) and the exercise of equitable jurisdiction to grant an anti-suit injunction.
Jurisdiction and initial position
Johns J began by confirming there was no jurisdictional challenge to the Family Court's ability to determine matrimonial property under the Family Law Act 1975: a matrimonial cause may be instituted where a party is present in or ordinarily resident in Australia (s 39(4)), and both parties were present in Australia with the wife ordinarily resident here. That established the Court's power to determine the husband's s 79 application.
The stay test and its application
The judge applied the well-established 'clearly inappropriate forum' test (drawn from Oceanic Sun Line, Voth and Henry), which requires the party seeking a stay to show continuance of local proceedings will be oppressive or vexatious. The Court adopted the non-exhaustive list of factors set out in Henry and summarised in Skinner (including order of institution, stage reached, recognition of foreign orders, which forum can fully resolve the dispute, costs, connections of parties to the jurisdictions, language and resources). The court found the following points critical:
The Australian proceedings were commenced first (April 2020), while the wife's Chinese proceedings were commenced in August 2020.
The parties and key witnesses live in Australia; the wife is ordinarily resident here; both parties are presently in Australia.
The Family Court has power to make s 79 in personam orders that can address interests held overseas (although enforcement abroad may be problematic).
The Chinese courts will not, by concession, take account of Australian property; there was no evidence the Chinese proceedings could provide a more complete resolution.
There was no convincing evidence that continuing the Family Court proceedings would be oppressive to the husband, nor that the wife proved Australia to be a clearly inappropriate forum.
On that basis the stay application was dismissed.
Anti-suit injunction
Johns J then considered the equitable power to restrain foreign proceedings, citing CSR for the proposition that courts can grant anti-suit injunctions to protect their own processes where necessary. He balanced the competing principle that instituting foreign proceedings bona fide is not, of itself, vexatious (Kent & Kent).
The judge found a real risk of two courts being seized of substantially identical property issues, producing potential conflicting outcomes. Given Australia was first-in-time, the parties' and witnesses' presence in Australia, that the Family Court proceedings were underway with disclosure and injunctive orders already made, and the wife's later initiation of Chinese property proceedings, the continuation of the Chinese property claim would be vexatious and oppressive in Voth/Henry senses.
Accordingly, Johns J granted an injunction restraining the wife from proceeding with the property division aspects of her Chinese application, but declined to restrain the Chinese divorce application (there was no pending dissolution application in Australia to protect).
In short, the Court refused to cede primary jurisdiction to China on the facts: Australia was not a 'clearly inappropriate forum', but the Court protected its process by enjoining parallel Chinese property litigation to avoid oppression and vexation.
Before and after state of the law
Before:
The relevant legal landscape was established by the High Court authorities: Oceanic and Voth framed the 'clearly inappropriate forum' enquiry; Henry refined the factors to consider; CSR authorised anti-suit injunctions to protect a court's processes; Kent & Kent emphasised that launching foreign proceedings in good faith is permissible and not automatically oppressive.
What this judgment confirms:
The decision applies these authorities in the family law property context and confirms that:
Presence and ordinary residence in Australia are important jurisdictional anchors under s 39(4).
The Family Court can make s 79 in personam orders affecting overseas property and that the in personam nature of s 79 proceedings is relevant to the forum analysis (citing Teo v Guan).
A later-filed foreign property claim which overlaps substantially with an earlier Australian property claim can, depending on circumstances, be restrained by anti-suit injunction to protect the Australian proceedings even where the foreign plaintiff acts in good faith.
The judgment does not change the law but applies established tests to common family-law fact patterns involving transnational assets.
After:
Practitioners should treat this judgment as an applicatory precedent in the Family Court context: litigants who start foreign property proceedings after Australian proceedings are on foot risk being restrained if the Australian proceedings are first, the parties are in Australia, and the Chinese court will not consider Australian property. Conversely, litigants with strong reasons to litigate abroad promptly and who can show Australia is a clearly inappropriate forum may still secure a stay.
Key passages with plain-English translation
Quoted legal test (Henry/Oceanic/Voth)
Court text (paraphrase): The Court will only stay local proceedings if Australia is a 'clearly inappropriate forum', i.e. continuing the proceedings here would be oppressive or vexatious.
Plain English: To get the Family Court to stop its own case because another country is dealing with the matter, the person asking must show that continuing here would be seriously unfair or amount to harassment.
In personam nature of s79 orders (Teo v Guan)
Court text: s 79 orders are made in personam and not in rem.
