CSP18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1058

1. This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (the Authority) dated 30 April 2018, affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (delegate) refusing to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa (SHEV).
2. For the reasons set out below, the applicant must be dismissed.

1. The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka.
2. On 13 October 2012, the applicant arrived in Australia. On 26 February 2016, the applicant lodged a SHEV application. The applicant claimed to fear harm if returned to Sri Lanka from the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and the Sri Lankan Army (SLA), including being detained and killed.
3. On 15 September 2016, the delegate refused to grant the SHEV. On 20 September 2016, the matter was referred to the Authority for review under Part 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act) (since repealed).
4. On 6 October 2016, the applicant provided three photographs and three letters to the Authority as additional documents. On 17 March 2017, a differently constituted Authority affirmed the decision under review.
5. On 10 April 2017, the applicant sought judicial review in the then Federal Circuit Court. On 6 December 2017, by consent, the Court ordered that the Authority's decision be quashed and remitted the matter for reconsideration.
6. On 13 December 2017, the Authority informed the applicant that his matter would be reconsidered. On 1 January 2018, the applicant requested an opportunity to comment on any concerns the Authority held and any new information, including country information.
7. On 30 April 2018, the Authority affirmed the delegate's decision under review. It is in respect of this decision that the applicant applied to this Court for judicial review.

1. At [3]-[27] of the Authority decision, it considered the material before it, given by the Secretary under s 473CB of the Act.
2. The Authority received an email from the applicant on 6 October 2016, attaching a Statutory Declaration (Declaration), three letters and three family photographs. The Authority dealt with these additional documents in turn and made the following findings.
3. As to the Statutory Declaration itself, the Authority did not exercise its discretion to seek new information in regard to the "documents from the UNHCR offices" that the applicant submitted to "substantiate [his] claims". The Authority accepted that the other information within the Declaration had already been put before the delegate and was therefore before it.
4. In relation to the three letters that constituted new information, the Authority relevantly found the following.
5. The first letter was authored by a Reverend detailing the devotion of the applicant to the church and its activities. The Authority considered the claims in the letter at [8]-[12] and found that there was no explanation as to why the document could not have been provided to the delegate beforehand. Further, the letter did not corroborate the applicant's claims. Having regard to the overall context of the letter and its contents, the Authority was not satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering the first letter.
6. The Authority was satisfied that the second and third letters, which post-date the delegate's decision, could not have been provided to the delegate before the decision was made [11].
7. The second letter, dated 2 October 2016, was from a Justice of the Peace (JP) who claimed to be a Grama Niladhari (otherwise a public official) in the area. The letter states that the applicant went to his father's residence with his family for their safety against the "prevailing terrorism" but was later threatened with death by the terrorists, and as a result, he left and sought safety elsewhere. The Authority noted at [13], that the evidence before the delegate indicated that, inter alia, the applicant had moved around a lot due to the circumstances of the war period and its aftermath, the applicant's father had abandoned the family when he was a child and he returned to A in 2009 after his release from the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp.
8. The new information suggested that the applicant had a continuing relationship with his father due to the "prevailing terrorism", which the Authority notes is at odds with the evidence before the delegate and the war period, which had been over for five months after he returned from the IDP. The evidence that applicant was threatened by terrorists was contradictory to his own evidence that the CID threatened him. At [17], the Authority did not consider there to be exceptional circumstances for this information to be considered.
9. The third letter, dated 25 September 2016, was purportedly written by another JP and ex-Parliamentarian, who claimed to have known the applicant from 1995 to 2016. The author states that the applicant was a cadre in the LTTE, who was severely injured and threatened on the basis of his political opinions and race by Sri Lankan forces. Further, the applicant's wife reported that the applicant was wanted by "unknown armed persons" and she had been visited by such people demanding she surrender her husband or inform them of his whereabouts.
10. The Authority considered this evidence against the information before the delegate and found that the applicant had stated he had not been an LTTE member or claimed to be a cadre. The applicant also did not indicate that approaches were made on his wife that involved threats. The letters did not provide contextual information as to these incidents. The events purported to have occurred in the letters also appeared to relate to matters said to have arisen before the delegate's decision was made. The Authority did not have an explanation as to why that information could not have been sought prior to this, and no evidence to suggest the applicant was in the process of trying to obtain further supporting evidence. At [17], the Authority did not consider there to be exceptional circumstances for this information to be considered.
11. As to the family photographs provided, the Authority was not convinced that the photographs could have affected consideration of the applicant's protection claims and was not satisfied of the matters in s 473DD(b)(i) or (ii) of the Act. The photographs were not considered new information.
12. The Authority received further information from the applicant on 1 January 2018, consisting of a cover letter, a doctor's letter and several photographs of the applicant's physical scarring and deformities. The Authority was satisfied that the doctor's letter and photographs could not have been provided to the delegate before a decision was made.
13. The Authority noted that the letter from Doctor 'ZH', who specialises in skin cancer medicine and has a keen interest in psychiatry with experience in treating refugees with stories of torture, trauma and PTSD, contained information about the applicant experiencing injuries when he was forcibly recruited into the LTTE and suffered injuries after being caught in a landmine. This information did not align with the information given to the Department [23].
14. Whilst the letter stated, among other things that the applicant "predictably suffers from a [PTSD], aggravated by continuing severe post-injury pain and through an excess of stress, both psychological and physical, both still extant and continuing", the applicant did not provide any medical evidence from a treating psychologist or psychiatrist, indicating that he was diagnosed or suffering from a mental condition or undergoing treatment for any such condition [24]. The Authority noted the inconsistencies in the applicant's history, as reported by his doctor and on which the doctor relies with the evidence provided to the delegate. The Authority was not satisfied that any exceptional circumstances existed to justify the information being considered.
15. The Authority considered there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering new information, being country reports from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), United Kingdom Home Office (UK Home Office) and United States State Department (USSD) [26].
16. The Authority noted that although the applicant requested an opportunity to comment on concerns or any new information, the Authority conducted a fast-track review, and there was no right to a hearing under the Act. The Authority did not exercise its discretion to seek new information from the applicant or invite him to comment on the new country information.

