Crosland v North Sydney Council

In that case, the learned Assessor concluded at p 18/19 that the proposed development was properly categorised as a "health centre" and hence for the permissible purpose of "hospital" as defined by the relevant planning instrument (in identical terms to the definition of "hospital" contained in the LEP).

In reaching that ultimate conclusion, the Assessor had distinguished the earlier decision of Perrignon J in Woollahra Municipal Council v Carr (1982) 47LGRA 105 where his Honour had held that a development involving a wide ranging dental practice providing total dental care to its patients could not be properly regarded as a "health centre".

At 109, his Honour had observed that (t)he meaning of the words "health centre" in the definition of "hospital" "presents difficulties" and "(w)hatever may be the precise limits of that meaning, I do not think that the activities which are presently under consideration fall within those limits".

It was because the development in Foote went beyond the concept of a medical practice by proposing "a mixed use" by medical practitioners and health care professionals…. "in order to offer a holistic approach to medical treatment" that the decision in Carr could be legitimately distinguished.

In Foote, the learned Assessor also considered some dictionary definitions of "health centre" in concluding that the concept of "health centre" did not involve as an essential ingredient "live in" the accommodation of patients.

In Peterson and Warta Holdings Pty Ltd, Talbot J, in the course of interpreting a development consent, concluded that it had permitted the use of the premises as a "health centre" within the definition of "hospital" (again in identical terms to the definition contained in the LEP).

The approved development in that case involved a new three storey building comprising carparking on the ground floor, two surgery rooms, a waiting room and childrens' play area with ancillary facilities on the first floor and another surgery and waiting room and two bedroom dwelling on the second floor.

In the course of concluding that the approved development was a health centre, his Honour said:

The council seeks to infer that because all of the other specified uses referred to in the definition of hospital involve the concept of a facility providing accommodation it was intended that a health centre should fall into that same category. While, arguably, there may be the common element of accommodation in the other specified uses identified within the definition they also have the common element of providing some form of medical care (see Tankard v Albury City Council 49LGRA 69). The Oxford Dictionary refers to a health centre as a local headquarters of medical services, spec., a local centre for a group practice. The use of three surgeries for doctors together with ancillary rooms and facilities can be as compatible with a residential area as a hospital in the normal sense, a nursing home or aged persons home or a sanatorium. In planning terms, it would be consistent to exclude such a use from the category of commercial premises which are prohibited in the residential zone.

These earlier decisions of the Court are of considerable illustrative assistance, since each case was dealing with similar statutory provisions to the relevant provisions of the LEP in the present case and with a similar small scale development, as is proposed in the present case.

However, ultimately, the question of the true meaning of the term "health centre" is one of statutory construction in which dictionary meanings have a legitimate role but not a determinative role: see Provincial Insurance Australia Pty Ltd v Consolidated Wool Products Pty Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 541 at 560/561 per Mahoney JA and House of Peace Pty Ltd v Bankstown City Council (2000) 106 LGERA 440 at 447 per Mason P.

In the interests of economy, I would confine quotation from the illuminating judgment of Mahoney JA in Provincial Insurance to the first two paragraphs of the extended passage cited, where his Honour states:

Dictionaries are not a substitute for the judicial determination of the interpretation and then construction of statutes and other documents: Life Insurance Co of Australia Ltd v Phillips (1925) 36 CLR 60 at 78 per Isaacs J. The meaning of the words used in a statute or document is not merely the sum of the individual meanings of the words used, ascertained from dictionaries. To adapt the much cited comment of Holmes J, a word is the skin of a living thought, and it is the thought which the court must ascertain and apply.

In doing this, it is, of course, necessary first to determine what is the ordinary or natural meaning of the words used because primarily it is from that that the intention of the legislator or of the parties is to be ascertained: see M P Metals Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1968) 117 CLR 631 at 634; Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297 at 304-305; Tullamore Bowling & Citizens Club Ltd v Lander [1984] 2 NSWLR 32 at 53. But that meaning is the ordinary usage of society: Shore v Wilson (1842) 9 Cl & Fin 355 at 527; 8 ER 450 at 518 per Coleridge J and R v Peters (1886) LR 16 QBD 636 at 641. And it is to be taken from the judge's understanding of the sense in which words are used: see, eg, NSW Associated Blue Metal Quarries Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1956) 94 CLR 509 at 514 per Kitto J. In Midland Railway Co v Robinson (1889) LR 15 App Cas 19, Lord Macnaghten (albeit in dissent) said (at 35) that, in considering the meaning of a term such as mines and minerals, the opinion of particular judges may be a safer guide than any definitions or illustrations to be found in dictionaries.

The present case, in my opinion, is an example of a word (or expression), namely " health centre " which has gained a modern day meaning or signification which demonstrates that the dictionary meanings referred to, offer only limited assistance.

In my opinion, the proposed development accords with the current day understanding and experience of the existence in our community of medical centres or health centres, being places offering an extensive range of professional services of medical and health care to the local community.

