Crown v Accused

1 Roland Griffiths, on 24 February 2025 you pleaded guilty to the murder of Kylie Sheahan and to recklessly causing serious injury to AB on 14 March 2022. For the purposes of these reasons, I will attempt to anonymise the names of the children involved in these events so that they are not identifiable. The anonymisation is not intended to be disrespectful.

2 On 5 June 2025, you pleaded guilty to one charge of assaulting a custodial officer on duty on 1 December 2022.

3 The maximum penalty for the offence of murder is life imprisonment. Murder is a standard sentence offence carrying a prescribed standard sentence of 25 years' imprisonment. The maximum penalty for the offence of recklessly causing serious injury was, and remains, 15 years' imprisonment. The maximum penalty for the offence of assaulting a custodial officer on duty was, and remains, 5 years' imprisonment.

4 Kylie Sheahan was 35 years old when you murdered her. She was the daughter of Anthony Sheahan and Sylvia Sebenik, her stepfather was Shane Doughty, and she had one younger sister, Tanya Ceh. Ms Sheahan had six children (AB, CF, JM, NP, QR and WX) who are now aged between four and 21 years old and who, as will be discussed below, loved her deeply.

5 AB was 16 years old when you recklessly caused her serious injury. These events occurred just days after her 16th birthday. AB was a passionate indoor cricketer, and persisted in playing cricket after suffering the injuries sustained in the fire caused by you. As one of the elder siblings in the family home, she spent significant time with her brothers and sisters, taking them to the shops and going on picnics. AB also enjoyed spending time with the family's pets.

6 You and Ms Sheahan commenced a relationship in 2016. Ms Sheahan and her children moved in with you, and you subsequently had two children together. The family had been living in Albanvale for approximately two years prior to these events, and your son, GK, joined you in 2021. All seven children were present at the home at the time of the events I am about to discuss.

7 On 14 March 2022, the day of the offending, there was tension in the family home. You were drinking alcohol and had arguments with various family members, including the children.

8 Later that day, you commenced arguing with Ms Sheahan about a friend of hers. You started damaging property and yelling. During this argument, you attempted to find a machete that had been hidden by Ms Sheahan. You were heard telling Ms Sheahan to get out of the house and seen pushing over a wall unit in the lounge room. Ms Sheahan ignored your behaviour.

9 Two of the children, including AB, observed you lighting the fire. AB recalls sitting with one of the younger children in her room when she heard you and Ms Sheahan arguing in the kitchen.

10 I note here that in the months preceding the offending, various witnesses, including AB and a neighbour, had heard you making threats to burn the house down in the months preceding the offending.

11 AB left her room and observed you with a red petrol can, pouring petrol over Ms Sheahan. The petrol went down Ms Sheahan's neck and back, and you were screaming whilst pouring it over her. Ms Sheahan and one of the children were yelling at you to stop. AB grabbed the petrol can from you and placed it on the kitchen bench.

12 You proceeded to grab a lighter and stand over Ms Sheahan, threatening to burn the house down. Ms Sheahan was bent over with her body in an 'L‑shape', and you were bent over her and holding her down. You continually repeated, 'Do you want me to burn it down?' and, 'Do you want me to set it alight?', whilst holding the ignited lighter close to the ground. You then moved the lighter closer to the ground and lit the fire.

13 One of the younger children observed you collect a red jerrycan from the front of the house and walk into the kitchen. You proceeded to pour the petrol onto Ms Sheahan, and AB saw the petrol drip onto Ms Sheahan's chest, shoulders, and legs. Ms Sheahan asked you to stop, and stated, 'Please don't do this'. You replied, 'I promise. Bub, I won't do it, I promise, I swear, I promise I won't do it'. You then proceeded to move the lighter towards the petrol. You ignited the petrol and CF watched the flames spread up Ms Sheahan and onto AB.

14 You, Ms Sheahan, and AB all caught fire. CF screamed and tried to help Ms Sheahan. You extinguished the fire on yourself before helping CF drag Ms Sheahan to the bathroom, where you placed her under a cold shower and subsequently moved her outside and sprayed her with the hose. At the same time, the house caught fire and the flames spread quickly.

15 Despite being burned, AB ran out the back door of the home, before climbing back inside via a window to rescue QR, aged just 2 years old, who was trapped inside the house. This was a selfless act of courage to return into a burning house to rescue QR. Similarly, in extreme danger, WX, who was aged just 10 months old, was trapped in the lounge room in his walker, and JM picked him up and carried him out of the house. The other children all escaped via the front door of the house. You exited the house and began spraying Ms Sheahan with a hose.

16 Outside, you were observed sitting on top of Ms Sheahan on the lawn holding her hands down whilst she was trying to get up. Ms Sheahan instructed the children to go to your mother's house, who lived around the corner in Albanvale.

17 A neighbour had been in the backyard of his home when he heard a loud bang and observed smoke coming from your house. He immediately went to the front to assist and put cold water on Ms Sheahan's burns. He heard you say, 'Help my kids', and tell Ms Sheahan, 'Keep quiet, don't say anything'.

18 AB and CF took the younger children to your mother's house. AB rang triple zero and spoke to them on the walk there. At one stage, you attended the house. AB and CF then returned to the scene, where AB received aid from first responders for her burns. You told her, 'Sorry, [AB], you know I didn't mean it, I didn't know it was going to go up like that, like up in flames'.

19 Emergency services arrived, whereupon Ms Sheahan was provided with oxygen and you received first aid. One of the first responders, Mr Chris Watson, overheard you say to Ms Sheahan, 'Why didn't you stop me?', 'You should have stopped me', and 'I should be in jail'.

20 Police arrived at 5:32pm and their interactions with you and others were all captured on body worn cameras. Constable Grenfell had a conversation with you in which you stated, 'It's not my fault, just send me to jail'. Constable Grenfell also spoke to CF and asked her who started the fire. Ms Sheahan interjected and stated that you tried to light yourself on fire and that, when she tried to stop you, she caught fire as well. When asked what caused you to light yourself on fire, she replied, 'intoxication'. You were also overheard telling AB, 'It wasn't supposed to get you'.

21 I have watched the entirety of the body worn camera footage, and the jury in the trial of this matter which proceeded in 2024 observed the footage in part. The scene portrayed is extremely confronting and harrowing, and the footage showed Ms Sheahan in her severely burnt condition, conscious and likely dying, as well as AB being treated for her injuries by police and paramedics with great care and tenderness.

22 Kylie Sheahan was taken by ambulance to the Alfred Hospital, where she was admitted at 6:28pm with a diagnosis of extensive full thickness burns affecting 91% of her total body surface area. A strong smell of petrol was noted upon arrival at the hospital. Ms Sheahan was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit, though her injuries were considered fatal and active treatment was withdrawn. Ms Sheahan died at 3:10am on 18 March 2022.

23 AB was taken by ambulance to the Royal Children's Hospital. She sustained burns to approximately 52% of her body, including her right hand, right foot, legs, arms and chest. Her injuries are discussed in further detail below.

24 WX was also taken to the Royal Children's Hospital and treated for respiratory issues.

25 You sustained burns and were treated at the Alfred Hospital for approximately two months.

26 On 21 March 2022, the forensic pathologist, Dr Matthew Lynch, performed a post‑mortem examination on Ms Sheahan's body. Dr Lynch concluded that Ms Sheahan's cause of death was 'multisystem failure complicating burns to skin and airways'. In his report dated 29 August 2022, Dr Lynch states that burns involving 91% of the body surface area are invariably fatal despite specialist medical and surgical treatment.

27 Dr Lynch noted thermal injuries to 14 separate areas of Ms Sheahan's body, including her eyes, abdominal and chest wall, lower limbs, and the soles of her feet.

28 Following the abovementioned events, AB was taken to the Royal Children's Hospital, where she presented with severe burn injuries. The report of Dr Ashan Fernando, dated 5 December 2023, notes that AB's burn injuries were extensive, involving an estimated 52% of her total body surface area. The burn injuries were of varying depths, albeit most were deep dermal or full thickness burns, and extended to her left and right limbs, chest, neck, and face.

29 AB underwent weekly surgeries for a period of three months during her time as a patient at the Royal Children's Hospital. She was then transferred to the Burns Unit at the Royal Adelaide Hospital for completion of acute and ongoing long‑term care. In a report dated 17 November 2025, Dr Marcus Wagstaff, a doctor at the Royal Adelaide Hospital ('RAH') where AB was treated, notes that AB last attended the RAH Burns Service for review in May 2024.