Plain English: The Family Court can order a party to do something about overseas property (for example transfer an interest), because orders operate against persons, not merely the thing, although actually enforcing such an order overseas may be harder.
Anti-suit injunction power (CSR)
Court text: A court may grant an injunction to restrain foreign proceedings if they interfere with proceedings pending in that court; the power is exercised when the administration of justice demands it.
Plain English: If an overseas lawsuit would mess up or duplicate what the Family Court is already handling, the Family Court can stop the overseas part of the fight to protect its process.
Final operative decision
Court text (paraphrase): Australia is not a clearly inappropriate forum; stay dismissed; injunction granted restraining the wife's Chinese property claim.
Plain English: The Family Court kept control of the property fight and stopped the wife from pursuing the Chinese property case while the Australian case continues, but she can still seek a divorce in China.
What fact patterns trigger this precedent
The judgment is most directly triggered in family/property cases where:
One spouse files property proceedings in an Australian court first, with procedural steps taken (case management, disclosure, asset restraint), and later the other spouse files overlapping property claims in a foreign court.
Both spouses and key witnesses are resident or present in Australia and the applicant in the foreign proceedings is not able to show that the foreign forum can provide a more complete resolution.
The foreign court will not or cannot deal with assets held in Australia, producing the risk of fragmented, inconsistent resolution.
There is a real risk of duplicative litigation producing vexation or oppression, e.g., the same subject matter being litigated in parallel courts with potential to produce conflicting outcomes.
The Family Court has already made in personam orders or is in a position to provide comprehensive relief, even if enforcement of parts of that relief overseas may be more difficult.
Practically, this decision is triggered where a spouse's resort to a foreign forum is second-in-time, and the Australian proceedings were properly instituted and are at a stage where the Court can continue to manage and ultimately resolve property questions.
How later courts have treated it
This judgment itself applied the established High Court authorities and Full Court family-law decisions; it is an instance of lower-court application rather than an innovating authority. Future Family Court judicial officers will regard the decision as an example of applying the Henry/Skinner checklist and CSR anti-suit principles to a transnational family property fact pattern.
For practitioners, the decision is a useful precedent to argue (a) that Australian proceedings commenced first and where both parties are in Australia should usually be preferred unless the foreign forum can demonstrate superiority; and (b) that anti-suit relief is available to protect ongoing Australian proceedings from duplicative foreign property litigation. It provides a template of the factual and evidentiary material the Court expects to see when addressing stay and anti-suit issues (evidence about timing, parties' connections, assets in each jurisdiction, stages reached, and capacity to enforce orders).
Still-open questions
Enforcement practicality vs forum competence:
The Court emphasised that s 79 orders are in personam and that the Family Court can order adjustments touching overseas property. The judgment recognises potential enforcement complexities in China but treats them as not decisive. An open question for future cases is how strong evidence of real-world inability to enforce Australian in personam orders in a particular foreign jurisdiction would have to be before it tips the balance to find Australia a 'clearly inappropriate forum'.
Timing and progress of foreign proceedings:
Johns J noted a lack of evidence about the likely timetable and substance of the Chinese proceedings. Where detailed evidence is available showing foreign proceedings are already at an advanced stage or can resolve issues more completely, the outcome could differ. The judgment leaves room for a more fact-specific analysis where the foreign case is demonstrably advanced or otherwise superior in its capacity to resolve the entire dispute.
Bona fides and subsequent Australian commencement:
Kent & Kent and CSR protect bona fide foreign litigants. The present decision restrained the wife's later-filed foreign property claim despite no positive finding of bad faith. How courts will calibrate the balance between bona fide resort to foreign courts and the need to prevent vexatious duplication remains a live question.
Scope of anti-suit injunctions in family law:
The Court declined to restrain the wife's divorce application in China. The judgment draws a distinction between property proceedings (which were restrained) and dissolution applications (which were not). Future cases may explore the limits of that boundary, particularly where dissolution and property claims are pleaded together or are interdependent under foreign law.
Interaction with international comity and recognition:
The decision notes concession that neither jurisdiction will recognise the other's orders. How the absence of mutual recognition affects the exercise of anti-suit relief and the 'clearly inappropriate forum' calculus in other bilateral contexts requires future elaboration.
Practical takeaway
If you commence family property proceedings in Australia and the other party moves abroad or starts foreign proceedings, this judgment is authority that the Family Court will protect its process and is unlikely to stay because of later-filed foreign actions unless the foreign forum is demonstrably superior. Conversely, if you are the later litigant abroad, you should bring evidence on timetable, comprehensiveness of the foreign forum, enforceability and reasons why Australia is incapable of delivering complete justice, to reduce the risk of an anti-suit injunction or refusal of a stay.
