Where respondent solicitor in OR 7/21 found guilty of professional misconduct - where parties agreed that he should be publicly reprimanded - where applicant sought orders recommending his removal from the roll - whether respondent solicitor is permanently unfit to practise - whether the tribunal should, alternatively, order that he not be granted a practising certificate for two years

Legislation cited: ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008, ss 7, 7A

Legal Profession Act 2006, ss 37, 384, 425, 433

Subordinate

Legislation cited: ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Procedures Rules 2024, rule 71

Cases cited Commissioner for Fair Trading v Tasic [2023] ACAT 26

Council of Law Society of Australian Capital Territory v Giles [2020] ACTSCFC 1

Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v Legal Practitioner 201822 (Alveer Singh) [2019] ACAT 27

Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner 20214 [2022] ACAT 33

Council of the Law Society of the ACT v LP 202103 (Jeffrey Silk) [2021] ACAT 105

Law Society v Ford (No 2) [2024] ACTSCFC 2

Re B [1981] 2 NSWLR 372

Date of Reasons for Decision: 26 September 2025

COUNCIL OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

The Tribunal orders in proceedings OR 6/2021:

1. The respondent is publicly reprimanded.
2. A local practising certificate is not to be granted to the respondent before the end of a period of two years commencing on 1 July 2025.
3. The respondent is to pay the applicant's costs on a party and party basis, as agreed or assessed, in accordance with Orders 4 and 5 below.
4. The parties are to notify the Tribunal as to whether they have reached an agreement as to the amount of those costs by 26 November 2025 and, if so, they are to notify the Tribunal of the amount agreed by the same date.
5. If the parties have not informed the Tribunal that they have reached an agreement as to costs by 28 November 2025 and no application has been made for an extension of time to reach an agreement on costs by that date, the registrar is to assess the applicant's costs on a party and party basis.

COUNCIL OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

The Tribunal orders in proceedings OR 7/2021:

1. The respondent is publicly reprimanded.
2. A local practising certificate is not to be granted to the respondent before the end of a period of two years commencing on 1 July 2025.
3. The respondent is to pay the applicant's costs on a party and party basis, as agreed or assessed, in accordance with Orders 4 and 5 below.
4. The parties are to notify the Tribunal as to whether they have reached an agreement as to the amount of those costs by 26 November 2025 and, if so, they are to notify the Tribunal of the amount agreed by the same date.
5. If the parties have not informed the Tribunal that they have reached an agreement as to costs by 28 November 2025 and no application has been made for an extension of time to reach an agreement on costs by that date, the registrar is to assess the applicant's costs on a party and party basis.

1. These are disciplinary proceedings brought by the applicant (the Law Society Council) against two individuals who were solicitors at the time of the relevant conduct. They have been given the pseudonyms LP202106 and LP202107. In these reasons, we will refer to the LP202106 as the Vendor Solicitor and LP202107 as the Advising Solicitor. Neither solicitor currently has a practising certificate.
2. On 8 April 2025, we found the Vendor Solicitor and the Advising Solicitor to be guilty of professional misconduct (the Liability Decision). The conduct of both solicitors involved dishonesty. Our reasons for those findings were provided on the same day (the Liability Reasons). We will assume, in these reasons, that the reader has a knowledge of the Liability Reasons and will use the same abbreviations as are used in those reasons.
3. After determining liability, we held a further hearing so that the parties had an opportunity to provide submissions as to the protective orders which we should make. The parties were also provided with an opportunity to file further evidence and submissions on which they wished to rely in relation to the making of those orders and did so.
4. For the reasons which follow, we did not accept the Law Society Council's submission that we should recommend that the Advising Solicitor's name be removed from the roll of legal practitioners. We are not satisfied that he is permanently unfit to practise.
5. We have decided that, having regard to the seriousness of the conduct of both solicitors, neither should be permitted to practise for a period of two years. As neither has a current practising certificate, we have ordered that a local practising certificate is not to be granted to either of them for two years. We have also decided that each solicitor should be publicly reprimanded to mark the seriousness of their misconduct, to uphold the standards of the profession and for the purposes of deterrence.

1. Chapter 4 of the Legal Profession Act 2006 (the Act) is entitled "Complaints and discipline." Section 384 of the Act sets out the purposes of Chapter 4 as follows:

(a) to provide a nationally consistent scheme for the discipline of the legal profession in the ACT, in the interests of the administration of justice and for the protection of consumers of the services of the legal profession and the public generally;

(b) to promote and enforce the professional standards, competence and honesty of the legal profession;

(c) to provide a means of redress for complaints about lawyers;

(d) to enable people who are not lawyers to participate in complaints and disciplinary processes involving lawyers.