30 At this appointment, the medical team observed that AB had an excellent range of movement across her major joints, but that scarring on her right hand might limit its movement and function in the future. Her scarring also means that she may find that hot weather and certain other environments create pain and itching. She has been advised to refrain from being in the sun for long periods of time.

31 Dr Wagstaff also reports that the psychological trauma of AB's burns scars should not be underestimated, and recommends that she engage continued psychological input.

32 You were released from hospital on 18 May 2022 into police custody and were assessed by a forensic medical officer as fit for interview. You made various comments to the police during your interview, including:

(a) 'To tell you the truth, I can't remember much of back then ... Didn't even know - at the time I didn't realise that it was - that there was a fire';

(b) 'Maybe I just fuckin' take things too far'; and

(c) 'I think this is something that I would fuckin' do to scare 'em and it got out of control'.

33 You accepted that it was possible that you had taken petrol into the house and spread it around, but denied that you would ever hurt Ms Sheahan and that you had made threats against her or the children with respect to setting them on fire.

34 Forensic scientist, Mr John Kelleher, examined the scene and clothing from you, Ms Sheahan, and AB, and concluded that the cause of the fire was the ignition of combustible material in the kitchen, hallway, and lounge room, assisted by the presence of petrol. Flammable liquid was identified on remnants of the clothing worn by Ms Sheahan.

35 Mr Kelleher reviewed the body worn camera footage from the scene and still images of you, Ms Sheahan, and AB, and cautiously opines that Ms Sheahan was in an unusual position at the time of the fire, possibly on her hands and knees. Ms Sheahan's face was burnt but not her hair, indicating that she was facing the fire, and the severity of the burns to her upper body and clothing in comparison to her lower clothing might result from the petrol being poured over her upper body whilst in a certain position.

36 In Mr Kelleher's view, you appeared to have been close enough to the fire to be quite badly burnt, however, you were likely to have been on the outer edge given the limited burning to your back. The lack of damage to your shorts indicates that there was no petrol present on them.

37 Further, the extent of AB's burns seems to indicate that she was upright and in the vicinity of the fire with both her front and rear briefly exposed. However, the burning to her clothes and skin are not indicative of the presence of petrol or any other flammable liquid on her skin or clothing.

38 On your arrest for causing the injuries to Kylie Sheahan, you were remanded into custody, where you have remained until today.

39 At approximately 8:15am on 1 December 2022, Custodial Officer Steve Desira commenced his shift in one of Port Phillip Prison's factories. Various other Custodial Officers, Galea, Singh, Steinhoff, and Burnett, were also on duty.

40 At approximately 8:50am, you were in Factory 6 and were being attended to by a pharmacy technician. The technician asked you to confirm your name and correctional reference number before dispensing the medication, to which you replied, 'I told you my fucking name, are you deaf?'. Custodial Officer Desira told you to be respectful to the pharmacy technician, and you stated that the technician was 'fucking deaf'. You received your medication and returned to your workstation.

41 At 8:58am, you entered the main office at which the Custodial Officers were stationed and began discussing the incident involving the pharmacy technician. You were told that the incident was over and were directed to return to work, and you stated, 'I am going to jump in, and I'll hit someone'. One of the officers directed you to return to your unit, however, you refused and walked back to your workstation.

42 The Custodial Officers approached you at the workstation and again directed you to return to your unit. You again refused and further discussion took place. You appeared to eventually comply, and began moving towards the door at the front of the factory. However, as you were walking, you stopped, interacted with Custodial Officer Desira, and then punched him in the face with your right hand which was in a closed fist.

43 As a result of the incident, Custodial Officer Desira sustained two cuts on the outside of his lip and one on the inside of his mouth. Desira required stitches for the lacerations on his face and later developed bruising and soreness in his jaw, which required treatment via pain medication. He was also placed on antibiotics and attended a General Practitioner on multiple occasions for subsequent treatment.

44 You declined to attend an interview with respect to this offending.

45 These matters have had an extensive procedural history.

46 You were arrested and charged on 18 March 2022. You were committed to stand trial on 5 April 2023.

47 The trial proceeded on 5 February 2024 and ran for 17 days before the jury was discharged during its deliberations due to circumstances not relevant to this sentence.

48 The matter was listed for re‑trial on 13 May 2024. However, this trial date was vacated after you obtained new counsel who were not in a position to proceed at this time.

49 The matter was then re‑listed for trial on 24 February 2025 and was ready to proceed on that date. However, on the morning that was to be day one of the re‑trial, you indicated that you would plead guilty to the charges. You were arraigned on 24 February 2025, and pleaded guilty to murder and recklessly causing serious injury.

50 The matter was listed for plea before me on 13 October 2025.

51 The Court received nine victim impact statements from people close to Kylie Sheahan. I have read and carefully considered all of them, and listened closely to those which were read aloud to the Court.

52 Ms Sheahan's mother, Sylvia Sebenik, reflects on her anger, sorrow, and grief that will never heal. She has trouble functioning day‑to‑day and often falls deep into thoughts of Ms Sheahan and the fact that she really is gone forever. She misses the simple things - family barbecues, playing with the children, and frequent phone conversations. The thought that she will never get a phone call from Ms Sheahan again causes her immense sadness.

53 Ms Sebenik now has trouble sleeping, and is plagued by nightmares of dying and death in general. She dreams of Ms Sheahan wishing she was there to protect her, constantly wondering what may have happened differently if she had been there to help her and the grandchildren. Ms Sebenik is also struggling to come to terms with having to make the difficult decision to turn off Ms Sheahan's life support which, she explains, is something a parent should never have to do.

54 The loss of her daughter leaves Ms Sebenik feeling as if she has lost a piece of her own heart, which now carries a void that will never heal. She will never get to hug or kiss her daughter again, and lives her life carrying the weight of that absence.

55 Ms Sheahan's father, Anthony Sheahan, misses his daughter enormously. He finds it difficult to express to the Court how a father feels about losing a child, and speaks lovingly of his tough, honest, and determined daughter.

56 Mr Sheahan reflects on the pain of no longer being able to share birthdays, Mother's Days or Father's Days with Ms Sheahan. It has been very hard for him to move on, but he has found some degree of comfort in speaking to workmates and friends, some of whom have also lost children. He states that, although his hurt will mend, his daughter can never be replaced, and he misses her every day.

57 Shane Doughty, Ms Sheahan's stepfather, struggles to find words to express how he feels. He will never get Ms Sheahan's death out of his mind, and refrains from lighting his fire pit due to his fears that it will remind him of the horrible way in which she died.

58 Mr Doughty's day‑to‑life has been significantly impacted by the crime. He is unable to eat, sleep, or think properly, and lost his job when he was unable to perform his work due to his mind constantly switching back to what happened to Ms Sheahan.

59 Tanya Ceh, Ms Sheahan's sister, describes the devastation she feels knowing that she will never be able to fully reconcile with Ms Sheahan. The two had a somewhat turbulent relationship as children, which caused a rift and meant they were often at odds. However, these differences aside, Ms Ceh loved her sister deeply. She feels immense pain knowing that the opportunity to mend their relationship has been taken from them, and is devastated that her big sister - the person she looked up to as a little girl - is gone. There is so much she wanted to say to Ms Sheahan, and she feels a sense of profound anguish at the fact that those loving words must now remain unsaid.

60 Ms Ceh feels particular distress when she considers the horrific nature of her sister's death. She writes that words cannot describe the feeling she has when she pictures the fear, pain, and betrayal Ms Sheahan must have felt as she took her last breath. These harrowing thoughts are triggered by small, everyday occurrences, such as turning on the oven or stove, seeing flames, or catching a glimpse of Ms Sheahan's likeness in the faces of her children.

61 Ms Ceh reflects on childhood memories of 'Smiley Kylie' - her happy, confident sister who would introduce her to new music and teach her how to make sandcastles. She laments the fact that she will never be able to make new memories with her sister, and wishes she could tell Ms Sheahan that she loves and misses her. The sadness of attempting to navigate life without her weighs painfully upon Ms Ceh every day. She acknowledges the cliché that time heals all wounds, and explains that time will never heal the pain of losing her sister.

62 Ms Ceh hopes that, if there is an afterlife, Ms Sheahan will be able to rest free from pain, and be at peace knowing that she is doing all she can to ensure the safety and happiness of the children.

63 Ms Sheahan's daughter, AB, describes her feelings of fear, hurt, and frustration, as well as the impact of the fire on her mental, physical, and social wellbeing. AB explains that it is difficult to enjoy life without her mother by her side. She describes her wish that her mother would return, and her feeling that a full stop has been put on their relationship. She also describes the pain of losing her mother seven days after her own birthday, which now serves as a painful reminder of Ms Sheahan's death.

