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[2026] NSWSC 607
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-05-29
Harrison AsJ
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Coonamble Shire Council v Bequick Pty Ltd [2026] NSWSC 607
Hearing dates: 8-12 September 2025
Submissions received 16 January 2026
Date of orders: 29 May 2026
Decision date: 29 May 2026
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Harrison AsJ
Decision: Judgment: Judgment is entered for the plaintiff. The defendant is to pay the plaintiff the sum of $148,106.61 plus interest. The Court orders that: The cross-claim is dismissed. The defendant is to pay the plaintiff’s costs of the proceedings and the cross-claim. The parties are to agree on the sum of interest owed up until the date of this judgment.
Catchwords: LOCAL GOVERNMENT – orders – s 124 Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) – asbestos contamination after fire to property – orders requiring premises in safe condition – whether orders valid – whether the defendant complied with orders – Council entry and remediation under s 678 – debt recovery – judgment for the plaintiff
TORTS – trespass – cross-claim – Council entry onto private property – demolition of fire-damaged property – asbestos contamination – whether Council authorised to enter – whether procedural fairness denied – s 43A Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) – whether bars cross-claim – cross-claim is dismissed
DAMAGES – post-fire demolition – betterment principle – whether deduction for betterment applicable – method of calculation
Legislation Cited: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)
Coonamble Local Environment Plan 2011 (NSW)
Design and Building Practitioners Regulation 2021 (NSW)
Local Government Act 1993 (NSW)
Cases Cited: Ballina Shire Council v Joblin [2022] NSWLEC 90
Barclay v Wollongong City Council (2005) 139 LGERA 167; [2005] NSWLEC 160;
Bobolas v Waverly Council (2012) 187 LGERA 63; [2012] NSWCA 126
Curtis v Harden Shire Council (2014) 88 NSWLR 10; [2014] NSWCA 314
Darley Australia Pty Ltd v Walfertan Processors Pty Ltd 188 LGERA 26; [2012] NSWCA 48
Della Franca v Lorenzato [2021] NSWCA 321
Disorganized Developments Pty Ltd v South Australia (2023) 280 CLR 515; (2023) 410 ALR 508; (2023) 97 ALJR 575; [2023] HCA 22
Entick v Carrington (1765) 95 ER 807; (1765) 19 St Tr 1029
Foster v Sutherland Shire Council [2001] NSWLEC 89
Gales Holdings Pty Ltd v Tweed Shire Council [2013] NSWCA 382; 85 NSWLR 514
Gulic v Boral Transport Ltd [2016] NSWCA 269
Houghton v Immer (No 155) Pty Ltd (1997) 44 NSWLR 46
Hunt Leather Pty Ltd v Transport for NSW [2023] NSWSC 840
Hunt Leather Pty Ltd v Transport for NSW (2025) 426 ALR 621; [2025] HCA 53
Hyder Consulting (Australia) Pty Ltd v Wilh Wilhelmsen Agency Pty Ltd (2002) 18 BCL 122; [2001] NSWCA 313
Johnson v Buchanan [2012] VSC 195
Mailey v Sutherland Shire Council [2017] NSWCA 343
Manly Council v Leech [2015] NSWLEC 149
McNeil v Narrabri Shire Council [2013] NSWCA 112
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ (2016) 259 CLR 180; [2016] HCA 29
Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin (2017) 248 FCR 311; [2017] FCAFC 59
Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin (No 6) [2015] FCA 1294
Palmer v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) (No 2) [2025] FCA 1425
Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635; [1991] HCA 5
R v Costa [2025] NSWSC 1575
Roads and Maritime Services v Zraika (2016) 94 NSWLR 159
Roberts v Goodwin Street Developments Pty Ltd (2023) 110 NSWLR 557; [2023] NSWCA 5
State of New South Wales v Ouhammi (2019) 101 NSWLR 160; [2019] NSWCA 225
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152; [2006] HCA 63
Traili v McRae (2002) 122 FCR 349; [2002] FCAFC 235
Transport for NSW v Hunt Leather Pty Ltd (2024) 115 NSWLR 489; [2024] NSWCA 227
Tyco Australia Pty Ltd v Optus Networks Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 333
Universal 1919 Pty Ltd v 122 Pitt Street Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 50
Walker Groups Constructions Pty Ltd v Tzaneros Investments Pty Ltd (2017) 94 NSWLR 108; [2017] NSWCA 27
Texts Cited: Rawlinsons Australian Construction Handbook 2024 (Rawlinsons Cost Data 2024 ed. 42)
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Coonamble Shire Council (Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant)
Bequick Pty Ltd (Defendant/Cross-Claimant)
Representation: Counsel:
M Wright SC and D Robertson (Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant)
N Kabilafkas (Defendant/Cross-Claimant)
Solicitors:
Mills Oakley (Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant)
McLachlan Thorpe Partners (Defendant/Cross-Claimant)
File Number(s): 2022/00203476
Publication restriction: Nil
JUDGMENT
Background
The statutory powers of the Council
The Council’s steps to make safe the property
Pleading framework
The defence and cross-claim
Issues in dispute
Evidence
The evidence and the expert reports
The Barnson Report
The Clifton Report dated 4 October 2018
First Affidavit of Gary John Wooding dated 5 July 2024
The property on the corner of Castlereagh and Aberford Street Coonamble
Ms Redden’s introduction and early involvement on the property
2 August 2018 site visit to the property
Post-fire and the temporary fencing around the fire-damaged properties
The Orders
Mr Wooding’s Compliance with the directions of the Order
Specified date
Direction 1
Direction 2
Direction 3
Direction 4
Directions 5 and Direction 6
Photograph of Aberford Street footpath on 9 September 2018
13 September 2018 – post fire inspection
Council's extension of the earlier Orders dated 5 October 2018
Resolution 4098 and the Warren Report
John Byrne of Byrne Demolition
Bequick's response dated Monday, 15 October 2018
Follow up with Byrne Demolition
Learning of the Council's intention to demolish
Demolition starts
Geolyse Structural Engineers - site inspection and video on 7 November 2018, and report dated 12 November 2018 (after the demolition was in progress)
The Council invoice no. 100115 dated 8 January 2019 - $137,092.24
January 2019 – updated drawings
January and February 2019 – the Council communications with the NSW EPA
13 January 2021 - subsequent calculations of Walton Smith Consultants
The Council’s minutes dated 10 March 2021
The Council’s invoice no. 10621 dated 20 May 2021 - $148,106.61
Affidavit of Chris Newbold dated 26 March 2025
Disposal of sandstock bricks
(1) First issue: Civil Liability Act, s 43A
Consideration of Hunt Leather
Hunt Leather in the High Court of Australia
Council’s submissions
Bequick’s submissions
Resolution
(2) Second issue: validity of the Orders
The Council’s submissions
Bequick’s submissions in reply
Resolution
(3) Third issue: compliance with the Council’s two orders
Bequick’s submissions
The Council’s submissions
Resolution
(4) Fourth issue: a denial of procedural fairness
Bequick’s submissions
The Council’s submissions
Resolution
Result
Damages
Bequick’s submissions
The Council’s submissions
The expert reports – damages
Bequick’s Expert Reports
Council’s Expert Report dated 5 November 2025
Bequick’s Expert Report dated 28 March 2025
Joint report of quantum experts dated 23 July 2025
What was the existing post fire-items in dispute?
(1) The structural integrity of the wall
(2) Rear of the Property
(3) Awning
(4) Steel inside the premises– the columns and lintels
(5) Fill
(6) Bricks
(7) Termite Protection
(8) Scaffolding
(9) Builder’s margin
(10) Rural loading
(11) Deduction for costs of clean up
The Council’s submissions in reply
Result
JUDGMENT AND ORDERS
Judgment
Orders
This judgment involves a claim for debt and a cross-claim seeking damages. It is the cross-claim that is the focus of this judgment.
The plaintiff/cross-defendant is the Coonamble Shire Council (the Council). It is represented by M Wright SC with D Robertson of counsel. The defendant/ cross-claimant is Bequick Pty Ltd (Bequick). It is the registered proprietor of 81-83 Castlereagh (the property). It is represented by N Kabilafkas of counsel.
The parties relied on a joint court book comprising 3 volumes (Exhibits A1, A2, A3 and collectively will be referred to as CB). Included with the joint court book was a USB that contained three short videos that documents the fire-damage at the property. These videos were played in Court.
On 23 August 2018, at 12.30am, a fire ran through the property and damaged several adjoining buildings located at the corner of Castlereagh and Aberford Streets in the town of Coonamble, New South Wales. On 27 August 2018, the Council issued identical orders (the Order(s)) to the proprietors of each of the fire-damaged properties directing them to take certain steps to render their premises safe. In the opinion of the Council, those Orders were not complied with by the proprietors.
On 5 October 2018, secondary orders were issued granting an extension of time (the Extension Order(s)) and extending the dates for compliance but contained the same terms as in the first Orders. Still not satisfied that those orders had been complied with, the Council itself undertook steps to render the premises safe. These steps included complete demolition of the buildings.
On 8 January 2019, the Council issued an invoice to Bequick in the sum $137,092.24 being what it considered to be Bequick's proper share of the total costs. This invoice remained unpaid.
On 20 May 2021, the Council issued a letter to Bequick enclosing invoice no. 10621 for the sum of $148,106.61.
On 11 October 2021, SR Legal issued a letter of demand to Bequick demanding of invoice no. 10621. Bequick has not paid this debt.
By statement of claim dated 12 July 2022, the Council brings an action against Bequick, one of the proprietors in debt, seeking reimbursement of funds expended in rendering the premises safe after the fire.
By way of cross-claim dated 13 September 2022, Bequick brings an action against the Council for damages caused by trespass to land, claiming that the Council had no authority to enter into and demolish the property.
As the balance of the issues are raised in the cross-claim; it is therefore convenient that I deal with Bequick’s cross-claim first.
The pleading framework is set out in detail later in this judgment.
Coonamble is a small town in central western New South Wales. It is about a 6-hour drive from Sydney, a 2-hour drive from Dubbo, and a 3-hour drive from Tamworth. Coonamble’s high street is Castlereagh Street.
At all relevant times, the Council was constituted as the local council for the Coonamble local government area under ss 219 and 220(1) of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW).
In about December 2016, Bequick purchased the property at 81-83 Castlereagh Street, Coonamble for $150,000 (Exhibit GW-A 1, par 14). The property was located at the corner of Castlereagh and Aberford Streets. Mr Wooding was and still is the sole director of Bequick.
The building on the property was approximately 100 years old, although, it had not been classed as a heritage item pursuant to the Coonamble Local Environment Plan 2011 (NSW). Mr Wooding had assumed otherwise and only learnt on the first day of the hearing that it was not heritage listed (T86.1-13). However, the Commercial Hotel across the road of which Mr Wooding, through Bequick, was the proprietor is listed as a heritage item (Coonamble Local Environment Plan Sch 5 Pt 1).
During Bequick’s ownership of the property, including up to the date of the fire, the property lay vacant. At that time, it was not used for commercial purposes (GW-A 1, par 17). Mr Wooding’s intention was to develop the property into a motel/motor inn named “the Woolshed Motor Inn” to complement the Commercial Hotel across the road and create an accommodation precinct in town (GW-A 1, par 25).
In about July 2018, Mr Wooding engaged Josephine Redden (Ms Redden), a building designer, to develop some schematic plans in relation to the property on the basis that he was interested in turning it into a motor inn (GW-A 1, par 26). On 2 August 2018 (prior to the fire), Ms Redden visited the property. She relied upon her affidavit and gave evidence that, in her view, the property was “run down and not in use” (Exhibit JR-A, par 10). However, it was nonetheless “solid, structurally sound and simple” (JR-A, par 11), “[t]he walls of the building were double brick, with sections of triple brick” (JR-A, par 14). Her evidence is a subject to which I will return. She took several photographs of the property which are in evidence (CB, p 626-640). I reproduce one of them below (CB, p 636):
As previously mentioned at about 12:30am on 23 August 2018, a fire which was started by an unknown person damaged the property that was in a row of adjoining buildings. The fire-damaged properties were:
79 Castlereagh Street, owned by A M Karanough and A Rangiawha;
81-83 Castlereagh Street (i.e. the property), owned by Bequick;
48-50 Aberford Street, owned by Raynbut Pty Ltd; and
52 Aberford Street, owned by Kype Pty Ltd. (the four fire-damaged properties).
Mr Wooding witnessed the fire as it occurred. He was working as the barman at the Commercial Hotel that is diagonally opposite the property. He deposed (GW-1 A, pars 30-34):
“[30] In the early hours of Thursday, 23 August 2018, at about 12.30am, a fire started in one of the other lots. I was closing the [Commercial Hotel] at the time. I had been the barman than evening and still had a couple of patrons finishing up. One of the patrons noticed something outside so we drew the window blind and saw the flickering fire. I saw the electrical sparks and fire coming from the closed café shop. We contacted the fire brigade.
[31] Five to ten minutes passed. The fire travelled in an easterly direction to the Anglican Church Op shop and as the fire got larger it spread west toward my building. Once the fire entered in the building on my [p]roperty, I recall it was only about 30 minutes until the metal roof/ceiling dropped inwards to the floor. I watched the area until about 5:30am. Afterwards, in the early morning, people and the media milled around to have a look and take photos.
…
[33] I also understood from the Fire Captain who attended the fire, that the fire had started in an adjoining building at 50 Aberford Street [the café].
[34] I saw the fire caused extensive but varying damage to the timbers of the 4 lots, including the [p]roperty.”
Following the fire, the Council deployed a number of staff to assist emergency services and control the area.
Having extinguished the fire, the NSW Fire Brigade provided a Site Handover form to the Council (CB, p 646). That form identified various hazards on the site, including asbestos, loose roofing materials, sharp edges and structural damage.
At 7:30am, the Council engaged Wooding Hire on the same morning (another business owned Mr Wooding (GW-A 1, par 13)), to erect fencing around the fire-damaged properties so that they could not be accessed by the public. Half an hour later, at 8:00am, Mr Wooding with the help of an employee, started erecting this fencing. The fencing was placed along the kerbs and gutters or roadway around all the properties (GW-A 1, par 35-38).
The Council paid various invoices to Wooding Hire in relation to temporary fencing hire in relation to those properties on Castlereagh Street and Aberford Street, Coonamble, impacted by the fire.
124 Orders
A council may order a person to do or to refrain from doing a thing specified in Column 1 of the following Table if the circumstances specified opposite it in Column 2 of the Table exist and the person comes within the description opposite it in Column 3 of the Table.
…
| | Column 1 To do what? | Column 2 In what circumstances? | Column 3 To whom? | | 21 | To do or refrain from doing such things as are specified in the order to ensure that land is, or premises are, placed or kept in a safe or healthy condition | The land or premises are not in a safe or healthy condition | Owner or occupier of land or premises |
129 Circumstances in which compliance with this Division is required
(1) Before giving an order, a council must comply with this Division.
(2) This section does not apply to—
…
(b) an order given, and expressed to be given, in an emergency.
130 Effect of compliance with this Division
A council that complies with this Division is taken to have observed the rules of natural justice (the rules of procedural fairness).
131 Criteria to be considered before order is given
If the council has adopted criteria in a local policy under Part 3 on which it is to give an order, the council is required to take the criteria into consideration before giving the order.
…
132 Notice to be given of proposed order
(1) Before giving an order, a council must give notice to the person to whom the order is proposed to be given of its intention to give the order, the terms of the proposed order and the period proposed to be specified as the period within which the order is to be complied with.
(2) The council’s notice must also indicate that the person to whom the order is proposed to be given may make representations to the council as to why the order should not be given or as to the terms of or period for compliance with the order.
(3) The notice may provide that the representations are to be made to the council or a specified committee of the council on a specified meeting date or to a specified councillor or employee of the council on or before a specified date being, in either case, a date that is reasonable in the circumstances of the case.
133 Making of representations
(1) A person may, in accordance with a notice under section 132, make representations concerning the proposed order.
(2) For the purpose of making the representations, the person may be represented by an Australian legal practitioner or agent.
134 Hearing and consideration of representations
The council or a specified committee, or the specified councillor or employee of the council, is required to hear and to consider any representations made under section 133.
135 Procedure after hearing and consideration of representations
(1) After hearing and considering any representations made concerning the proposed order, the council, the committee, or the councillor or employee concerned, may determine—
(a) to give an order in accordance with the proposed order, or
(b) to give an order in accordance with modifications made to the proposed order, or
(c) not to give an order.
(2) If the determination is to give an order in accordance with modifications made to the proposed order, the council is not required to give notice under this Division of the proposed order as so modified.
136 Reasons for orders to be given
(1) A council must give the person to whom an order is directed the reasons for the order.
(2) The reasons may be given in the order or in a separate instrument.
(3) The reasons must be given when the order is given, except in a case of urgency. In a case of urgency, the reasons may be given the next working day.
137 Period for compliance with order
(1) An order must specify a reasonable period within which the terms of the order are to be complied with, subject to this section.
(2) An order may require immediate compliance with its terms in circumstances which the council believes constitute a serious risk to health or safety or an emergency.
138 Notice of right to appeal against order
(1) A council must, in giving a person notice of an order—
(a) state that the person may appeal to the Land and Environment Court against the order or a specified part of the order, and
(b) specify the period within which an appeal may be made.
(2) This section does not apply in relation to order No 22A in the Table to section 124.
…
143 Combined orders
(1) A council may include two or more orders in the same instrument.
(2) However, an order in terms of order No 22A in the Table to section 124 cannot be included with another order in the same instrument.
144 Giving and taking effect of orders
An order is given by serving a copy of the order on the person to whom it is addressed and takes effect from the time of service or a later time specified in the order.
…
152 Modification of orders
A council may, at any time, modify an order it has given to a person (including a modification of the period specified for compliance with the order) if the person agrees to that modification.
153 Revocation of orders
(1) An order given by the council may be revoked by the council at any time.
(2) An order given by the Minister may be revoked by the Minister at any time.
…
“Dear Sir/Madam,
EMERGENCY ORDER UNDER THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT 1993 (NSW) IN RELATION TO THE PREMISES AT LOT 51 0P253491, ALSO KNOWN AS 81-83 CASTLEREAGH STREET COONAMBLE NSW 2829.
A recent inspection of the above premises on 23 August by an Environmental Health Officer, Matthew Cock of Coonamble Shire Council has revealed that the premises is likely to contain asbestos which may pose a threat to public health. The asbestos is likely to have been disturbed due to the recent fire at the premises.
Accordingly, the Council, as the 'appropriate authority' under the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) (the 'Act') is of the opinion that circumstances now exist to warrant the giving of an Emergency Order No. 21 directing you to make the premises safe and engage a licensed contractor to identify and remove asbestos from the premises.
EMERGENCY ORDER P[U]RSUANT TO SECTIONS 124 & 129 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT, 1993 (NSW)
TO WHOM:
BEQUICK PTY LTD
TO DO WHAT:
- Render the premises safe.
- Erect fences surrounding the premises to prevent entry by unauthorised people.
- Engage an Occupational Hygienist to identify all areas that contain asbestos on the premises and furnish this report to Council.
- Engage a licensed contractor to spray PVA sealant and dye.
- Engage a licensed contractor to remove the asbestos and demolish and remove all building debris from the premises make site safe and dispose to a licensed facility.
- Furnish Council with receipts from the licensed facility for the disposal of the asbestos.
REASONS FOR ORDER: (Section 136 of the Act)
The above-mentioned premises is not in a safe or healthy condition, namely that the recent fire on the premises is likely to have exposed asbestos on the premises. This may pose a threat to public health. The fire has left the buildings in an unsafe manner and is a danger to public safety.