The range of such services has not, however, become standardised. Nor has there emerged any concept of a minimum range in the variety of such services. Such matters are necessarily variable depending upon the scale of the medical or health centre.

However, what clearly distinguishes the modern day medical or health centre from, for example, a general medical practitioner's practice of a group practice of general medical practitioners, is the fact that there is available at the one place (ie the medical or health centre) a variety of specialised medical or health services.

It is obvious that the proposed development will provide only a small range of medical or health services within the overall spectrum of services that nowadays are commonly provided at medical or health centres.

However though undoubtedly small, I think the proposal will provide a sufficient range of medical and health services as to properly and reasonably qualify its existence as a medical or health centre. This conclusion is entirely consistent with the conclusions that were reached by the Court in the two earlier cases that I have cited and discussed for illustrative purposes.

Whereas it is not appropriate for the Court to attempt to prescribe the range or the variety of medical and health services required for a development to qualify as a medical or health centre (the Court's interpretative task being more descriptive of such activity as it manifests itself in our modern day community, than prescriptive of what should be provided by that activity) it is entirely legitimate for the Council as the local planning authority to insist upon the continuing existence and essentiality of such a variety of medical and health services, whilever the LEP distinguishes (as it currently does) between different categories of development providing various forms of medical or health services.

As I have earlier noted, the LEP defines a number of purposes of development all of which are concerned with the provision of medical or health services eg hospitals (with its several types of different services including "health centres") professional consulting rooms, resident medical practices and commercial premises. More importantly, for present purposes, the LEP limits the type of medical health service that may be established in the Residential 2C Zone to hospitals (including "health centres"). It is this limiting and discriminating feature of the LEP which justifies the insistence that a proposed development that provides a range of medical and health services (and thereby qualifies as a health centre according to modern day understanding and experience) must maintain that distinctive.

The Council argues that because some of the proposed medical and health services will be provided on a sessional basis, this feature disqualifies the proposal from being properly categorised as a health centre.

In my opinion, this feature of the proposal is not disqualifying per se, because it simply reflects the manner in which even very large medical centres generally provide medical specialist services.

To some extent, I think the provision of medical and health services on a sessional basis in the present proposed development is to be understood as a function of the small size of the health centre (with a floor space of 130 m2). However, I do not think these facts in combination, disqualify the proposal from being properly categorised as a health centre, albeit a small one providing a limited variety of medical and health services.

For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that the proposed development is properly categorised as a "health centre" and hence falls within the permissible purpose "hospital" in terms of the LEP as it applies to the Residential 2C zone.

Accordingly, I would order that the question whether the medical consulting rooms component of the proposed development is for a prohibited purpose of development in terms of the LEP be answered in the negative.

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29. It is obvious that the proposed development will provide only a small range of medical or health services within the overall spectrum of services that nowadays are commonly provided at medical or health centres.

30. However though undoubtedly small, I think the proposal will provide a sufficient range of medical and health services as to properly and reasonably qualify its existence as a medical or health centre. This conclusion is entirely consistent with the conclusions that were reached by the Court in the two earlier cases that I have cited and discussed for illustrative purposes.

31. Whereas it is not appropriate for the Court to attempt to prescribe the range or the variety of medical and health services required for a development to qualify as a medical or health centre (the Court's interpretative task being more descriptive of such activity as it manifests itself in our modern day community, than prescriptive of what should be provided by that activity) it is entirely legitimate for the Council as the local planning authority to insist upon the continuing existence and essentiality of such a variety of medical and health services, whilever the LEP distinguishes (as it currently does) between different categories of development providing various forms of medical or health services.

32. As I have earlier noted, the LEP defines a number of purposes of development all of which are concerned with the provision of medical or health services eg hospitals (with its several types of different services including "health centres") professional consulting rooms, resident medical practices and commercial premises. More importantly, for present purposes, the LEP limits the type of medical health service that may be established in the Residential 2C Zone to hospitals (including "health centres"). It is this limiting and discriminating feature of the LEP which justifies the insistence that a proposed development that provides a range of medical and health services (and thereby qualifies as a health centre according to modern day understanding and experience) must maintain that distinctive.

33. The Council argues that because some of the proposed medical and health services will be provided on a sessional basis, this feature disqualifies the proposal from being properly categorised as a health centre.

34. In my opinion, this feature of the proposal is not disqualifying per se, because it simply reflects the manner in which even very large medical centres generally provide medical specialist services.

35. To some extent, I think the provision of medical and health services on a sessional basis in the present proposed development is to be understood as a function of the small size of the health centre (with a floor space of 130 m2). However, I do not think these facts in combination, disqualify the proposal from being properly categorised as a health centre, albeit a small one providing a limited variety of medical and health services.

36. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that the proposed development is properly categorised as a "health centre" and hence falls within the permissible purpose "hospital" in terms of the LEP as it applies to the Residential 2C zone.

37. Accordingly, I would order that the question whether the medical consulting rooms component of the proposed development is for a prohibited purpose of development in terms of the LEP be answered in the negative.