64 AB also details the impacts of the crime on her mental health, and her struggles with depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder ('PTSD'). She experiences constant mental struggles associated with flashbacks to the night of the fire, and has trouble sleeping due to her thoughts about what she might have been able to do in order for things to have turned out differently. Her anxiety has extended to the workplace, with customers' queries as to the cause of her burns causing considerable stress. She has also developed an extreme fear of fire, which weighs heavily upon her.

65 AB also details the enormous physical toll of her serious injuries. Suffering burns to 52% of her body, she was put in an induced coma for one week. Coming out of the coma, she experienced hallucinations, hearing your voice saying you were going to burn the hospital down.

66 AB subsequently required weekly skin grafts, and recalls her distress when one graft required her to have her hair cut off in order to permit skin to be taken from her head. She explains that her hair was the one thing she had left of her mother, who had blonde hair like her. AB also recalls the terrible pain of her burn injuries, which was so severe that she required nitrous oxide when having her dressings changed, and the green whistle (methoxyflurane) when showering. Three photographs of her burns are included in her statement.

67 AB further emphasises the immense discomfort of feeding tubes, plaster casts, and having to ingest water by chewing on water‑soaked cotton swabs. Unable to move when emerging from the coma, she describes the mental and physical strain of attempting to walk again, which required the assistance of a machine, nurses, and physiotherapists. It was during this period that preparations for her mother's funeral were commenced, and she was thus unable to assist with making her tombstone.

68 Both the pain of losing her mother and the trauma of her burns have affected other areas of her life. When AB moved to Adelaide, she attended a non‑mainstream school out of concern that she would be bullied because of her burns. She finds it difficult to look in the mirror, and has immense trepidation about wearing short sleeves or shorts in public, due her remaining scars.

69 Finally, AB reflects on how the crime has torn apart her personal relationships. She now lives with her father in Adelaide, but describes feeling alone as she does not know him well and is separated from her siblings and friends. She misses watching her siblings grow up, and now reflects sadly upon people telling her she was like her mum. For AB, the pain of losing her mother and parting from her siblings makes it difficult to enjoy life.

70 Ms Sheahan's daughter, CF, reflects on the intense pain, loss, and trauma you have inflicted upon her family. She says that words cannot describe the trauma of attending hospital to see her mother wrapped in bandages and on life support.

71 Desperately wishing to help, CF asked doctors to take her skin and give it all to her mother, regardless of the potential effects on her own health. Destroyed by the understanding that Ms Sheahan could not live on, she could not bring herself to be present when life support was ceased. CF reflects that she herself has lost her mother, and Ms Sheahan has been denied the opportunity to become the aunt or grandmother she could have been.

72 CF also attended hospital to assist her sister, sitting by her side and helping her to eat and walk again after she awoke from her coma. Her grief and trauma, as well as the significant disruption to her family life, have forced her to mature at a young age. She now faces the difficult and terrifying process of adapting to life without her mother.

73 KT, with whom JM, NP, QR and WX have been placed in foster care, provided a victim impact statement detailing the effects of the crime on the children.

74 KT first speaks of WX, whom she describes as a fun‑loving, caring little boy who makes everyone laugh. She explains that WX, now aged 4, will only ever get to see his mother in photographs. Ms Sheahan will never see him or QR grow up, start school, get married, or have children of their own. At just 10 months old, WX lost the bond with his mother and spent several months in residential homes with different workers each day. KT writes that this would have been a frightening experience for such a young child.

75 KT then turns to QR who, following the fire, would freeze with fear upon hearing the name 'Roland'. She describes QR's enduring fear and sadness following the fire. He struggles to sleep at night due to night terrors, wakes up screaming for his mother, and is scared of sirens, loud noises, raised voices, fire trucks, and smoke. When QR's school had a fire evacuation drill, he jumped the school fence and ran towards the road screaming that he did not want to die and go to heaven like his mother.

76 QR attends school part‑time, as his anxiety makes it difficult for him to settle in the class. He attends play therapy every week to help him regulate his emotions, but easily becomes angry and frustrated. KT explains that QR misses his mother immensely, and makes drawings that are hung on her photos or left at her gravesite. She observes that QR's day‑to‑day life remains a struggle, but that underneath that struggle is a beautiful boy who loves life.

77 KT explains that NP faced bullying at school and often came home crying, and requires medication every night to help him sleep due to visions of the fire. Moreover, JM has experienced significant memory loss, and missed a lengthy period of schooling, which continues to impact her education.

78 The biggest impact on the children, she explains, was the sudden transition from being together at home as a family to being taken by strangers and placed in foster care. KT reflects that although life is very different for the children now, their fear is frequently stirred by raised voices, the smell of smoke, and voices that remind them of their mother or you. They find it extremely difficult to visit Ms Sheahan's gravesite, and they miss their family pets, favourite toys, siblings, friends, and mother tremendously.

79 Ms Sheahan's daughter, JM, speaks of how much she misses her mum, and how scared she felt after the fire. She describes the fear of not knowing what was happening to her family, and explains that she is scared to live alone.

80 JM states that, following the fire, she missed out on half of Year 5, so does not spell or write well, but finds comfort in doing arts and crafts. She also notes that she is now unable to trust men until she gets to know them.

81 JM reflects on her relationships with her mother and her siblings. She sorely misses spending time her elder sister, AB, and fondly recalls AB cooking meals for her and taking her out for picnics. Turning to the grief she feels at not being able to see her mother anymore, JM writes, '[I] lost my mum', '[I] miss my mum', and it is 'sad' that she 'won't be there for important things'.

82 Ms Sheahan's son, NP, feels scared, frightened, and confused. He recalls the many changes that have occurred in his life after the fire, including not being able to see his family and moving in with complete strangers from foster care. He reflects particularly on the fact, although he is just 12 years old, he will never have another birthday with his mum.

83 NP writes that he has been bullied at school because his mother died. He has not been able to see old friends from his former school, and has struggled keep friends at his current school. He struggles with persistent flashbacks, and sees the day of the fire happening whenever he closes his eyes.

84 NP hopes that you understand the extent to which to have hurt the family, both physically and mentally. He will forever miss his family and his mum.

85 In conclusion, it is impossible for me to adequately describe these victim impact statements, each of which were eloquent and gave heartfelt remembrances of Kylie Sheahan. The statements attest to Ms Sheahan's kind and loving nature, and describe the pain caused by her loss. Some statements further detail the pain and trauma stemming from the victims' own physical and mental injuries as a result of these events.

86 The Court has carefully considered all these statements, and taken them into account.

87 Mr Griffiths, I now turn to your personal circumstances.

88 You were born on 24 May 1984 and were 37 years old at the time of the offending on Indictment 1 and 38 years old at the time of the offending on Indictment 2. You are now aged 41. You have six biological children with three different women.

89 You are the eldest child of two siblings. Your parents separated when you were nine years old. Your father, a truck driver, spent considerable time away from home. You have reported that your mother was a strict physical disciplinarian who, at times, would hit you with a cricket bat. You remained in contact with your father until his death in 2008, at which time you were in custody.

90 You attended Albanvale Primary School, West Sunshine Primary School, and Deer Park High School. At approximately the Year 8/9 level you left school after getting into trouble in relation to car thefts. At this time, you were engaged with Youth Justice. From the age of 13 or 14, you commenced using alcohol. You also smoked cannabis between the ages of 15 and 18. At the age of 16, you were formally diagnosed with epilepsy, for which you are being treated in custody and are prescribed Epilim. You have also been diagnosed with asthma.

91 In your early 20s, you began working as a forklift driver. At some point during this period you commenced using amphetamine, though were not doing so at the time of the index offending. Between your 20s and your 40s, your longest period of employment was approximately six months. For two to three months prior to the index offence, you were employed as a truck driver and delivered carpet on an almost daily basis.

92 In 2016, you began a relationship with Ms Sheahan. Both she and her children moved in with you, and you then had two more children together - QR and WX. The family had been living together in public housing at 15 Sutherland St, Albanvale for approximately two years before the fire. Your son, GK, had been living with the family since approximately one year before the fire.

93 As detailed above, you have a history of drug and alcohol issues, particularly in your teens and early 20s. You report having given up all substances at some time prior to the offending, but relapsed and began drinking approximately one week before the day of the fire. It is conceded that alcohol was a factor in relation to the offences on Indictment 1.

94 You have had little family support since coming into custody following your arrest on 14 March 2022. Your younger sister, who resides in Brisbane, has had virtually no contact with you, and your mother has visited you on one occasion.