PERIOD FOR COMPLIANCE: (Section 137 of the Act)
Points 1 & 2 are to be completed within 24 hours from the date of this Emergency Order 29/08/2018.
Point 3 to be completed within 72 hours from the date of this Emergency Order 29/08/2018.
Point 4 is to be completed within 7 days from the date of this Emergency Order 29/08/2018.
Points 5 & 6 are to be completed within 21 days from the date of this Emergency Order 29/08/2018
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE ORDER: (Section 628 of the Act)
It is an offence pursuant to Section 628 of the Act to fail to comply with this Order. You are reminded that should the terms of the Order not be complied with, Council may commence legal proceedings in the appropriate Court with jurisdiction for such a matter. The Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) provides a maximum penalty of $2200 for failure to comply with this Order.
In addition, Council may also choose to exercise its powers pursuant to Section 678 of the Act to do all such things that are necessary or convenient to give effect to the Order and recover all costs incurred as a debt due back to Council.
RIGHT OF APPEAL AGAINST THE ORDER: (Sections 138 & 180 of the Act)
Pursuant to Section 180 of the Act an Individual(s) or corporation affected by the Order may appeal to the Land and Environment Court of NSW against the Order or a specified part of the Order within 28 days after the service of the Order.
In addition, Council may also choose to exercise its powers pursuant to Section 678 of the Act to do all such things that are necessary or convenient to give effect to the Order and recover all costs incurred as a debt due back to Council.
RIGHT OF APPEAL AGAINST THE ORDER: (Sections 138 & 180 of the Act)
Pursuant to Section 180 of the Act an Individual(s) or corporation affected by the Order may appeal to the Land and Environment Court of NSW against the Order or a specified part of the Order within 28 days after the service of the Order.
Note: Section 710 of the Act includes the following modes of service:
(a) personal, or
(b) by delivering the notice at or on the premises at which the person to be served lives or carries on business, and leaving it with any person apparently above the age of 14 years resident or employed at the premises, or
(c) by posting the notice by prepaid letter addressed to the last known place of residence or business or post office box of the person to be served, or
(d) by transmitting the notice by facsimile transmission to a number specified by the person (on correspondence or otherwise) as a number to which facsimile transmissions to that person may be sent, or
(d) by transmitting the notice by electronic mail to an email address specified by the person (on correspondence or otherwise) as an address to which electronic mail to that person may be transmitted, or
(e) by fixing the notice on any conspicuous part of the land, building or premises owned or occupied by the person, or
(f) in the case of an offence involving a vehicle, by attaching the notice to the vehicle, or
(g) if the person to be served maintains a box at a document exchange established in New South Wales, by depositing the notice in that box or leaving it at another such exchange for transmission to the first mentioned exchange for deposit in that box.
Finally, should you choose to comply with the Order by the specified period then the matter will be finalised requiring no further action.
NOTES FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE:
The above penalties are the maximum that the relevant Court can impose, and the Court has significant discretion in deciding the amount of any penalty below that maximum. However, as a guide, the relevant Penalty Infringement Notice for failure to Comply with this Order provides for a penalty amount of $330.
Should you require any assistance understanding the Order or you require further information please do not hesitate to contact, Matthew Cock on XXX during office hours to discuss your options. Council cannot provide legal advice to you and Council recommends that you seek independent legal advice.
Yours faithfully
Matthew Cock
MANAGER ENVIROMENTAL SERVICES”
Mr Wooding’s position is that he, as far as he was able, substantially complied with the Orders. The Council had a different view. The Council was of the opinion that Mr Wooding had not complied with the Orders at all. A subject which I will return.
Under s 628 of the Local Government Act, it is an offence to fail to comply with an order. It reads as follows:
628 Failure to comply with order
(1) A person who fails to comply with an order given to the person under Part 2 of Chapter 7 that is an order in the terms of any of orders Nos 1, 3, 5 and 7–12 in the Table to section 124 is guilty of an offence.
Maximum penalty—50 penalty units (in the case of an individual) or 100 penalty units (in the case of a corporation).
(1A) A person who fails to comply with an order given to the person under Part 2 of Chapter 7 that is an order in the terms of any of orders Nos 15, 16 or 17 in the Table to section 124 is guilty of an offence.
Maximum penalty—100 penalty units (in the case of an individual) or 200 penalty units (in the case of a corporation).
(2) A person who fails to comply with an order given to the person under Part 2 of Chapter 7 that is an order in the terms of any of orders Nos 18–25 or 27–29 of the Table to section 124 is guilty of an offence.
Maximum penalty—20 penalty units.
(3) A person who fails to comply with an order given to the person under Part 2 of Chapter 7 that is an order in the terms of order No 30 in the Table to section 124 is guilty of an offence.
Maximum penalty—The same penalty as the penalty imposed for carrying out the activity the subject of the approval otherwise than in accordance with the approval.
(4) A person who fails to comply with an order given to the person under section 125 to abate a public nuisance is guilty of an offence.
Maximum penalty—20 penalty units.
(5) It is a sufficient defence to a prosecution for an offence to which this section applies if the defendant satisfies the court that the defendant was unaware of the fact that the activity in respect of which the offence arose was the subject of an order under Part 2 of Chapter 7.
678 Failure to comply with order—carrying out of work by the council
(1) If a person fails to comply with the terms of an order given to the person under Part 2 of Chapter 7, the council may do all such things as are necessary or convenient to give effect to the terms of the order, including the carrying out of any work required by the order.
(2) If the council gives effect to an order by demolishing a building, the council—
(a) may remove any materials concerned, and
(b) may sell the materials, unless the expenses of the council in giving effect to the terms of the order are paid to it within 14 days after removal of the materials.
(3) If the proceeds of such a sale exceed the expenses incurred by the council in relation to the demolition and the sale, the council—
(a) may deduct out of the proceeds of the sale an amount equal to those expenses, and
(b) must pay the surplus to the owner on demand.
(4) If the proceeds of sale do not exceed those expenses, the council—
(a) may retain the proceeds, and
(b) may recover the deficiency (if any) together with its costs of recovery from the owner as a debt.
(5) Materials removed that are not saleable may be destroyed or otherwise disposed of.
(6) Any expenses incurred by the council under this section (less the proceeds, if any, of any sale under this section) together with all its associated costs may be recovered by the council in any court of competent jurisdiction as a debt due to the council by the person concerned.
(7) Nothing in subsection (3), (4) or (6) affects the owner’s right to recover any amount from any lessee or other person liable for the expenses of repairs.
(8) A reference in subsection (4) or (6) to costs is a reference to costs incurred by the council in seeking to recover the deficiency or expenses otherwise than by proceedings in a court, but nothing in this section prevents the council from receiving costs as between party and party in respect of those proceedings.
(9) A council may exercise its functions under this section irrespective of whether the person concerned has been prosecuted for an offence under section 628.
(10) In any proceedings before the Land and Environment Court that are brought by a council against a person as a result of the person’s failure to comply with an order under Part 2 of Chapter 7, the Court may, at any stage of the proceedings, order the council to exercise the council’s functions under this section. Having made such an order, the Court may continue to hear and determine the proceedings or may dismiss the proceedings.
191 Power of entry
(1) For the purpose of enabling a council to exercise its functions, a council employee (or other person) authorised by a council may enter any premises.
(2) Entry may only be made at any reasonable hour in the daytime or at any hour during which business is in progress or is usually carried on at the premises.
…
192 Inspections and investigations
For the purpose of enabling a council to exercise its functions, a person authorised to enter premises under this Part may—
(a) inspect the premises and any food, vehicle, article, matter or thing on the premises, and
(b) for the purpose of an inspection—
(i) open any ground and remove any flooring and take such measures as may be necessary to ascertain the character and condition of the premises and of any pipe, sewer, drain, wire or fitting, and
(ii) require the opening, cutting into or pulling down of any work if the person authorised has reason to believe or suspect that anything on the premises has been done in contravention of this Act or the regulations, and
(c) take measurements, make surveys and take levels and, for those purposes, dig trenches, break up the soil and set up any posts, stakes or marks, and
(d) require any person at those premises to answer questions or otherwise furnish information in relation to the matter the subject of the inspection or investigation, and
(e) examine and test any meter, and
(f) measure a supply of water, and
(g) take samples or photographs in connection with any inspection.
193 Notice of entry
(1) Before a person authorised to enter premises under this Part does so, the council must give the owner or occupier of the premises written notice of the intention to enter the premises.
(2) The notice must specify the day on which the person intends to enter the premises and must be given before that day.
(3) This section does not require notice to be given—
(a) if entry to the premises is made with the consent of the owner or occupier of the premises, or
(b) if entry to the premises is required because of the existence or reasonable likelihood of a serious risk to health or safety, or
(c) if entry is required urgently and the case is one in which the general manager has authorised in writing (either generally or in the particular case) entry without notice, or
…
From about 19 September 2018 (the final date, in the Council’s opinion, for Bequick’s compliance with the Orders), the Council commenced taking steps to make safe the property. Briefly, those steps included the following:
On 19 September 2018, the Council engaged Richard Noonan (Mr Noonan) of Barnson Pty Ltd, a structural engineer, to inspect the fire-damaged properties and prepare a report for Council. On 21 September 2018, Mr Noonan forwarded his report to the Council (Barnson Report). It was recommended that the entire property (including the masonry walls and awnings) be demolished.
On 23 September 2018, the Council engaged Newbold Bulk Haulage Pty Ltd (Newbold Bulk Haulage) (of which Mr Newbold was the director), a licensed demolition and asbestos removal contractor, to clean-up friable asbestos on the footpath areas around the properties. This work was carried out between 24 and 28 September 2018.
In early October 2018, the Council engaged Philip Clifton (Mr Clifton) of P. Clifton & Associates Pty Ltd (P. Clifton & Associates), an occupational hygienist and Safework NSW licensed asbestos assessor, to inspect the fire-damaged buildings and prepare a scope of work for the removal of fire-damaged asbestos containing materials and asbestos contaminated materials on the site (BQ-A 1, par 22). On 4 October 2018, the Council received this report (Clifton Report). The contents of this report is a subject to which I will return.
On 23 October 2018, the Council again engaged Newbold Bulk Haulage with instructions to remediate the site.
On 5 October 2018, the Council was still of the opinion that Bequick and the other property owners had not complied with the Orders, so it issued a secondary order extending the time for compliance, the Extension Order. The Extension Order was in the following terms:
“Dear Sir/Madam,
…
We note that you are the owner of the abovementioned premises.
On 27 August 2018 an Emergency Order in the terms of an order no. 21 in the Table to section 124 of the Local Government Act 1993 ("LG Act") was served upon you. The Emergency Order was served upon you because fire had caused substantial damage to the abovementioned premises. Not only did the fire damage cause asbestos to be exposed, it also rendered the premises in an unsafe and unhealthy condition.
The Emergency Order required you to attend to the following:
- Render the premises safe.
- Erect fences surrounding the premises to prevent entry by unauthorised people.
- Engage an Occupational Hygienist to identify all areas that contain asbestos on the premises and furnish this report to Council.
- Engage a licensed contractor to spray PVA sealant and dye.
- Engage a licensed contractor to remove the asbestos and demolish and remove all building debris from the premises make site safe and dispose to a licensed facility.
- Furnish Council with receipts from the licensed facility for the disposal of the asbestos.
The Emergency Order required you to attend to all of these things over staged periods with the last matters as required by emergency orders 5 and 6 to be attended to by 17 September 2018.
A recent inspection of the above mentioned premises has confirmed that you have not complied with any of the terms of the Emergency Order.
The Emergency Order also contained details which confirmed that the failure to comply with the terms of the order is an offence under the LG Act and that in the event of your failure to comply with the terms of the order the Council may do all such things that are necessary or convenient to give effect to the Emergency Order and recover all costs incurred as a debt due back to Council. In this regard section 678 of the LG Act provides:
[Section 678 of the Local Government Act is quoted in full. It has already been set out earlier in this judgment]
This letter is to advise that Council provides you with an extension of time to comply with the terms of the Emergency Order being until close of business on Monday, 15 October 2018. Council puts you on notice that should you fail to comply with the terms of the Emergency Order by close of business on Monday, 15 October 2018 then Council will enter onto the premises without further notice to you and do all such things as are necessary or convenient to give effect to the terms of the Emergency Order. Council also puts you on notice that should it be required to take these steps it will also be seeking to recover from you all associated expenses and costs incurred.
Please give this matter your urgent attention.
Yours faithfully
…
Matthew Cock
Manager Environmental Services”
On 9 October 2018, Mr Wooding’s evidence is that he received a copy of the Extension Order (GW-A 1, par 76). He says that he also complied with the Extension Order (GW-A 1, pars 93-99). The Council’s opinion differed, namely, that Mr Wooding had not sufficiently complied with either the Orders or the Extension Order.
On 10 October 2018, the Council adopted a resolution in the following terms (resolution 4098):
“11.4 FIRE DAMAGED BUILDINGS – CASTLEREAGH & ABERFORD STREETS, COONAMBLE
4098 RESOLVED on the motion of Crs. Karanouh and Webb that Council:
…
b) note that if the Order is not complied with by 15 October 2018, Council will, without further notice, enter upon the property to demolish, make safe and dispose of all debris on the sites and the costs will be recovered from the owners of the properties.”
(Citations omitted.)
“Dear Sir,
RE: BURNT OUT SHOPS ON THE CORNER OF ABERFORD AND CASTLEREAGH STREETS, COONAMBLE NSW 2829
Coonamble Shire Council has issued an Emergency Order on the four shop owners requesting that the sites be demolished and cleaned up due to debris and friable asbestos in Castlereagh and Aberford Streets, Coonamble. To date the owners have not complied with emergency order.
Coonamble Shire Council will now under Section 678 of the Local Government Act request Newbold Bulk Haulage Pty Ltd to demolish and clean-up the burnt out shops in Castlereagh and Aberford Street, Coonamble. The works are to be carried out ASAP as the asbestos possess a health risk to the general public in the surrounding area.
Should you have any further queries or concerns regarding the above matter, please do not hesitate to contact Council's Manager of Environmental Services Matthew Cock on [XXX].
Yours faithfully
…
MATTHEW COCK
Manager Environmental Services”
On about 29 October 2018, after the date of expiration of the Extension Order dated 15 October 2018, Mr Newbold, engaged by the Council, began the clean-up work and completed it by mid-November 2018 (Exhibit CN-A, pars 13-35). Mr Newbold gave evidence and was cross-examined, which I will refer to his evidence in more detail shortly.
With respect to all four fire-damaged properties, the Council incurred expenses totalling $258,614.51 excl GST in respect of their demolition, clean-up and remediation. On 8 January 2019, the Council issued an invoice to Mr Wooding of Bequick in the sum $137,092.24.
By letter dated 29 March 2019, the Council explained to Mr Wooding that the distribution of costs had been carried out on the basis of the percentage share of each property with relation to the whole.
On 12 October 2020, Mr Quarmby issued a letter of instruction to Graeme Walton-Smith (Mr Walton-Smith) of Walton Smith Consultants Pty Ltd, a quantity surveyor, to prepare a report as to the apportionment of the clean-up costs between the four owners (Walton Smith Report) (CB, p 980-991).
On 13 January 2021, Mr Quarmby received a report from Walton Smith Consultants. The Walton Smith Report dated 13 January 2021 held the opinion that a proper apportionment of costs would have required Bequick to contribute $148,106.62.
On 10 March 2021, following receipt of the Walton Smith Report, the Council passed a resolution at its ordinary meeting in which it resolved to reissue the invoices to the four property owners, but updated in accordance with the Walton Smith Report.
On 20 May 2021, the Council issue the new invoice to Bequick in the amount of $148,106.61.
On 11 October 2021, SR Law, acting on behalf of the Council, issued a letter of demand to Bequick demanding payment of the latter invoice within seven days from the date of the letter.
On 12 July 2022, the Council filed a statement of claim against Bequick as the defendant in the District Court of New South Wales seeking judgment in debt for an amount of $148,131.84 as principal, plus costs and interest in the total sum of $157,648.31.
The Orders and the Extension Order were set out in the statement of claim. The Council pleaded that Bequick had not complied with the Orders and Extension Order and sought to recover in debt exercising its statutory cause of action under s 678(6) of the Local Government Act. It claimed the sum of $148,131.84.
“The various periods for compliance with points 1 to 6 of the s. 124 notice were each expressed to be a certain number of days 'from the date of this emergency order 29/08/2018'. As there was no emergency order dated 29 August 2019, the notice is ambiguous and thus invalid.”
On 21 September 2022, Bequick filed a summons in this Court seeking that the proceedings be removed from the District Court and transferred to this Court. An order was made for the District Court proceedings to be transferred to this Court.
On 11 February 2025, the Council filed an amended defence to the cross-claim. In short, the amended defence pleaded that the Orders and the Extension Order were both valid. However, it also relied upon s 43A of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (CLA) in response to Bequick’s trespass claim against the Council. Yet another subject to which I will return.
Bequick also pleaded, in its defence to the statement of claim, that the Extension Order was invalid or ineffective. Bequick pleaded that, by the time that the Extension Order was issued, the property had been made safe. That is to say that the terms of the Order had been complied with. It pleaded that the power contemplated by s 678 of the Local Government Act never arose.
By way of its cross-claim, Bequick repeated the pleadings as made in it’s defence, and sought damages in excess of $842,045.01 for the Council’s trespass. It also seeks damages for rebuild costs and lost opportunity costs. Both the Orders and the Extension Order are again pleaded to have been invalid and to no effect, therefore the Council had no authority to enter Bequick’s land and so its acts of remediation (ultimately, demolition) are actionable as trespass.
Bequick additionally pleaded that it was denied natural justice because it was not informed of the Council’s intention, in the course of remediation, to demolish the building.
As I understand it, there are five issues which must be dealt with to dispose of the dispute between the parties. They will be dealt with in the following order:
Does s 43A of the CLA operate to prevent any cause of action ever accruing to Bequick?
Did the Orders have legal effect or were they void?
Did Bequick comply with the terms of the Orders?
At any point during the process, was Bequick denied procedural fairness and, if so, what is the legal effect of this? And finally,
Damages.
The Council relied on the following evidence:
Affidavits of Bruce Quarmby (Mr Quarmby) dated 12 January 2024 (BQ-A 1) and 19 November 2024 (BQ-A 2) and 4 September 2025 (BQ-A 3). Mr Quarmby was the Council’s director of corporate services. He attended the hearing for a few days but ultimately was not required for cross-examination.
An affidavit of Chris Newbold (Mr Newbold) dated 10 February 2025 (CN-A 1). Mr Newbold is the director of Newbold Bulk Haulage, a company which completed remedial and demolition works for the Council. Mr Newbold gave evidence and was cross-examined on 8 September 2025.
An expert report of Imad Fares (Mr Fares), a quantity surveyor, dated 5 November 2024 (Council Expert Report). He gave evidence and was cross-examined in conclave with Mr Luscombe on 10 September 2025 and was further cross-examined, separately, on 12 September 2025.
Affidavit of Samatha Ann Peterson (Ms Peterson), the Council’s solicitor, dated 3 September 2025.
Bequick relied on the following evidence:
Affidavits of Gary Wooding dated 5 July 2024 (GW-A 1) and 21 March 2025 (GW-A 2). Mr Wooding gave evidence and was cross-examined at length.
An affidavit of Josephine Redden dated 8 July 2024 (JR-A 1). Ms Redden was a building designer. She gave evidence and was cross-examined. She gave evidence in relation to the inspection of the property both before and after the property. She accompanied Mr Wooding on both occasions. Ms Redden’s evidence accords with that that of Mr Wooding. I will deal with the inspection by Mr Wooding and Ms Redden together.