1. The applicant's claims for protection are summarised at [28] of the decision record:

• He is a Tamil Hindu born in Akkaraipattu in the Ampara District of Sri Lanka in 1974.
  • His father abandoned the family when he was a child. He left school and started working on a farm.
  • His brothers P and K were killed by the SLA in 1993 and 1998 respectively. K had been in the LTTE. He was martyred and posthumously given the rank of lieutenant. The applicant's mother sent him to live with his uncle in Jaffna.
  • He moved around the Vanni. He always lived in LTTE controlled areas. He was required to support the LTTE financially, to attend some LTTE events and to undergo basic self-defence training.
  • In 1998 he was severely injured from shelling while transporting goods on his tractor. Another person on the tractor was also severely injured and another was killed.
  • In about 2002, he married his wife, and he lived in LTTE controlled [area A]. They had two daughters.
  • He was displaced by the war in 2006 and again in 2009. While displaced in 2009, the applicant, his wife and one of their daughters were injured by shelling. His eldest child was not hurt but due to the shock of this incident, she did not speak until she was about three years old.
  • When the war ended in 2009 the SLA took them to an army controlled area. They were then taken to Vavuniya and put in the Zone 4 camp in Chettikulam. His whole family including his wife and children and father-in-law lived in this camp for about five months. At this camp, the CID officers would make enquires and investigate if they knew if anyone else in the camp had been with the LTTE.
  • His Gama Sevaka from his birth village came to the camp and had his family released however his father-in-law remained detained.
  • They returned to live in [Area A]under strict conditions. Practically every day the police would call and check on him. If he wanted to travel, even to the next town, he had to give the police his planned travel details and get their permission. He travelled regularly for medical treatment but would always return home the same day and the police would check everyone in the house against their forms. Whenever the police came to their house, they would come in a group and were all wearing police uniforms.
  • The CID also started checking on him during this time. Two men in civilian clothing would come to his house almost every day to make enquiries, asking whether he had any connection with the LTTE. They believed that he was from the LTTE because he was a Tamil from the Vanni and had injuries from the war.
  • One day the CID called him and said that he had to report to their office where they again noted his injury and asked if he was involved with the LTTE. The applicant spoke back to them and he was beaten. His wounds from his injuries started bleeding. He was released after his wife came to the office and started crying begging for his release.
  • Another time, two men came to his house and required him to go to the CID office. They then kept him at the office for two days. They told him that he had spoken back to them and that they had heard things about him being connected to the LTTE. They also connected him with his brothers, who had been shot by the army, and they noted he was from an LTTE controlled area and had done a lot of things for the LTTE. The applicant told them that just as he now does as he is told in the SLA controlled area, he also had to do as he was told by the LTTE while living under their control. They threatened him, saying the CID had a lot of information about him. His wife sold his children's jewellery and paid for his release.