95 You have an extensive criminal history which spans multiple decades. You first came before a court in 2001, and thereafter committed an array of offences over the following years.

96 Significantly, and of particular relevance in this case, you have been convicted of the following offences:

(a) recklessly causing injury/serious injury;

(b) making a threat to kill;

(c) intentionally destroying property;

(d) contravening a Family Violence Intervention Order;

(e) persistent contravention of Family Violence Notice/Order;

(f) persistent contravention of Intervention Order;

(g) intentionally causing injury;

(h) assaulting an emergency worker on duty; and

(i) resisting an emergency worker on duty.

97 You have been convicted of some of these offences, including recklessly causing injury and making threats to kill, on multiple occasions, and these convictions have been as recent as 2021, when you were convicted of being a persistent family violence offender and, as part of the outcome, ordered to complete a men's behaviour program.

98 It is of significant concern for your future prospects that your historical use of violence has escalated to the point where you have now committed two extremely serious violent offences against family members that you should have cared for and protected.

99 The Crown highlights that you set fire to your wife, the person who you were supposed to love and protect, causing her an excruciating death. You did so in front of her two daughters who were trying to stop you from hurting their mother. In the course of murdering Ms Sheahan, you set fire to AB, who was then 16 years old, and who suffered burns to 52% of her body.

100 The Crown refers to Hopkins v The Queen, in which Redlich JA stated that:

it would be a futile exercise to attempt to imagine a death that more appals the conscience than death by burning. It is a form of death likely, in common knowledge, to be accompanied by extreme pain ... [It has been] aptly described ... as a form of death 'so brutal as to be beyond the understanding of most civilised human beings'.[1]

101 It is submitted that the Court in this case should impose a sentence that truly acknowledges the brutality of the offending and the utter devastation it has caused to the lives of the children who were present in the house and watching when you set fire to their mother. The offending was committed in breach of an intervention order as well as in front of two children, and it is argued that the offending is of the utmost gravity. The Crown submits that the only available sentence is life imprisonment, however, concedes that a non‑parole period should be set.

102 Turning to the offence of murder, the Crown submits that the offending in this case is grave, and that there are a multitude of aggravating features, including:

(a) the use of fire to inflict death;

(b) your offending occurred in the context of family violence;

(c) your conduct was in contravention of a family violence intervention order;

(d) Ms Sheahan was murdered in her own home where she was entitled to feel safe;

(e) the offending was witnessed at very close quarters by two of Ms Sheahan's children who tried to stop you. As the stepfather of two of the children, it was your duty to protect them from harm, and instead you subjected them to a terrifying ordeal, forcing them to witness the brutal killing of their mother in circumstances where they tried to stop you and begged you not to do it. The children tried to help their mother, dragging her from the fire and into the bathroom and then outside;

(f) there was an aspect of pre‑meditation in that you had previously told one of the children that it was 'easy to light [them] up when [they] are asleep';

(g) you engaged in some planning as you contemplated the offending for some time prior to the offence, before collecting the petrol from outside and splashing it around the kitchen and onto Ms Sheahan and one of the children;

(h) you sought to avoid responsibility for the offending by telling Ms Sheahan not to say anything to the police; and

(i) you placed blame on Ms Sheahan for the offending by stating to her, 'Why didn't you stop me, you should have stopped me'.

103 As to the relevance to charge 1 of the offending against AB and the risks posed to the other children, the Crown submits that:

(a) the offending against AB can be taken into account in assessing the gravity of charge 1;

(b) at the time you ignited the petrol, you had probable foresight not only of causing really serious injury to Ms Sheahan but also to AB, who was standing in the kitchen where you had just poured the petrol;

(c) your moral culpability for the offending on charge 1 is elevated because of the known risk to AB, which ultimately eventuated;

(d) the Court can take into account the risk posed to the other children in the house which, the Crown asserts, must have been known to you at the time you ignited the petrol; and

(e) given these known risks, your moral culpability for the offending is extremely high which, along with the other relevant factors, places this case in the worst category and requires the imposition of the maximum penalty.

104 The Crown cites Noori v The Queen ('Noori') in support of the above propositions.[2] In that case, the offender pleaded guilty to murder, and charges relating to injured victims, at an early stage. These charges all rose out of the same acts. The Crown identifies that, in confirming the sentence of life imprisonment, the Court of Appeal stated that:

In assessing in the first place whether it was proper to impose a non‑parole period, and, in the second place, its length, it is necessary to bear steadily in mind that the applicant's crime of murder did not stand alone. The murder was part of a criminal onslaught, the purpose of which was to cause maximum havoc. Not only did the execution of that purpose cause death, but it caused a number of innocent people to be seriously injured, and others to have their lives gravely endangered ... [and] the length of any non‑parole period that it was decided to impose, fell to be considered in the context of the applicant's overall criminality, including that his acts were calculated to - and did - cause wholesale devastation.[3]

105 The Crown therefore submits that the Court ought to consider that you knew you were placing AB and the other children at risk at the time you ignited the petrol, and that this is relevant to an assessment of your moral culpability, which is said to be extremely high given the duty of care you owed to the children. However, the Crown notes that the Court must not impermissibly double‑punish you for the offending against AB. The submission is thus that, in sentencing on charge 1, the Court ought to take into account the risk posed to AB, but not the actual injuries she sustained.

106 Finally, the Crown also notes that Noori is an example of a case in which a life sentence was imposed for a murder with reckless intent, and for which a plea of guilty was entered at a relatively early stage.

107 The Crown contends that you were supposed to love and protect Ms Sheahan, your children, and your stepchildren. Instead, whilst Ms Sheahan was trying to make dinner for the family, you poured petrol over her and set her on fire, for no other reason other than indiscriminate anger. It is submitted that the commission of an offence of this nature in circumstances of family violence is a significant aggravating feature.

108 The Court's attention is drawn to Director of Public Prosecutions v Pualic, in which the Court of Appeal stated:

family violence is contemptible. It warrants both condemnation and appropriate punishment. Where an offence is committed in the context of family violence, it is necessary to consider the surrounding behaviours of the offender in order to assess the true gravity of the offending and for the sentence to vindicate the dignity of the victim. Thus, the gravity of family violence offending will be aggravated if the offending breaches an intervention order or is committed in front of children.[4]

109 Regarding the offence of murder specifically, the Court's attention is also drawn to Director of Public Prosecutions v Paulino, in which Bell J stated:

To murder a person protected by a family violence intervention order is a very serious matter. Family violence intervention orders are not worthless pieces of paper. The general purpose of such an order is to provide legally enforceable protection for the safety of the individual, usually a woman at risk of violence from a man. The contravention in the present case is not separately charged but represents a seriously aggravating feature of the murder.[5]

110 The Crown submits that the offending has undermined the community's confidence in the ability of the law to protect women and children, and that the full force of the law, as expressed through the intervention order, was not enough to protect Ms Sheahan or AB from your behaviour. As such, the Crown submits that particular emphasis ought to be given to the sentencing purposes of general deterrence, denunciation, and community protection.

111 Turning then to the offence of recklessly causing serious injury against AB, the prosecution submits that a number of the same aggravating features that apply to the charge of murder, also apply to the charge of recklessly causing serious injury, with the additional feature that the victim was a child who was trying to stop you from hurting her mother.

112 The Crown also refers to AB's victim impact statement, submitting that the physical and mental injuries she sustained due to this offending will impact her forever. The Court's attention is drawn particularly to the fact that she had to re‑learn how to walk in order to attend her mother's funeral, went through immense mental and physical suffering, and remains scared of fire. The effects of that day still weigh heavily upon her.

113 It is submitted that AB's physical injuries, their psychological and emotional effects, and their identified long‑term consequences, place those injuries in a high category of seriousness.

114 The agreed basis for sentencing on the murder charge is that you were reckless to the causation of at least really serious injury at the time you lit the petrol and started the fire. In addressing your culpability and degree of responsibility, the prosecution drew the Court's attention to Barrett v The Queen, in which Maxwell P and Neave JA stated that:

An offender who intends to kill or cause really serious injury is not necessarily to be regarded as more culpable than an offender who foresees the probability that his acts will seriously injure or kill the victim.[6]

115 Similarly, citing in support the remarks of Tinney J in Director of Public Prosecutions v Lee ('Lee'), the Crown also submits that there should be no distinction in sentencing between probable foresight of really serious injury and probable foresight of death.[7]

116 It is argued that your culpability for the offence is high, notwithstanding that the mens rea is recklessness rather than intention. Your conduct is argued to be particularly egregious in light of the use of fire as a weapon.