Expert reports of David Luscombe (Mr Luscombe) dated 5 July 2024 (Bequick Expert Report 1) and 28 March 2025 (Bequick Expert Report 2). Mr Luscombe is a building estimator. He assessed damages. He gave conclave evidence together with Mr Fares.
The parties relied on a joint expert report of Mr Luscombe and Mr Fares dated 23 July 2025 (Joint Expert Report) in which they were in substantial disagreement.
The structural inspection report of Mr Noonan of Barnson Pty Ltd dated 21 September 2018, the Barnson Report, is also relied upon by both parties. Mr Noonan did not give evidence and was not required for cross-examination.
On 21 September 2018, at the request of the Council, Mr Noonan, prepared the Barnson Report. This report was based on an inspection of the property and adjacent fire-damaged properties on 19 September 2018.
The Barnson Report reads as follows:
“1.0 INTRODUCTION
The following report aims to advise on the structural condition of the remaining structure of commercial buildings on the corner of Castlereagh Street and Aberford Street, Coonamble, which were damaged extensively by fire on the 22nd August 2018. The report was requested by Matthew Cock of Coonamble Shire Council.
2.0 STRUCTURAL INSPECTION
The burnt out buildings were inspected by Richard Noonan, practising structural engineer with Barnson Pty Ltd, on 19th September 2018. Access to the street footpath was available, however due to burnt rubble and existence of friable asbestos, internal access to the buildings was not possible. Therefore, the below inspection comments are not based on any detailed internal inspection, except for that visible from the street.
The buildings inspected are those shown on the below site plan. The building comments are divided into the set of four commercial shops on Aberford St (No. s 50-52) and the three connected shops on Castlereagh Street (No. s 79-83).
Figure 1: Site Plan
2.1 50-52 Aberford Street
These four shops were noted to consist of double brick side and rear walls with a timber framed clad shop front. The roof framing has been destroyed by the fire and is now offering no lateral restraint to the walls. The front façade, above roof level, has been destroyed by fire. However, the shop fronts below ceiling level are still standing. Some fire damage to the shop front wall framing could be noted near the side walls. The damage to the inside of these walls is likely to be greater.
The intertenancy double brick walls are still standing, yet have some bricks dislodged at the top from where the timber rafters have dislodged. Wall height is estimated from external measurements to be 4 metres.
…
2.2 79-83 Castlereagh Street
The three shops on Castlereagh Street also have collapsed roofs. The shop fronts and steel frame cantilever awnings are still standing, however the facades above roof level are destroyed. The intertenancy double brick walls are still standing yet have local damage at the top where the rafters have dislodged.
…
…
3.0 STRUCTURAL RECTIFICATION
The masonry walls on all buildings are currently unrestrained by roof framing and thus have insufficient capacity to resist lateral loading. Therefore, the walls are in danger of collapse if sufficient wind or seismic loading was to occur. The Castlereagh Street awnings are also not adequately tied down and would fall from uplift wind forces.
It is recommended that the walls are demolished when the burnt roof debris is removed. The remaining shop front framing needs to be removed at the same time, along with the awnings on Castlereagh Street. Precautions need to be made for the removal of friable asbestos in accordance with Workcover guidelines.
There may be heritage conservation issues, where the demolition of the building is regarded to be not desirable. However, most of the heritage construction, including the roofs and facades, have been lost by the fire. The remaining masonry walls appear to have no significant features on their own. This statement is made with the fact that the writer has no heritage qualifications, and further [advice] from a heritage architect is recommended if Council is concerned by this issue.
The remaining shell of the buildings could not be repaired economically, compared to complete demolition and re-building.
The shops adjacent to 79 Castlereagh Street are reportedly unaffected by the fire. However, the shop next door (no. 77) does rely on it's awning to be supported by a cantilever beam which is fastened to the common wall. As reported above, this beam and it's fixing to the masonry have been affected by heat. It is recommended in the short term, this beam be provided with a column near the end of the cantilever. A suitable short term column is an 89 x 3.5SHS fixed to a concrete footing in the footpath of 600mm square by 900mm deep. In the long term, the beam and it's fixing should be replaced or stiffened.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The fire in the buildings on the corner of Castlereagh and Aberford Streets, Coonamble have destroyed the roof and façade of each building reported on. The remaining masonry walls have no lateral restraint and will collapse under sufficient wind or seismic loads.
The awning to Castlereagh Street is also inadequately fixed and is in danger of collapse from wind loading.
It is recommended the entire buildings with awnings are demolished.”
“1 INTRODUCTION
This technical specification provides (sic) details the findings of an asbestos materials site inspection, the asbestos removal scope of work, work procedures and occupational health and safety precautions to be observed for the removal of fire damaged asbestos containing materials and asbestos contaminated materials that are present within the commercial property at 79 – 83 Castlereagh Street, Coonamble NSW and 48 – 52 Aberford Street, Coonamble NSW (the site).
The site comprises seven retail premises which were all destroyed by a fire that occurred within the building on the night of 22/23 August 2018. This fire has destroyed the whole of the building with only the masonry walls and shop fronts remaining. All timber framing within the building has been burnt or destroyed with the metal roof collapsing into the building.
Asbestos cement sheet materials on the western and southern street front facades of the building have been burnt and broken during the fire and work to extinguish the fire. Asbestos cement sheet cladding remains on these elevations of the building across with debris on top of the awning extending along the western Castlereagh Street side of the building.
The rear of the premises fronting Castlereagh Street had asbestos cement sheet cladding present to various walls and this material has been burnt and broken with asbestos cement sheet scattered over the paved and unpaved ground areas adjacent to the rear of these premises. There are pieces of burnt and broken asbestos cement debris within each of the premises in the building.
2 FINDINGS OF SITE INSPECTION
The fire which occurred in the commercial building at 79 – 83 Castlereagh Street, Coonamble NSW and 48 – 52 Aberford Street, Coonamble NSW has caused extensive damage to the building with the roof framing and all internal partition walls having been burnt. The metal roof cladding and framing have collapsed into the building and cover most of the fire debris within the building.
Remaining construction materials in the building include the collapsed metal roof cladding, masonry walls, and timber or metal shop front windows and entry doors. The timber framed wall above the shopfront windows and entry doors along Castlereagh Street has mostly collapsed and the remains of the wall and the cladding are present within the building and on the roof of the awning over the foot path...
The timber framed walls at the top of each of the shopfronts along both Castlereagh Street and Aberford Street were clad with flat asbestos cement sheet. Debris from these walls is present within the building.
Ash and fire debris on the footpaths along the western and southern sides of the building has been removed however since this work was completed some charred timber and ash has blown out of the building onto these footpath areas.
The internal areas of the building were unable to be accessed during the site inspection due to the collapsed roof, and the full extent of asbestos containing and contaminated materials within the building was unable to be assessed. Inspection from the front and rear areas of each of the premises within the building found there to be burnt and broken asbestos cement sheet debris present. All debris within the building is assumed to be asbestos contaminated.
The electrical backing boards within each of the premises in the building are ‘Zelemite’ boards that contains chrysotile asbestos.
Located at the rear of 79 – 83 Castlereagh Street there is large quantity of burnt and broken asbestos cement sheet debris from the wall cladding that was present in these areas.
…
3 SCOPE OF ASBESTOS REMOVAL WORK
The demolition and removal of asbestos contaminated fire debris from within the building will require access by mechanical equipment. This work will be difficult to carry out in single premises and therefore each of the premises within the building will need to be demolished concurrently.
We recommend that the asbestos removal work therefore be carried out in two stages with stage 1 being the removal of fire debris from the footpaths and front walls (west and south sides fronting Castlereagh and Aberford Streets) of the building with the shopfronts to be boarded over with plywood at the completion of the work to contain debris within the building.
The removal the debris from the interior of the building and demolition of the building to ground or concrete floor slab level will form the second stage of the asbestos removal and decontamination work.
Stage 1 Work
The following scope of work is to be completed at the site to remove accessible asbestos containing materials and asbestos contaminated materials from the street front areas of the building, including the footpaths and Castlereagh Street awning area:
The temporary fencing across the front and side of the site is to remain in place and form the perimeter of the asbestos removal area along these sides of the building.
Place 0.2mm plastic sheeting, geo-fabric or shade cloth on the temporary fencing on the west and south sides of the building. Asbestos removal warning signs are to be placed on the temporary fencing and at the entry gate into the removal work area of the site.
Remove all of the ash and other fire debris on the steps / ledges, etc. along the shop front areas and also from the footpaths, within the kerb gutters, on the roadways and within the garden area at the south west area of the site. This asbestos contaminated material is to be placed into asbestos waste bags for disposal as asbestos contaminated waste.
HEPA filtered vacuum equipment is to be used to clean debris from the spaces between the payers on the footpath and in joins in the concrete paving and kerb guttering (where present). The mulch in the garden area is to be removed and disposed of as asbestos contaminated waste.
Remove asbestos cement sheet debris from the awning roof along the western side of the building. This material is to be bagged for disposal as asbestos contaminated waste.
Remove the remaining asbestos cement sheet cladding from the framed walls along the top of the western and southern sides of the building and bag for disposal as asbestos contaminated waste. Demolish the timber framing and place inside the building with the other fire debris.
Remove the remaining asbestos cement sheet cladding from the framed walls above each of the shop fronts and bag for disposal as asbestos contaminated waste.
Securely fix plywood panels over the shopfronts to contain the debris within the building and prevent unauthorised access.
Stage 2 Work
The following scope of work is to be completed at the site to remove accessible asbestos containing materials and asbestos contaminated materials from within the building:
The temporary fencing across the front of the site is to remain in place and barricades or additional temporary fencing are to be erected between this temporary fence and the north and east sides of the property.
Place 0.2mm plastic sheeting, geo-fabric or shade cloth on the temporary fencing. Asbestos removal warning signs are to be placed on the temporary fencing and at the entry gate into the removal work area of the site.
Scrape soil from the rear unpaved area where the truck loading is to be carried out to remove asbestos contaminated soil and debris. This material is to be disposed of as asbestos contaminated waste.
Erect barricades and asbestos warning signs in the rear area to delineate the asbestos work area (loading and decontamination area) from the clean area.
Remove the metal roof cladding and other metal items, wash to remove dust and debris and dispose of as clean metal for recycling. Alternately dispose of as asbestos contaminated waste without cleaning.
Remove all contents and debris including all timber framing from the building and dispose of as friable asbestos contaminated waste.
Remove the remaining asbestos cement sheet materials from the perimeter walls (where present) and dispose of as asbestos waste.
Scrape surface soil in areas where timber floors have been removed and all of the unpaved area at the rear of the building to remove asbestos contaminated soil and debris from the work in the area where truck loading was undertaken to remove debris from the work. This soil is to be disposed of as asbestos contaminated waste.
Clean the masonry walls and concrete floor to remove all ash, dust and debris. HEPA filtered vacuum equipment is to be used to clean debris from the gaps and cracks in the concrete floor slabs and masonry walls. These material surfaces are to all be sprayed at the completion of the visual clearance inspection with tinted PVA sealant.
Clean pavers on the footpath area to remove ash staining using water at mains pressure and scrubbing brooms. Geo-fabric is to be placed in the kerb gutter to collect ash, dirt etc. that is dislodged during this cleaning work.
Undertake a visual clearance inspection of the exposed surfaces remaining in the building and the adjacent ground areas where floors have been removed and in the truck loading and decontamination area to verify that they are clear of visible asbestos containing and contaminated materials, ash, fire debris, etc.
Collect soil samples from the exposed ground areas for laboratory analysis to confirm that the remaining soil is free of asbestos fibre contamination.
All of the above asbestos containing and contaminated materials that are removed from the site are to be disposed of as asbestos contaminated waste at a landfill facility that is licenced to accept friable asbestos contaminated waste.
Throughout the duration of the work airborne asbestos fibre monitoring is to be undertaken on the site boundaries.
4 RISK ASSESSMENT AND ASBESTOS MATERIAL CLASSIFICATION
Health risk from asbestos containing materials only occurs from airborne asbestos fibres. Whilst asbestos containing materials remain undisturbed and there are no fibres being released from these materials then there is no actual risk posed. Materials which contain loose fibres have a high potential to generate airborne when disturbed.
In accordance with the NSW Work Health and Safety Regulation 2017, asbestos containing materials are classified as either 'friable' or 'non-friable' materials.
'Friable' asbestos containing materials are any material that contains asbestos and is in the form of a powder or can be crumbled, pulverised or reduced to powder by hand pressure when dry.
'Non-friable' asbestos containing material means any material (other than friable asbestos material) that contains asbestos.
The fire damaged asbestos cement sheet materials at the site are broken and burnt and pieces that were inspected were able to be reduced to powder by hand pressure.
The fire damaged asbestos cement materials on and in the remains of the commercial building at 79 - 83 Castlereagh Street, Coonamble NSW and 48 - 52 Aberford Street, Coonamble NSW are classifiable as friable asbestos containing materials and must only to be removed by a contractor holding a Class A licence for friable asbestos removal work.
5 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
5.1 Statutory Regulations and Code of Practice
The removal and disposal of asbestos containing construction materials in NSW is overseen by various authorities including SafeWork NSW (SafeWork), the NSW Environment Protection Authority (NSW EPA), local government (council) by administering various legislation, regulations and codes of practice. Statutory documents that are applicable to the work include (but are not limited to) the following:
NSW Work Place Health & Safety Act 2011.
NSW Work Place Health & Safety Regulation 2017.
How to Safely Remove Asbestos Code of Practice issued by Safe Work Australia, April 2016.
Exposure Standards for Atmospheric Contaminants in the Occupational Environment [NOHSC1 003(1995)].
NSW Protection of the Environment Operations (General) Regulation 2009: Reg 92.
NSW Protection of the Environment Operations (Waste) Regulation 2014: Sections 77 - 81.
The proposed work at the site involves the removal of all of the asbestos containing materials and asbestos contaminated materials and debris from the building and the ground areas within and adjacent to the site.
5.2 Asbestos Removal Notification and Licence for Friable Asbestos Removal
The condition of the asbestos containing materials within the remains of the fire damaged building is poor. The fire damaged asbestos containing materials on and in the remains of the building are classified as friable asbestos containing materials.
The removal of the asbestos containing materials and debris may only be carried out by an experienced asbestos removal contractor holding a Class A licence for friable asbestos removal work. Prior to the commencement of the proposed work the licenced asbestos removal contractor must submit a notification of friable asbestos removal work to SafeWork NSW.
The work on site is not to commence until the notification of friable asbestos removal is submitted to and accepted by SafeWork NSW.
A copy of the asbestos removal notification and asbestos removal licence is to be held on site at all times during the work.
5.3 Working Area
The asbestos removal contractor shall ensure that all work is contained within the asbestos removal area of the site at all times. An area for storage of materials and equipment is to be located within the site. All materials and equipment are to be contained within the site area for the duration of the work.
6 REQUIREMENTS FOR ASBESTOS REMOVAL WORK
The asbestos removal work shall be contained within the commercial property at 79 – 83 Castlereagh Street, Coonamble NSW and 48 – 52 Aberford Street, Coonamble NSW.
Prior to the commencement of asbestos removal work, the licenced asbestos removal contractor(s) is to prepare a project specific Asbestos Removal Control Plan for the removal of the asbestos containing / contaminated materials from the building and adjacent areas in accordance with the requirements of section 3.5 of the How to Safely Remove Asbestos Code of Practice issued by Safe Work Australia, April 2016. This asbestos removal control plan is to be kept on site for the duration of the asbestos removal work.
For friable asbestos removal work, the temporary fencing surrounding the building is to be covered with geo-fabric and / or plastic sheeting to delineate the asbestos removal work area from adjacent areas. Warning signs are to be placed at the entry to the asbestos removal work area and should read “Asbestos Work Area, No Unauthorised Entry”. These signs are to comply with Australian Standard 1319-1983: Safety signs for the occupational environment.
A change area and wet decontamination facilities are to be located at the entry to the 'friable' asbestos removal work area. All persons entering the asbestos removal work area are to change into asbestos protective equipment in the change area and undergo decontamination prior to leaving the work area. All asbestos PPE is to be removed in the decontamination area when exiting the work area.
The contractor will be liable for all damage caused during the work to construction materials that do not form part of this scope of work. Should any damage occur during the course of the asbestos removal work, all costs associated with the repairs to the affected areas will be met by the asbestos removal contractor.
6.3 Decontamination Procedure and Facilities - Friable Asbestos Removal Work
For the removal of friable asbestos containing materials, a decontamination unit with showers that can be divided into three distinct regions is to be established at the entry to the work area.
These three regions are:
- Dirty decontamination area
- Clean decontamination area
- Clean changing area.
The wet decontamination facilities shall be sited at the entry to the friable asbestos removal work area. All persons exiting the asbestos removal work area are to undergo full wet decontamination prior to exiting the area.
Water supply to the decontamination unit is to be taken from the nearest available location. Waste water is to be filtered of all asbestos and disposed of via the sewer system. Used water filters are to be disposed of as asbestos waste.
The decontamination unit is to be maintained in a clean and sanitary condition at all times. It is not to be used for the storage of equipment or other items whilst the work is in progress.
6.4 Bagging and Disposal of Asbestos Contaminated Waste
All asbestos contaminated waste from the work is to be double bagged in 0.2 mm asbestos waste bags for disposal at a landfill facility licenced by the NSW Environment Protection Authority (NSW EPA) to accept friable asbestos containing material.
The waste material is to be placed into the first asbestos waste bag at the work face and sealed. This bag is to then be placed into a second waste bag away from the work face (but within the work area). Each bag is to separately 'goose necked' and sealed with tape. The waste material is to be wetted prior to placement in the bag.
Large items of asbestos containing and contaminated materials may be wrapped in two sheets of 0.2 mm plastic or loaded directly into a truck or skip bin fully lined with two layers of 0.2 mm plastic sheeting.
The asbestos waste is to be transported to the landfill site in leak proof vehicles or bins which are to be fully lined with two layers of 0.2 mm plastic. This plastic lining is to be fully tape sealed over the waste to prevent water leakage and dust emissions during transport to the landfill site.
Documentary evidence of the correct disposal of the waste shall be provided. This documentation will include name of authorised tip, weigh bridge docket and registration number of vehicle for every disposal.
7 AIRBORNE ASBESTOS FIBRE MONITORING
Monitoring for airborne asbestos fibres is to be carried out by a licenced asbestos assessor at all times throughout the duration of the asbestos removal work. The monitoring will be undertaken by P. Clifton & Associates engaged directly by the client.
Monitoring is to be carried out in accordance with the requirements of the Guidance Note on the Membrane Filter Method for Estimating Airborne Asbestos Fibres' 2nd edition [NOHSC:3003(2005)]. Analysis of the air monitoring filters is to be carried out by a NATA accredited laboratory.
Air monitors are to be placed in the decontamination unit / change room and on the temporary fencing surrounding the asbestos removal work area.
The daily reports of the results of the air monitoring will be forwarded to the client. A copy should be held on site.
The NOHSC recommended exposure level for airborne asbestos fibres, measured as a time weighted average over an 8-hour work shift, is 0.1 fibres per millilitre of air (0.1 fibres/mI).
The NOHSC Code of Practice for the Safe Removal of Asbestos details control levels for airborne asbestos fibre concentrations that are to be observed during the work. These control levels are as follows:
Airborne fibre concentration (fibres/ml) Control Measure
<0.01 Continue work using existing asbestos dust control measures
≥0.01 Continue work and review asbestos dust control measures
≥0.02 Stop work, identify cause of dust emissions and revise dust control measures.
8 ASBESTOS REMOVAL PROCEDURE
The asbestos work procedure detailed below is designed to minimise and control the potential exposure of persons undertaking the work and also to prevent the exposure of persons in adjacent areas to airborne asbestos fibres. This procedure summarises the step by step procedure to be used in undertaking the stage 1 and stage 2 removal of friable asbestos containing and contaminated materials from the remains of the commercial building at the site.