• He was very fearful and worried because he thought he could be shot at any time as he had witnessed the shooting of other unarmed Tamils without reason. He secretly moved to Kandy and lived in hiding for a month while he arranged with an agent to leave the country as soon as possible.
  • He left in about June 2011 via air from Colombo to Singapore. He dressed like a rich person to avoid attention at the airport. When he reached the gate, the officer told him he was suspicious and the applicant paid a bribe to depart the country.
  • He fears that if returned to Sri Lanka, he will be subjected to serious harm including being detained and killed by the SLA and the CID. He has already been detained twice by the CID. He worries they will target him because he is Tamil, his brother was in the LTTE, he lived in LTTE controlled areas and has scarring, because he left soon after being questioned and because he would be returning as a failed asylum seeker.
  • Since he left Sri Lanka, his family has been approached by the CID and the police. For their safety, he told them to move as he does know what will happen to them if the authorities find out he fled the country.

2. At [30]-[34], the Authority accepted the applicant's evidence about his experiences during the war, the immediate aftermath, up until his release from the IDP camp in 2009.
3. The Authority accepted at [35] - [37], the applicant's claims that as a Tamil male, who was living in a region which was one of the last LTTE strongholds at the end of the war, who had also sustained injuries in the war and had a brother in the war, that he was questioned and closely monitored by authorities. The Authority found the evidence to be consistent, convincing and not implausible when considered with country information [37].
4. In relation to the applicant's perceived profile, the Authority noted that the applicant was never formally charged or sent for rehabilitation, and he was able to depart the country lawfully in June 2011, on a genuine passport obtained despite local police monitoring.
5. The applicant claimed that his wife paid bribes in May 2011 to secure his release from detention, and to the airport office in June 2011 to assist his departure from Sri Lanka. Although the Authority accepted that bribery and corruption occur in Sri Lanka, it was not satisfied that the bribes were the reason the applicant was able to depart. Had the applicant been regarded as an LTTE suspect, it was implausible that a bribe diminished the authorities' overall interest in the applicant. The Authority was not satisfied that the applicant was of any interest to the authorities after his release from the CID Office in May 2011 [41].
6. The applicant claimed in his written application that since his departure from Sri Lanka, his family have been approached by the CID and the police, and his wife and children had moved to a residence in 'V'. The Authority noted that there were no contextual details provided regarding these incidents of the family being approached, the evidence before it did not conclude that the applicant's wife and children are living in hiding, and if the authorities wanted to know about his whereabouts, they would have located them already. Taking all of the factors outlined at [43] into consideration, it did not accept that the CID or police had been searching for the applicant since he left Sri Lanka.
7. In making an assessment of the applicant's claims to fear harm upon return to Sri Lanka, the Authority considered country information which highlights the changes in Sri Lanka's political landscape since the applicant's departure. The Authority noted concerns raised by human rights groups regarding the ongoing risk of mistreatment in Sri Lanka based on the country information before it, but accepted that on balance, it was satisfied the situation for Tamils had significantly improved [49].
8. The evidence before the Authority at [50], did not indicate that Tamils are subject to discrimination or harassment of a level amounting to serious harm.
9. Although the Sri Lankan government, at the time of the decision, was sensitive to the potential re-emergency of the LTTE, country information did not indicate that Tamils were at risk of persecution in Sri Lanka and did not support that the applicant would be imputed with LTTE membership or support or of having a pro-LTTE opinion on the basis of ethnicity or having lived in a former LTTE controlled area [51].
10. The Authority had regard to the UNHCR's 2012 'Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Needs of Asylum Seekers from Sri Lanka', a January 2017 DFAT Report and country information from the UK Home Office, opining on risk profiles that may require international protection. In the applicant's circumstances, the Authority was satisfied that the authorities only held a low-level interest in the applicant and was ultimately not satisfied that the applicant was wanted by authorities on account of any LTTE-related matters [56].
11. The Authority accept that the applicant had lived a difficult life, and was not without his vulnerabilities, however, the review material before it did not indicate that he would suffer serious harm.
12. At [57], the Authority was not satisfied that the applicant would face harm on account of his Tamil race, origins from an LTTE-controlled area, his injuries and scarring, gender, age, connection to his brother and interactions with the authorities involving monitoring and detention. The Authority was also not satisfied that the applicant would suffer serious harm due to the ongoing effects of these circumstances.
13. On the basis of the country information, the Authority accepted that the applicant may be questioned, processed at the airport and face a brief period of detention. At [63]-[64], the Authority assessed that while there is a chance the applicant would be screened at the airport, it would not constitute more than a remote chance that he would be screened more than what is necessary. The Authority was not satisfied that this processing is or would result in serious harm to the applicant.
14. The applicant did not meet the requirements of s 5H(1) and s 36(2)(a) of the Act [66]. At [72], the Authority did not accept that there were any substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of his removal from Australia to Sri Lanka, there was a real risk he would suffer significant harm.

