State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s9, s 87, s 87(1), s 87(2), s 87(3), s 88, s 88(1), s 88(2), s 89, Div 5

Strata Titles Act 1985 (WA), s 47(2), s 47(3), s 47(5), s 118, s 137, s 199(3), Sch 5, cl 30(1)

Chew and Director General of the Department of Education and Training [2006] WASAT 248

Couper and Crugnale [2025] WASAT 140

McLerie and Koleszko [2014] WASAT 160 (S)

Medical Board of Western Australia and Kyi [2009] WASAT 22

Western Australian Planning Commission v Questdale Holdings Pty Ltd [2016] WASCA 32

1. The decision in Couper and Crugnale [2025] WASAT 140 (the substantive decision) was reported by the Tribunal on 9 December 2025. The substantive decision should be read in conjunction with these reasons for decision.
2. The first applicant, Ms Couper made an application under s 47(3) of the Strata Titles Act 1985 (WA) (ST Act) seeking the enforcement of the scheme by-laws against the first respondent, Ms Crugnale (original application). Later, Ms Beacham was added as the second applicant. The original application was partly successful in that the Tribunal made two declarations under s 199(3) of the ST Act. First, the Tribunal declared that Ms Crugnale had contravened Sch 2 by-laws 1(2) and Sch 2 by-law 2(a), 2(c) and 2(d) by parking, standing or otherwise leaving the caravan with registration NGN 13181 and other items on the common property from about 2019 until about September 2025 when she sold the caravan. Second, the Tribunal declared that Ms Crugnale contravened Sch 2 by-law 15A by allowing Lot 1 to be used for short-stay occupation for period of less than 60 days from about 2021 until by-law 15A was repealed by special resolution passed by the strata company in or about November 2025. The Tribunal otherwise dismissed the original application.
3. After Ms Couper filed her original application with the Tribunal, on 29 October 2024 she filed further documents, including a document which included a statement that Ms Crugnale be required to reimburse her for 'legal fees and strata specialist consultations, with the funds being allocated to the strata account'. Further, in response to an order made by the Tribunal on 15 November 2024 Ms Couper filed with the Tribunal on 28 November 2024, a written statement of the specific orders sought (listed numerically) and the particulars of the basis on which each of those orders is sought. One of the orders sought by Ms Couper is order 7 which provides as follows:[1]

Order 7

It is requested that [Ms Crugnale] submits a formal letter of apology to the [Tribunal] in a time they deem fair, which will also be presented to all owners of 1 Wilton Place. The letter must address and apologise for her behaviour, including breaches of the bylaws, and outline steps she will take to ensure compliance moving forward. This apology will serve as [a] formal record, which may be referenced should similar breaches occur in the future.

Justification:

I have incurred substantial personal costs, exceeding $4,000, in seeking resolution for these ongoing issues. This includes legal fees for consulting strata lawyers, obtaining guidance from strata specialists, registering with the Strata Community Association of Western Australia (SCAWA), and meeting with other strata managers to discuss and implement effective measures.

...