1. Section 425 of the Act, within Chapter 4, relevantly provides:

425 ACAT orders - Australian legal practitioners

_(1) If, after the ACAT has finished considering an application under this part in relation to an Australian legal practitioner, the ACAT is satisfied that the practitioner is guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, the ACAT may - _

(a) make 1 or more of the orders mentioned in subsections (3) to (5); or

(b) any other order it considers appropriate.

(3) The ACAT may make the following orders in relation to the Australian legal practitioner:

(a) an order recommending that the name of the practitioner be removed from the local roll;

(c) an order that a local practising certificate not be granted to the practitioner before the end of a stated period;

(e) an order publicly reprimanding the practitioner or, if there are special circumstances, privately reprimanding the practitioner.

1. It is not controversial that the object of disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer, and of disciplinary orders, is to protect the public and to maintain public confidence in the profession.[1]

1. In the Liability Decision, we found that the Vendor Solicitor had sworn an affidavit in support of a statutory demand knowing it to contain false information in three respects. He falsely stated in the affidavit that:

(a) none of the instalments of the purchase price for a law firm, being the basis for the debt claimed in the statutory demand, had been paid;

(b) the purchase price was due and payable;

(c) there was no dispute about the existence of the amount of the debt claimed in the statutory demand.[2]

1. We also found that the Vendor Solicitor gave instructions to defend proceedings in which it was sought to set aside the statutory demand, in circumstances where he knew, or should have known, that the statutory demand had been issued for an improper purpose.[3]
2. The Law Society Council sought the following protective orders in relation to the Vendor Solicitor:

(a) An order publicly reprimanding the Vendor Solicitor;

(b) An order that a local practising certificate not be granted to the Vendor Solicitor before the end of two years.[4]

Vendor Solicitor's evidence and submissions on protective orders

1. The Vendor Solicitor provided the Tribunal with a witness statement on which he was not challenged.[5]
2. The Vendor Solicitor has been in practice for 50 years, having been admitted to the Supreme Court of New South Wales as a solicitor in 1973. He enrolled as a barrister and solicitor of the ACT Supreme Court in 1976. The Vendor Solicitor was rarely involved in litigation over the course of his career and was not involved in commercial litigation.
3. The Vendor Solicitor stated in his witness statement that the Advising Solicitor had advised him to sue the Purchaser Solicitor for the full $550,000, not the $150,000 which was owing, because the 2015 Agreement was between his company and the Purchaser Solicitor, and was not with him personally. The Vendor Solicitor stated that he said to the Advising Solicitor, "What about the $400,000 already paid?" but was assured that was not a problem given that the Vendor Solicitor was not a party to the 2015 Agreement.[6]
4. In his witness statement, the Vendor Solicitor acknowledged and accepted our findings in the Liability Reasons and Liability Decision.
5. As for previous disciplinary action, the Vendor Solicitor stated that, in about 2014 to 2015, he self-reported some accounting errors in his trust account to the Law Society. He identified the major error as being the payment of a sum of money to an incorrect but similarly-named client. The Vendor Solicitor attributed the errors to the recent retirement of his partner, who had managed the trust account. He stated that he was fined by the Law Society and lost his ability to practise on an unrestricted basis for five years.[7]
6. The Vendor Solicitor also relied upon a reference from Mr David Harper, written in August 2024. Mr Harper had, at that time, known the Vendor Solicitor for forty-five years. Mr Harper was President of the Law Society from 1978 to 1980; chairman of the ACT Legal Practitioners Admission Board from 1983 to 2007; a part-time member of the ACT Administrative Appeals Tribunal from 2000 to 2003; a Master of the Supreme Court of the ACT from 2003 to 2013; and a chairman of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal from 2006 to 2009.
7. Mr Harper stated that he had read the application for disciplinary action and relevant judgments involving the Vendor Solicitor and had had discussions with the Vendor Solicitor about his conduct and his attitude towards it. Mr Harper expressed the opinion that the Vendor Solicitor "is fundamentally a man of good character who has committed a serious error of judgment in the circumstances of this case, aggravated by his failure to accept his mistake and remedy the situation as soon as he became aware of it."
8. In the Liability Reasons, on the basis of evidence provided by the Law Society, we described the Vendor Solicitor as being retired.[8] That proved to be incorrect.[9] As at 27 June 2025, the date of the hearing on protective orders, the Vendor Solicitor held a restricted practising certificate and had applied to renew that certificate. On the same day, following the hearing, the Vendor Solicitor withdrew his applications for renewal. The Vendor Solicitor's right to practise ceased on 30 June 2025.[10]
9. It was submitted on the Vendor Solicitor's behalf that our disciplinary finding against him was the only finding of professional misconduct which might lead to the suspension of his right to practise. It was further submitted that it was a salutary lesson for him and he is certainly not at risk of further misconduct. Before the hearing, the Vendor Solicitor agreed in writing to an order of a public reprimand and a moderate period of suspension from practice.[11]
10. Mr Sabharwal, for the Vendor Solicitor, submitted at the hearing that the Vendor Solicitor had shown insight into his conduct, as evidenced by his witness statement and his discussions with Mr Harper.[12] Mr Sabharwal said that, given the Vendor Solicitor's age of 74, his lifetime in practice of the law, and that a period of two years out of the law would make it "nigh impossible" to return to practice, a suspension of a shorter duration than two years should be imposed.[13]