1. The applicant advances nine grounds of judicial review as contained in his Originating Application filed with the Court on 25 May 2018. They are as follows (less particulars):
   1. On 17 March 2017, the Immigration Assessment Authority (the IAA) affirmed the delegates decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa, following which the Federal Circuit on 6 December 2017 that the "Minister (First respondent) concedes that the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) is affected by jurisdictional error BVZJ 6 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 958 at [46]- [47] and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176 at [112] by misconstruing or misapplying the term 'exceptional circumstances' ins 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and set aside the IAA's said decision and remitted the matter to the IAA for reconsideration. On the remittal, the IAA, in light of the above history and the applicant's request for an opportunity comment on any concerns of the IAA, it was legally unreasonable for the IAA not to give the applicant an opportunity to comment before making its decision dated 30 April 2018.
   2. The IAA found in paragraph [43] of its decision that it did "not accept that the CID or police or any authorities have been searching for the applicant since he left Sri Lanka". The IAA made this finding on the balance of probabilities. The IAA, in considering whether the applicant had a real chance of persecution, ought to have considered the possibility that the CID, police or authorities were searching for the applicant.
   3. The IAA erred in applying the "real chance" test when assessing whether the applicant's fear of persecution was well-founded.
   4. The applicant claimed that after he moved to [Area A]on or about 10 May 2011 and ten days after again he was detained for two days and tortured, and he then escaped. The Immigration Assessment Authority (the IAA) accepted that the applicant was detained and tortured and did not make a clear finding as to whether or not the applicant could face persecution in considering his profile and background. The IAA found that the applicant would be questioned by the authorities if he is required to return to Sri Lanka. If the applicant escaped in May 2011 and will be questioned and identified by the authorities on his return to Sri Lanka, the authorities would become aware of his involvement with the LTTE and his escape. A question is whether the applicant would face a risk of persecution as a result. The IAA failed to deal with this issue in its decision, which is a jurisdictional error.
   5. IAA in its said decision, equated a "low risk:' of Tamils who live in the former LTTE areas in the North and the East, including Tamils that provided low level support to the LTTE or who had family members that are former members of the LTTE, may be monitored by the Sri Lankan authorities, but are at a low risk of being detained or prosecuted with an absence of a "real chance" of detention and persecution of the applicant. This involved an erroneous application of the "real chance" test, which was a jurisdictional error.
   6. To fail to invite the applicant to provide information in reply was resulting in jurisdictional error s473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) either because the IAA unreasonably declined to exercise its power under s473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to put the new grounds to the applicant and invite him to provide information in reply, or because the IAA denied the applicant procedural fairness by not exercising its power under s 473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
   7. The IAA's decision involved irrationality. The applicant contends that it was unreasonable for the IAA to rely upon exclusively DFAT country information when contrary and current information existed particularly the report "Silenced: survivors of torture and sexual violence in 2015 of the International Truth & Justice Project Sri Lanka January 2016" though it was taken into consideration by the IAA it failed to consider the subsequent country report UNSTOPPED: 2016/17 TORTURE IN SRI LANKA JULY 2017 of the International Truth and Justice Project based in London about the Sri Lankan Authorities as a new information thereby not exercising its power under s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) which is a jurisdictional error.
   8. The IAA preferred one piece of evidence over another piece of contrary evidence closer in time to the decision was being made and there were no reasons provided for preference of one piece of evidence contrary to another. This is a jurisdictional error.
   9. The IAA stated "In January 2015 the Srisena government came to power replacing the Rajapaksa regime and taking a more proactive approach to reconciliation and the advancement of human rights at [paragraph 47]. The applicant states that this is a lopsided information of the prevailing actual human rights situation in Sri Lanka and misleading and it is so naïve to accept this information therefore it was incumbent for the IAA to consider whether an applicant for protection visa in Australia would face of real chance of persecution in Sri Lanka in the reasonable foreseeable future in these circumstances and the available independent country information. Failure to consider this is a jurisdictional error.
2. By way of submissions filed on 17 June 2025, the applicant advanced an additional ground of review, which is as follows:

The IAA failed to discharge its statutory function under s.473DE of the Migration Act 1958(Cth) by failing to put the UK Home Office Report to the Applicant; and the applicant was denied procedural fairness as the IAA failed to put the UK Home Office Report to him which, ultimately, shaped the decision to reject his claims.