A safe work method statement for the asbestos removal work is to be compiled by the asbestos removal contractor prior to undertaking the work.
1. The temporary fencing across the front and sides of the site is to remain in place and barricades or additional temporary fencing are to be erected between this temporary fence and the north and east sides of the property.
2. Place 0.2mm plastic sheeting, geo-fabric or shade cloth on the temporary fencing. Asbestos removal warning signs are to be placed on the temporary fencing and at the entry gate into the removal work area of the site.
3. Prior to the commencement of friable asbestos removal at the site, the contractor undertaking the work must submit a notification of friable asbestos removal work to SafeWork NSW and also prepare a safe work method statement and risk assessment for their proposed work.
4. A site and project specific safe work method statement for the proposed work including details of the asbestos related precautions to be incorporated into the asbestos removal work as required by section 299 of the Work Health and Safety Regulation 2017 at the site is to be compiled by the asbestos removal contractor undertaking the work.
5. The asbestos removal contractor must compile an asbestos removal control plan as per section 3.5 of the How to Safely Remove Asbestos Code of Practice.
6. All persons undertaking friable asbestos removal work at the site are to wear disposable coveralls and a full-face Class P3 respirator. Persons engaged in the work are to have completed formal training in friable asbestos removal work and be supervised by a person who has completed a formal friable asbestos removal supervisor's course.
7. A wet decontamination unit and change area is to be located at the entry to the friable asbestos removal area at the site. All persons entering the asbestos removal work area are to change into and out of their asbestos PPE in the decontamination and change area.
8. Friable asbestos containing materials are to be carefully removed by hand (where safe to do so). These materials are to be wetted prior to removal and following removal these materials are to be wrapped in two layers of 0.2 mm plastic sheeting or placed into double plastic asbestos waste bags.
9. Friable asbestos removal work is to be undertaken in a manner that minimises further breakage of the asbestos containing materials.
10. All asbestos containing materials and asbestos contaminated debris is to be removed for disposal as asbestos contaminated waste. These materials are to be placed into trucks or bins for transport to a landfill site licenced to accept Special Waste - Asbestos Waste in accordance with the requirements of the NSW Environment Protection Authority (NSW EPA).
11. The transport of the asbestos contaminated waste is to be undertaken in fully lined (two layers of 0.2 mm plastic sheeting) covered leak proof vehicles and is to be disposed of at a landfill site that can lawfully receive this waste in accordance with the ‘Section 42 - Special Requirements Relating to Asbestos Waste’ as detailed in the Protection of the Environment Operations (Waste) Regulation 2014.
12. The contractor is to use the NSW EPA ‘waste locate’ on-line notification system to advise the receiving landfill site of the asbestos waste that is to be disposed.
13. Following completion of the removal of asbestos containing and contaminated materials at the site, the tools and equipment used in the work are to be cleaned of asbestos contamination.
- A visual clearance inspection is to be carried out at the completion of the friable asbestos removal work to verify that all asbestos containing and contaminated materials as detailed in the scope of work have been removed and that the various surfaces in the building and all ground areas within the site are free of visible asbestos contamination.
15. A written clearance certificate is to be issued prior to the friable work area being opened for access without the use of asbestos PPE.
16. Monitoring for airborne asbestos fibres is to be carried out prior to and during the removal of friable asbestos containing materials.”
(Emphasis omitted.)
Mr Wooding is a fifth-generation Coonamble resident and a third-generation carpenter/builder.
When he was 17 years old, he left Coonamble and moved to Lake Macquarie with his parents. He developed and continued his building trade in Newcastle over the next 28 years. He became a foreman and site manager and oversaw the construction of several buildings, including Woodlands Nursing Home in Wallsend, NSW and Salamander Bay Shopping Centre in Port Stephens, NSW. He also built his own commercial/industrial buildings in Newcastle and Lake Macquarie.
From 1987, he held a contractor licence as a carpenter and joiner to its expiry on 11 August 2022. After that period, he retired except for a brief period of about 6 to 12 months.
He visited Coonamble regularly to help a sick relative. On one occasion discovered that the closed Commercial Hotel was for sale. The Commercial Hotel’s address was 70 Castlereagh Street, being the main road through Coonamble. The Commercial Hotel was the original Cobb & Co Hotel, which he understood was built in about 1912.
In 2008, he incorporated Bequick for the purpose of purchasing the Commercial Hotel. Within the hotel, he designed a new hotel restaurant and café called River Café. In about September 2009 the café was opened and was operated through Naersa Pty Ltd, leased from Bequick. In 2010, as it was difficult to find quality staff to support his investment, Mr Wooding decided to relocate to Coonamble, leaving his son to take over his business in Newcastle. Mr Wooding ran the bar and the 18 accommodation rooms in the Commercial Hotel, with the assistance of two part-time staff.
In the process of moving to Coonamble, he also relocated all his building equipment, including a tip truck, bobcat and excavator, which eventually led to him establishing an equipment hire business in Coonamble called Wooding Hire, which is operated through the corporate vehicle Bryshan Pty Ltd.
In December 2016, through Bequick, Mr Wooding purchased the property on 81-83 Castlereagh Street, Coonamble, New South Wales (lot 61 in deposited plan 253491).
The property has two street frontages: Castlereagh Street and Aberford Street. The land size of the Property is 980.4 sqm. The historic building on the property was over 100 years old (GJW-1, p 1, a copy of deposited plan 253491).
Many years before Bequick's ownership, the property had been used for a discount shop called “Bag-A-Bargain”. That signage was still on the front of the building.
The external construction of the building on the property was made with red sandstock bricks. Sandstock bricks are historic hand-made bricks. The final step of making these bricks is by burning them in a kiln. He explained that he has all this knowledge because he started to work with bricks as a teenager and during his apprenticeship, he worked on several historical building sites which involved remodelling, removing and replacing sandstock bricks in walls. In his experience, those bricks are more expensive than modern ones.
His building experience enabled him to recognise the features of the property. On the Castlereagh Street frontage, the cantilevered frame awnings attached to the exterior wall were made from steel. All the glass shop/front windows were of an aluminium frame. The internal walls of 4m high were built of double and/or triple brick with arches. Internally, the building had a metal/gyprock suspended ceiling with commercial ceiling tiles. It also had a reinforced concrete floor from when it in the past had been converted to a supermarket, which to the best of his knowledge, was in the mid-1970s. Above the ceiling were 5 Cathedral-style Oregon trusses (triangular wooden structures designed to support the roof) in excellent condition. The roof space was 4m high. The roof was made of corrugated iron. At the time, the paint colours were white and burgundy.
Additionally, Mr Wooding has a long-standing practice of keeping a hard copy diary in which he notes tasks done and to be done.
Ms Redden has a Bachelor of Science (Architecture) which her obtained in approximately 2005. She obtained a Master of Architecture in approximately 2011. She is not registered with the NSW Architects Registration Board.
Her business, which she operates as a sole trader, is called Redden Design. Since 2013, she has operated her business. In her role as a building designer, she creates designs for new buildings, renovations and extensions. She also assists with her client's Development Approval processes and helps with client's building processes by liaising with builders, engineers, surveyors and other relevant consultants required for the project.
Ms Redden first became acquainted with Mr Wooding when she hired some equipment from his hire business in about 2014. She caught up with Mr Wooding in late June 2018 when she delivered an old timber wool press that she sold to him via Facebook Marketplace (JR-A, pars 6-7).
It was at this visit that Mr Wooding mentioned to her that he was the owner of the property and that he was interested in turning it into a motor inn. He asked Ms Redden if she would be interested in designing this given her interest in older buildings and experience in converting such a building (JR-A, par 7).
Sometime between the late June 2018 and prior to the site visit on 2 August 2018, Ms Redden told Mr Wooding that she had a brief look at the property and was interested in working on it. She then scheduled a site visit to measure the existing structures so that she could work out the spatial parameters for the re-design. She remembers mentioning to Mr Wooding that she thought the property had potential with its size, volume and unique roof line (JR-A, par 8).
In about July 2018, he engaged Ms Redden to draft a site plan.
It is common ground between Mr Wooding and Ms Redden that on 2 August 2018 she first visited the property to consult with him, review the site and take measurements. Ms Redden independently agreed that they inspected the property soon before the fire.
Mr Wooding intended to use all the characteristics of the building, such as the brickwork which was going to be used as feature walls in all the foyers, halls and rooms. He discussed this plan with Ms Redden. He planned to remove the suspended 1970s ceiling, to reveal the Oregon trusses for display.
Mr Wooding recalled that Ms Redden did not complete the existing site plans by the time of the fire. Shortly after the fire, he confirmed to Ms Redden that he wanted her to complete her work which she had started prior to the fire.
In cross-examination, Ms Redden accepted that the drawings prepared by her in the period between 27 August and 1 September 2018 were “like the start of the concept”, being “measured drawings basically from the existing” structure (T143.25-30).
On 2 August 2018, Ms Redden made a site visit to the property, together with Mr Wooding. During her inspection, she saw the property was run down and not in use. The roof was made from corrugated iron. The roof structure was constructed of decorative wooden rafters that made up a clerestory/dormer cupola type roof line section. This had been covered from sight by suspended commercial ceiling tiles. Her proposal was to remove the false ceiling to expose the rafters as a feature of the motor inn.
On the Aberford Street frontage/elevation, the roof line windows had been covered enclosed with corrugated iron. From her inspection and from an old photo of the building she saw, it appeared to her that these windows could have been operable (awning type) windows. She considered the building itself, while old, to be solid, structurally sound and simple (JR-A, par 11).
Ms Redden recalled having the view that renovating and restoring an historic building such as this might breathe new life into Coonamble and add to the streetscape, as it sat on a prominent corner/entrance to the main street of Coonamble.
Ms Redden took full measurements for the purpose of preparing drawings of the existing building to include a floor plan, elevations and site plan, and considering which of the building's original features could be retained during the proposed conversion/re-design. Ms Redden noted the measurements down on her drawing of the property which she sketched by hand.
She did not rely on the rough drawing of dimensions and the outline of the building which Mr Wooding gave her when she arrived on 2 August 2018.
Ms Redden also took numerous photographs of the property, inside and out and from different angles, using her iPhone. Based on her business records, she took a total of 112 photographs that day. Some of the photographs she took were from an elevated position across the street, from the balcony of the Commercial Hotel, as well as from street level near the corner of Aberford and Castlereagh Streets.
She recorded the hours she spent at the property on 2 August 2018 in a hard copy “tax invoice/statement” book. Based on what she recorded on tax invoice/statement no. 838986, she spent between 9:00am and 2:00pm at the property consulting with Mr Wooding and taking site measurements on and spent 2.5 hours traveling to and from the property, 1.5 hours working on the design and a further 1.5 hours on 10 August 2018.
On 29 August 2018, Ms Redden prepared updated versions of the drawings which contained additional information regarding site details, which she obtained using the photographs and some measurements (“Measure Up -4”, JMR-1, p 7) recorded on her site visit on 2 August 2018, the use of six maps, Google Earth and an original site plan to show site boundaries.
On 1 September 2018, Ms Redden prepared a third set of drawings by updating the existing floor plan to include boundary dimensions. She did not change the 3D Perspectives drawing on this occasion.
In about late August 2018 or early September 2018, Mr Wooding received the final versions of the "Floor Plan - Existing" and "3D Perspectives - Existing" from Ms Redden.
Annexed to Mr Wooding’s affidavit dated 5 July 2024 (GJW-1, p 3 to 5) were the following documents prepared by Ms Redden:
a drawing "Floor Plan - Existing" dated 2 August 2018;
a drawing "3D Perspectives - Existing" dated 2 August 2018; and
invoice no. 838986 dated 27 August 2018 relating to her site visit on 2 August 2018 and preparation of drawings of the existing floor plan and building.
Mr Wooding deposed that on 23 August 2018, at approximately 7:30am, he received a call from a Council Officer who asked Wooding Hire to supply temporary 2m high temporary fencing to prevent the four fire-damaged properties being accessed by the public.
On 23 August 2018, at 8:00am, Mr Wooding started to erect the fence with one of his workers. The temporary fencing was placed along the kerbs and gutters roadway and around all properties.
Mr Wooding has revised the Wooding Hire's invoice no. 1483 on four occasions based on the time the fencing had then been in place (BQ-1, p 6-10). According to the last version of the invoice, Wooding Hire's temporary fencing was in place around all properties for a total of 13 weeks. The Council paid Wooding Hire $5,642 for the temporary fencing.
When Mr Wooding erected the temporary fencing, the fire brigade was still spraying the fire-damaged properties with water.
When the fire was out, he could see the masonry exterior walls, shop front and its windows and the entry door were still standing. He also saw that the interior brick walls in the property were visibly undamaged, the Oregon trusses in the ceiling had burnt to ash and the metal roof to the building had collapsed inwards to the floor.
Mr Wooding accessed the property by walking inside the building. He used his boom lift which was located on the southern boundary (on Aberford Street) to take an elevated view. He observed that the walls and the concrete floor of the building were still intact. Based on his building experience, it was evident to him that the walls and concrete floor had remained structurally sound. At the time he did not see any cracking anywhere which he thought would be typical of damage caused by fire and heat.
On 27 August 2018, the Council forwarded the Orders pursuant to ss 124 and 129 of the Local Government Act, most likely to Bequick’s accountant’s office, as that is where the Extension Order was served by post.
After reading the Order, Mr Wooding noted that the Council had considered that the property was “likely to contain asbestos which may pose a threat to public health. The asbestos is likely to have been disturbed due to the recent fire at the premises”. He also noted that the Council was directing Bequick “to make the premises safe and engage a licensed contractor to identify and remove asbestos from the premise”.
Mr Wooding explained that he did not know that there was asbestos at the property since the Council was stating the premises was “likely” to contain asbestos. He understood from the Council’s used of the word “likely”, that the Council did not know for sure either (GW-A 1, par 47).
He further explained that from his experience as a builder/carpenter, fibrous cement sheeting was commonly used in ceilings and walls, in both commercial and residential buildings, and he was aware that asbestos was sometimes added to fibro products from about the 1940s to 1980s. This is non-friable (bonded) asbestos. Prior to the fire, the only place he had seen compressed fibro sheeting was above the glass shop fronts on the main street entrance of the building on the property (on the Castlereagh Street frontage). To his understanding, “friable asbestos” is the high-risk asbestos, because it can be crumbled by hand or easily reduced to a powder, which can become airborne. To his understanding, non-friable asbestos is material containing asbestos fibres, where the material has been reinforced with a bonding compound, such as the fibro sheeting. He had a general understanding of the two types of asbestos from his experience as a builder/carpenter. He learned more because of dealing with asbestos contractors in the aftermath of the fire.
Mr Wooding understood from the Orders that, to identify and remove possible asbestos from the premises, the Council was directing Bequick to undertake six steps:
Direction 1: render the premises safe, within 24 hours of 29 August 2018.
Direction 2: erect fences to prevent entry by unauthorised people, within 24 hours of 29 August 2018.
Direction 3: engage an Occupational Hygienist to identify all areas that contain asbestos on the premises and furnish this report to Council, within 72 hours of 29 August 2018.
Direction 4: engage a licensed contractor to spray PVA sealant and dye, within 7 Days of 29 August 2018.
Direction 5: engage a licensed contractor to remove the asbestos and demolish and remove all building debris from the premises make site safe and dispose to a licensed facility, within 21 days of 29 August 2018.
Direction 6: furnish Council with receipts from the licensed facility for the disposal of asbestos, within 21 days of 29 August 2018.
He did not understand the meaning of “render the premise safe” in Direction 1. He thought that it was unclear because the collapsed roofing was inside the four walls on the concrete floor, and not accessible to the public.
On 31 August 2018, to further make the property safe from about 10:00am, Mr Wooding attended the property with a boom lift. He used this to remove all loose debris on top of the front awning on Castlereagh Street. He threw everything that he removed from the top of the front awning into the building onto the concrete floor and added to the other debris.
On 31 August 2018, after removing the loose debris, Mr Wooding returned to the property and installed four acro props which were supplied by Wooding Hire, which he says was to make sure the site safe and meet Council’s directions to “make safe”. These are a vertical support system, and he used them to support the front awning on Castlereagh Street. The awning was a cantilevered structure.
On 30 August 2018, Shane Ezzey (Mr Ezzey), a licensed asbestos contractor engaged by Mr Wooding, called Mr Phil Clifton, a hygienist/asbestos consultant, as Mr Ezzey told Mr Wooding that he had work with Mr Clifton before. Mr Wooding stood and listened whilst Mr Ezzey had a conversation with Mr Clifton on speakerphone, explaining that the Council required Mr Wooding to engage an occupational hygienist to identify all areas that contain asbestos at the property and to furnish this report to Council. Mr Clifton then advised Mr Wooding during this call of his cost. Mr Wooding agreed to engage Mr Clifton and his business, P. Clifton & Associates. He understood from Mr Ezzey, that Mr Clifton was located on the Central Coast, NSW at the time, so he expected it would take a while for Mr Clifton to get to Coonamble.
Mr Clifton inspected the property on 6 September 2018 to prepare a report "as per item 3 in the Coonamble Shire Council emergency order issued for the site". Mr Wooding did not realise that Mr Clifton would not release the report until the invoice was paid. On 10 October 2018 he paid the invoice, and the report was released shortly after (10 October 2018 Report).
In respect of Direction 4, on behalf of Bequick, Mr Wooding had engaged Mr Ezzey, to spray PVA (polyvinyl sealant) and dye at the property. He had not met or spoken with Mr Ezzey before. Mr Ezzey held an Asbestos Removal Licence Class B - Non-Friable at the time. Mr Ezzey initially contacted Mr Wooding after the fire, saying a friend of his from Coonamble had informed him of the fire, and Mr Ezzey introduced himself and said he worked out of Gunnedah. Mr Ezzey did not provide affidavit nor give evidence and was not required for cross-examination.
After Mr Wooding received the Orders, he called Mr Ezzey and read Direction 4 to him. Mr Wooding understood from speaking with Mr Ezzey that the dye added to the PVA sealants allowed the sprayer to see which areas have been treated. Mr Wooding kept a diary note that he called Mr Ezzey at 10:00am on 30 August 2018 and asked him to come to Coonamble from Gunnedah. Although, he does not remember what day he called Mr Ezzey. He remembered Mr Ezzey met him at the property on 30 August 2018 between about 1:00pm and 2:00pm.
When he met Mr Ezzey at the property and watched him work, Mr Wooding had no prior experience with asbestos removal and had not witnessed such work before. Mr Ezzey completed the spraying work on the afternoon of 30 August 2018.
Mr Ezzey did not charge him for the work, although Mr Wooding stated he offered to pay on several occasions. Mr Ezzey had a sprayer, resembling a garden weed sprayer to spray pieces of fibro lying on the footpath before placing them in a bag which he sealed. To Mr Wooding the sprayed substance looked like glue, and to his understanding, when sprayed on materials it stops dust and airborne fibres. The substance sprayed was pink. He did not see Mr Ezzey prepare the mixture.
Mr Ezzey then placed the bag in his vehicle for disposal. He also sprayed numerous pieces along the footpath outside next door (no. 79 Castlereagh Street owned by the Coonamble Mayor), then picked them up and bagged them. Mr Ezzey stayed on the footpath on Castlereagh Street while he worked and sprayed anything that looked like it might contain asbestos on the outside of the building on the property, and on the footpath. He also extended his sprayer inside the building of the property where he could reach and sprayed the mixture around.
Mr Ezzey repeated the same process outside property no. 79 Castlereagh Street where there were broken pieces of fibro lying on the ground. Mr Ezzey sprayed the pieces, bagged them and placed them in his car.