117 The Crown further submits that your level of intoxication does not reduce your moral culpability, and that you made a conscious decision to light the petrol despite knowing the likelihood of the consequences, pleas from the children to stop, and the opportunity for you to desist. The fact that you were reckless rather than having intended the result does not, it is argued, materially reduce your culpability for the offending in the circumstances of this case. I pause to remark that I accept this submission.

Injury, loss and damage and impact on victims

118 Referring to the victim impact statements, the Crown argues that it is difficult to contemplate a more impactful crime than one which causes such young children to lose their mother. Ms Sheahan's children were in the house when the fire was lit, AB suffered serious burn injuries, and WX suffered smoke inhalation.

119 The Court has been informed that AB, CF and JM will all receive bravery awards for their actions. CF tried to save her mother, JM saved WX who was not walking at the time, and AB saved QR who was trapped inside in his cot. Following the fire, the family have been split apart, with AB moving to Adelaide and four of the children placed in foster care.

120 The Crown argues that although there is some utilitarian benefit given that the plea avoided the need for a second trial, the pleas to murder and recklessly causing serious injury were entered at a very late stage.

121 Following the first trial in which the jury was discharged, the plea was entered on the first day of the second trial, with the Court having been notified in the preceding days that the plea would be entered. Thus, the Crown highlights that you never indicated that you would plead guilty to the charge until it was entered in 2025. The prosecution draws the Court's attention to the fact that witnesses, including Ms Sheahan's two daughters, AB and CF, had been cross‑examined both at committal and trial before a jury.

122 The prosecution also argues that, although you may regret the circumstances that you are currently in, your plea of guilty in the circumstances of this case cannot be said to be evidence of genuine remorse. Nor, the prosecution argued, is there otherwise an evidentiary basis that would allow the Court to find that you are genuinely remorseful.

123 The prosecution notes that towards the end of your police interview you stated, 'It looks like I've fucked up, haven't I', but argues that this is, at most, a tacit acceptance of some responsibility rather than an expression of remorse. The prosecution submits that the only statement you made on the day of the offending that could potentially be an expression of remorse was the statement to AB - 'I'm sorry, I didn't mean for it to get you, I didn't know it would go up like that'. However, the prosecution argues that, if this is deemed to be an expression of genuine remorse, it would only relate to charge 2, regarding AB.

124 The prosecution submits that, although not formally assessed, the available material demonstrates that your prospects for rehabilitation are poor. The prosecution emphasises that you have consistently engaged in criminal offending against intimate partners throughout your adult life and have been sentenced eight times for breaching family violence orders, two of which were persistent breaches.

125 You have also previously been sentenced for recklessly causing serious injury, multiple times for assaults, twice for making a threat to kill, and twice for intentionally causing injury. Your history also includes resisting emergency workers, contravening community corrections dispositions, and, most recently, assaulting a custodial officer whilst on duty. This offending, it is submitted, has dramatically escalated in recent times, culminating in the most recent offences.

126 There has been no formal assessment before the Court as to your prospects of rehabilitation, but the prosecution argues that your violent history suggests you pose a high risk of committing further offences. In light of your history of consistently contravening court orders, the prosecution submits that there are no orders imposable by this Court that will detract from that fact.

127 As the prosecution identifies regarding the principles in R v Verdins ('Verdins'), the existence of a 'condition at the date of sentencing (or its foreseeable recurrence) may mean that a given sentence will weigh more heavily on ... [you] than it would a person in normal health'.[8] The prosecution submits that, in order to enliven limb 5 of Verdins, an offender must demonstrate through cogent evidence that imprisonment will weigh more heavily upon them because of their mental impairment.

128 The Crown argues that there is insufficient evidence before the Court to justify a finding that you suffer from a mental impairment at the date of sentencing, or its foreseeable recurrence. The prosecution submits that the evidence appears in a report, dated almost two years ago, of a clinical psychologist who treated you in prison, rather than a formal psychological assessment report.

129 As will be seen below, your counsel submits that some moderation in sentence ought to be afforded due to the purportedly burdensome impact of prison on you, due to your physical injuries. In support of this submission, lengthy delays in treatment were cited.

130 Addressing the submissions on this point, the Crown refers to your Justice Health Records and identifies that an entry for 28 June 2025 indicates that you refused an appointment at the Barbara Walker Pain Centre without providing a reason for that refusal. The prosecution also identifies several other occasions on which the records indicate that you refused appointments that were offered to you. As the Crown notes, the Justice Health Records indicate that approximately 70 appointments were offered to you in a 12 month period.

131 It is thus submitted that at least some of the delay in treatment is attributable to your own decisions and that, though it may occasionally be untimely, the Court ought not find that you are unable to receive appropriate treatment in prison. The prosecution further submits that the opinion of Dr Byron Collins as to the inadequacy of prison treatment ought not be accepted, as the opinion extends beyond the boundaries of his expertise and is not reflected in a concrete way. Finally, the prosecution further submits that Dr Collins is not able to provide any sort of opinion as to your mental state.

132 The prosecution draws the Court's attention to several cases, both preceding and following the standard sentence regime that, it is said, may provide assistance. The Crown asserts that the Court should have regard to sentences imposed in other standard sentence cases, and that the pre‑standard sentence cases cannot be relied on as comparable but can still be considered for applicable statements of principle. The prosecution identifies several such cases, but accepts that the circumstances of this case are unique and that no others could be said to be truly comparable.

133 The Crown identifies Lee as the only standard sentence offence for murder in which the victim was set on fire. In that case - which, the Crown submits, is the longest sentence for a single charge of murder imposed in recent times - Lee set fire to his neighbour after he became angered by noise being emitted by the machinery the neighbour was using to fell trees. Tinney J sentenced the offender to 35 years' imprisonment with a non‑parole period of 27 years.

134 The prosecution identifies some similarities between Lee and the present case including death by fire, the accused's relevant prior history, and the accused seeking to assist the victim by requesting an ambulance. However, it is argued that a number of features of your offending are more serious, including the fact that you killed your wife in her own home, doing so in breach of an intervention order and with two children present who witnessed their mother being murdered.

135 The Crown also raises Director of Public Prosecutions v Lindemann, in which Lindemann stabbed his partner to death in front of her two children and mother, and pleaded guilty to both murder and recklessly causing injury.[9] His step‑daughter was injured in the course of attempting to stop him. The prosecution acknowledges that the offending is not analogous to the present case, but submits that the case provides relevant statements of principle regarding sentencing for family violence murders committed in front of children, and guidance about sentencing for an assault of a child in the context of murder.

136 The prosecution also notes Director of Public Prosecutions v Basham as an example of the circumstances in which a life sentence is appropriate for murder.[10] Following a trial, Basham was convicted of the murder of his ex‑wife, having killed her shortly before she was due to give evidence against him in proceedings relating to an allegation of rape. The murder was staged to look like a suicide, and his defence at trial was that she had killed herself. Basham was sentenced to life imprisonment with a non‑parole period of 30 years. The Crown submits that, although the motive and planning tend to make Basham's offending more serious, the use of fire and the presence of children makes your offending more serious.

137 The prosecution identifies Director of Public Prosecutions v Sako as an example of circumstances in which the Court determined that a life sentence was not appropriate.[11] In that case, Sako murdered a young woman in her home after stalking her, and received a sentence of 36 years on a plea of guilty. The prosecution submits that those circumstances were less serious than the present case given that fire was not used and there were no children present. Moreover, Sako had an extreme psychiatric condition that reduced his culpability to some degree.[12]

138 The Crown also identifies several pre‑standard sentence cases which are said to provide applicable statements of principle. One such case is Stone v The Queen, in which Stone set fire to her husband, causing him to suffer an excruciating death, later falsely blaming intruders and lying to police.[13] She was convicted of murder following a trial and sentenced to 34 years' imprisonment with a non‑parole period of 28 years. In dismissing Stone's appeal against sentence, the Court of Appeal stated that the sentencing judge was justified in using adjectives such as vicious, barbarous, malicious, and abhorrent to describe her conduct.[14]

139 The Court further noted that 'domestic murder is the ultimate act of family violence and must be condemned', and that 'her Honour had little alternative but to impose a very stern sentence' given the aggravating features including the absence of any remorse or psychiatric explanation for the crime.[15]

140 The Crown also identifies Director of Public Prosecutions v Clover, in which Clover deposited petrol on the perimeter of an alcove where the three victims were squatting, and set it alight.[16] After pleading guilty to reckless murder, he was sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment with a non‑parole period of 24 years. The Crown accepts that the present circumstances are quite different, but submits that, relevantly, Dixon J found that:

[I]t cannot be said that the moral culpability involved in these offences is much reduced because you did not specifically intend the death of each of your victims or foresee the probability of death as distinct from really serious injury ... Fuel and fire combined to create a dreadful event.[17]

141 Finally, the prosecution draws the Court's attention to R v Kilic.[18] Although, following this case, the courts have deprecated the use of the term 'worst category', the prosecution submits that the circumstance is different for murder where the maximum of life imprisonment is imposed. In circumstances where the maximum penalty is life, the Crown asserts, it is still permissible for the Court to view cases such as the present as falling into the worst category of offending.