Law Society Council's evidence and submissions on protective orders

1. The Law Society Council provided the Tribunal with evidence of the Vendor Solicitor's disciplinary history. The Law Society Council included, in its evidence, a decision of this Tribunal in relation to the Vendor Solicitor's failure to supervise the management of trust moneys.[14] The facts as recounted in that decision appear to differ to some degree from the Vendor Solicitor's account of what occurred, but the Law Society Council did not make an issue of that.
2. The Law Society Council submitted that Mr Harper's reference should be given little weight, as it pre-dated the Tribunal's findings and did not address his dishonesty.[15]
3. The focus of the Law Society Council's submissions was upon the seriousness of a finding of dishonesty.
4. Mr Moujalli, for the Law Society Council, drew the Tribunal's attention to the judgment of the Full Court of the Supreme Court (Mossop, McWilliam JJ and Ainslie-Wallace AJ) in Law Society v Ford (No 2) [2024] ACTSCFC 2 (Ford), in which the Court emphasised the importance of honesty on the part of a legal practitioner.[16] Their Honours observed that "a lawyer's duty of honesty and candour to a court is a fundamental feature of the practice of law" and remarked that "the centrality of honesty and candour of lawyers in dealing with courts ... is significant in a number of ways."[17] The Court elaborated:[18]

Pragmatically, our system of justice can only function and get through the work that is required if lawyers, as officers of the court, can be relied upon for their candour and honesty. But the obligation of candour and honesty is also fundamental to the core values of the judicial system, the fair and impartial determination of disputes, and to societal confidence in its institutions. Any erosion of the obligations of lawyers to be honest and candid in their dealings with courts carries with it an unacceptable risk of both eroding the institutions administering justice as well as the social acceptance of the authority of those institutions.

1. The Law Society Council submitted that the gravity of the Vendor Solicitor's misconduct underlying the charges which had been proven "cannot be overstated."[19] It submitted that the swearing of an affidavit by a solicitor, knowing it to be false in material respects, was a serious failure to honour the high degree of trust and confidence required of lawyers.[20] It also submitted that a solicitor who is prepared to be involved in the issuing of a statutory demand for an improper purpose could not be relied upon to discharge his or her duty to uphold the law and further its proper administration (relying upon Re B [1981] 2 NSWLR 372 at 382).[21]
2. It was the Law Society Council's position that the Vendor Solicitor had not expressed remorse or contrition for his dishonest conduct, and that his witness statement appeared to be primarily intended for the purpose of attributing responsibility to the Advising Solicitor for his conduct. Nevertheless, the Law Society Council acknowledged that the Vendor Solicitor had some limited insight into the seriousness of his wrongdoing.[22] After the Vendor Solicitor indicated that he recognised that a period of suspension from practice was appropriate, Mr Moujalli submitted that "he should be given credit that he accepts the seriousness of the findings, and that he accepts that the findings warrant a serious penalty."[23]
3. The Law Society Council urged the Tribunal to consider the effect on the public's confidence in the profession if the Vendor Solicitor were allowed to continue to practise without first serving a period of exclusion from practice.[24] This, it said, would have a deterrent effect.
4. The Law Society Council's position was that the Vendor Solicitor was temporarily unfit to practise, because he had commenced a process of demonstrating insight which would lead to him becoming fit to practise in time.[25]