At the time, Mr Ezzey wore white PPE coveralls, although he is unsure if Mr Ezzey wore a mask. Mr Ezzey took approximately 20 minutes to do the work. Mr Wooding did not wear PPE, and he remained some distance from Mr Ezzey while observing his work.
By the time Mr Ezzey had finished, Mr Wooding observed that Mr Ezzey had picked up every larger piece of fibro sheet lying on the western footpath on Castlereagh Street, including under the awning of the building, and in front of no. 79 Castlereagh Street. The items Mr Ezzey bagged are the larger items shown in the video recorded by Mr Wooding on 25 August 2018 (CB, tab 6).
The south wall of the building on the property, running along Aberford Street, was entirely brick. As Mr Wooding had previously observed and again observed when he attended the property with Mr Ezzey on 30 August 2018, there was no broken fibro pieces on that footpath adjacent to the property. There was some broken fibro sheeting further along on the footpath on Aberford Street outside the small shops on that street, including the closed down cafe and the Anglican Church op shop.
At the time Mr Wooding received the Orders, he was not sure whether:
the Council was directing him to engage a licensed contractor by whatever the due date was meant to be, and for the work to be completed in due course; or
for the licensed contractor to be engaged and for this work to be completed by whatever the due date was meant to be.
From his reading of Direction 5, Mr Wooding understood that the Council required Bequick to remove asbestos, and to demolish and remove all loose building debris, with that asbestos and loose building debris from the fire being disposed in a licensed facility. He did not read or understand that he was being directed to demolish a structurally sound building or to demolish the whole building and did not understand that the words “demolish and remove all debris” was an order to demolish the whole property, including the exterior and interior brick walls which were still standing.
On 6 September 2018 (and still within the Order’s time for compliance), the Council received a quote from Newbold Bulk Haulage for the "removal of Friable Asbestos and Demolition of Fire damaged buildings in Coonamble Main Street”. Mr Wooding was not aware of this quote at the time. Mr Wooding says he became aware of the Newbold Bulk Haulage quote through discovery in these proceedings.
Mr Wooding did not understand how a quote for the demolition of the four fire-damaged properties could be requested by the Council:
less than a fortnight after the fire;
when the time for compliance given under the Orders issued to Bequick was yet to expire;
when, as he understood, there was no actual evidence of asbestos or unsafe buildings before the Council;
when he had not even been informed that the Council had taken the view demolition of the property was actually required or my input sought; and
when he was not allowed to have any meeting or contact with Council representatives to discuss the matter.
Mr Wooding evidence is that he found it very difficult, in a small country town, to engage qualified specialists, especially engineers and hygienists, who potentially had to come from Sydney and who had prior work commitments. He explains the time frames imposed by the Council were difficult to comply with; for example, Direction 3 requiring an Occupational Hygienist to identify all areas that contained asbestos and furnish a report within 72 hours. There were few hygienists in NSW to choose from. On 30 August 2018, which was within 72 hours of 27 August 2018, he arranged for Mr Clifton to attend from the Central Coast. By the time he was able to attend Coonamble on 6 September 2018, this was the same date as the Council had obtained a quote for demolition of all the properties.
In the circumstances, he says that the Council demolished the whole building on the property before he had any meeting with the Council representatives or could comply with Direction 5.
For the same reason, he says that could not comply with Direction 6.
I note that the evidence Mr Wooding gave in cross-examination was at odds with that which was contained in his affidavits referred to in detail above.
On 13 September 2018, Ms Redden met Mr Wooding in Coonamble regarding an unrelated job. While there, Mr Wooding took her to the property to look at the damage from the fire. Mr Wooding had a “cherry-picker” at the property which they used to take an elevated inspection of the property.
She took photographs of the fire-damaged property using her smartphone from the cherry-picker. She took photographs of the debris and parts of building still standing (JMR-1, p 37-57).
She recalled that all of the structure of the building except the roof was still standing, including the external walls, an internal brick wall, and part of the building to the rear, being the safe and the awning on the Castlereagh Street frontage.
Ms Redden, during cross-examination, when she was asked how much she could see from the cherry picker when she inspected the building on 13 September 2018 with Mr Wooding, she gave the following evidence (T141-142):
“Q. How far towards the boundary of the site could you progress to observe the building from a cherry picker?
A. We were on the edge of the building, but you could see, and I took photos as well, but you could see to the, you could see the majority of it from the cherry picker, like, the main, the main section, before the wall with the archways in it. And then beyond that you could just see that the roof was missing, and you could see through the archways, like, the debris from that side. You could see the back part of the building that still had the roof intact but damaged.
Q. Intact, but?
A. Damaged, slightly damaged.
Q. You weren't able from the cherry picker to inspect the rear of the site to ascertain whether there was any internal damage to the area as you've just described, you just don't know that, do you?
A. No, I didn't go in to that side.
Q. And you couldn't enter the site from any direction, including the laneway at the rear, is that right?
A. Correct, yes.”
Mr Wooding observed that the exterior walls, internal brick walls with arches in them, the amenity block built from concrete blocks with its roof and the solid brick walk-in safe with its big man-size steel door all still intact.
Ms Redden confirmed that she observed some damage to the walls, particularly the tops of the southern wall, and to some walls where the roof trusses had fallen in.
During the inspection Mr Wooding and Ms Redden discussed the extent of the damage and that they could push forward with their original design for the motor inn if he installed a new roof on the building.
She recommended to Mr Wooding that he engage a structural engineer because it was her view that it was necessary for that expertise to be engaged to assess the structural integrity of the walls post fire (T142.32-35). An engineer report would be necessary to determine that the remaining walls could be use in any rebuilding of the building.
She recalled thinking at the time that even if a structural engineer said that the building could not be saved, the double and triple layer of bricks could still be salvaged. These were vintage bricks and she later calculated based on her measurements an approximate number of 40,000 bricks.
Based on her profession as an architect (although no longer practising as such), as well as her work converting an old Masonic Lodge into a house (which was a red brick building), she was aware that these bricks have a re-sale value as they are becoming rare. She also observed other items on the property that she thought would have re-sale value, such as the safe door. Ms Redden shared those views with Mr Wooding at the time.
She discussed with Mr Wooding that even if the building was deemed unsalvageable and had to be demolished, that Mr Wooding owning a hire business that had an extensive amount of heavy equipment would have made the clean-up quite efficient and cost-effective.
She additionally told Mr Wooding that it would be worthwhile to engage a quantity surveyor to get the value of what was left and what had been demolished.
On 9 October 2018, Mr Wooding received another letter from the Council dated 5 October 2018, stating to be an “Emergency Order pursuant to section 125 of the Local Government Act 1993”. Mr Wooding deposed that the copy in GJW-1/BQ-1 is the copy he received, on which he handwrote the date of receipt on 9 October 2018. He does not recall how he received the letter but recalls his accountant initially received one in the mail. The registered office of Bequick is Mr Wooding’s accountant's office. Four days passed between the date of the letter (5 October 2018) and Mr Wooding’s receipt (9 October 2018).
On 9 October 2018, Mr Wooding read the Extension Order. It stated that the Orders had to be complied with by 17 September 2018, and that Bequick had “not complied with any of the terms of the Emergency Order”. He considered that statement incorrect. In respect of Direction 2 (temporary fencing), the Council had already provided fencing around the entire site. By then, he had already taken further steps.
He understood the Extension Order to provide Bequick with an extension to comply with the Orders until the close of business on Monday, 15 October 2018. He understood the Extension Order to mean that, if he failed to comply, "then Council will enter onto the premises without further notice to you and do all such things as are necessary or convenient to give effect to the terms of the Emergency Order”. That is what is written in the Extension Order.
On Wednesday, 10 October 2018, the Council adopted resolution 4098 in order to enter upon the property to demolish, make safe and dispose of all debris and costs recovery.
Mr Rick Warren, the Council's General Manager, prepared a report dated 9 October 2018 (Warren Report) described as:
“URGENT BUSINESS
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT BY GENERAL MANAGER
COUNCIL MEETING ON WEDNESDAY 10 OCTOBER 2018”
Mr Wooding now understands that for the purpose of the meeting this report was prepared.
Under the heading issues, the Warren Report refers to a structural engineer's report in respect of all the fire-damaged buildings which stated that “[i]t is recommended the entire buildings with awnings are demolished.”
From the fire on 23 August 2018 to the making of resolution 4098 on 10 October 2018, Mr Wooding had no idea the Council had decided or intended or had been advised that the whole building on the property should be, or needed to be, demolished.
It was sometime in 2023 that he became aware of resolution 4098 as his partner, Sally Halliday, was researching Council documents via its website and drew it to his attention.
The Barnson Report dated 21 September 2018
As to the Barnson Report, Mr Wooding understood that the Warren Report was referring to the Barnson Report, by quoting from section “4.0 Conclusion” of the Barnson Report. It related to all the fire-damaged properties.
He did not receive a copy of the Barnson Report itself at the time. Mr Wooding says that the Council refused to provide him with a copy of the Barnson Report until it was produced in these proceedings.
The Council did not require him to retain an engineer to review the structural integrity of his building, but he did so by engaging Geolyse Structural Engineers in Dubbo (Geolyse).
On 11 October 2018, Mr Wooding called John Byrne (Mr Byrne) of Byrne Demolition. Byrne Demolition is an asbestos removal specialist, as well as a demolition contractor, based in Young, NSW. Young is about a 5-hour drive from Coonamble. At the time he called Byrne Demolition, Mr Wooding was unaware of resolution 4098, the Warren Report, the Barnson Report and the intended demolition of the property by the Council.
When he called Mr Byrne, he was still trying to find a contractor who could dispose of the building debris from inside the property. He and Mr Byrne spoke about Bequick engaging Byrne Demolition to remove all the building debris from inside the property. After that discussion, Mr Byrne sent Mr Wooding a text providing his email address. By text Mr Wooding then confirmed he had sent Mr Byrne an email. Mr Wooding’s evidence is that he does not have this email. Mr Wooding used an iPad to access an email account he used for Wooding Hire. He did not access this email from another device. He recalled that on the morning of about 7 or 8 November 2018, he found the iPad blank, and he could not retrieve anything, including access to that email account. He does not recall what he sent to Mr Byrne by email. He and Mr Byrne then exchanged further text messages on 12 October 2018.
At about 1:00pm on 15 October 2018, Mr Wooding attended the Council offices seeking to meet with Mr Warren (the Council's General Manager). Mr Wooding asked the receptionist if he could speak with Mr Warren. He then observed her make a call before informing him that Mr Warren refused to meet with him.
Instead, Mr Quarmby came to the reception area to speak with Mr Wooding. Mr Wooding had with him a letter dated 15 October 2018 addressed to Matthew Cock, the Council’s Manger of Environmental Services. Mr Wooding handed that letter to Mr Quarmby.
In Mr Wooding’s letter, he wrote that he had completed Directions 1 to 5, and that he would furnish to the Council receipts upon completion of “item 5”. His letter also enclosed:
a copy of the Extension Order he had received, on which he had added his handwritten ticks to signify he had completed Directions 1 to 5; and
a report by P. Clifton & Associates prepared for Bequick and dated 10 October 2018.
As referred to earlier, Mr Wooding did not pay P. Clifton & Associates until 10 October 2018. On that day Mr Clifton was forwarded the 10 October 2018 Report to Mr Wooding.
When he read the 10 October 2018 Report, Mr Wooding noted that Mr Clifton recommended to him two stages of work:
The first stage was to “remove accessible asbestos containing materials and asbestos contained material from the street front areas of the building, including the footpaths and Castlereagh Street awning area” (GJW-1, p 54).
The second stage was to “remove accessible asbestos containing materials and asbestos contaminated materials from within the building”, including the ninth bullet point which stated (GJW-1, p 55):
“Clean the masonry walls and concrete floor to remove all ash, dust and debris. HEPA filtered vacuum equipment is to be used to clean debris from the gaps and cracks in the concrete floor slabs and masonry walls. These materials/surfaces are to all be sprayed at the completion of the visual clearance inspection with tinted PVA sealant.”
Mr Wooding understood that the work required was to remove loose debris from the property and to ensure that the walls and floor were appropriately cleaned and treated to remove any possible asbestos dust.
It was only sometime after 10 October 2018 that he became aware that the Council had earlier engaged P. Clifton & Associates to prepare a scope of works for the removal of fire-damaged asbestos and asbestos-contaminated material from all the fire-damaged properties.
Mr Wooding does not recall how he became aware that the Council had also retained P. Clifton & Associates to provide a report.
By 23 October 2018, Mr Wooding had not heard from Mr Byrne following their conversation by text exchange and email.
On 23 October 2018, Mr Wooding sent Mr Byrne a follow-up text asking if he was “interested in this job”, by which Mr Wooding was referring to the removal of the building debris from the property. He does not recall if they had a discussion between that text message, and the next text message to Mr Byrne on 24 October 2018. Mr Wooding became aware from a later text from Mr Byrne on 28 October 2018 that Byrne Demolition was quoting the Council at the same time but he thought this was for the required clean-up as he was trying to engage Byrne Demolition for the same purpose. Mr Byrne did not immediately reply by text.
The quote dated 24 October 2018 from Byrne Demolition to the Council in the sum of $64,580 plus GST is described as to “demolish and remove the buildings as discussed” (GJW-1, p 93). Mr Wooding only became aware during these proceedings, in about 2023, that Byrne Demolition had provided a quote to the Council for demolition rather than merely the removal of building debris.
While the Byrne Demotion quote to the Council dated 24 October 2018 was for $64,580 plus GST, a separate quote from Newbold Bulk Haulage dated 6 September 2018 was for $131,000 plus GST. Mr Wooding does not know why the Council proceeded to engage Newbold Bulk Haulage for the demotion despite its quote being more than double that of Byrne Demolition.
When he learned that the Council intended to enter the property to clear or clean it, Mr Wooding sent a letter to the Council by email at about 4:46pm on Friday, 26 October 2018 with the subject line “URGENT HEALTH INSPECTOR”. He also delivered a signed copy of the letter to the front desk of the Council’s office at about 4:55pm on the same day (GJW-1, p 95-96).
Mr Wooding did not receive a reply from the Council in relation to the above letter. At that point, he still thought the Council was intended only to clean up any asbestos and building debris. He was unaware the Council was intending to demolish the part of the building on the property which was still standing and had engaged Newbold Bulk Haulage to do so.
Mr Wooding had wanted to engage an engineer to inspect and write a report regarding the structural stability of the parts of the property still standing.
One of the engineers he tried to engage for this purpose at the outset was W J (Bill) Bryan in Tamworth. He does not recall when he initially spoke with Mr Bryan. Mr Bryan told Mr Wooding that he could not accept the work because he was unwell from a serious disease.
On 29 October 2018, Mr Wooding called Barnson Engineers. He made the call before he wrote to the Council again later that day. He spoke with Chris Bassingthwaighte (Mr Bassingthwaighte). Mr Bassingthwaighte identified himself as a structural engineer and they discussed the fire and the property. Mr Bassingthwaighte told him that Barnson Engineers had already provided a report for the Council. He now understands Mr Bassingthwaighte was referring to the Barnson Report dated 21 September 2018.
At about midday on 29 October 2018, he observed workers removing the first lot of temporary fencing from in front of the fire-damaged properties on Aberford Street.
At about 4:22pm on 29 October 2018, he forwarded to the Council his earlier email and letter of 26 October 2018 with the subject line “URGENT General manager and HEALTH INSPECTOR”. By the time of his email of 29 October 2018, he had learned of the Council’s intention to demolish and again requested to meet with Mr Warren and Mr Cock.
He then received a letter dated 29 October 2018 from the Council in response to his 29 October 2018 email (GJW-1, p 100) that states, in summary, the following:
The Extension Order was valid and required compliance by 15 October 2018;
Bequick had "not complied with the requirements of the [Extension Order] and Council is now exercising the option to enter upon the property to give effect to the [Orders]”;
the Council did “not intend to enter into any discussion regarding the matter”; and
the 26 October 2018 letter did not require any issue requiring a response.
The next day Mr Wooding wrote again to the Council in response by letter dated 30 October 2018. He hand delivered this letter to the Council's office that day (GJW-1, p 101).
On Thursday, 1 November 2018, Mr Wooding sent an email to Mr Bassingthwaighte following up their earlier discussion and confirming he wanted to proceed with “engineer documents stating the walls are sound etc or what you may recommend to make sound” (GJW-1, p 102-103, a copy of the email dated Thursday, 1 November 2018). His reference in the email to Mr Bassingthwaighte’s and his discussion on “Tuesday” was an error, as he believes they spoke on Monday, 29 October 2018.
On 1 November 2018, Mr Newbold called Mr Wooding and asked him about the door for the safe on the property that had survived the fire. Mr Wooding observed the safe was located undamaged on the eastern wall. The man-sized steel door to the safe faced south. He asked what Mr Newbold was doing on the property and told him he was not supposed to be touching it. Mr Newbold responded that he had an order from the Council to demolish. Mr Wooding responded that the Council did not own the property and he should not carry out this work.
In an attempt to halt demolition, Mr Wooding did the following:
He called the police to report trespassing on the property. He also called Heritage NSW to report what was happening. Neither took any action.
On 2 November 2018, he sent an email to Mr Newbold requesting him to cease the destruction of his property immediately. Mr Newbold did not reply.
On 3 November 2018, Mr Noonan responded to the 1 November 2018 email (and copied in Mr Cock) confirming what Mr Bassingthwaite had already told Mr Wooding that Barnson Engineers had already prepared a report for the Council, the Barnson Report. Mr Noonan wrote in his email that Samson “will not be able to carry out any work for [me]”.
On 4 November 2018, Mr Wooding sent an email in identical terms to each of the seven Councillors for Coonamble (Councillors Karanouh, Churchill, Fisher, Thomas, Wheelhouse, Walker and Webb) at their individual email addresses listed on the Council's website (GJW-1, p 105, a copy of the email he sent to Councillor Karanouh at als_XXX@hotmail.com on 4 November 2018).
On 7 November 2018, Christian Matheson (Mr Matheson), a senior structural engineer with Geolyse, and Mr Wooding attended the property.
Mr Wooding had phoned Geolyse and engaged them some time after the fire, just after he was informed Barnson Engineers would not assist him. Mr Wooding engaged Geolyse to inspect the property and write an engineer's structural report.
Mr Wooding recorded a video on his phone while he and the engineer walked around the site (GJW-1, tab 33, a copy of this video).
The video shows, by this point, the building debris from the fire had been cleaned up, leaving the exterior walls, interior wall and floor standing.
On 9 November 2018, Mr Wooding sent a further email to Mr Newbold of Newbold Bulk Haulage.
On about 12 November 2018, Mr Wooding received Mr Matheson's report of Geolyse dated the same day (Geolyse Report) (GJW-1, p 108). It records the site inspection on 7 November 2018. The Geolyse Report stated:
“The brick and concrete walls showed signs of cracking to the surface of the walls, however it appears to be localised to certain areas and may have been pre-existing. Typically large and extensive cracking is typical of fire I [and] heat damage.
The steel lintels in the brickwork at the western end of the building do not appear to be adversely affected and do not show any signs of distress typical of fire damage.
More severe damage has occurred at the eastern end of the building where demolition works have commenced. This includes the demolition of the coolroom, safe and storage areas as well as damage to the existing concrete slab which appears to be otherwise undamaged.
The site is surrounded by exclusion fencing to prevent public access.
From our inspection we have determined that the structure is not in immediate danger of collapse in normal conditions, and provided public access to the site has been restricted, we believe that there is currently no immediate danger to public health or safety.
We recommend that the remaining structure not be disturbed and that the site remain excluded from public access pending an engineering review of stability under wind/earthquake loading.”