1. I accept by the above statements that Ms Couper seeks an order for her costs in the proceeding.
2. On 6 January 2026, orders were made by the Tribunal for Ms Couper to file a schedule of the costs claimed in sufficient detail to enable the Tribunal to assess and fix any costs which might be awarded, together with any supporting documents upon which she wishes to rely and written submissions addressing the basis upon which she contends costs should be awarded and the quantum of costs claimed. Orders were also made for the respondents to file any written submissions opposing Ms Couper's application for costs.
3. On 8 January 2026 Ms Couper filed her application for costs claiming legal fees, filing fees, travelling and other expenses and losses totalling $5,477.70 against Ms Crugnale. In addition, Ms Couper seeks an order requiring Ms Crugnale to pay $3,000 to The Owners of One Wilton Place Strata Plan 5978 (strata company) for costs that Ms Couper says arose solely as a result of Ms Crugnale's private commercial use of her Lot 1 which would not have been incurred but for Ms Crugnale's conduct.
4. On 3 March 2026 Ms Crugnale filed her opposition to Ms Couper's application for costs.
5. The strata company did not file any written submissions.
6. The only issue for my determination is whether, in the particular circumstances or realities of this case, it is fair and reasonable that the party claiming her costs, Ms Couper, should be reimbursed for the expenses and losses claimed, and if so, in what amount? Ms Couper has the burden or onus of establishing that it is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of the case for her to be awarded an amount against Ms Crugnale.
7. As the proceeding was commenced in the Tribunal under the ST Act in the Tribunal on 18 October 2024, that is after the major amendments to the ST Act effective from 1 May 2020, the provisions of the ST Act apply to the determination of Ms Couper's application for costs (cl 30(1) of Sch 5 of the ST Act).[2]
8. For the reasons set out below, Ms Couper's application for costs is unsuccessful. The result is that the application for costs is dismissed. The orders are set out later in these reasons (see below following [46]).

1. Ms Couper claims costs of $5,477.70 as follows:[3]

Two return flights to attend Tribunal hearings in person

Loss of income due to days taken off work to attend Tribunal hearings

Time and effort prepping for Tribunal ($30 x 20 hours)

1. In her application for costs, Ms Couper contends, in summary:[4]
   • the costs she incurred were entirely avoidable had Ms Crugnale acted in accordance with her duties as a member of the council and maintained a working knowledge of the ST Act. During the proceeding Ms Crugnale denied having such knowledge, despite her role requiring her to act with due care, skill and diligence under s 118 and s 137 of the ST Act. Ms Crugnale's failure to comply with these statutory obligations directly resulted in significant and unnecessary expense including travel to attend Tribunal hearings and taking avoidable time away from work; and
   • Ms Crugnale failed on multiple occasions to properly serve documents which caused further procedural delays and unnecessarily prolonged the proceeding, despite being directed on multiple occasions to comply with procedural requirements.
2. In addition, Ms Couper seeks an order that Ms Crugnale be required to pay to the strata company $3,000 for costs incurred by the strata company in connection with Ms Crugnale's use of her Lot 1 for short-stay (Airbnb) accommodation. Ms Couper says that the strata company was required to expend time and resources responding to complaints, addressing compliance issues, obtaining advice, managing the matter as it escalated, and dealing with the increased wear and tear on the common property associated with the short-stay use of Lot 1 beyond what would reasonably be expected from ordinary residential occupation.
3. Ms Couper submits that it would be unjust and inequitable for the costs of $3,000 be borne by the strata company and, by extension, the other lot owners, none of whom derived any benefit from the short-stay use. In such circumstances, Ms Couper says the only fair and reasonable outcome is that those costs be borne by the party, Ms Crugnale, whose conduct caused them.[5]

Ms Crugnale's position opposing any order for costs

1. Ms Crugnale opposes any order for costs. The main reasons for this are in summary:[6]
   • the original application consisted of several accusations and vague orders, not only directed at her but also at other members of the council and at the strata manager;
   • the legal advice was directed to the strata company and not to her. Further, the advice was sought by Ms Couper immediately after she (Ms Crugnale) was given written permission by the strata company to park her (then) caravan on the common property. Also, the minutes of the council meeting record that three members of the council did not want to go down a legal path. The legal advice was sought by Ms Couper 10 months after she commenced the proceeding in the Tribunal;
   • Mr Munday is not a lawyer and in any event his invoice does not state the subject of his advice and whether it pertains to the proceeding in the Tribunal;
   • neither she nor the strata company acted unreasonably, inappropriately, untruthfully or without merit. Rather, Ms Couper has acted unreasonably, inappropriately, untruthful, frivolously and vexatiously;
   • she did not ignore any breaches of the scheme by-laws as there were no written notices issued to her by the strata company under s 47(2) of the ST Act;
   • Ms Couper could have attended the hearings by videoconference to avoid the costs of flying to Perth from Kalgoorlie and taking time off work;
   • while she accepts that she did not properly serve documents on Ms Couper, she corrected this as soon as she was made aware of the correct procedure and any delay in doing this did not cause a delay in the proceeding;
   • there is no evidence that the strata company incurred any costs in connection with Lot 1 being used for short-stay accommodation. There are other lots in the strata complex available for short-stay accommodation. The financial statements for the strata company confirm that the strata company did not incur any costs; and
   • she has spent in excess of 100 hours of her own time in regards to the proceeding in the Tribunal.