1. A finding of dishonesty is very serious, as the Law Society Council has submitted. Deliberately making a false affidavit is conduct which is likely to mislead a court. Such conduct tends to undermine our system of justice, as the Full Court observed in Ford.
2. The Vendor Solicitor has shown some insight into his conduct. However, as the Law Society Council submits, the degree of insight he has demonstrated is still limited.
3. In his witness statement, the Vendor Solicitor gave evidence which would have been relevant at the liability stage. As we indicated in our Liability Reasons, the Vendor Solicitor did not provide any evidence at that stage of the proceedings as to his state of mind at the time of swearing the 2019 Affidavit,[26] nor did he provide any affidavit evidence in response to the Law Society Council's allegations.[27] The witness statement he has provided to us now is to be understood in that context.
4. The Vendor Solicitor has stated that he acknowledges and accepts our findings, but the effect of his witness statement is to indicate that he was acting upon the Advising Solicitor's advice and not to fully accept his own culpability. To the extent that the Vendor Solicitor's evidence is designed to persuade us that he was not dishonest, but merely acting on advice, we do not accept it. The language he uses in the witness statement (for example, "Notwithstanding my concerns [the Advising Solicitor] assured me..." and "When it came to my knowledge that the proceedings were ill-founded...") tends to suggest that he did not exercise any independent judgment about the proceedings to set aside the statutory demand, or about his affidavit, and that he still does not realize that he should have done so.
5. We have had regard to the reference from Mr Harper and have placed some weight on his opinion of the Vendor Solicitor's character. However, we have also taken into account that Mr Harper has not referred to our findings of dishonesty (having written the reference before those findings were made) and has described the Vendor Solicitor as having "committed a serious error of judgment" rather than as having acted dishonestly.
6. We agree with the Law Society Council that, due to the seriousness of his dishonest conduct and his limited insight, the Vendor Solicitor is currently not a fit and proper person to practise law. We accept that he is developing some insight into his conduct. His insight is evidenced by his acceptance of our findings and his acceptance that an order prohibiting him from practising for a period of time is appropriate. We have taken into account his age. There is no evidence to support his submission that there is no realistic possibility that he would be able to work again after two years and he has not explained how, if that is so, he would be able to work again after, say, eighteen months. The Vendor Solicitor appears to have been getting work up until 30 June 2025, and may be able to obtain more work from the same source in another two years.
7. Taking into account all of the relevant circumstances and considerations, including the importance that solicitors behave honestly and that the Vendor Solicitor has demonstrated only limited insight into his conduct, we consider that a period of two years away from practice, commencing on 1 July 2025, is needed before he will be fit to practise again. That will give him some time to reflect on his conduct in light of our reasons.
8. As the Vendor Solicitor does not have a practising certificate, we will make an order under section 425(3)(c) of the Act, that a local practising certificate not be granted to the Vendor Solicitor before the end of a period of two years commencing on 1 July 2025. The respondent suggested different wording (that a local practising certificate not be granted to the Vendor Solicitor before 30 June 2027) but the wording we have decided upon more accurately reflects the terms of 425(3)(c) of the Act, and has the same effect.
9. We will also impose a public reprimand, pursuant to section 425(3)(e) of the Act. A public reprimand serves to protect the profession's reputation and to maintain its standards, as well as serving the purposes of specific and general deterrence.[28]

1. The Law Society Council sought an order that the Vendor Solicitor pay the costs of the proceeding calculated on a party and party basis as agreed or as assessed by the Registrar of the Tribunal.
2. Section 433(1) of the Act provides:

If the ACAT finds an Australian legal practitioner guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, the ACAT must order the practitioner to pay costs (including costs of the relevant council and the complainant), unless the ACAT is satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist.

1. The Vendor Solicitor did not submit that any exceptional circumstances exist and we find that they do not.
2. Under section 433(5) of the Act:

_(5) An order for costs - _

(a) may be for a stated amount; or

(b) may be for an unstated amount but must state the basis on which the amount is to be decided.