On 10 January 2019, Mr Wooding received an email from the Council attaching an invoice no. 100115 dated 8 January 2019 addressed to Bequick in the sum of $137,092.24 for “expenses incurred in relation to demolition of the fire damaged building on Lot 61 DP253491 and associated works carried out by Council” (GJW-1 A, p 124-125, a copy of the covering letter dated 8 January 2019 and invoice no. 100115 dated 8 January 2019). Bequick did not pay invoice no. 100115.
On 29 March 2019, Bequick received a letter from the Council providing a breakdown of the costs said to have been incurred, and how those costs were apportioned between Bequick and the other fire-damaged property owners.
Mr Wooding was not sure that the costs the Council had claimed were accurate or that the methodology of apportionment was fair. He referred to par 29 of the affidavit of Mr Quarmby dated 12 January 2021 and Ex BQ-1 from pages 116 to 119. Mr Wooding disputed the following expenses related to Bequick in this and the following paragraph. Mr Quarmby included “invoices issued by Cant Bros Home Hardware in relation to clean-up and demolition works”. The items in those invoices were not used in respect of the property or the other fire-damaged properties. They were used on the adjoining no. 77 Castlereagh Street, which was not demolished. This was because the four properties which were demolished by the Council left vacant land, and items in those invoices are for buildings.
The invoice at p 116 of Ex BQ-1 includes an item for a 100 x 100 x 3mm RHS steel post, which he believed was used to support the front awning at no. 77 Castlereagh Street. He said the same invoice also includes a charge for 15 bags of rapid set cement, which was used as the pier under that steel post.
No. 77 Castlereagh Street shared a common wall with no. 79 Castlereagh Street which was damaged in the fire and then demolished by the Council. The Council accepted by letter to the owner of no. 77 Castlereagh Street (Halcroft & Bennett Ply Ltd) dated 19 December 2018 that it had undertaken unnecessary demolition works to the common wall between those two properties and that it would reinstate the concrete reinforced wall.
In January 2019, Mr Wooding contacted Ms Redden and asked her to prepare new drawings based on the measurements she had previously taken, showing the property without its roof, being its state between the fire and before the demolition.
At pp 58 to 63 of JMR-1 are Ms Redden’s updated set of drawings:
Floor plan – post fire (dated 22 January 2019 – p 1 of 6).
3D perspectives – post fire (dated 22 January 2019 – p 2 of 6).
Photographs pre and post fire (dated 22 January 2019 – p 3, 4, 5, and 6 of 6).
A couple of days later, Ms Redden revised the above drawings. She sent the revised drawings to Mr Wooding via email on 25 January 2019, with invoice no. 838986-2.
The drawings forwarded to Mr Wooding on 25 January 2019 were the same drawings that she had previously prepared in 2018, but with the roof removed.
In revised floor plan dated 22 January 2019, she also showed some additional detail outlining wall thickness and type, flooring type, safe door, compressors as well as the steel framed structure that supported the Castlereagh Street awning.
During cross-examination, Ms Redden stressed that her drawings were only schematic. When Mr Wooding engaged Ms Redden to do work related to the property around July to August 2018, she assumed the building was heritage listed based on its age.
When asked about the drawings prepared in early 2019 based off previous measurements, Ms Redden confirmed that only the roof was no longer shown in those drawings, and the walls were retained.
During cross-examination (T144.23-25), she gave evidence that the assessment she made did not involve any opinion about what might be required to clear the site post-fire and remove all debris:
“Q. But the walls were retained in those drawings.
A. Yes, it was based on the photos taken pre post fire, yes.”
She could not provide evidence as to what might be involved in terms of removing building debris and maintaining the integrity of the site in the course of carrying out clean up or removal of debris as it is not within her expertise.
She confirmed that the trusses had all been burnt and was asked if she would accept from her experience as a building designer that the trusses provided lateral support to the walls before the fire. She replied that the trusses were probably pinned to the walls, and that the walls would have lost some integrity (T145.1-7).
After Ms Redden prepared those drawings, Mr Wooding engaged Mr Luscombe of Luscombe Consulting to prepare a quantity surveyor's building cost estimate.
Some concrete on the property, which was outside the rear door of the original building to the north of the neighbouring (lot 63), had not been removed in the demolition. He provided Mr Luscombe with measurements detailing the concrete that remained and the concrete outside of the original building that had been removed. Mr Wooding recorded those measurements on Ms Redden's site plan and calculated that 30 square metres of concrete remained after the demolition. He photographed this document and provided it to Mr Luscombe. Hence, Mr Luscombe did not allow for the replacement of the existing concrete in his building cost estimate.
An email exchanged occurred between Helen Smith (Ms Smith) (Operations Officer, SouthWest Branch, NSW EPA)) and Mr Cock between 22 January 2019 and 6 February 2019, with the subject heading “Red bricks from burnt shops” (GJW-1, p 147-198, includes the attachment to Mr Cock's email being a report from P. Clifton & Associates dated 20 November 2018 (the 20 November 2018 Clifton Clearance Report) described as “15Nov18 Phil Clifton Final Clearance Report”).
Mr Wooding became aware of such email exchange and attachment, when the email chain was produced by NSW EPA in answer to a subpoena.
In Ms Smith’s email sent to Mr Cock on 22 January 2019, Ms Smith:
wrote she was in the process of “tidying up loose ends regarding the disposal of the red bricks from the burnt down shops in Coonamble”; and
sought from Mr Cock “[c]larification regarding the clearance of the red bricks that were removed from the burnt shops as not being asbestos contaminated i.e. was [their] written clearance or verbal clearance and how was this determined”.
Mr Wooding cannot see that Mr Cock's email in reply to Ms Smith on 6 February 2019, which included the 20 November 2018 Clifton Clearance Report, responded to her query about the red bricks being cleared as they were not asbestos contaminated. He understood that Mr Cock did not provide to the NSW EPA any documents as it had requested between the Council and Newbold Bulk Haulage.
The 20 November 2018 Clifton Clearance Report provided some of the following comments:
“At the completion of the removal of asbestos containing and contaminated materials from each of the seven retail premises within the site a visual inspection within each premise was carried out prior to the demolition of the remaining structure. These visual inspections found all asbestos containing and asbestos contaminated materials and debris to have been removed.”
By letter dated 13 January 2021 addressed to Mr Quarmby as Executive Leader of Corporate Sustainability, Coonamble Shire Council, Walton Smith Consultants recalculated the allocation of costs and expenses attributable to Bequick in the sum of $148,107.00 (CB, p 980-991). I note that the first page of the letter records the sum owing by Bequick as $148,107.00, whereas the seventh page, which contains a table of costs, records the amount as $148,106.62. The difference appears to reflect rounding.
Mr Wooding gave evidence that he had not seen a copy of that the 13 January 2021 letter prior to the commencement of these proceedings.
Mr Wooding became aware through the Council's website that on 10 March 2021, the Council voted:
To instruct the Executive Leader of Corporate and Sustainability to arrange to re-credit the invoices previously issued to the four property owners.
To instruct the Executive Leader of Corporate and Sustainability to raise and new invoices “reissued in accordance with the calculations provided by the quantity surveyor engaged by Council”.
To write off $6,237.39 from the account of Councillor Karanough, “because a formal agreement had been reached for settlement of the account prior to the adjusted distribution amounts being determined”.
Based on the 10 March 2021 minutes, Mr Wooding understood that invoice no. 100115 dated 8 January 2019 was required to be credited to Bequick, and the costs as claimed by the Council would be re-issued in a new invoice. However, Mr Wooding says that the Council did not issue a new invoice to Bequick.
As I have referred to earlier, on 20 May 2021, the Council issued a letter of demand to Bequick enclosing invoice no. 10621 for the sum of $148,106.61. Mr Quarmby said that he personally arranged for this letter and enclosed the invoice to be sent to Bequick. In doing so, Mr Quarmby explained that he reviewed a form 484 ASIC document for Mr Wooding which the Council had in its files (BQ-A 3, par 8). The form 484 recorded the address of Bequick's registered office as Ryan and Rankmore Accountants, XXX Miller Street, Gilgandra NSW 2827 (CB 498, copy of the form 484 ASIC document). Bequick failed to pay that invoice.
The Council's statement of claim sues on invoice no. 10621. Mr Wooding evidence is that Bequick had never received an invoice no. 10621 dated 20 May 2021. He said that the only invoice Bequick received from the Council was invoice no. 100115 dated 8 January 2019 in the amount of $137,092.24, which, required to be re-credited to Bequick in accordance with the Council's motion passed on 10 March 2021.
It is difficult to accept that Mr Wooding did not receive invoice no. 10621 dated 20 May 2021. The 20 May 2021 letter that contained the invoice no. 10621 for $148,106.61 was addressed to Bequick at its registered office in Gilgandra. Mr Wooding as the sole director accepted that the Gilgandra address was the company’s registered office (T134.49-135.3). Mr Quarmby stated that the letter dated 20 May 2021 and enclosed invoice was mailed on 24 May 2024 (Bruce Quarmby Affidavit, par 9; CB, p 498 is a copy of the mail records showing the same). Mr Wooding acknowledged that he received the SR Law letter of 11 October 2021 that recorded the invoice amount of $148,106.61 (T135.1-4). If it was such a case that Mr Wooding did not receive the invoice, he was given the opportunity to respond to SR Law and request the invoice. In that respect, I prefer the evidence of Mr Quarmby.
Mr Newbold is the Director of Newbold Bulk Haulage. He has held that role since the Company was registered on 7 November 2000.
Mr Newbold has held a Friable and Bonded Asbestos Removal License since 2000. He also has a demolition license. It is and as of 2018 was a Class A friable asbestos removal contractor.
He is frequently engaged by councils in the mid to north-west part of NSW in relation to demolition of sites impacted by fires.
Mr Newbold was aware a fire had impacted the four properties on the main street of Coonamble on the night of 22/23 August 2018.
On or about 6 September 2018, Mr Newbold was contacted by Council and asked to provide a quote for the removal of friable asbestos and demolition of the four fire-damaged properties.
On or about 6 September 2018, Mr Newbold provided a quote to Council for the removal of friable asbestos and demolition of fire-damaged properties. The quote was for the total sum of $131,000 plus GST. Of that sum, $46,000 plus GST pertained to “Bag-A-Bargain” which was what the property had been used for prior to Bequick’s ownership.
Between 24 September 2018 and 28 September 2018 Mr Newbold removed asbestos from the footpaths outside the four fire-damaged properties by spraying PVA glue and dye on the friable asbestos in accordance with SafeWork NSW Code of Practice. The dye allows clear identification of where the PVA spray has been applied. An invoice no. 1019 dated 30 September 2018 was issued to the Council in the sum of $23,979.65 inclusive of GST. That included an invoice from EnviroScience for the sum of $9,799.68 representing the cost of asbestos air monitoring and clearance provided by that company in relation to removal of asbestos from the shop front footpaths.
On 23 October 2018, Mr Newbold received a letter from the Council directing Newbold Bulk Haulage to carry out work in relation to the four fire-damaged properties. The work was to remove asbestos, clear out the debris and demolish the shops as soon as possible due to the presence of asbestos (the works).
On approximately 29 October 2018 the works commenced. Debris was removed in its entirety before demolition commenced.
When Mr Newbold commenced the works, he called Mr Wooding and asked if he wanted the safe door, he was advised that it was located at the rear of the property.
It appeared to Mr Newbold that little if any debris had been removed since the fire. He formed the opinion it was not safe to enter the four fire-damaged properties without machinery because of the presence of metal roofing material, asbestos, burnt out debris and loose material.
It was necessary to remove the metal sheeting first, then the debris and then the asbestos. All debris was classed as asbestos contaminated as in the occupational hygienist report. Due to the extensive amount of asbestos, all components removed, including the remnant brick walls, were cleaned on site. Geofabric was laid around the building, including the perimeter to prevent run-off water seeping or flowing outside the confines of the four fire-damaged properties. The geofabric was then disposed of in the same location as the asbestos, in a purpose-dug hole at the Council's landfill facility.
The machinery used to remove the material from the four fire-damaged properties, included 25 tonne and 12 tonne trucks and a 20 tonne excavator.
Mr Newbold does not know if the intensity of the fire compromised the integrity of the slab at the property, but it was very brittle in places and was cracked and broken. It appeared to be very old concrete for most of the slab. There was one relatively small area of some 25sqm which had newer concrete. The majority were, however, extremely brittle and crumbled easily.
He was directed verbally by Mr Cock to remove the slab and to cover with clean soil once clearance had been certified by the occupational hygienist.
The other fire-damaged properties had largely timber floors and those had burned out in the course of the fire.
Mr Wooding was present during the course of the works. At one stage, Mr Wooding live-streamed the works to SafeWork with a camera set up at his pub across the road. SafeWork carried out an audit of the works, and no further action was taken by it. Mr Newbold is used to dealing with SafeWork during services Newbold Bulk Haulage undertakes when it comes to asbestos and demolition.
In relation to the property, before Mr Newbold commenced the works, it was his opinion that there was no evidence that the asbestos had been sprayed and dyed in accordance with SafeWork guidelines. That was also the case in the remaining three of the four fire-damaged properties. There was no evidence of a MakeSafe procedure until completed by Mr Newbold.
Asbestos waste cannot be taken to general landfill facilities except with specific clearance from NSW EPA. It must be booked as a special waste deposit which can only be accepted at nominated licensed landfills, unless specific clearance is provided by NSW EPA. For amounts in in excess of 10sqm of non-friable asbestos and for any amount of friable asbestos, an asbestos remove license is required.
In addition, as at 2018, the removal of asbestos was tracked by NSW EPA via WasteLocate (now replaced by Integrated Waste Tracking Solution (IWTS)).
It did not appear to Mr Newbold that any asbestos had been removed from any of the four fire damaged properties prior to his commencement of the works on 29 October 2018. Had any such removal occurred, it would have required execution by a licensed asbestos removalist in accordance with the applicable regulatory framework. At the relevant time, authorised tips accepting asbestos were required to issue disposal dockets upon receipt. Further, a licensed removalist ordinarily would have provided the requisite SafeWork notification prior to commencing work, in addition to a hygienist air monitoring and clearance certificate and maintaining appropriate waste tracking documentation.
In relation to asbestos removed from the four fire-damaged properties, Mr Newbold dealt with Ms Smith of NSW EPA. Prior to commencement of the works, approximately 240m3 of asbestos was estimated to be removed from the four fire damaged properties. Mr Newbold undertook that work. Initially the bricks were cleaned and taken to Mr Newbold’s property but because it was unknown if they were contaminated with asbestos, Mr Newbold followed the direction of Ms Smith and took them to the Council’s landfill facility.
At the Council’s landfill facility, the Council arranged for a hole to be dug to accommodate the asbestos from the four fire-damaged properties. It was approximately 4m deep, 50m long and 20m wide. Mr Newbold used two trucks, each having a 20m3 capacity to remove the asbestos. Approximately 240m3 of asbestos were removed.
Throughout the works, Mr Newbold used spotters at the properties. The spotters stayed away from danger as much as possible, but it was difficult to even enter the property, particularly at the commencement of the works, due to the extent and type of rubble. The removal work was done in machines with a 30ft boom.
Once all the debris had been removed, Mr Newbold began the process of removing the remnant walls. As soon as the walls were touched, they gave way immediately. That did not surprise him as the properties had large timber trusses which were destroyed in the fire. There were gaps in the walls where the trusses had held the walls from span to span. Some areas of the walls had a rod throughout them but even in relation to those, once the area had been gutted, it only took a very slight effort for the walls to be removed.
In relation to the bricks, he estimated approximately 100,000 bricks were removed from the area. That pertains to all four of the fire-damaged properties.
Based on his experience, Mr Newbold stated that bricks such as the original bricks used to construct the four fire-damaged properties, if fully cleaned and intact and assuming no asbestos contamination remained, in a Sydney market could be sold for up to $3 per brick.
On 20 November 2018 Mr Newbold issued an invoice to the Council for the works. The invoice is for the sum of $151,800 inclusive of GST. It included a variation for the supply, delivery and spread of 350m3 of clean fill over all fire-damaged properties.
An issue arising from Mr Wooding’s affidavit evidence concerned the disposal of sandstock bricks from the property. Mr Wooding says that the sandstock bricks were not contaminated with asbestos and suggested they were not transported to the landfill facility in Coonamble.
At the time of the fire on 22 and 23 August 2018, management of the Council's landfill facility on Quambone Road, Coonamble was contracted to Robbo's Construction & Earthworks Pty Ltd, ABN 36 145 791 028 (Robbo's Construction).
Robbo's Construction managed the Council's landfill facility between October 2016 and November 2022. During that period, Robbo's Construction managed all material coming through the landfill facility and retained all tipping fees. Since January 2024, the Council has been managing the Coonamble landfill facility (BQ-A 2).
On 18 November 2024, Mr Quarmby attended Coonamble landfill facility with Mr Newbold of Newbold Bulk Haulage. Mr Quarmby asked Mr Newbold to show him the area where the bricks from the demolition of the properties had been deposited (annexed to BQ-A 2 are two photographs Mr Quarmby recorded on 18 November 2024 showing the piles or mounds of bricks identified by Mr Newbold as having been taken to Coonamble landfill facility by Newbold Bulk Haulage).
The NSW Environmental Protection Agency (NSW EPA) produced in answer to a subpoena in these proceedings what were described as “photos of site inspection on 20 November 2018”. There were 21 photographs produced. Mr Wooding believes the photograph shows piles of sandstock bricks taken from the property, with some modern bricks (the ones with holes) mixed in. From that photo, he does not believe they were taken to the landfill facility and says it looks like they were being stockpiled. He says sandstock bricks have a re-sale value. Ms Redden expressed that opinion to Mr Wooding. He does not know what became of the sandstock bricks after Newbold Bulk Haulage took them (GW1- A, par 148).
Mr Quarmby’s evidence is that the Council has not removed, sold or otherwise taken off-site from the Coonamble landfill facility any of the bricks from the properties (BQ-A 2, par 8).
As I have earlier referred to, Mr Newbold gave evidence that the bricks were contaminated with asbestos, and following the direction of Ms Smith took the bricks to the Council’s landfill facility.
I accept the evidence of Mr Newbold and Mr Quarmby.
43A Proceedings against public or other authorities for the exercise of special statutory powers
(1) This section applies to proceedings for civil liability to which this Part applies to the extent that the liability is based on a public or other authority’s exercise of, or failure to exercise, a special statutory power conferred on the authority.
(2) A special statutory power is a power—
(a) that is conferred by or under a statute, and
(b) that is of a kind that persons generally are not authorised to exercise without specific statutory authority.
(3) For the purposes of any such proceedings, any act or omission involving an exercise of, or failure to exercise, a special statutory power does not give rise to civil liability unless the act or omission was in the circumstances so unreasonable that no authority having the special statutory power in question could properly consider the act or omission to be a reasonable exercise of, or failure to exercise, its power.
(4) In the case of a special statutory power of a public or other authority to prohibit or regulate an activity, this section applies in addition to section 44.
In Hunt Leather Pty Ltd v Transport for NSW [2023] NSWSC 840 (Hunt Leather (No 1)), concerned persons whose business lined a light rail track who brought actions in private nuisance and public nuisance against Transport for NSW in regard to interference to their businesses occasioned by trackwork. Cavanagh J found the actions proved and granted relief to the plaintiffs.
Transport for NSW appealed to the Court of Appeal: Transport for NSW v Hunt Leather Pty Ltd (2024) 115 NSWLR 489; [2024] NSWCA 227 (Hunt Leather (No 2)). At [174]-[181], the Court of Appeal in a joint judgment (Bell CJ, Leeming and Mitchelmore JJA) in strict obiter dicta stated the following as to the operation of s 43A:
“[174] Once again, these grounds do not arise in light of what has been said above as to the principal challenge to the finding of fact, and we address these grounds concisely.