1. Division 5 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act) is comprised of s 87 to s 89 and is headed 'Costs'.
2. As a starting point, each party should expect to pay their own costs in the proceeding before the Tribunal in circumstances where there is a genuine dispute under the ST Act. However, that does not exclude the possibility of an award of costs by the Tribunal: s 87(1) of the SAT Act. For example, where a party conducts itself in such a way to unnecessarily prolong the hearing or acts unreasonably or inappropriately, or where a matter has been brought vexatiously or for an improper purpose, the Tribunal may decide that the justice of the case supports moving away from the starting point.[7]
3. The power for the Tribunal to make an order for one party to pay all or any of another party's costs which includes an amount to compensate the other party for any expenses, loss, inconvenience or embarrassment resulting from the proceeding or the matter because of which the proceeding was brought is found in s 87(2) and s 87(3) of the SAT Act, subject to the contrary in the relevant enabling Act. In this case, the enabling Act is the ST Act and it does not limit the Tribunal's powers to award costs (see above at [10]).
4. If the Tribunal makes an order for the payment of costs and does not fix the amount of costs, that amount is to be assessed or settled in accordance with the rules (s 89 of the SAT Act).
5. The leading authority on the exercise of the discretion conferred upon the Tribunal to make orders for the payment of costs to a party is the decision of the Court of Appeal in Western Australian Planning Commission v Questdale Holdings Pty Ltd [2016] WASCA 32 (Questdale).
6. In considering the exercise of the discretion conferred upon the Tribunal under the SAT Act, Murphy JA made the following observations in Questdale at [49] to [62]:
   1. Although s 87(2) does not in terms say that the discretion is to be exercised if it is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case to do so, the judicial nature of the exercise and the scheme of the SAT Act indicates that, broadly speaking, that is the legislative intention.
   2. ... the 'important principle commonly referred to as the "usual order as to costs", under which the successful party is prima facie entitled to his or her costs, has no application given the presumptive position or starting point under s 87(1) of the SAT Act that each party is to bear its own costs'.
   3. Section 87(2) is to be construed in the context that the legal rationale for an order for costs is not to punish the person against whom the order is made, but to compensate or reimburse the person in whose favour it is made. That rationale is evident in s 87(3) of the SAT Act. Accordingly, even in a statutory context where the presumptive position is that no costs will be ordered, generally speaking, the question is whether, in the particular circumstances of the case, it is fair and reasonable that a party should be reimbursed for the costs it incurred. The onus is on the party seeking an order in its favour.

1. ... the nature of the dispute, ... is a relevant consideration.
2. ... every party to proceedings before the Tribunal, is, ... taken to be cognisant of the Tribunal's objectives in s 9 of the SAT Act. ... it will be relevant to consider whether and to what extent the [party] can establish that the [other party's] conduct in connection with the proceedings has impaired the attainment of the Tribunal's objectives to have the proceedings determined fairly and in accordance with the substantial merits, with as little formality and technicality as possible, and in a way which minimises the costs to the parties.
3. Nevertheless, the mere fact that a [party] ultimately fails on some contention or contentions advanced at [the hearing] would not, in itself, signify that it has acted inconsistently with the objectives in s 9. That is particularly so in the context that under s 46, s 47 and s 48 of the SAT Act, plainly unmeritorious claims, or claims made or pursued in circumstances which, broadly speaking, may be characterised as involving misconduct, may be screened out before the final hearing. The Tribunal in such circumstances may act on its own volition or on the application of a party.