1. At the commencement of the hearing, the applicant stated that he was not proficient in the English language and needed a lawyer to tell the Court the legal errors that were in the Authority's decision.
2. The applicant told the Court he previously had a lawyer, Mr Ben Zipser (now Judge Zipser of this Court), however, Mr Zipser had advised him in September 2024 that he could no longer represent him. Since then, the applicant had been searching for a new lawyer, he had been injured and cannot find the funds to pay for a new lawyer, and that he had spoken to four lawyers, including one the week before the hearing.
3. The first respondent opposed the application for an adjournment. The matter had been on foot in this Court since 2018, and the applicant has had nine months to organise a new lawyer after Mr Zipser was no longer able to act.
4. In a separate judgement, the Court refused the adjournment application, noting the need for the finalisation of these type of matters, the length of time the applicant had to organise a new lawyer and even if an adjournment was granted, the Court could not be certain the applicant would be able to organise sufficient funds for a new lawyer.
5. After refusing the application for an adjournment, Counsel for the first respondent indicated they were able to deal with the new ground. Leave was granted for this ground to be relied upon by the applicant.

1. The applicant appeared before the Court assisted by an interpreter. Prior to the hearing commencing, the Court ensured that the applicant was in possession of a copy of the relevant Court books and that the first respondent's written submissions had been translated to him. The Court also ensured the applicant had access to a pen and paper so he could take notes during the course of the hearing, should he so wish to.
2. At the commencement of the hearing, the Court explained that it was undertaking judicial review, not merits review and the difference between the two types of review. The Court also explained the procedure by which the hearing would be undertaken.
3. The applicant told the Court he had no legal knowledge and was unable to assist the Court other than what was contained within the written submissions that had already been provided.
4. At the conclusion of the first respondent's oral submissions, the applicant was asked if he wished to state anything in reply. The applicant answered that what is still happening in Sri Lanka is different to what the country reports say. The applicant does not have freedom of speech and wants to live in a country where there is freedom of speech.
5. The applicant filed written submissions on 17 June 2025. The applicant commenced by stating he is a self-represented litigant. The applicant requests the Court to consider referring the matter to the "Honourable Minister" to exercise his discretion under s 46A of the Act to lift the bar, if the Court does not find that the Authority's decision is infected with error.
6. The applicant's written submissions only address the additional ground raised.
7. The applicant argues that the Authority failed to afford him a natural justice opportunity by failing to invite him to comment on the UK Home Affairs Office report (UK Report) that was relied upon in the decision record. Pursuant to s 473DE, the UK Report constituted new information, and on this basis, the Authority was required to give him the particulars of the material or the reasons or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review.
8. The applicant relied on the decision of the Full Court in NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 (NAHI) at [11], where the Court held:

The appellants' submissions contained a number of complaints about reliance by the Tribunal on information from sources other than the first appellant, referred to as 'country information'. The Tribunal summarised in its reasons for decision a significant quantity of material it saw as relevant to the task it had to perform. This included material from the United States of America State Department, DFAT and various international news services and publications. To some extent, this material could have been considered to be helpful to the appellants' case, but it is certainly true that the Tribunal relied on some of it in making findings adverse to the appellants. By s 420(2)(a) of the Migration Act, the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence. By s 424(1), in conducting a review, the Tribunal may get any information that it considers relevant. There can be no objection in principle to the Tribunal relying on 'country information'. The weight that it gives to such information is a matter for the Tribunal itself, as part of its fact-finding function. Such information as the Tribunal obtains for itself is not restricted to 'guidance', as the appellants submitted. It may be used to assess the credibility of a claim of a well-founded fear of persecution. It is not, as the first appellant submitted, an error of law, or a jurisdictional error, for the Tribunal to base a decision on 'country information' that is not true. The question of the accuracy of the 'country information' is one for the Tribunal, not for the Court. If the Court were to make its own assessment of the truth of 'country information', it would be engaging in merits review. The Court does not have power to do that.

1. The applicant highlights that the Court in NAHI acknowledged that the decision-maker can place the weight it sees fit on country information, however, it also asserted that the decision-maker should place this information before the applicant for comment. The applicant referenced [19] of NAHI to attempt to argue that the Court in that case suggested:

That an error may be apparent if an applicant can "demonstrate[e] that the opportunities given to [them] to respond to that material were inadequate in the circumstances" or that they requested an opportunity to respond by way of written submissions to certain country information and were "denied such an opportunity".