1. We will make an order that the parties are to notify the Tribunal of any agreement as to costs, or lack thereof, within two months. If the parties have not agreed on costs by then, we will order that the applicant's costs are to be assessed on a party and party basis. Under the tribunal rules, the Registrar is required to assess the parties' costs once such an order takes effect.[29] The period of two months will encourage prompt negotiations between the parties to resolve any dispute as to costs, consistently with the parties' obligation to cooperate with the tribunal to give effect to the principle that the tribunal is to seek to ensure that its procedures are as simple, quick, inexpensive and informal as is consistent with achieving justice.[30]

1. In the Liability Decision, we found that the Advising Solicitor had:

(a) signed and issued a statutory demand in circumstances where:

(i) he knew that it was supported by an affidavit containing false statements;

(ii) he knew that there was a genuine dispute as to the debt claimed in the statutory demand; and

(iii) he therefore knew, or should have known, that the statutory demand was issued for an improper purpose;

(b) prepared, settled and witnessed an affidavit prepared by the Vendor Solicitor knowing that it was false to the extent that it contained false statements that:

(i) the whole of the purchase price was due and payable; and

(ii) there was no dispute about the existence of the amount of the debt claimed in the statutory demand.

(a) publicly reprimanding the Advising Solicitor; and

(b) recommending that his name be removed from the roll.[31]

Advising Solicitor's evidence and submissions on protective orders

1. The Advising Solicitor provided the Tribunal with an affidavit, sworn by him, on which he was not challenged.[32]
2. The Advising Solicitor was admitted as a barrister of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in 1967. He commenced private practice in the Australian Capital Territory as a solicitor in 1970. He practised continually from then until 20 June 2024. He was 84 years old at the time of swearing his affidavit.
3. The Advising Solicitor has provided pro bono services to a charity over a long period of time, receiving certificates and medals to recognise that assistance.
4. The Advising Solicitor stated that he was not in a position where he would ever be able to return to legal practice, due to his health. He stated that, before the events giving rise to these proceedings, he had never been the subject of a complaint from clients, colleagues or the judiciary.
5. The Advising Solicitor acknowledged, in his affidavit, the serious nature of the findings made against him. He stated that he understood the importance of courts, other lawyers and members of the public being able to rely on the integrity and honesty of legal practitioners.
6. The Advising Solicitor annexed to his affidavit two character references from non-lawyers, one of whom held a senior position in business and the other of whom retired from a senior position in government and is a Companion of the Order of Australia. Both referees attested to the Advising Solicitor's integrity and standing within the business community. Both had known the Advising Solicitor for a long time.
7. Mr Crispin submitted, for the Advising Solicitor, that his lengthy period of productive practice, his pro bono work and his character references all speak to him being a person of ordinarily good fame and character. The conduct the subject of our findings was, in Mr Crispin's submission, "an aberration from an otherwise honest life in the service of the law."[33]
8. It was also submitted, on the Advising Solicitor's behalf, that a recommendation that his name be removed from the roll of legal practitioner was unnecessary and would go beyond what is necessary to protect the community. Mr Crispin submitted that, given that the Advising Solicitor has retired and is unable to return to practice due to his age, there was little utility in a period of suspension. However, it was said that he would not oppose a suspension should the Tribunal be minded to make such an order.[34]
9. The Advising Solicitor submitted that he was likely to face a costs order which would greatly exceed the sum of any fine the Tribunal might consider appropriate.[35] He relied upon Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory v Legal Practitioner 201822 (Alveer Singh) [2019] ACAT 27 at [41](h),[36] in which the tribunal set out a submission that a relevant factor when considering appropriate protective orders is "the loss already suffered by the lawyer personally as a result of the misconduct."
10. The most appropriate protective order, in Mr Crispin's submission, is a public reprimand.[37]

Law Society Council's evidence and submissions on protective orders

1. The starting point, in the Law Society Council's submission, is that the Advising Solicitor's conduct is very serious.[38] It was submitted that the seriousness of the misconduct needed to be marked for the profession and so as to maintain public confidence in the legal profession and the administration of justice.[39]
2. Mr Moujalli, for the Law Society Council, submitted that the understanding of the misconduct which the Advising Solicitor has demonstrated appeared to be somewhat superficial.[40] He pointed out that the Advising Solicitor had had a substantial period of time to reflect on his conduct, and it was only when serious findings had been made by the tribunal, that he said that he accepted that the findings were serious.[41] Mr Moujalli continued:[42]

There is no acknowledgement of a personal failing on his part. There is no attempt to grapple with the nature of the finding, being a finding of dishonesty against him. No attempt to explain how it is that he allowed himself to engage in dishonest conduct. The superficiality of his understanding of the gravity of these findings is also underscored by the references on which he relies.