1. The nature of the dispute for determination, ... will be a factor in the exercise of discretion under s 87(2) ... That is not in recognition of a rule that costs follow the event. Rather, it is a recognition that, generally speaking, the legislative purpose will be served by 'the claimant ... [receiving] his reasonable costs of obtaining the compensation that is, ex hypothesi, his due'. Even there, however, it would remain relevant to consider whether it would be fair and reasonable for the 'successful' [party] to be deprived of its costs, or part of its costs, in all the circumstances of the case, including having regard to the matters referred to earlier.
2. The above observations proceed on the basis that there is no offer that the Tribunal is obliged to consider pursuant to s 87(5) of the SAT Act and r 42 of the SAT Rules. Where r 42 applies, the weight to be given to that mandatory consideration will be a matter for the Tribunal in each case. On the one hand, its importance as a factor is informed by the evident legislative intent that, where possible, parties to proceedings should endeavour to consider settlement ...

1. The above observations are not intended to provide an exhaustive statement of the considerations which should, or may or may not, be taken into account under s 87(2) of the SAT Act in proceedings[.]
2. In McLerie and Koleszko [2014] WASAT 160 (S) (McLerie) the Tribunal set out additional factors that might contribute to the Tribunal making of a costs order as follows at [3]:

1. where a party conducts itself unreasonably, particularly where the conduct leads to unnecessary costs to the other party;
2. where a party has conducted itself inappropriately, particularly where the conduct leads to unnecessary costs to the other party;

1. where credibility of evidence is at the heart of a matter;

1. where the application undermines the integrity of proceedings under the relevant Act;
2. where the case is weak, being incredible or implausible or obviously unmeritorious;
3. where a party has to embark in proceedings to vindicate its clear contractual entitlement;
4. the circumstances of the case having regard to the above, or other factors, are such that the justice of the case supports moving away from the initial position that each party should bear their own costs;

1. The above observations from Questdale and summary from McLerie is a non-exhaustive range of factors and there may be other relevant factors for the Tribunal to take into account which point to the justice of the case requiring an award of costs.
2. In conclusion, the Tribunal takes a pragmatic approach in framing the costs order and this will naturally involve an impression and evaluation of not only the importance of the matters but also the time occupied and ambit of the submissions. However, it is unrealistic to expect mathematical precision in deciding what amount to award for costs.
3. I turn now to consider the circumstances of this case including the nature of the dispute and the conduct of the parties in order to determine whether or not it is fair and reasonable in all of the circumstances or realities of this case to exercise the Tribunal's discretionary power under s 87(2) and s 87(3) of the SAT Act to make an award for costs in favour of Ms Couper, and if so, in what amount.

1. A relevant consideration to the Tribunal's exercise of its discretion to make an order for costs is the nature of the dispute. In considering the nature of the dispute this will require a consideration of the history of the dispute as well as the complexity of the dispute.
2. According to Ms Crugnale, the dispute between herself and Ms Couper dates back to September 2023 when there was an incident with the broken plastic crate sticking out of the yellow recycle bin (refer to the substantive decision at [10]).
3. Ms Couper's original application raised a number of complex issues concerning the use of common property including the parking, standing or otherwise leaving a caravan and other items on the common property, the making available of a lot for short-stay occupation, the proper interpretation of scheme by-laws to do with short-stay occupation and storage of inflammable liquids and other materials as well as the enforcement of scheme by-laws. This is in circumstances where the strata company had not issued a written notice under s 47(2) of the ST Act to Ms Crugnale for the alleged contravention of a scheme by-law. Accordingly, in my view, it was reasonable for Ms Couper to bring the proceeding in the Tribunal.
4. It was also open and appropriate, in my view, for Ms Crugnale to participate in the proceeding and to explain her actions in relation to the caravan issue, the language/behaviour issue, the short-stay occupation issue and the inflammable materials issue. The substantive decision, where Ms Couper was successful in having declarations made by the Tribunal but unsuccessful in that no orders were made by the Tribunal made against Ms Crugnale supports the position that it was entirely appropriate for Ms Crugnale to not concede any of the issues.