1. The Authority committed jurisdictional error by failing to put the UK Report country information to the applicant, of which he had a "legitimate expectation" to have been given a fair chance to respond to.

1. Counsel for the first respondent noted that there is some overlap in the grounds of judicial review.
2. As to ground one, there is no error made out in the applicant's assertion that he had concerns that the Authority needed to invite him to comment on material. What those concerns are is not particularised. The Authority's procedural fairness obligations are governed by Division 3 of Part 7AA, together with ss 473GA and 473GB of the Act. In this way, the Authority had an obligation to invite comment on certain new information as explored in s 473DE and not with respect to country information (s 473E (3)(a)). Therefore, this obligation did not require the applicant to be invited to comment on any concerns the Authority had about its case. It was obligated to review the fast-track reviewable decision on the review material provided to it without accepting or requesting new information and without interviewing the applicant pursuant to s 473DB. There existed no broader obligation for the Authority to invite comment on its concerns: DGZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 12 at [75].
3. Ground two should not be accepted on the basis that at [43] of its decision, the Authority considered the applicant's claim that the CID, police or authorities were searching for him and concluded that it did not accept the claim. The ground goes no further than expressing disagreement with the Authority's findings and does not show any jurisdictional error on behalf of the Authority.
4. By ground three, the applicant asserts that the Authority erred in applying the "real chance" test. The first respondent accepts that the "real chance" test remains part of the statutory consideration for the requirement to grant a visa: (s 5J(1)(b)). The test itself conveys the notion of a substantial risk of persecution occurring as opposed to a remote chance: Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs [ 1989] HCA 62 at [12]. A fair reading of the Authority decision demonstrates that the Authority properly considered the applicant's claims at [51], [54], [55], [60], [63] and [64] by reference to the real chance test.
5. The fourth ground fails to establish an error in the Authority's decision as the Authority considered whether the applicant would face harm on return to Sri Lanka in respect of his profile and scarring on his body, together with his escape from Sri Lanka. In its consideration of this matter, and after relying on country information from DFAT, the Authority concluded that he may be subject to brief processing but would not suffer harm as a failed asylum seeker.
6. As to ground five, the first respondent relies on their submissions as to ground three to maintain that the Authority properly applied the real chance test.
7. By ground six, the applicant argues that the Authority unreasonably failed to invite him to provide information "in reply", raising a similar point to ground one. Under s 473DC, the Authority had the discretion to get new information from the applicant. Whilst the Authority acknowledged that, in his letter dated 1 January 2018, the applicant requested the opportunity to provide information, the Authority decided not to exercise its discretion under s 473DC.
8. In doing this, the Authority noted several reasons why it did not exercise the discretion, which the First respondent summarises at [24], of its written submissions as being that the applicant:

a) had several opportunities to clarify points and expand on the information he provided to the delegate; > > b) was invited to tell the delegate anything he wished; > > c) was represented throughout the process and a post-interview submission was provided which addressed issues personal to the applicant and the country information provided; > > d) had not given any indication of what information he would have provided if invited; > > e) and, had provided new information on two occasions previously

9. The Authority provided an intelligible justification for not seeking further information from the applicant.
10. By ground seven and eight, the applicant contends that the Authority erred by relying solely on DFAT reports, to the exclusion of a 2016 International Truth and Justice Project Sri Lanka report (ITJP Report) or alternatively failed to consider the report as new information under s 473DD of the Act. If the applicant's argument suggests that the Authority ought to have considered the ITJP report in accordance with s 473DD, this line of reasoning is misconceived. The report was provided by the applicant's Migration Agent in his submission to the delegate, in accordance with s 473CB of the Act. The Authority took it into account and at [47]-[54] of the decision. The Authority evaluated and weighed country information before. That the Authority might have preferred the DFAT report when assessing the situation in Sri Lanka under the Sirisena government does not give rise to an error. NAHI at [11]-[13] confirms that it is a matter for the Authority to select and weigh country information.
11. The applicant's submissions as to ground nine express disagreement with the Authority's treatment of country information and do not assert any jurisdictional error.
12. As to the new ground of review, it is accepted that the UK Report was new information before the Authority. However, country information is excluded from the obligations under s 473DE to give the referred applicant particulars of any new information as it is "not specifically about the referred applicant and is just about a class of persons of which the referred applicant is a member": s 473DE(3)(a).

1. In Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3 at [17], the task of a court conducting judicial review was described in this manner:

... An application for judicial review is one in which the judicial branch of government reviews, by reference to legality or lawfulness, the decision or decisions of the executive branch of government, here in the form of a decision of the Minister. The court does not consider the merits or wisdom the decision; nor does it remake the decision. The task of the court is to rule upon the lawfulness or legality of the decision by reference to the complaints made about it.