Judgment (21 paragraphs)
[1]
These proceedings are as and between parties to a marriage with respect to their matrimonial assets. Proceedings arising from a matrimonial cause may be instituted under the Act pursuant to s 39(4) if:-
[2]
(a) in the case of proceedings between the parties to a marriage or proceedings of a kind referred to in paragraph (b) of that definition in relation to a marriage - either party to the marriage is an Australian citizen, is ordinarily resident in Australia, or is present in Australia, at the relevant date; and
(b) in any other case - any party to the proceedings is an Australian citizen, is ordinarily resident in Australia, or is present in Australia, at the relevant date.
[3]
As both parties to the marriage in this matter are present in Australia, and the wife is an ordinary resident of Australia, I am satisfied that this Court has jurisdiction to deal with the property application filed by the husband which is currently before the Court.
The first issue to be determined is whether there should be a stay of that application, as contended for by the wife. The test for determining whether the Family Court should stay the proceedings is whether it is a "clearly inappropriate forum" to exercise its jurisdiction to entertain the dispute between the parties (_Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Company Inc v Fa_y [1988] HCA 32; (1988) 165 CLR 197 ("Oceanic"); Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Proprietary Limited and Another[1990] HCA 55; (1990) 171 CLR 538 ("Voth")).
The party seeking a stay of the proceedings, that is the wife, bears the onus of establishing that this Court is a clearly inappropriate forum. In order to demonstrate that it is a clearly inappropriate forum it must be found that the continuance of the proceedings will be "oppressive" in the sense of "seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging" or "vexatious" in the sense of "productive of serious and unjustified trouble and harassment" (Voth; Oceanic).
The majority in Henry v Henry[1996] HCA 51; (1996) 185 CLR 571 ("Henry") considered the matters to be taken into account in determining what is a clearly inappropriate forum at 592 - 593 as follows:-
[4]
Some of the matters properly to be taken into account in a case such as the present emerge from what has already been written. To start with, no question arises unless the courts of the respective countries have jurisdiction with respect to the parties and their marriage. And if there is a question as to the jurisdiction of the foreign court, it may be necessary to adjourn the local proceedings to enable the foreign court to determine that question. However, if both have jurisdiction, it will be relevant to consider whether each will recognise the other's orders and decrees. If the orders of the foreign court will not be recognised in Australia, that will ordinarily dispose of any suggestion that the local proceedings should not continue. However, if the orders of the foreign court will be recognised in Australia, it will be relevant to consider whether any orders may need to be enforced in other countries and, if so, the relative ease with which that can be done. As well, it will be relevant to consider which forum can provide more effectively for complete resolution of the matters involved in the parties' controversy.
Other considerations include the order in which the proceedings were instituted, the stage which they have reached and the costs that have been incurred. It will also be relevant to consider the connection of the parties and their marriage with each of the jurisdictions and to have regard to the issues on which relief might depend in those jurisdictions. Moreover, it will be relevant to consider whether, having regard to their resources and their understanding of language, the parties are able to participate in the respective proceedings on an equal footing. The list is not exhaustive. Rather, the question whether Australia is a clearly inappropriate forum is one that depends on the general circumstances of the case, taking into account the true nature and full extent of the issues involved.
(Footnote omitted)
[5]
Murphy J helpfully summarised the non-exhaustive list of matters relevant to the application of the "clearly inappropriate forum" test in Skinner & Alfonso-Skinner[2010] FamCA 329 ("Skinner") at [69] as follows:-
[6]
Whether each court will recognise the other's orders and decrees;
2. Which forum can provide more effectively for complete resolution of the matters involved in the parties' controversy;
[7]
The order in which the proceedings were instituted;
[8]
The stage at which the proceedings have each reached;
2. The costs that have been incurred by the parties;
3. The connection with the parties and their marriage with each of the jurisdictions;
4. The issues on which relief might depend in each of the jurisdictions; and
5. The resources of the parties and their understanding of language enabling the parties to participate in the respective proceedings on an equal footing.
[9]
It was conceded by counsel representing each of the parties that neither the Family Court in Australia nor the Court in China will recognise the orders and decrees of the other Court.