1. As for the references on which the Advising Solicitor relied, Mr Moujalli submitted that neither was from a member of the legal profession and neither referee appeared to have been told the nature of the findings that had been made. That, he said, raised a question as to whether the Advising Solicitor truly accepts the gravity of the findings which have been made against him.[43]
2. Mr Moujalli accepted that this was a borderline case as to whether an order recommending the Advising Solicitor's removal from the roll was appropriate.[44] He acknowledged that a recommendation for removal is often made where there has been repeated offending or offending over a protracted period of time.[45] However, Mr Moujalli submitted that a recommendation for removal may be appropriate where the offending is extremely serious.[46] It was appropriate in this case, in the Law Society Council's submission, because the Advising Solicitor was permanently unfit to practice. However, Mr Moujalli said that if the Tribunal was against him on the removal recommendation, we should order that the Advising Solicitor not be granted a practising certificate for two years.[47]
3. Mr Moujalli also submitted that we should not consider the deterrent effect of a costs order when considering what protective orders to make.[48]

1. The Advising Solicitor's conduct was inconsistent with fulfilling the obligations of candour and honesty which attach to officers of the court.[49] He prepared and settled an affidavit knowing it to contain false statements. He also issued a statutory demand for an improper purpose. Whilst it was submitted on his behalf that the loss suffered by the other party in the proceedings to set aside the statutory demand was remedied by costs orders,[50] that does not detract from the seriousness of the conduct. It also does not take into account the stress of the legal proceedings for all parties concerned, or the cost to the court as a result of those proceedings.
2. It is also relevant, however, to consider that the Advising Solicitor has, until now, had a long and unblemished career.
3. We accept the Advising Solicitor's evidence that, until the conduct the subject of these proceedings, he has never had any complaints made against him. The references on which the Advising Solicitor relies have some limitations, as identified by the Law Society Council. However, taken with his good disciplinary history, they demonstrate that he is ordinarily of good fame and character. The Advising Solicitor's pro bono work also demonstrates good character. We are satisfied that the conduct the subject of these proceedings was uncharacteristic.
4. The Advising Solicitor has not shown any insight into his conduct and has not expressed remorse or contrition. This lack of understanding, at the end of a disciplinary process, tends to show that he is not presently fit to practise law.
5. We note, however, given that the Advising Solicitor appears to consider that his conduct was not blameworthy in the ways we have found (or at all), he has shown some integrity in not expressing, in the affidavit he relies upon before us, any contrition which he does not genuinely feel. After the presiding member had raised this for the parties' consideration at the hearing, Mr Crispin made the following submission on the Advising Solicitor's behalf:[51]

The nature of the allegation - I'm sorry, the nature of the conduct for which [the Advising Solicitor] was found to have engaged in professional misconduct was about the propriety in forwarding an inaccurate affidavit. If [the Advising Solicitor] was not concerned at all about ensuring he gave accurate evidence, the comments in his current affidavit would be very different.

What I would say, members, is that there is an inference available to be drawn that although [the Advising Solicitor] might not have, in that affidavit, demonstrated insight into the specific events for which there has been a finding, his affidavit is, nonetheless, consistent with insight into the broader principle that he must be truthful in affidavits.

... whilst, of course, the latter would be ideal, insight into the importance of honesty generally would provide, at least, a measure of comfort that conduct would not be repeated were he to return to practice.