1. It is well established that the Authority is not required to accept uncritically any and all claims made by an applicant_: Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs_ [1994] FCA 1253; (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451.
2. Nor does the Authority have to possess rebutting evidence before holding that a particular assertion was not made out: Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347 at 348.
3. It is well settled that the country information and the weight it gives to that information is a matter for the Tribunal Authority: NAHI.
4. It is for the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal, being the relevant decision maker, that the applicant meets the criteria for being a refugee: Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 at [187].
5. It was for the applicant to provide his evidence and arguments in sufficient detail to enable the Authority to reach the requisite state of satisfaction: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Lat (2006) 151 FCR 214 at [76]. The Authority is under no obligation to "afford every opportunity to an applicant for review to present his or her best possible case or improve upon the evidence": Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2012] HCA 61; (2013) 249 CLR 332 (Li) at [82].
6. Unreasonableness is where a decision-maker has come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could have come to it: Li at [28], or where a decision has been made that lacks an "evident and intelligible justification"; Li at [76]. The test for unreasonableness is "stringent" and will only arise in rare cases. Unreasonableness is not a means for challenging a decision on the basis that the court disagrees with the consideration of matters or the evaluative judgements made by the decision-maker: Li at [30], [113].
7. The review conducted by the Authority was pursuant to the now-repealed Part 7AA of the Act, and was a 'Fast-Track' review. Significant limitations are placed on the Authority as regards the receipt of new material and interviewing the referred applicants: s 473DB. New information may only be accepted in circumstances where either it was not and could not have been provided to the Minister before the decision was made, or it is credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected consideration of the referred applicant's claims. Even then, exceptional circumstances must exist before the new information can be considered: s 473DD.
8. Even where new information is obtained by the Authority, there is no requirement for the applicant to be invited to comment on that information, if it is not specifically about the referred applicant and is just about a class of persons to which the referred applicant is a member of: s 473DE(3)(a). This includes updated country information.
9. The Court notes that the Authority's decision record is a lengthy and detailed analysis of the applicant's claims, followed by a consideration of those claims against the relevant requirements for the grant of a protection visa.

1. Ground one is a claim that following the consensual remittal of the matter by this Court back to the Authority for reconsideration, it was legally unreasonable for the Authority not to give the applicant the opportunity to comment prior to making its second decision.
2. As noted by the first respondent, the applicant fails to outline what concerns he says the Authority needed to invite him to comment upon. The Authority was under an obligation to invite the applicant to comment on certain new information pursuant to s 473DE of the Act, however, this obligation does not extend to updated country information: s 473DE(3)(a). Further, the Authority is exhorted under s 473DB(1)(b) to carry out its review without interviewing the referred applicant. In the absence of any matter that the applicant can point to that required the Authority to put to him under s 473DE, no jurisdictional error arises. Ground one has no merit.

1. Ground two is a claim that the Authority at [43], "did not accept that the CID or police or any authorities have been searching for the applicant since he left Sri Lanka". The applicant claims this consideration was erroneously done on the balance of probabilities, whereas the Authority should have considered whether there was a possibility that the authorities were searching for the applicant.
2. In its consideration at [43], the Authority noted that only vague evidence has been provided by the applicant around approaches by the CID and police to the applicant's family. The Authority properly concluded, on the evidence that was before it, that it did not accept that the CID or police had been searching for the applicant since he left Sri Lanka. This was a positive finding and did not require the Authority to consider the possibility that it may be incorrect in this finding. This ground expresses disagreement with the Authority's findings. No jurisdictional error arises as the ground has no merit.

1. Ground three is a complaint that the Authority erred in applying the 'real chance' test when assessing whether the applicant's fear of persecution was well-founded. Again, this complaint centres around whether or not there was a possibility that allegations of torture and mistreatment would be suffered by returnees. As noted by the first respondent, the 'real chance' test clearly conveys a notion of a substantial as distinct from a remote chance of persecution occurring. The test is not set in rigid boundaries and is ultimately a question of fact for the Authority to determine.
2. A fair reading of the totality of the Authority's reasons clearly indicates that it considered the applicant's claims by reference to whether or not there was a real chance. In so doing, the Authority considered relevant country information, including whether or not the applicant's personal characteristics, of being a Tamil from a pro LTTE area that has visible scarring or deformities from war injuries, would raise adverse interest by authorities.
3. The Court is satisfied that the Authority properly considered all of the relevant personal characteristics of the applicant, together with relevant country information, and properly arrived at a conclusion, based on all the evidence, that the applicant was not a real chance of suffering persecution if he were returned. This included any brief detention that he may undergo as a failed asylum seeker who left the country illegally upon return. Ground three has no merit.