It was also common ground between the parties that the courts in China will not deal with assets held by the parties outside of China. Further, it was conceded by both counsel that whilst the Family Court has jurisdiction to take into account and make orders in respect of property held by or on behalf of the parties in China, there may be issues with respect to enforcement of such orders affecting that property. It is that factor which has motivated the wife to seek a stay of the Family Court proceedings to enable her to pursue her applications in China with respect to properties held by the parties there.
The proceedings with respect to the parties' property were commenced by the husband first in the Family Court, those proceedings having commenced on 22 April 2020. The wife's proceedings in China were not commenced until 20 August 2020. Prior to the commencement of those proceedings there were two court events in the Family Court, being Case Management Hearings conducted on 24 June 2020 and 4 August 2020, with orders made on each occasion regarding the filing of court material, disclosure and injunctive relief.
The wife deposes that the proceedings in the City N Court have been referred to mediation. There is no evidence before the Court as to when those proceedings are likely to be listed for hearing or when they are likely to be concluded.
Given the husband's application commenced in April 2020, it is likely that that application will be allocated to a judicial docket in this Court and listed for hearing in the second half of 2021.
There is no evidence before the Court as to the costs incurred by the parties to date.
The parties migrated to Australia in 2009 and the wife and the parties' child have lived in Australia since that time. The husband's evidence is that he has divided his time between China and Australia since 2009. At the time of the interim hearing, the husband was present in Australia.
The parties hold property in both China and Australia. The husband contends that the parties have purchased properties at F Street, Suburb G, H Street, Suburb J, and K Street, Suburb J. Since the commencement of the Family Court proceedings the wife has transferred the properties at F Street and K Street to the parties' daughter and niece respectively. The husband contends that those transfers were conducted without his knowledge or consent. There is a significant dispute between the parties as to the nature and value of their property interests in Australia.
[10]
Accordingly, I am satisfied that the wife's application for a stay of these proceedings ought be dismissed.
[11]
Legal principles in determining anti-suit injunction
[12]
This Court has the power to grant an anti-suit injunction. That power arises either by reason of the Court's implied power to protect the integrity of its own processes or arguably pursuant to s 34 and s 114(3) of the Act. The High Court of Australia ("High Court") in CSR Limited v Cigna Insurance Australia Limited (1997) 189 CLR 345 ("CSR") at 391 - 392 held:-
[13]
The counterpart of a Court's power to prevent its processes being abused is its power to protect the integrity of those processes once set in motion. And in some cases, it is that counterpart power of protection that authorises the grant of anti-suit injunctions. ...a court may grant an injunction to restrain a person from commencing or continuing foreign proceedings if they, the foreign proceedings, interfere with or have a tendency to interfere with proceedings pending in that court.
The inherent power to grant anti-suit injunctions is not confined to the examples just given. As with other aspects of that power, it is not to be restricted to defined and closed categories. Rather, it is to be exercised when the administration of justice so demands or in the context of anti-suit injunctions, when necessary for the protection of the court's own proceedings or processes.
(Citations omitted)
[14]
In Henry, the High Court observed at 591 that:-
[15]
... the problems which arise if the identical issue or the same controversy is to be litigated in different countries which have jurisdiction with respect to the matter are such, in our view, that, prima facie, the continuation of one or the other should be seen as vexatious or oppressive within the Voth sense of those words.
[16]
As was observed by the Full Court in Kent & Kent[2017] FamCAFC 157; (2017) FLC 93-792 at [56], "a person acting bona fide is perfectly entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of a court to which they and their property are amendable." In support of that position, the Full Court relied upon the statement of the High Court in CSR at 395 that:-
[17]
Neither principle nor authority supports the view that the institution of foreign proceedings is, of itself, vexation or oppression according to the principles of equity. Similarly, neither principle nor authority supports the view that foreign proceedings become vexatious or oppressive in accordance with those principles in the event that the party against whom they are brought later commences proceedings with respect to the same subject matter in this country.
[18]
In her affidavit filed 8 October 2020 the wife deposes at paragraph 4 that she has filed an application for divorce and property division orders at the City N Court of C District. The wife seeks a dissolution of the parties' marriage and the division of their common property in China.
The factors relevant to the question of whether the wife ought be permitted to continue those proceedings include:-
[19]
(a) If not restrained, there will be two courts seized with an identical issue, the division of the parties' property interests with the potential of different outcomes in both courts;
(b) The parties have participated in proceedings in this court since their commencement in April 2020;
(c) Both parties have Australian lawyers;
(d) The wife, the parties' daughter and niece (both of whom may be joined and are likely to be witnesses in the proceedings) live in Australia;
(e) In contrast, the wife deposes that the husband has not engaged lawyers to represent him in the proceedings in China which commenced some four months later.