1. The conduct of parties to the proceeding is also a relevant consideration to the Tribunal's exercise of its discretion to make an order for costs. In this regard, it is necessary to consider, whether, and to what extent a party has established that the conduct of the other party has impaired the attainment of the Tribunal's objectives as set out in s 9 of the SAT Act (Questdale at [54]) which include having the proceeding determined fairly and in accordance with the substantial merits, speedily and with as little formality and technicality as possible, and in a way which minimises the costs to the parties.
2. All parties in this proceeding are self-represented.
3. Ms Couper was, ultimately, unsuccessful in having orders made by the Tribunal under s 47(5) of the ST Act against Ms Crugnale that she breached a number of the scheme by-laws. However, Ms Couper was successful in that the Tribunal declared under s 199(3) of ST Act that Ms Crugnale had contravened some of the scheme by-laws by:

(a) parking, standing or otherwise leaving her (then) caravan on the common property from about 2019 until about September 2025 when she sold her caravan; and

(b) allowing her Lot 1 to be used for short-stay occupation for period of less than 60 days from about 2021 until about November 2025 when scheme by-law 15A was repealed by the strata company.

1. Such declarations made by the Tribunal, do not in themselves, without more, signify that Ms Crugnale acted inconsistently with the objectives of the Tribunal as set out in s 9 of the SAT Act.
2. I accept Ms Crugnale's position that it was only in September 2023 that she was made aware that she needs to have written permission from the strata company to have her caravan on the common property. Ms Crugnale's evidence is that after seeking approval at the AGM held on 25 October 2023, Ms Crugnale received written confirmation on 12 December 2023 from the strata manager that the majority of the council approved her request for her to continue to park on the common property and therefore she did so (refer to substantive decision at [58] to [76]). It was reasonable, in my view, in the circumstances of this case, for Ms Crugnale to have requested the approval and then to act on the advice (albeit misguided) provided by the strata manager. Similarly, in relation to the short-stay occupation issue, it was reasonable, in my view, in the circumstances of this case, for Ms Crugnale to rely on the advice (albeit misguided) provided by the strata manager.
3. Ms Couper generally complied with the orders of the Tribunal in a timely manner and thereby assisted the Tribunal to achieve its objective of acting speedily in the resolution of the proceeding and to minimise the costs to the parties.
4. Similarly, Ms Crugnale generally complied with the orders of the Tribunal in a timely manner. In regards to Ms Couper's assertion that Ms Crugnale failed to properly serve documents causing unnecessarily delay in the proceeding, Mr Crugnale readily accepts that as soon as she was made aware of not having properly served the other parties, she attended to giving proper service. A party's compliance with timeframes for the proper serving of documents ordinarily assists the Tribunal to act speedily in the resolution of disputes. On this occasion, I do not consider that the late proper service of documents by Ms Crugnale interfered with the Tribunal's objectives in s 9 of the SAT Act.
5. In conclusion, in my view the conduct of both Ms Couper and Ms Crugnale did not impede the attainment of the Tribunal's objectives as set out in s 9 of the SAT Act.