1. Ground four is a claim that the Authority did not properly consider the fact that the applicant was detained for two days, tortured and then escaped. The applicant claims that the authorities would be aware of his escape and that he would be questioned and identified upon his return. The applicant states that the Authority failed to deal with this issue in its decision. The Court does not accept this contention.
2. The Authority specifically considered at [51], whether the applicant would face harm on his return to Sri Lanka, having regard to all of his claims, including his specific profile and scarring on his body. The Authority properly relied on country information to reach the conclusion that the applicant did not have a profile that would be of interest to authorities, notwithstanding the fact that he would be returning as a failed asylum seeker. The Court is satisfied that this was a conclusion that was open to the Authority to make, based on the evidence that was before it and for the reasons it gave. This ground has no merit.

1. Ground five is a similar claim of a misapplication of the "real chance" test. The applicant claims the Authority erroneously found that there was a low risk of harm for Tamils who live in former LTTE areas in the north and east. Again, the Court is satisfied that the conclusion arrived at by the Authority in this regard was open to it based on the evidence that was before it and for the reasons it gave. This ground has no merit.

1. Ground six is an assertion that the Authority failed to invite the applicant to give information in reply and failed to exercise properly its power under s 473DC of the Act.
2. As set out above, the Authority had the power to obtain up-to-date country information. The Authority was under no obligation to put that country information to the applicant, as it was information that was exempted by s 473DE(3)(a) of the Act. Further, the Authority set out at [27], cogent reasons why it determined not to exercise its discretion to seek comment from the applicant on the new information. This included the fact that the applicant had already been given several opportunities to clarify points and expand on information he had provided. The Authority noted the applicant was represented throughout the process and a post-interview submission was provided on his behalf, which addressed issues personal to the applicant relating to the country information. In these circumstances, the Court is not satisfied there was an error on the part of the Authority in not seeking comment from the applicant on the new information. Ground six has no merit.

1. Grounds seven and eight can be considered together. Ground seven is a claim that the Authority's decision involved irrationality. The applicant claims it was irrational or unreasonable for the Authority to rely exclusively on DFAT country information and commentary when alternative information existed, particularly the ITJP Sri Lanka Project 2016 report. Ground eight is a claim that the Authority preferred some country information over others and provided no reasons for the preference of one piece of information over the other.
2. First, the Court does not accept that the ITJP report was overlooked. That report was provided by the applicant's agent to the Authority and is specifically referred to at [3] of the Authority's decision record, where reference is made to post interview submissions which included that report. Further, at [23], the Authority makes reference to a letter from a medical practitioner that was included as part of the post-hearing submissions. The report is specifically mentioned at [48].
3. The Court is satisfied that the Authority evaluated the country information before it, including the ITJP report and the various country information provided by DFAT. The fact that the DFAT report was preferred to the ITJP report was a matter for the Authority in its consideration and weighing of the evidence. It is a matter for the Authority to select and weigh country information: NAHI at [11] - [13]. Grounds seven and eight have no merit.

1. Ground nine is a complaint with respect to the assessment by the Authority as to the security situation on the ground in Sri Lanka. Again, it suggests that the Authority did not properly consider whether or not there was a real chance that the applicant would face harm if returned.
2. This ground expresses no more than disagreement with how the Authority weighed the country information and the conclusions arrived at. Ground nine reveals no jurisdictional error and, if anything, invites the Court to undertake impermissible merits review. Ground nine has no merit.

1. The additional ground, put forward by the applicant in his submission dated 16 June 2025, asserts that the Authority erred in failing to comply with s 473DE of the Act in not inviting the applicant's comment, like the UK Home Office country information report. The first respondent accepts this was new information, however, there was no requirement on the authority to invite the applicant to comment on this information as it was exempt information under s 473DE(3)(a) of the Act. The Court accepts this submission. This ground has no merit.
2. As the applicant is unrepresented, the Court has carefully perused the relevant Court book, together with other relevant documents, including the Authority's decision record. The Court is unable to ascertain any unarticulated jurisdictional error.

1. As none of the grounds of judicial review have any merit, the application must be dismissed. The Court will hear from the parties in relation to the issue of costs.

I certify that the preceding ninety-eight (98) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge D Humphreys.