[20]
I am satisfied that the above factors support an injunction restraining the wife from proceeding with her application for property division in the City N Court; to enable those proceedings to continue in circumstances where there is an application for division of property before this Court would in my view, be vexatious and oppressive. However, in circumstances where there is no pending application for dissolution of marriage before this Court, I am not persuaded that the injunction should extend to that part of the wife's application in the Chinese proceedings.
[21]
I certify that the preceding fifty-six (56) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Johns delivered on 17 December 2020.
Orders: (1) Interim anti-suit injunction restraining the wife from proceeding with her application for property division in the City N Court (China) pending determination of the Family Court proceedings; (2) Dismissal of the wife's interim orders sought in her Response to Initiating Application; (3) Dismissal of the husband's Application in a Case filed 2 August 2020 (other relief not pressed); (4) All extant applications to be added to the list awaiting allocation to a judicial docket.
In addition to their Australian property, the parties have interests in China. The wife contends that the husband holds interests in two properties in C District as well as jointly held property in Suburb L. In addition the wife concedes that she holds a property at M Street, C District. The wife also contends that the husband holds an interest in a business, bank accounts, shares and a motor vehicle in China.
The wife submits that the parties' interests in China are valued at in excess of $5.3 million, whilst their Australian interests are valued at approximately $500,000. As a result, the wife seeks to pursue her claims in the Court in China and that the Australian proceedings be stayed pending the resolution of those matters.
The husband disputes the wife's allegations as to the extent of his interests in China and the values attributed to those interests by the wife. He deposes that the businesses established by the parties during the marriage have ceased operation. Further, he denies the wife's allegations that he owns properties in the C District. I am unable to make any findings in relation to the parties' contentions as to the identity and value of their interests.
The wife deposes that there is no prejudice to the husband in staying the proceedings in Australia until the Chinese proceedings have concluded. In contrast, the wife submits that she would suffer prejudice if proceedings were not stayed as she requires the powers of the Chinese Court to obtain relevant documentation in relation to the husband's business dealings, and to restrain him from dealing with any assets prior to the separation of the matrimonial assets.
The wife submits that the Family Court is unable to make a just and equitable distribution of assets between the parties until the proceedings in China have been finalised. In contrast, the husband submits that Australia is not a clearly inappropriate forum, and thus the proceedings ought not be stayed.
There is no evidence before this Court as to what matters will likely be relevant to the determination of the proceedings in China.
As to the applications before this Court, they will be determined in accordance with s 79 of the Act. In order to determine those applications the parties will be required to adduce evidence as to the nature and extent of their interests and the value of those interests. The parties will be required to obtain valuations of their interests both in Australia and in China. That property is held in China is not an impediment to the assessment as to the value of the parties' interests. The Court will also be required to assess the parties' contributions and the matters relevant to a consideration of s 75(2) of the Act.
In addition to those matters, the husband has flagged the prospect that other parties may be joined to the proceedings as a result of the transfer by the wife of her interest in the properties at H Street and K Street to the parties' daughter and niece.
Neither party appears to have any advantage over the other with respect to the conduct of the proceedings. Both parties will require the assistance of interpreters. Both parties are represented in these proceedings by Australian lawyers.
The fact that the parties have interests in property in China does not preclude this Court from exercising jurisdiction with respect to the adjustment of property in which all of the parties' interests in that property are considered. Orders in s 79 proceedings are made in personam and not in rem (see Teo v Guan[2015] FamCAFC 94; (2015) FLC 93-653 at 135). An order for one party to transfer title in real property situated overseas is an order in personam against that party as are orders for enforcement against a party. Whilst the parties in these proceedings are in this country, they are amenable to this jurisdiction and subject to any orders made in personam against them. There is no evidence before this Court as to the position with respect to the law in China in relation to property division.
Having regard to those matters, I am satisfied that this Court is able to provide a complete resolution of the matters that are involved in the dispute between the parties. I am not in a position to make the same assessment with respect to the proceedings in China.
I am not satisfied that Australia is a clearly inappropriate forum to determine the matter having regard to the fact that:-
These proceedings were commenced first-in-time;
The parties hold property and superannuation interests in Australia;
This Court has the power to make orders with respect to the parties' interests, whether held in Australia or in China;
The concession made on behalf of the wife that the Chinese proceedings will not take into account the Australian property interests; and
The parties are both present in Australia, are permanent residents of Australia and the wife is ordinarily resident in Australia.