142 On the charge of murder, the prosecution seeks the imposition of a life sentence with a non‑parole period, and relies on the following factors in support:

(a) the circumstances of the offending are extremely grave, including taunting Ms Sheahan before igniting the petrol, later attempting to ensure she would not tell police, blaming her for the offending, lying to police, and engaging in the offending both in the presence of children and in breach of an intervention order;

(b) the devastating impact of the offending on Ms Sheahan's children and wider family;

(c) serious offender provisions which require the Court to consider protection of the community as the paramount purpose for which the sentence is imposed;

(d) your lengthy history of committing family violence offences;

(e) the existence of very few matters in mitigation, of which none are said to be of significant weight;

(f) in Lee, Tinney J considered that life imprisonment may well be within range for that offending which, the Crown submit, was less serious than the present offending; and

(g) a plea of guilty will not necessarily avoid the imposition of a life sentence.

143 The Crown submits that, if a sentence of life imprisonment is imposed for murder, then the other sentences imposed must be served concurrently. It is the prosecution submission that a life sentence with a minimum non‑parole period is the only available sentence. In R v Chamberlain, Charles JA confirmed that:

It is well‑established that once a prisoner has been sentenced to life imprisonment, any later offence can only be served concurrently because of the nature of a life sentence...[19]

144 It is further submitted that, if a sentence less than life imprisonment is imposed, a significant portion of the sentence for recklessly causing serious injury to AB should be served cumulatively upon the murder sentence. The Crown asserts that this is necessary to reflect the additional criminality involved in splashing petrol onto AB, and lighting the fire with probable foresight of her suffering serious injury.

145 I turn to the charge of assaulting an emergency worker on duty, the maximum penalty for which is 5 years' imprisonment. The prosecution submits that this offending is symptomatic of your capacity for, and familiarity with, violence, as evinced by your prior criminal history for similar offending.

146 The prosecution notes that the plea was entered after a protracted procedural history, but that there is utility in the plea given that no witnesses were cross‑examined. It is submitted that there should be some cumulation for this offending if a sentence less than life imprisonment is imposed for the murder.

147 Your counsel, accepting the statements of principle made by the Court of Appeal with respect to deaths by fire, acknowledges that your offending was very serious, and your moral culpability high. However, it is submitted that a head sentence of life imprisonment is not the appropriate sentence in this case.

148 Your counsel argues that there are several significant mitigating factors the Court ought to take into account and that, in the circumstances, a non‑parole period ought to be imposed.

149 The first of these factors is the pleas of guilty with respect to all three offences on the two indictments, in which there is said to be significant utilitarian value. In respect of the first indictment, it is acknowledged there was a trial, which was defended, and came to an end through no fault attributable to you. The Court's attention is drawn to the fact that the trial was conducted on the basis that manslaughter was put to the jury on your behalf. In respect of the second indictment, there was no trial and, once your mental state was determined and it was understood that no defence was available, you entered your guilty plea on 5 June 2025.

150 Your counsel emphasises that, in these circumstances, you have consistently admitted that your actions caused the death of Ms Sheahan and the injuries suffered by AB. It is submitted that the pleas of guilty carry utilitarian value in saving the community further expense and delay with respect to the crimes, and also any further cross‑examination of the witnesses.

151 Turning to your background, it is submitted that it is open to the Court to find that you come from a background of disadvantage. Your counsel argues that the disadvantage stemmed from a very early age and carried on through to your 40s. As identified above in relation to your personal circumstances, you had a difficult relationship with your mother, who was a strict disciplinarian, and you report that she would bash you with a cricket bat. Your father, a truck driver, spent considerable time away from the home.

152 At the age of 12 or 13 you ceased attending school and thus had a limited education to a Year 8/9 level. It was around this time that you began getting into trouble in relation to car thefts and became engaged with Youth Justice. You have also struggled with drug and alcohol issues. You commenced using alcohol from the age of 13 or 14, smoked cannabis between the ages of 15 and 18, and commenced using amphetamine in your early 20s. You have continued to have issues with alcohol and other substances for long periods of your life, and have found it very difficult to maintain consistent employment.

153 It submitted on your behalf that these features of hardship and disadvantage invoke the application of the Bugmy v The Queen ('Bugmy') principles, and that there ought to be some moderation of the sentence to be imposed.[20]

154 Your counsel asserts that, even if Bugmy does not apply, the Court ought to accept that hardship - including your lack of education, lack of a relationship with a father figure, and criminal behaviour from your teenage years - exists and has applied throughout your life. It is submitted that these are matters the Court ought to take into account in determining the appropriate sentence.

155 Your counsel further submits that, at the time of sentencing, it ought to be accepted that, on the balance, you are suffering from a mental impairment, at the very least being depression, which is likely to continue during your incarceration. It is argued that it is open to the Court to find that limb 5 of Verdins applies, as you have a mental impairment that could increase the hardship experienced by you in prison.

156 Your counsel explains that you are currently engaged with a psychologist, participating in talk therapy, and taking both anti‑depressants and anti‑anxiety medication. The material provided to the Court includes a Mobile Forensic Mental Health Service Summary, Justice Health Clinic Summary, and Justice Health Care Plans and Interventions. These show provisional diagnoses that were provided to you in 2017, and it is submitted that they suggest that you are experiencing depression and that it has been a longstanding feature of your mental health.

157 It is further submitted that the evidence provided to the Court suggests that you are suffering from symptoms consistent with PTSD. The Mental Health Service Summary shows that, following the fire, you presented with active trauma symptoms and poor sleep patterns and self‑reported having an ongoing low mood and hopelessness. The Summary, dated 2023, reports that you completed a DSM‑5 PTSD checklist, with a sufficient number of items endorsed as moderately problematic or above within each symptom cluster, to be suggestive of a diagnosis of PTSD.

158 The Summary also reports that your file indicates there being a past history of depressive symptoms, but notes that further information is very limited. The material provided to the Court is only current to October 2024.

159 Your counsel also draws the Court's attention to Smith v The Queen, in which the Court of Appeal accepted that an offender's physical features can mean that they will find prison life more difficult, and thus be more severely punished than an offender without such features.[21]

160 During the fire, you sustained extensive self‑inflicted burn injuries, and were admitted to the Alfred Hospital to receive treatment. You sustained mid‑deep dermal burn injuries to 35% of your body, required multiple surgeries, experienced multiple seizures, and required skin grafts and synthetic bio‑brane grafts. It is submitted that, given the nature and severity of the wounds and the ongoing pain you experience on a daily basis, your experience of incarceration will be more burdensome than that of an ordinary prisoner.

161 An expert report by Dr Byron Collins, a Consultant Forensic Pathologist, was put before the Court. It is to be noted that Dr Collins did not conduct an interview or physical examination of you, and he thus acknowledges that his comments and opinions are somewhat fettered. Dr Collins reports that, due to your burns, you are suffering from neuropathic pain which is likely to remain for the rest of your life. This kind of chronic nerve pain, Dr Collins reports, is extremely difficult to manage, and this difficulty would be enhanced during incarceration given various inefficiencies of the prison health system.

162 It is submitted that you have, at times, been unable to be seen by a medical professional for long periods of time, meaning that the nature of care provided in custody is dissimilar to the nature of care that can be provided to an ordinary member of the community. Your counsel notes that you have provided instructions that you are in constant pain, and have been told that that there is not much that can be done about neuropathic pain beyond the provision of painkillers.

163 On this point, Dr Collins notes that there was an approximately five‑month time lapse between your referral to the Barbara Walker Centre for Pain Management and your eventual appointment. Such a delay, Dr Collins reports, is not optimal and is likely to have a sinister effect on your psychiatric conditions, thus worsening both your physical and mental status.

164 It is submitted these features of your physical health, and the associated effects on your mental health, mean that some moderation ought to be afforded when considering an appropriate sentence.