1. We accept that submission. Mr Moujalli conceded that we could infer that the Advising Solicitor understands the importance of honesty, and especially the importance of honesty in affidavits.[52] We infer from the Advising Solicitor's affidavit that he understands the broader principle that he must be truthful in affidavits, even though he allowed himself to be blinded to that principle when engaging in the conduct in question and apparently still does not appreciate how his conduct was inconsistent with the principle.
2. We do not consider that an order recommending the removal of the Advising Solicitor's name from the roll is appropriate in this case, having regard to his long previously unblemished history, his otherwise good character and his insight into the general principle that legal practitioners must behave with integrity. He stated in his affidavit, and we accept, that he understands in general terms "the importance of Courts, other lawyers and members of the public being able to rely on the integrity and honesty of legal practitioners."
3. The difficulty is that, while the Advising Solicitor has a broad understanding of that principle, his legalistic approach to advising the Vendor Solicitor, and his single-minded pursuit of a forensic strategy designed to make the Purchaser Solicitor and Purchaser Company come to a commercial resolution, led him to contravene his duty of honesty and candour to a court. He continues to lack insight into the way his integrity was compromised by choosing to take that approach. As Mr Moujalli submitted, what is required here and what is missing is any explanation as to how the Advising Solicitor failed to adhere to professional and ethical standards in respect of the conduct which we have found.[53]
4. We consider, as the Advising Solicitor accepts, that a reprimand is an appropriate protective order. As we have said in relation to the Vendor Solicitor, a public reprimand maintains the standards of the profession and has a deterrent effect, both generally and for the Advising Solicitor in particular.
5. We are not satisfied, on balance, that the Advising Solicitor is permanently unfit to practise, despite the lack of insight he currently displays into his conduct. It may be, as the Advising Solicitor submitted, that he will never return to practice, given his health and his age. However, we have no medical evidence to support that assertion, and it is possible that he may wish to work as a solicitor again in the future.
6. The Advising Solicitor does not oppose a period of suspension. We consider that an equivalent order to that made in respect of the Vendor Solicitor is appropriate. An order that the Advising Solicitor not be granted a practising certificate for two years from 1 July 2025 furthers an object of Chapter 4 of the Act, being to promote and enforce the professional standards, competence and honesty of the legal profession.[54] We accept the submission of the Law Society Council that the misconduct by the Vendor Solicitor is comparable to that of the Advising Solicitor in that they were both knowingly involved in the swearing of a false affidavit. Although the Advising Solicitor stopped practising in 2024 for unrelated reasons, the starting date of 1 July 2025 for the exclusion period is a few days after the hearing, marks the start of the practising certificate renewal year,[55] and is consistent with the order made in respect of the Vendor Solicitor.
7. The argument that a costs order has a deterrent effect and should be taken into account when making protective orders was made in the Advising Solicitor's written submissions in the context of opposing a fine (as we understood it). We were not asked to impose a fine and do not intend to do so. Costs orders are made for compensatory purposes. Whilst they may have a deterrent effect, the making of a costs order would not generally affect the tribunal's consideration of the appropriate period of a suspension, or a period in which the practitioner is not permitted to practise. It has not affected our consideration of that issue in this case.

1. The Advising Solicitor did not submit that any exceptional circumstances exist such that we should not make a costs order in favour of the applicant. We find that there are no exceptional circumstances for the purposes of section 433(1) of the Act.
2. Accordingly, we have made a costs order in the same terms as that made in respect of the Vendor Solicitor, and for the same reasons.

The Tribunal orders in proceedings OR 6/2021:

1. The respondent is publicly reprimanded.
2. A local practising certificate is not to be granted to the respondent before the end of a period of two years commencing on 1 July 2025.
3. The respondent is to pay the applicant's costs on a party and party basis, as agreed or assessed, in accordance with Orders 4 and 5 below.
4. The parties are to notify the Tribunal as to whether they have reached an agreement as to the amount of those costs by 26 November 2025and, if so, they are to notify the Tribunal of the amount agreed by the same date.
5. If the parties have not informed the Tribunal that they have reached an agreement as to costs by 28 November 2025 and no application has been made for an extension of time to reach an agreement on costs by that date, the registrar is to assess the applicant's costs on a party and party basis.

The Tribunal orders in proceedings OR 7/2021:

1. The respondent is publicly reprimanded.
2. A local practising certificate is not to be granted to the respondent before the end of a period of two years commencing on 1 July 2025.
3. The respondent is to pay the applicant's costs on a party and party basis, as agreed or assessed, in accordance with Orders 4 and 5 below.
4. The parties are to notify the Tribunal as to whether they have reached an agreement as to the amount of those costs by 26 November 2025 and, if so, they are to notify the Tribunal of the amount agreed by the same date.
5. If the parties have not informed the Tribunal that they have reached an agreement as to costs by 28 November 2025 no application has been made for an extension of time to reach an agreement on costs by that date, the registrar is to assess the applicant's costs on a party and party basis.