[175] First, as the primary judge noted at [692], s 43A does not provide, strictly, for a defence. “That characterisation obscures the true operation of the section”, as Basten JA said writing for this court in Della Franca v Lorenzato (2021) 250 LGERA 136; [2021] NSWCA 321 at [8], [107], [147]. Rather, s 43A(1) imposes an altered standard of care, attenuating the standard of care required to be proved when establishing the civil liability in tort to which s 40(1) refers.
[176] Secondly, it is no part of a claim for nuisance to show that the defendant failed to take reasonable care. The fact that a defendant who creates, adopts or continues a nuisance may be found liable demonstrates as much. And the same is true even when the defendant causes the interference directly. Nuisance is a term used to cover a wide variety of tortious acts or omissions and in many negligence in the narrow sense is not essential: Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty [1967] 1 AC 617 at 639. It follows that s 43A has no operation.
[177] Thirdly, and consistently with the above, in [Gales Holdings] this court rejected reliance on s 43A in answer to a claim in nuisance. The correctness of this decision was not challenged. Emmett JA observed at [196]–[197] that:
“[196] … A clear distinction is drawn in the legislation between a liability that is ‘based on’ the exercise of, or failure to exercise, a special statutory power, and an act or omission ‘involving’ an exercise or failure to exercise such a power: see Precision Products (NSW) Pty Ltd v Hawkesbury City Council [2008] NSWCA 278; (2008) 74 NSWLR 102 at [173].
[197] Gales’ claims are not based on any allegation that the Council failed to exercise a particular statutory power or that it exercised a particular power negligently or unreasonably. Rather, Gales sues in nuisance, not for breach of statutory duty, in relation to the continuing operation of the Council’s stormwater drainage network. It is a misconception to suggest that Gales’ claim is based on the Council’s exercise of any particular statutory power. Accordingly, s 43A has no application to the proceedings.”
[178] Leeming JA and Sackville AJA agreed that the civil liability in nuisance on which Gales sued was not based on the exercise or failure to exercise a statutory power within the meaning of s 43A: at [283] and [284].
[179] If a special statutory power is exercised negligently, or if it is alleged that it was negligent not to exercise a special statutory power, then the action for negligence is one that is based on the exercise or failure to exercise a special statutory power. In such a case, the effect of s 43A is that rather than needing to satisfy s 5B and s 5C, it is necessary to show that the exercise or failure to exercise the statutory power is unreasonable in the sense stated by s 43A(3). But the claim for nuisance in this case is not one which is based on the exercise of a special statutory power.
[180] Fourthly, it is not the exercise of a special statutory power to plan the construction of a light rail system. Nor is it the exercise of a special statutory power to determine to start construction after there had been incomplete identification of utilities along the route. The gravamen of the plaintiffs’ case was that TfNSW had either failed sufficiently to incentivise the contractor to adhere to the staging contemplated, or else had failed to address the risk posed by unknown utilities along the route. Those were not failures to exercise special statutory powers; they were complaints that TfNSW had not insisted on the right terms in a contract, or had not caused different things to have taken place before construction began.
[181] Those reasons are sufficient to conclude that these grounds are not made out. In an appeal where the application of s 43A does not alter the result, it is neither necessary nor desirable to address the operation of s 43A comprehensively.”
In February 2025, the High Court of Australia granted leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal’s decision. The operation of s 43A was argued before the High Court on the appeal which took place over 15-16 May 2025.
At the time of these proceedings, the appeal had been heard by the High Court, but judgment was reserved.
On 17 December 2025, the High Court delivered its decision in Hunt Leather Pty Ltd v Transport for NSW (2025) 426 ALR 621; [2025] HCA 53 (Hunt Leather (No 3)). The High Court’s decision in Hunt Leather (No 3) is relevant to one issue in these proceedings namely: whether the Council can rely on s 43A CLA as a defence to Bequick’s trespass claim. On 19 December 2025, this Court invited the parties to provide short submissions by 16 January 2026 as to whether the High Court’s decision in Hunt Leather (No 3) has altered the law so far as s 43A of the CLA is concerned. Both parties provided written submissions by 16 January 2026.
In light of the High Court’s reasoning in respect of s 43A of the CLA, the Council made the following submissions as to the operation of s 43A in the present case.
First, the Court should not accept Bequick’s submissions, which relied on the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Hunt Leather (No 3) (which has now been overturned in part by the High Court), that s 43A only applies to claims in negligence. The High Court did not hold that s 43A only applies to claims in negligence. Although not deciding the point, the High Court considered the applicability of s 43A on the basis that it was at least potentially applicable as a defence to a claim in nuisance, depending on the specific facts of the case.
The Council submitted that the Court should adopt the same approach in the present case as the High Court did in Hunt Leather (No 3), by proceeding on the basis that s 43A is potentially applicable as a defence to Bequick’s trespass claim, depending on the specific facts of the case as found. That is because a claim in trespass, like a claim in nuisance, is a claim to which Pt 5 of the CLA applies: see s 40(1) of the CLA.
Secondly, the High Court’s reasoning in Hunt Leather (No 3) makes clear that s 43A only applies in respect of liability which is “based on” an authority’s exercise of (or failure to exercise) a special statutory power. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the alleged acts or omissions of the authority which form the basis of the plaintiff’s claim in order to determine whether the defendant’s liability for those acts or omissions is based on the exercise of (or failure to exercise) a special statutory power.
The same point was made by the Court of Appeal in the decision of Gales Holdings Pty Ltd v Tweed Shire Council [2013] NSWCA 382; 85 NSWLR 514 (Gales Holdings), which concerned a claim in nuisance. That decision was cited by both Cavanagh J (at [698]) in Hunt Leather (No 1) and the Court of Appeal (at [177]) in the Hunt Leather (No 2) litigation. In Gales Holdings, Emmett JA (with whom Leeming JA and Sackville AJA agreed) stated at [196]-[197]:
“[196] The application of s 43A is limited to proceedings for civil liability to which Part 5 of the Liability Act applies. However, it applies only to the extent that the liability is based on a public or other authority's exercise of, or failure to exercise, a special statutory power conferred on the authority. Assuming a special statutory power is involved, the anterior question is whether the proceedings were proceedings for civil liability, in which the liability was based on the Council's exercise of, or failure to exercise, a special statutory power conferred on it. A clear distinction is drawn in the legislation between a liability that is based on the exercise of, or failure to exercise, a special statutory power, and an act or omission involving an exercise or failure to exercise such a power: see Precision Products (NSW) Pty Ltd v Hawkesbury City Council [2008] NSWCA 287; 74 NSWLR 102 at [173].
[197] Gales' claims are not based on any allegation that the Council failed to exercise a particular statutory power or that it exercised a particular power negligently or unreasonably. Rather, Gales sues in nuisance, not for breach of statutory duty, in relation to the continuing operation of the Council's stormwater drainage network. It is a misconception to suggest that Gales' claim is based on the Council's exercise of any particular statutory power. Accordingly, s 43A has no application to the proceedings.”
The Council submitted that in the present case Bequick’s claim in trespass against the Council is “based on” the acts committed by the Council in entering the property and carrying out the work to clean-up and remediate the property. It did those acts in the exercise of its special statutory power pursuant to s 678 of the Local Government Act to “do all such things as are necessary or convenient to give effect to the terms of the order, including the carrying out of any work required by the order”. Therefore, s 43A of the CLA applies in the present case.
As such, in order to make out its claim of trespass against the Council in the present case, it is Bequick that must satisfy the Court that any of the acts committed by the Council which are alleged to constitute a trespass – such as the demolition of the remnants of the fire-damaged properties including the brick walls – were acts which were so unreasonable that no local council having the power under s 678 of the Local Government Act could properly consider the acts to be a reasonable exercise of the power: see s 43A(3) of the CLA (Della Franca at [8] and [27] per Basten JA).
Bequick submitted that the Court is correct to have formed the view that the decision of the High Court has not altered the current law in so far as s 43A of the CLA is concerned.
The High Court in Hunt Leather (No 3) did not determine the question of the applicability of s 43A to claims framed in the tort of nuisance rather than the tort of negligence. As the Chief Justice stated at [55]:
“Whether an action in private nuisance against a public or other authority at common law is of a nature in respect of which s 43A of the Civil Liability Act can have meaningful operation or in respect of which liability can or might in specific circumstances be said to be “based on” the authority’s exercise of a special statutory power are large questions. They were not fully argued in the appeals and do not now need to be determined.”
“There may be doubt about whether s 43A applies to a claim for private nuisance. But that issue need not be resolved on these appeals because even if s 43A were applied to a claim for private nuisance, it would not be engaged by the conduct of TfNSW.”
Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ agreed with Gordon and Edelman JJ on this point at [193] and [300] respectively.
Bequick submitted that although the decision of the Court of Appeal is no longer binding on this Court as a matter of stare decisis, that decision remains the most authoritative statement of principle of the operation of s 43A. As McElwaine J stated on 18 November 2025 in Palmer v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (No 2) [2025] FCA 1425 at [24]:
“…a judge at first instance should follow seriously considered dicta of an appellate court in the same hierarchy, absent a conclusion that the reasoning is plainly wrong: BHP Billiton Nickel West Pty Ltd v KN (Decd*)* (2017) 258 FCR 521; [2018] FCAFC 8 at [41]-[43], North, Dowsett and Jagot JJ.”
“I conceive that it is my duty to apply seriously considered dicta of the Court of Criminal Appeal as though it were part of the ratio decidendi of the decision, more so when it is unanimous.”
The unanimous (Bell CJ, Leeming and Mitchelmore JJA) decision of the Court of Appeal in Hunt Leather (No 2) at [175]-[179] was to the effect that s 43A operates to impose an “an altered standard of care” where there has been a failure to take reasonable care, but that “it is no part of a claim for nuisance to show that the defendant failed to take reasonable care”.
The position is well established by following previous decisions of the Court of Appeal:
In Curtis v Harden Shire Council (2014) 88 NSWLR 10; [2014] NSWCA 314 at [234], Basten JA (with whom Bathurst CJ agreed) held that s 43A “assumes the existence of a duty of care and identifies the standard to be applied in determining whether there has been a breach”.
In Roads and Maritime Services v Zraika (2016) 94 NSWLR 159 at [109], Leeming JA (with whom Gleeson and Simpson JJA agreed) followed Basten JA in Curtis stating that “Section 43A assumes the existence of a duty of care and identifies the standard to be applied in determining whether that duty has been breached”.
In Della Franca v Lorenzato [2021] NSWCA 321 (Della Franca) at [18], Basten JA (with whom Macfarlan JA agreed), held that “[a]s noted in Zraika, s 43A assumes the existence of a general law duty of care; it then fixes the relevant standard to be applied”.
None of these decisions were the subject of adverse comment by any of the Justices in Hunt Leather (No 2).
Bequick referred to its outline of opening submissions where it stated:
The only requirement for intention in the tort of trespass as it applies to land is whether the entry upon the land is intentional or negligent: Johnson v Buchanan [2012] VSC 195 at [63]-[64] (Bell J).
It is no defence for the defendant to say that it had a mistaken but reasonable belief that it was entitled to enter upon the plaintiff’s land: Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin (No 6) [2015] FCA 1294 at [262] (Siopis J); Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin (2017) 248 FCR 311; [2017] FCAFC 59 at [55] (North, Dowsett and Rares JJ).
Justification (such as a lawful right of entry) is therefore a defence which must be proved by the defendant: Entick v Carrington (1765) 95 ER 807; (1765) 19 St Tr 1029; Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635; Johnson v Buchanan [2012] VSC 195 at [57]-[62]; State of New South Wales v Ouhammi (2019) 101 NSWLR 160; [2019] NSWCA 225 at [14] (Basten JA), [56]-[57] (Brereton JA).
There is no question that the interference with the property was intentional.
On the basis of the dicta of the Court of Appeal in a series of cases, including but not limited to Hunt Leather (No 2), Bequick submitted that s 43A of the CLA has no application to a claim not framed in negligence.
The first issue is whether s 43A of the CLA operates so as to prevent any cause of action ever accruing to Bequick.
Section 43A applies only to the extent that liability in question is “based on” the exercise, or failure to exercise, a special statutory power.
In Hunt Leather (No 3), the High Court did not finally determine the applicability of s 43A to causes of action framed in the tort of trespass but consideration of the tort of private nuisance rather than the tort of negligence. The High Court nevertheless emphasised that the section is engaged on where liability is properly characterised as being “based on” the exercise of such a power.
As the Chief Justice observed in Hunt Leather (No 3) at [55] – [56]:
“[55] Whether an action in private nuisance against a public or other authority at common law is of a nature in respect of which s 43A of the Civil Liability Act can have meaningful operation or in respect of which liability can or might in specific circumstances be said to be "based on" the authority's exercise of a special statutory power are large questions. They were not fully argued in the appeals and do not now need to be determined.
[56] For the purposes of resolving the appeals, it is sufficient to record my agreement with the analysis of the primary judge that TfNSW did not exercise any special statutory power in planning or contracting for the construction of the Sydney Light Rail. First, the specific power of TfNSW to "develop light rail systems, or facilitate their development by other persons" was not engaged in the absence of the existence at the time of regulations having the effect of bringing the Sydney Light Rail within the statutory definition of a "light rail system". Second, in exercising its power to contract in the performance of its function to facilitate the development of transport infrastructure, TfNSW was not exercising a power of a kind that persons generally are not authorised to exercise without specific statutory authority. Third, just as "[t]o drive a vehicle on a public street, for the purpose of dealing with a fire or for any other purpose, needs no grant of power", so to plan for the development of transport infrastructure required no specific statutory authority.” (citations omitted)
Similarly, Gordon and Edelman JJ in Hunt Leather (No 3) noted there may be doubt about whether s 43A applies to a claim in private nuisance, but that the issue did not need to be resolved (at [144]).
Whether liability is so characterised is a question of substance. It requires a distinction to be drawn between liability which is based on the exercise of a statutory power, and liability arising from acts or omissions which merely occur in the course of or are said to be justified by the exercise of such a power.
In the present case, Bequick's claim is that the Council unlawfully entered onto Bequick's land and carried out works, including demolition, and therefore by doing so committed trespass.
The Council submitted that its entry was undertaken pursuant to powers conferred by s 678 of the Local Government Act, and that any liability is thereby “based on” the exercise of a special statutory power.
That Council’s characterisation cannot be accepted, as the exercise of that power goes to justification. It does not determine the basis of the claim.
Properly characterised, the liability alleged is based on the asserted unlawfulness of the Council’s entry onto the land. The statutory power is relied upon only as a putative answer to that claim.
The distinction between a claim that involves the exercise of statutory power and one that is “based on” it is made clear in a passage of Gales Holdings excerpted by the Court of Appeal in Hunt Leather (No 2) at [177]:
“[177] Thirdly, and consistently with the above, in Gales Holdings [Gales Holdings Pty Ltd v Tweed Shire Council (2013) 85 NSWLR 514; [2013] NSWCA 382] this court rejected reliance on s 43A in answer to a claim in nuisance. The correctness of this decision was not challenged. Emmett JA observed at [196]–[197] that:
‘[196] … A clear distinction is drawn in the legislation between a liability that is ‘based on’ the exercise of, or failure to exercise, a special statutory power, and an act or omission ‘involving’ an exercise or failure to exercise such a power: see Precision Products (NSW) Pty Ltd v Hawkesbury City Council [2008] NSWCA 278; (2008) 74 NSWLR 102 at [173].
[197] Gales’ claims are not based on any allegation that the Council failed to exercise a particular statutory power or that it exercised a particular power negligently or unreasonably. Rather, Gales sues in nuisance, not for breach of statutory duty, in relation to the continuing operation of the Council’s stormwater drainage network. It is a misconception to suggest that Gales’ claim is based on the Council’s exercise of any particular statutory power. Accordingly, s 43A has no application to the proceedings.’”
Nothing in Hunter Leather (No 2) disturbs that distinction.
The same reasoning applies here. Bequick’s claim is not “based on” the exercise of a statutory power. It is based on the alleged unlawfulness of the Council’s entry onto the land and demolition. The statutory power is relied on only as a possible justification.
It is my view, that s 43A has no application to Bequick’s claim in trespass.
Therefore, the Councils defence in relation to s 43A CLA raised as a defence to Bequick’s cross-claim fails.
Bequick pleaded that the Orders were invalid. On the basis they are ambiguous, unclear, and in certain instances directed that a thing which had already been done be done. Bequick’s contention of invalidity of the Orders also involves procedural fairness. As the arguments involving procedural fairness permeate the entirety of Bequick’s defence and cross-claim and so will be dealt with compendiously under the subheading “Fourth issue: procedural fairness”.
If the Orders are found to be invalid, the result will be that the Council’s power under s 678 of the Local Government Act to give effect to the terms of the order will have never arisen. If that is correct, the Council’s entry onto and demolition of Bequick’s land constitutes trespass.
By its written and oral submissions, Bequick submitted that the Orders must be evaluated with appreciation of the fact that the Orders authorise an interference with private property and that non-compliance exposes the subject to criminal conviction and punishment.
Bequick relied on the decision of Biscoe J in Manly Council v Leech [2015] NSWLEC 149 (Leech) where, at [22], His Honour stated:
“[22] A statutory order requiring someone to do or not do something that is subject to penal consequences, and the authorising statute, are strictly construed. Consequently, the validity of such an order depends on strict compliance with the statutory conditions governing its issue, and it will not be enforced unless it is expressed in clear and unambiguous language… Such an order must convey clearly and unambiguously to the person to whom it is given that that person is being ordered to do or refrain from doing something, and that it is not merely a statement of intention to issue such an order in the future: Bobolas v Waverley Council. There is a close analogy with the principle that, because of the potentially serious consequences, a person will not be found in contempt of court for breach of a court order that is not clear and unambiguous: Rafailidis v Camden Council [2015] NSWCA 185 at [45]-[47].”
“[69] …While it is clear that Council sought to comply with its statutory obligation to provide notice of the proposed order, and that the defendant may have had some awareness of Council's earlier position, these matters are not relevant to the objective construction of the Order.
…
[73] I find that the requirement for clear and unambiguous language is now well understood particularly in relation to notices and orders issued by regulatory authorities, and the principles and approach I adopt have been consistently and regularly applied by this Court: Foster v Sutherland Shire Council [2001] NSWLEC 89; (2001) 115 LGERA 130 at [8]-[10]; Barclay v Wollongong City Council [2005] NSWLEC 160; (2005) 139 LGERA 167 at [35]-[36].
[74] Applying the above principles and accepting that each determination depends upon its own facts, I have come to the view, particularly given the consequences of non-compliance, that the Order is not expressed in sufficiently clear and unambiguous language and it is therefore invalid…
…”
Bequick submitted that the Orders were ambiguous in that it was not clear whether the relevant periods for compliance were to be counted from 27 August 2018 or from 29 August 2018. Mr Wooding further deposed that he did not understand when the Council was directing Bequick to carry out acts in compliance with the Orders and submitted that an ordinary reading of the terms of such order would give rise to confusion and that Mr Wooding was in fact confused. Earlier I have set out Mr Wooding’s evidence in his affidavits in detail.
Under cross-examination, however, Mr Wooding’s evidence significantly departed from what he deposed in his affidavits. Mr Wooding accepted in cross-examination that he understood:
That the Order was an emergency order issued by the Council (T93.40-43):
“Q. You understood from the face of the order in the heading in bold type, and the words in the middle of the page in bold type, that it was an emergency order issued by the council.