1. As already stated, and repeated here, in assessing an application for costs, the Tribunal takes a relatively broadbrush approach as a matter of impression and without any attempt at mathematic precision. In doing so, the costs awarded are compensatory and not punitive.
2. The fact that a party is unsuccessful, or fails on a contention advanced during the course of the hearing, does not in itself signify that the party has acted inconsistently with the objectives of s 9 of the SAT Act or automatically supports the making of a costs order unfavourable to that party. This is because the presumptive position is that each party will bear its own costs in a proceeding before the Tribunal (s 87(1) of the SAT Act). Further, it is not the task of the Tribunal to evaluate each argument raised by a party seeking costs and to award costs if a particular argument is ultimately successful.
3. The nature of the dispute is relevant to the Tribunal's exercise of discretion under s 87(2) and s 87(3) of the SAT Act. In this proceeding, a dispute arose in relation to the alleged contravention of a number of the scheme by-laws, in particular concerning the use of common property and having available a lot for short-stay occupation. Ms Couper points to Ms Crugnale's failure to act in accordance with her duties as a member of council and that Ms Crugnale does not maintain a working knowledge of the ST Act as a reason for an award of costs in her favour, while Ms Crugnale contends that the strata company did not issue any written notice to her under s 47(2) of the ST Act alleging that she was in breach of the scheme by-laws and that she relied on the advice (albeit misguided) of the strata manager that she could continue to park her caravan on the common property and that she could allow her lot to be available for short-stay accommodation meant that she acted reasonably in contesting the original application made by Ms Couper.
4. The dispute did raise legal issues that were complex in nature, in particular about the use of common property and the proper construction of scheme by-laws. It was therefore open, in my view, for Ms Crugnale to properly ventilate them in defence of her position. The fact that Ms Couper was partially successful in the proceeding, where the Tribunal made declarations under s 199(3) of the ST Act signalling disapproval of Ms Crugnale's conduct in relation to her caravan and the use of Lot 1 for short-stay accommodation, supports a finding that Ms Couper had a reasonable basis to make her original application and that her case was not without merit.
5. I find Ms Crugnale did not act unreasonably or inappropriately in the conduct of the proceeding so as to impair the attainment of the Tribunal's objectives in s 9 of the SAT Act. There is a suggestion by Ms Crugnale that Ms Couper acted unreasonably, inappropriately, untruthfully, frivolously and vexatiously. However, Ms Crugnale provided no evidence to support these assertions. In my view, no party unnecessarily prolonged the proceeding.
6. Finally, in regard to the claim by Ms Couper that Ms Crugnale should be ordered to pay $3,000 to the strata company there is no evidence before the Tribunal that the strata company incurred any costs in connection with Ms Crugnale making her Lot 1 available for short-stay accommodation. The strata company made no application for costs and did not file any written submissions. Consequently, I am unable to consider Ms Couper's claim in respect of the $3,000 any further.
7. In the circumstances of this proceeding, I do not consider it would be fair and reasonable for Ms Couper to be reimbursed for any of the expenses or losses she has claimed for herself or for the strata company. Ms Couper has not demonstrated that the Tribunal should exercise the discretion conferred on it by s 87(2) and s 87(3) of the SAT Act. The result is Ms Couper's application for costs is dismissed.

1. I am not persuaded to depart from the Tribunal's starting position that each party should bear its costs, nor that it would be fair and reasonable for a costs order to be made in Ms Couper's favour. The application for costs is therefore dismissed.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.

[1] Statement of Orders sought filed on 28 November 2024 of Ms Couper and Ms Beacham.

[2] Historically, prior to 1 May 2020, the Tribunal could not make an order for costs under the ST Act except in two circumstances. The first circumstance arose where the applicant was given leave by the Tribunal to amend their application to compensate persons (for example, the respondent) for time unnecessarily spent in connection with the application. The only other circumstance was concerning a variation to unit entitlements. As a result of the major amendments to the ST Act, which came into operation on 1 May 2020 under the Strata Titles Amendment Act 2018 (WA), the Tribunal is now not so limited in making orders for the payment of costs under the ST Act.

[3] Ms Couper's application for costs filed on 8 January 2026.

[6] Ms Crugnale's written submissions filed on 3 March 2026.

[7] See for example Chew and Director General of the Department of Education and Training [2006] WASAT 248 at [85] and Medical Board of Western Australia and Kyi [2009] WASAT 22 at [73] to [74].