[1] See, for example, Council of Law Society of Australian Capital Territory v Giles [2020] ACTSCFC 1 at [115]

[2] Liability Decision at [105] and [115]

[3] Liability Decision at [129]-[130]

[4] Applicant's Submissions on Penalty and Costs in relation to the Vendor Solicitor, filed 24 June 2025 at [1.8] and [4.10]

[5] Vendor Solicitor's witness statement filed on 17 June 2025

[6] Vendor Solicitor's witness statement filed on 17 June 2025 at [10]-[12]

[7] Vendor Solicitor's witness statement filed on 17 June 2025 at [14]

[9] Affidavit of Greg Williams filed on 23 June 2025 at [6]-[7]

[10] Affidavit of Katie Elizabeth Miriam Binstock failed on 18 July 2025 at [4] to [7].

[11] Respondent's Submissions on Penalty and Costs in OR 6/2021, filed 26 June 2025 at [6]-[7]

[12] Transcript of hearing dated 27 June 2025, page 33, lines 20 to 36

[13] Transcript of hearing dated 27 June 2025, page 33, lines 42 to 47

[14] Affidavit of Samuel William Harper, filed on 8 May 2025, Ex SWH1, pages 1-13

[15] Applicant's Submissions on Penalty and Costs in relation to the Vendor Solicitor, filed 24 June 2025 at [3.12], [3.13], [4.5]; Transcript of hearing dated 27 June 2025, page 10, lines 8 to 18

[16] Transcript of hearing dated 27 June 2025, page 8, lines 20-32

[19] Applicant's Submissions on Penalty and Costs in relation to the Vendor Solicitor, filed 24 June 2025 at [4.1]

[20] Applicant's Submissions on Penalty and Costs in relation to the Vendor Solicitor, filed 24 June 2025 at [4.1]

[21] Applicant's Submissions on Penalty and Costs in relation to the Vendor Solicitor, filed 24 June 2025 at [4.2]

[22] Applicant's Submissions on Penalty and Costs in relation to the Vendor Solicitor, filed 24 June 2025 at [4.4]-[4.6]

[23] Transcript of hearing dated 27 June 2025, page 10, lines 20 to 21

[24] Applicant's Submissions on Penalty and Costs in relation to the Vendor Solicitor, filed 24 June 2025 at [4.7]

[25] Transcript of hearing dated 27 June 2025, page 10, lines 21 to 23

[28] Council of the Law Society of the ACT v Legal Practitioner 20214 [2022] ACAT 33 at [91](a); Commissioner for Fair Trading v Tasic [2023] ACAT 26 at [41]; Council of the Law Society of the ACT v LP 202103 (Jeffrey Silk) [2021] ACAT 105 at [69]

[29] ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Procedures Rules 2024, rule 71(3)

[30]ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008, ss 7, 7A

[31] Transcript of hearing dated 27 June 2025, page 14, lines 17 to 21

[32] Advising Solicitor's affidavit sworn on 26 June 2025

[33] Advising Solicitor's Written Submissions on Protective Orders dated 27 June 2025 at [23]

[34] Advising Solicitor's Written Submissions on Protective Orders dated 27 June 2025 at [24]-[25]

[35] Advising Solicitor's Written Submissions on Protective Orders dated 27 June 2025 at [22]

[36] Transcript of hearing dated 27 June 2025, page 25, lines 8 to 19

[37] Advising Solicitor's Written Submissions on Protective Orders dated 27 June 2025 at [26]

[38] Transcript of hearing dated 27 June 2025, page 15, line 1

[39] Transcript of hearing dated 27 June 2025, page 15, lines 9 to 13

[40] Transcript of hearing dated 27 June 2025, page 15, lines 18 to 24

[41] Transcript of hearing dated 27 June 2025, page 15, lines 33 to 36

[42] Transcript of hearing dated 27 June 2025, page 16, lines 1 to 6

[43] Transcript of hearing dated 27 June 2025, page 18, lines 14 to 16

[44] Transcript of hearing dated 27 June 2025, page 14, lines 23 to 24

[45] Transcript of hearing dated 27 June 2025, page 14, lines 26 to 28

[46] Transcript of hearing dated 27 June 2025, page 14, lines 28 to 31

[47] Transcript of hearing dated 27 June 2025, page 24, lines 25 to 29

[48] Transcript of hearing dated 27 June 2025, page 19, lines 35 to 43

[50] Advising Solicitor's Written Submissions on Protective Orders dated 27 June 2025 at [21]

[51] Transcript of hearing dated 27 June 2025, page 29, lines 20 to 45

[52] Transcript of hearing dated 27 June 2025, page 32, lines 7 to 11

[53] Transcript of hearing dated 27 June 2025, page 32, lines 12 to 15