165 Turning then to the question of remorse, it is submitted on your behalf that there is, at the very least, an indication that you have some remorse at having committed your offending. In this respect, counsel points to your conduct immediately following the fire, statements made to AB, and aspects of the Mental Health Service Summary.

166 Your counsel asserts that you, at the very least, did attend on Ms Sheahan shortly after she was burned, helping to drag her to the bathroom where you put her under a cold shower. You then took Ms Sheahan outside and put the hose on her. Once outside, your counsel asserts that you apologised to AB and made statements such as 'just send me to jail. It is submitted that the immediacy and spontaneity of these statements indicate a degree of remorse at the time of the offending.

167 Counsel also raises the Mental Health Service Summary completed following the fire, in which you reported consistently low mood and you completed a DSM‑5 PTSD checklist with results suggestive of a diagnosis of PTSD. It is submitted that, although it could be linked to combination of poor sleep, grief, and your knowledge of your current legal circumstances, there is some indication that, together with the plea of guilty, you have expressed grief with respect to your crimes.

168 Finally, addressing the level of pre‑meditation, it is submitted on your behalf that there was a degree of spontaneity involved in the commission of the offence. Confining the meaning of the word 'spontaneity' to the conduct on that particular day, counsel noted that you did not, for example, go out that day to buy a jerrycan full of petrol. Rather, it is submitted, your actions were affected by alcohol and performed in the context of a dynamic situation.

169 Section 5(2) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ('the Act') sets out a series of factors which a court must have regard to in sentencing an offender.

170 It is well accepted that the weight and emphasis given to any one factor by a sentencing court will vary according to the facts and circumstances of each case.[22]

171 As stated before, the maximum penalty for murder is life imprisonment. As a Category 1 offence, a sentence of imprisonment is mandatory unless any of the statutory exemptions in section 5(2GA) of the Act apply.[23] None of the circumstances advanced in this case enliven any of the statutory exceptions.

172 Section 5(2)(ab) of the Act provides that a court must have regard to the standard sentence, if any, for the relevant offence.

173 The offence of murder is a standard sentence offence.[24] The standard sentence for murder is 25 years' imprisonment.[25] Further, the Court must fix a non‑parole period of at least 70 percent of the head sentence, unless it is in the interests of justice not to do so.[26]

174 The standard sentence represents 'the sentence for an offence that, considering only the objective factors affecting the relative seriousness of that offence, is in the middle of the range of seriousness'.[27]

175 I note that the standard sentence is but one of the factors relevant to sentencing that the Court must take into account,[28] and should not be prioritised or given more weight than other sentencing factors but considered a legislative guidepost.[29]

176 Dealing first with the charge of murder, this is the most serious type of criminal conduct brought before the courts. The following discussion concerns how your offending fits within a wider range of offences of this kind. In making conclusions about this matter, I do not seek in any way to diminish the tragedy of Ms Sheahan's death.

177 It should be noted, as a significant factor, that the agreed basis for sentencing is that you were reckless as to the causation of at least really serious injury when you lit the fire. Your counsel concedes, nevertheless, that yours was very serious offending.

178 By some degree of contrast, the prosecution submits that your offending was of the utmost gravity, given that you used the brutality of fire to inflict the death of your victim; that instead of protecting your intimate partner, you were in breach of an intervention order which was designed to protect the safety of Ms Sheahan; that you murdered her in what should have been the safety of her own home; and that her killing occurred in the direct presence of her children with your actions exposing them to danger, as well as causing significant trauma and creating a terrifying ordeal for them. The children who were present pleaded with you not to light the petrol but instead you poured the petrol on their mother while she was helpless and vulnerable on the floor. Further, you later attempted to avoid responsibility for your actions and sought to lay blame on her for what you did. I agree with these submissions. Your offending was a brutal example of the offence of murder.

179 It is also submitted by the prosecution that there was an aspect of premeditation in your killing of Ms Sheahan. Having given this aspect considerable consideration, I am not satisfied to the required standard that you planned her death for any significant time, despite your earlier statements regarding the ease by which you could light members of your family up when they were asleep. However, I do consider that in circumstances where you left the kitchen, went outside and obtained a container of petrol, and then took it inside to the kitchen of the house, as providing you enough time to reflect on what you were going to do with the petrol. You were intending to use the petrol, or the threat of it, as a weapon; otherwise there was no reason to carry a container of highly flammable petrol into the house. You went into the kitchen of the house in an angry state of mind carrying the can of petrol, which, given your previous threat, must have terrified those present. Having previously said that it would be easy to light people up, it is clear that you had turned your mind to the possibility of using fire against the members of your family and it was something that had crossed your mind, even though it may have been said to intimidate and destabilise those that heard you say it. In these circumstances, you then deliberately lit the petrol, but not without taunting your victims. After carefully considering this matter, I accept the submission made on your behalf that your actions were affected by alcohol, although this provides no excuse for what you did.

180 That you later sought to lay blame on Ms Sheahan, asking her why she did not stop you, recalls a common statement these courts hear from men towards their intimate partner female victims suggesting, 'look what you made me do', 'it's really your fault', 'you caused this to happen'. I find this statement of victim‑blaming to be particularly repugnant in this case. I make it clear that Ms Sheahan was entirely blameless and innocent and did not deserve the treatment you meted out to her in any way at all. Male perpetrators of intimate partner violence against females must learn that the kind of behaviour you carried out towards your victim will not be tolerated by our community, and the response of the courts will be to pass appropriately severe sentences.

181 I also take into account that Ms Sheahan's death was protracted, and that she lingered under palliative sedation for a number of days, towards the inevitability of her death. From an early stage after the fire, it was determined by doctors that she could not survive. These were doubtless agonising and highly traumatic days for her family, added to which was the fact that AB was herself elsewhere experiencing her own battle from the injuries you inflicted upon her.

182 Taking these objective factors into account, I agree with the submission that your offending was of the utmost gravity, falling into the worst category of this type of offending.

Your culpability and degree of responsibility

183 Pursuant to section 5(2)(d) of the Act, a court must have regard to an offender's culpability and degree of responsibility.[30]

184 The prosecution submits that, in all the circumstances discussed, your level of culpability, and the degree of recklessness as to the risk of serious injury or death, is objectively of a high order. I cannot disagree with this submission.

185 Your attack on Ms Sheahan was grievously inappropriate and an overwhelmingly disproportionate response to the circumstances. Ms Sheahan was in the kitchen cooking dinner for the family, and she posed no threat to you, when you attacked her in a display of extreme and brutish anger. At the time you poured petrol on her and lit it, you were extremely reckless as to whether you would kill or cause really serious injury to Ms Sheahan. With your basic life experience as an adult, I am quite satisfied you knew that the use of such a dangerous substance as petrol extensively poured and lit on Ms Sheahan would bring about a shocking result, which it did. It is hard to imagine the degree of terror she experienced when you poured petrol on her. A human being should not be exposed to that.

186 I am quite satisfied that the level of your culpability is of a very high order.

187 I acknowledge, and take into account, your plea of guilty.

188 You pleaded guilty after the first trial concluded without verdict. However, you entered your plea of guilty close to the start of the retrial. In my opinion, this was a late plea in the circumstances such that you cannot obtain the benefit of an early plea. However, I do recognise the utilitarian value of the plea, and I will extend to you the benefit of that. The prosecution concedes that you are entitled to an appropriate reduction in the sentence imposed.[31]

189 Remorse is recognised as a mitigatory factor in sentencing, and in some instances can be very powerful in mitigation.[32]

190 The prosecution contends that there is no evidence of genuine remorse. As I have already stated, your counsel submits that there exists some basic or some level of remorse, along with grief with respect to your crimes, and highlighted the factors that were said to establish that state of affairs.

191 Regrettably, given the nature of this crime, I am not satisfied that there exists genuine remorse on your part for what you have done. In my opinion, your acceptance of responsibility has been begrudging at best, which is far from an expression of genuine remorse, or sorrow, for what you have done.

192 Section 5 of the Act sets out that the only purposes for which sentences may be imposed are just punishment, specific and general deterrence, rehabilitation, denunciation, and protection of the community.

193 These purposes apply to each of the offences to which you have pleaded guilty.

General deterrence, denunciation and punishment

194 With respect to the offence of murder, there is no question that considerations of general deterrence, denunciation, and just punishment are primary sentencing purposes in a case concerning the murder of an intimate partner. These factors manifestly apply to your case.

195 Once again, the courts must strongly denounce this type of conduct as completely unacceptable and intolerable within our community. I note the observation of Osborn J in the case of R v Davey, wherein it was said:

It is necessary that a continuing message be sent to persons in emotional relationships that the resort to violence against a partner will not be accepted either by the community or the Court. The sentences of this Court must reflect both the sanctity of human life and the total unacceptability of weak and vicious behaviour towards persons said to be the objects of love.[33]

196 With respect to general deterrence, this factor remains an important consideration in sentencing you. Individuals, particularly men, must be deterred from losing their tempers and committing heinous acts of violence upon their domestic partners.

197 Your offending must be strongly denounced, and I do so.

198 In my opinion, the sentencing purposes of general deterrence, denunciation and just punishment are all factors which must be given primary weight in the assessment of the sentence to be imposed in your case.

Specific deterrence, rehabilitation and protection of the community

199 The material placed before the Court does not address your prospects of rehabilitation in any significant and meaningful way. Your extensive criminal history suggests that your prospects are poor, however I do not regard your prospects for rehabilitation as closed, as you are likely to be a quite different person by the time you are released from what must be a lengthy period spent in custody.

200 The nature of this offending and your extensive criminal history require that I take into account the protection of the community when sentencing you. Given your previous criminal history and the serious crimes, for which you being sentenced, including the subsequent assault of the prison officer, I indicate that I have taken this purpose into account. The protection of the community is an important and necessary factor in my determination of your sentence.

201 In this regard, you are to be sentenced as a serious violent offender on the charge of murder. You have been previously sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a serious violence offence. Your prior convictions include two instances of threats to kill, in 2009, and 2015, and include other examples of actual violence being committed by you.

202 To the extent they are relevant, a number of the factors discussed in the context of murder of Kylie Sheahan similarly apply to the other offences to which you have pleaded guilty before this Court, and I turn to a discussion of these offences now.

203 The offence you committed against AB was a very serious example of recklessly causing serious injury for the reasons I have discussed. I have already detailed the injuries that AB received and do not need to repeat those comments.

204 This offence, too, is a crime of family violence. AB was entitled, and expected you, to care for her as a child. Instead, your actions in burning your wife, AB's mother, resulted in very serious injuries to AB, with profound and lifelong impacts, both physical and emotional. You carried out these acts whilst taunting AB's mother in front of her. This was despicable behaviour to carry out in front of a child, whilst being begged by AB and her sister not to light the petrol.

205 I take into account that your actions in seriously injuring AB were reckless, despite your comments on a previous occasion that you could easily 'light up' members of your family. Knowing, as you must have, the extremely dangerous properties of petrol as a highly flammable substance, you foresaw the broader risks of igniting the fuel and attacking Ms Sheahan inside a house with children present, but you nonetheless went ahead.

206 I take into account your plea of guilty to this offence, adding that there appears a faint glimmer of remorse in your comment to AB that 'it', meaning the fire, was not meant to get her. I also note that you have written a letter to the Court which was handed to me this morning which I have taken into account.

207 However, this was an offence of significant family violence, perpetrated against a child, with dreadful consequences for her. The factors of general deterrence, punishment and denunciation apply to this offending. Your moral culpability for this offence is also high.

208 The matters concerning your background of violence, and your poor prospects of rehabilitation, special deterrence and community protection, similarly apply to this offence in the ways that I have described earlier.

209 With respect to the charge of assaulting Custodial Officer Desira whilst on duty, you committed yet another offence of violence. Your victim sustained two cuts on the outside of his lip and one on the inside of his mouth. He required stitches for the lacerations on his face and later developed bruising and soreness in his jaw which required treatment via pain medication.

210 The offence was committed during your period of remand for the offences against Ms Sheahan and AB. Custodial Officer Desira was acting reasonably in the course of his duty and was entitled to carry out his work in a safe environment. In the lead‑up to the assault, you had been abusive and belligerent and, when you later struck your victim, you again acted in anger and lashed out.

211 Once again, you have demonstrated not only an inability to control yourself, but a habit of resorting to violence when you become angry and frustrated. Given that you will face a lengthy period in custody, you must be deterred from behaving in this manner towards staff in the future.

212 Prison officers are entitled to expect the protection of the courts, and the sentence to be imposed must deter others from behaving similarly and detracting from the continuing maintenance of good order in the prison system.

213 Section 5(2)(b) of the Act requires me to have regard to current sentencing practices for your offences at the time of passing sentence. In respect of the charge of murder, I have had regard to the standard sentence and current sentencing practices for this offence to which you have pleaded guilty, including considering the cases referred to by the parties, and discussed above. I have had regard to current sentencing practices for the other offences before the Court.

214 With respect to the impact of Verdins on the sentences to be passed on all offences, I am prepared to accept that limb 5 of Verdins is enlivened. I have applied a slight moderation of your sentences on the basis that your self‑imposed physical injuries and PTSD may render you more susceptible to ongoing depression and stress other rigors of the custodial environment. In a similar vein, I also accept that as a result of the injuries that you inflicted on yourself, you are likely to find your terms of imprisonment more burdensome than if you did not have these injuries. I have allowed you some slight moderation of your sentences as a result of the effects of these injuries.

215 With respect to the application of the Bugmy principles, I do not accept the argument that the issues said to have a mitigatory impact on your offending are available for you to rely on. The evidence is simply insufficient in this regard, and I accept the submissions of the prosecution on this matter.

216 Further, the principle of parsimony in section 5(3) of the Act must also be applied, and the sentence must not be more severe than is necessary to achieve the purpose or purposes for which it is imposed. I have had regard to this principle and applied it.

217 Finally, I note the effect of sections 11 and 11A(4)(a) of the Act. In all the circumstances, including the submissions of both parties, I consider it appropriate to fix a non‑parole period on the charge of murder.

218 Roland Griffiths, having taken all of these factors into account, for the murder of Kylie Sheahan I sentence you to life imprisonment.

219 Taking into account the necessity of setting a lengthy parole period, I order that you serve 32 years before being eligible for parole.

220 On the charge of recklessly causing serious injury to AB, I sentence you to 10 years' imprisonment.

221 On the charge of assaulting a custodial officer on duty, I sentence you to 2 years' imprisonment.

222 The prosecution has submitted that, should the Court sentence you to the maximum term of life imprisonment, all other offences imposed upon you must be served concurrently with that sentence. I agree with that submission. The sentences imposed on the charges of recklessly causing serious injury and assaulting a custodial officer on duty shall be served concurrently with the sentence imposed on the charge of murder.

223 I have imposed on you a less severe sentence than I otherwise would have because you have pleaded guilty to these offences.

224 Pursuant to section 6AAA of the Act, I declare that but for your pleas of guilty, I would have sentenced you to life imprisonment with a non‑parole period of 35 years; on the charge of recklessly causing serious injury, 12 years with a non‑parole period of 8 years; and for the assault on a prison officer, 3 years' imprisonment with a non‑parole period of 2 years.

225 I further declare that that you have served 1,352 days of pre‑sentence detention, not including this day. No pre‑sentence detention is available to be calculated on the charge of assaulting the custodial officer.

[1] Hopkins v The Queen [2015] VSCA 174 [28].

[2] Noori v The Queen [2021] VSCA 46.

[4] DPP v Pualic [2025] VSCA 178 [80] (citations omitted).

[5] DPP v Paulino [2017] VSC 794 [11] (citation omitted).

[6] Barrett v The Queen [2010] VSCA 133; (2010) 27 VR 522, 528 (Maxwell P and Neave JA).

[7] DPP v Lee [2025] VSC 376.

[8] R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269, 276.

[9] DPP v Lindemann [2024] VSC 220.

[10] DPP v Basham [2023] VSC 655.

[11] DPP v Sako [2024] VSC 77.

[13] Stone v The Queen [2021] VSCA 186.

[16] DPP v Clover [2019] VSC 123.

[18] R v Kilic [2016] HCA 48; (2016) 259 CLR 256 [18]-[19].

[19] R v Chamberlain [2001] VSCA 159 [15].

[20] Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571.

[21] Smith v The Queen [2018] VSCA 208.

[22] See, eg, Wong v The Queen [2001] HCA 64; (2001) 207 CLR 584, 612-613 [77]-[78] (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ); Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357, 373-375 [37]-[39] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ); Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120, 128-129 [18]-[19] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).

[23] Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(2G).

[24] Ibid ss 5A-5B.

[25] Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 3(2)(b).

[26] Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 11A(4).

[27] Ibid s 5A(1)(b).

[28] Ibid s 5B(2)(a).

[29] R v Brown [2018] VSC 742 [65]-[68].

[30] Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(2)(e).

[31] Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(2)(e).

[32] Ibid s 5(2C).

[33] R v Davey [2006] VSC 173 [25].