A. Yes.”
“Q. You understood from the heading that it related to your property known as 81 83 Castlereagh Street, Coonamble, didn't you?
A. Yes.”
“Q. You understood that it was directed to BeQuick, the owner.
A. Yes.”
“Q. And under the heading "to do what" you understood from reading it there were six steps that the order required Be[q]uick to take, you understand that?
A. The six items, yes there is.
Q. And you understood that when you read it, didn't you?
A. Well, it's confusing.
Q. I'll come back to that in a moment. But my question to you is that you understood those six steps when you read them.
A. Yes, there were six steps, yes.
Q. And you understand, don't you, from reading them that they are in sequence.
A. Yes.
Q. That's one through to six. (1), render the premises safe, and I'll paraphrase to save time, (2), erect fences surrounding the premises, prevent entry by unauthorised people, those words are clear to you, aren't they?
A. Yes.”
“Q. When you read the order on 27 August 2018 you understood what it was telling you to do; erect fencing surrounding the premises.
A. Yes.
Q. Being your property, to prevent entry by unauthorised people.
A. Yes.
Q. You understood that plain English, didn't you?
A. Yes.
Q. Next the step is "to engage an occupational hygienist to identify all areas that contain asbestos on the premises, and furnish this report to the council", do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. You knew when you read this order what an occupation hygienist was, did you?
A. I - yes, correct.
Q. And you knew that this was telling you to engage an occupational hygienist first to identify all areas that contained asbestos.
A. Yes.
Q. And, to furnish a report to the council.
A. Yes.
Q. Next, in sequence, going to step 4 you understood that you were then to engage a licenced contractor to spray PVA sealant and die.
A. Yes.
Q. You're a builder, and have been for a long time
A. Yeah.
Q. and you understood when you read the words "licenced contractor" that that was a person licenced to deal with asbestos, didn't you?
A. Yes.
Q. And you also understood, in relation to step 4, that that would occur after step 3.
A. Yes.
Q. Because a licenced contractor can't do what the contractor's required to do until the hygienist has identified all areas that contain asbestos; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you understood that
A. Yes.
Q. at the time, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. The next step is five "engage a licenced contractor to remove the asbestos" again you understood that to mean a licenced contractor to deal with asbestos in the same way you agreed that that was the case in relation to step 4.
A. Yes.
Q. And "demolish and remove all building debris from the premises, make site safe and dispose to a licenced facility", those words were clear to you when you read them on 27 August, weren't they?
A. Those words were, yes.
Q. And then six, "furnish council with receipts from a licenced facility for the disposal of the asbestos", used plain English, and you understood it on 27 August, didn't you?
A. Yes.”
From his cross-examination, I accept that Mr Wooding on behalf of Bequick did understand all the directions had to be fulfilled sequentially as set out in the Orders.
The Council outlined additional matters that weigh against a finding that the Orders were ambiguous or that Mr Wooding did not understand it. In the cross-examination, Mr Wooding gave the following evidence:
Mr Wooding never considered it necessary to obtain legal advice in relation to the terms of the Order even though the order recommended that he do so (T98.2-4):
“Q. At the time you received this you didn't feel the need to seek legal advice in relation to the terms of the order, or its effect on you.
A. No.”
“Q. Let's just be clear then for the moment, and we'll explore that a little further later. At the time you received this, having read this final paragraph, you did not on 27 August contact Mr Cock for further information in relation to the order, did you?
A. No, correct.”
“Q. Having read that section you did not lodge an appeal against the order at any time, did you?
A. No.”
“Q. It's fair to say, isn't it, Mr Wooding, that your letter of 15 October and no other letter that you sent to the council in the period up to about the middle of November 2018 ever suggested to the council that you did not understand the terms of the emergency order?
A. Correct.
Q. Never wrote to them saying, I don't understand this?
A. No.
Q. Indeed, the steps you took on 15 October were an indication to the council that you both understood the order and that you were complying with it; is that right?
A. Yes.”
“[47] The Council's claim against Mr McNeil under s 678 was based on failure to comply with the s 124 order, purportedly given under s 124 of the Local Government Act. Section 124 provides that a council may order a person to do or refrain from doing a thing specified in column 1 of the table in s 124 if the circumstances specified in column 2 of the table exist. Mr McNeil says that such circumstances are a jurisdictional fact for the giving of a valid order and that, if the circumstances on which an order is based do not exist, there will not be a valid order.
[48] The circumstances on which the s 124 order was based were that, as a result of the presence of, inter alia, friable asbestos waste, the Property was not in a safe and healthy condition. Mr McNeil contended that the primary judge should have found, on the evidence before him, that there was no friable asbestos material on the Property at the time when the Council made the s 124 order and, accordingly, should have found that the s 124 order was invalid. That raises a question as to onus in relation to invalidity. Mr McNeil contended that, in order to succeed in its claim under s 678, based on failure to comply with the s 124 order, the Council had the onus of establishing the validity of the s 124 order.
[49] However, the Council is entitled to rely on the presumption that the s 124 order was valid, in reliance upon the presumption of regularity. That presumption is captured by the maxim, omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter acta esse donec probetur in contrarium: that is to say, all things are presumed to have been done duly and in the usual manner until the contrary is proved. On the face of the s 124 order, there is no reason to doubt that the circumstances set out in column 2 in item 21 exist, namely, that the Property is not in a safe and healthy condition. The onus was on Mr McNeil to establish the contrary.”
The Council submitted that the Order is valid because it complied with the relevant requirements set out in the Local Government Act, namely those found in ss 124, 136, and 137, which have been set earlier in this judgment.
The Orders specified:
(a) the premises: being the property at 81-83 Castlereagh Street, Coonamble (b) the persons to whom the Order was given being the defendant, Bequick; (c) the circumstances which Council considered existed: being that the property was not in a safe or healthy condition; (d) the things required to be done by the person: being Directions 1 to 6 in the Order; (e) the reasons for the Order being that the property was not in a safe or healthy condition, because the recent fire was likely to have exposed asbestos on the property; (f) the period for compliance with the Order being the time specified for each Direction to be completed (with time commencing to run on 29 August 2018); and (g) the Order was given, and expressed to be given, in an emergency.
“[67] The Council submitted that there is no separate ground of invalidity at common law for uncertainty: King Gee Clothing Co Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 184; [1945] HCA 23 at 194-196; Cann's Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1946) 71 CLR 210; [1946] HCA 5 at 227-228. However, there is no doubt that an order must convey to a reasonable reader what it is that must be done in order to comply with it: Bobolas v Waverly Council (2012) 187 LGERA 63; [2012] NSWCA 126 at [44], [49]. The order must therefore be intelligible, but the consequences of non-compliance “do not authorise any unusual rigour in the construction of the document or create any doubt as to its meaning which would otherwise not be there … and the whole document must be given a reasonable construction”: Dehimi Pty Ltd v Barob Pty Ltd (1987) 4 BPR 97,277 at 5.35 per Bryson J.
…
[73] I find that the appellants have not established that the order is uncertain in the various ways alleged. As the primary judge observed, the order must be read as a whole and mindful of the circumstance in which the order was issued and the purpose that it seeks to address (at [103]). The circumstance in which the order was issued was the imminent risk of collapse of retaining wall D, which made the area of the appellants' land around wall D unsafe. The purpose of the order was to place the appellants' land in a safe condition. The means by which this purpose was to be achieved was by carrying out the works specified in the order (in the section “To do what”).”
The Council relied upon four cases for the proposition that courts have not readily found that an order issued under the Local Government Act or similar legislation is invalid because it is uncertain or ambiguous and that the threshold for establishing such invalidity is high. I regard three of those cases as relevantly instructive namely: Foster v Sutherland Shire Council [2001] NSWLEC 89 (Foster); Barclay v Wollongong City Council [2005] NSWLEC 160 (Barclay); Bobolas v Waverly Council [2012] NSWCA 126 (Bobolas).
In Foster an order issued under s 121B of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW), requiring a person to cease using premises for a use which was prohibited under the relevant planning law, was held to be invalid because it purported to require the recipient of the order to cease using the premises for “short-term accommodation” whereas the prohibited use was “short-term tourist accommodation”. Cowdroy J confirmed at [8]-[10] that court orders must be formulated in precise terms, that proscribed conduct must be clearly stated to avoid uncertainty and continual breaches. And that the court order should not leave the central issue unresolved.
In Barclay, an order under s 121B of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act requiring compliance with a development consent was held to be invalid for uncertainty, the order being expressed in terms too broad to be enforceable: see [35]-[38] per Talbot J.
In Bobolas, an order under s 124 of the Local Government Act, requiring removal or disposal of waste on residential premises, was held to be invalid because it was expressed in terms of being a “proposed order”, rather than a final order. At [48]-[50], McColl JA, (with whom MacFarlan JA and Tobias AJA agreed) stated
“[48] The terms of the s 124 orders in this case did not convey any requirement for immediate implementation or compliance. Rather, they were expressed in terms of futurity. The heading to the part of the order referring to the removal of rubbish was expressed to be “Terms of the proposed order”. The idea that an order was yet to be given was confirmed in that part of the document headed “Reasons for the order”, by the phrase “the order will be given …”. That notion of futurity was also reaffirmed in that part of the document identifying the “Period for compliance” where the words “… the order will require that you comply …” appear.”
The Council submitted that none of the above cases support a finding that the Order issued to Bequick was invalid. It is submitted that the things required to be done by Bequick to comply with the Order and the period for compliance were intelligible to a reasonable reader.
Directions 1 to 6 in the Order were expressed in straightforward and clear terms, as a set of six sequential steps. The Order was expressed as requiring present action and compliance by Bequick; it was not expressed in terms of futurity. There was no possible ambiguity that the Order was merely a proposed order.
A reasonable recipient of the Order would have read the period for compliance as beginning on 29 August 2018, as set out in the “Period for Compliance” section of the Order, and not at any earlier date. That was made clear by the “date of this Emergency Order” being specified as “29/08/2018”, that is, 29 August 2018. Section 144 of the Local Government Act provides that an order may take effect either from the time of service or at a later time specified in the order. In this case, the Order was served on Bequick on 27 August 2018, but the Order specified that it took effect from 29 August 2018, two days later. That complied with s 144 of the Local Government Act. That was also beneficial to Bequick by giving it additional time to comply with the Order, rather than if the Order took effect on the date, it was issued and served.
The Council submitted that, as a matter of fact, Mr Wooding understood the Order and what they required of Bequick. From the extracts of Mr Wooding’s cross-examination reproduced earlier, I made factual findings where I agree Mr Wooding understood the terms of Directions 1 to 6.
The Council additionally submitted that any ambiguity in the Order’s time for compliance was “cured” by the Extension Order.
“[115] The presumption of regularity has also been described as one which “arises from the ordinary course of business”, being “a rule of very general application, that where an act is done which can be done legally only after the performance of some prior act, proof of the later carries with it a presumption of the due performance of the prior act”: McLean Bros & Rigg Ltd v Grice [1906] HCA 1; (1906) 4 CLR 835 at 850 per Griffith CJ (Barton and O'Connor JJ agreeing), citing Knox County v Ninth National Bank 147 US 91 (1893). In Minister for Natural Resources v NSW Aboriginal Land Council at 164 McHugh JA explained its operation in the public law context as follows:
“Where a public official or authority purports to exercise a power or to do an act in the course of his duties, a presumption arises that all conditions necessary to the exercise of that power or the doing of that act have been fulfilled.”
…
[117] There is authority to the effect that the presumption of regularity applies “only to matters of form, rather than of substance”, a proposition which may not be consistent with earlier decisions of this Court: see the discussion in GPT RE Limited v Belmorgan Property Development Pty Limited [2008] NSWCA 256; (2007) 72 NSWLR 647 at [82] per Basten JA (Bell JA and Young CJ in Eq agreeing). Such authority would also be inconsistent with Brickworks Ltd v Warringah Corporation in which the presumption of regularity was applied to conclude that a council had given consent for land to be used to extract minerals.”
I agree that the Order and the Extension Order must be expressed in clear and unambiguous terms, particularly given the consequences of non-compliance. Both orders are to be read as a whole and in their proper context, and the threshold for invalidity on the basis of uncertainty is a high one.
While aspects of Mr Wooding’s affidavit suggested confusion, Mr Wooding in cross-examination gave evidence that he understood each of the Directions 1 to 6 of the Order and what was required to comply with them in a sequential order. I have set this evidence out earlier. However, from the sequential order of the Directions, once a report was obtained from an occupational hygienist as to the presence of asbestos on the property, it would have been clear that the fencing around the property was insufficient to that end, Mr Wooding later put black plastic around the fencing.
Bequick submitted that the Order was uncertain as to the content of Directions 1 and 2. It is not necessary to resolve whether Direction 2, which required the erection of fencing, lacked precision in circumstances where fencing had already been installed shortly prior to the making of the Order. Even if Direction 2 were affected by some ambiguity, which I have found it is not, that would not render the Order invalid in its entirety. The Directions imposed by the Order are capable of operating independently. Critically, Direction 3 required Bequick to engage an occupational hygienist to identify the location and extent of asbestos contamination and report to the Council. That requirement is clear. It establishes an intelligible and necessary step upon which subsequent direction, including the treatment, removal and disposal of asbestos logically depend.
The balance of the Order, including the requirements to engage licensed contractors to treat and remove asbestos is expressed in terms sufficiently certain to be understood by a reasonable reader. Those Directions are neither conditional upon, nor rendered uncertain by, any lack of precision in Direction 2.
In that regard, Mr Wooding’s evidence in cross-examination establishes that Bequick, through Mr Wooding, understood the substantive requirements of the Order and Extension Order, including the sequential engagement of specialists.
What work Mr Wooding had undertaken was in fact not in sequential order, namely, hiring Mr Ezzey to treat asbestos when an occupational hygienist had not provided a specialist report that would have identified where asbestos was located within and around the property.
He also understood that if he failed to comply with those orders that “the Council will enter into the premises without further notice to [Mr Wooding] or do all such things as are necessary or convenient to give effect to the term of the [Orders]”.
In this respect, the second issue raised in the cross-claim therefore fails.
Bequick referred to Mr Wooding’s affidavit evidence as to his understanding of the Directions and material compliance with them. It need not be repeated here.
Bequick submitted that the evidence establishes that:
(a) Direction 1 was already complied with on the day of the Order, but on any view, it was complied with by 31 August 2018 (GW-A 1, pars 51-53). (b) Direction 2 was already complied with on the day of the Order (GW-A 1, par 54). (c) Direction 3 was complied with on 30 August 2018 (GW-A 1, pars 64-65). (d) Direction 4 was complied with on 30 August 2018 (GW-A 1, pars 55-63). (e) The property was demolished before Bequick had a reasonable opportunity to comply with Directions 5 and 6 (GW-A 1, pars 66-72).
The Council submitted that, in fact, Bequick did not comply with the Directions in the Order at all within the requisite time (that is by 19 September 2018 or alternatively by 17 September 2018).
In cross-examination, Mr Wooding gave the following evidence, that did not accord with the evidence he gave by way of affidavits:
(a) Bequick did not erect any fencing around the building (as required by Direction 2) (T99.44-100.4):
“Q. No, just listen to my question, please. Until a time later in October Be[q]uick did not erect any fencing around the property at 81 83.
A. Okay, yes.
Q. Is that correct.
A. Correct.
Q. I'm going to come to the dates in October, just do it by step. So in the period between 27 August 2018, and around 13 or 14 October 2018, Be[q]uick took no steps to erect fencing around 81 83, did it?
A. Correct.”
(b) Bequick did not provide to Council any report from an occupational hygienist which identified all areas of the land which contained asbestos (as required by Direction 3) (T101.20-26):
“Q. Now between, and again when we come to it I'll ask you questions about what happened on 30 August. Between 27 August and 30 August you didn't take any steps to engage an occupational hygienist, did you?
A. No.
Q. But you knew what an occupational hygienist was.
A. Yes.”
(c) Bequick did not engage a licensed contractor to spray PVA sealant and dye over the asbestos identified by the occupational hygienist (as required by Direction 4) (T102.6-14):
“Q. And in the period from 27 August to 30 August you didn't engage a licenced contractor to spray PVA sealant and dye, did you?
A. No.
Q. Again, I'll come to this in due course. Now you understand, and I think you accept it from me earlier, Mr Wooding, that before a licenced contractor could spray PVA sealant and dye on any asbestos it would first have to have been identified by the hygienist under direction 3, is that right?
A. Correct.”
(d) The Council submitted that the “perfunctory” spraying that Mr Ezzey conducted on 30 August 2018 did not meet the terms of the Order as it could not have covered all asbestos on the property until that had first been identified by a qualified occupational hygienist. (e) Bequick did not engage a licensed contractor to remove the asbestos and demolish and remove all building debris from the land, make the site safe, and dispose of the asbestos to a licensed facility (as required by Direction 5) (T102.24-28):
“Q. … Just turning to the balance of the steps that you set out at paragraph 49, you didn't engage a licenced contractor to remove the asbestos and demolish and remove building debris from the premises, did you?
A. No.”
(f) Bequick did not furnish the Council with receipts from the licensed facility for the disposal of the asbestos (as required by Direction 6) (T102.30-33):
“Q. You did not, as a consequence, furnish council with receipts from the licenced facility where any asbestos may have been disposed of? You didn't do 5; you couldn't do 6, could you?
A. Correct.”
Mr Wooding's evidence on behalf of Bequick, illustrates that some steps were taken after the Order was made. However, those steps fall short of what the Order required. The Directions were specific and required steps to be taken sequentially within a set timeframe.
Mr Wooding in cross-examination admitted that none of Directions 1 to 6 were met, whether strictly or in any material sense. I accept that he did not comply with Directions 5 and 6 because he had not complied with Directions 1 to 4, the time for compliance with the Directions had expired and the property had already been demolished. In particular, the cross-examination of Mr Wooding reproduced in Issue 2 and pursuant to this issue that the Council referred to in its submissions demonstrated that Bequick did not comply with Directions 1 to 6 in the timeframe provided at all.
In my view, Bequick did not materially comply with the Orders or the Extension Order. As such, the Orders are valid. That means that the Council validly exercised its valid power under s 678 of the Local Government Act to enter the land and give effect to such orders. In these circumstances, there was no trespass to the property.
It follows that this issue raised by Bequick in its cross-claim fails.
Bequick relied on the decision of the High Court of Australia in Disorganized Developments Pty Ltd v South Australia (2023) 280 CLR 515; (2023) 410 ALR 508; (2023) 97 ALJR 575; [2023] HCA 22 where, at [32]-[34], Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Gleeson and Jagot JJ confirmed that “the existence of a duty to afford procedural fairness is a question of statutory interpretation”, subject to a “’strong’ common law presumption” that statutory powers affecting the rights or interests of individuals are impliedly conditioned on the observance of procedural fairness, unless “clearly displace by the particular statutory scheme”. Notwithstanding the breadth of the stated presumption, the presumption does not extend to powers affecting individuals only as undifferentiated members of the general public.
The content of the duty depends on the circumstances. Bequick relied upon Traili v McRae [2002] FCAFC 235 to support that proposition, where at [134], Sackville, Kenny and Allsop JJ stated:
“[134] …what is adequate notice of a matter and when it should be provided, so as to enable a practitioner fairly to respond, is to be decided by reference to the circumstances of the case in question: Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 584. …”
So far as the issue of the Order, Bequick submitted that there is no suggestion that the duty to provide procedural fairness has been displaced, s 130 of the Local Government Act is proof of the incorporation of that duty.
Bequick further submitted that the narrow timeframes for compliance set out in both the Order and the Extension Order amount to a denial of procedural fairness. Although an unreasonable time for compliance in such an order is not properly to be complained of as a denial of natural justice, but rather as a defect of the order itself, rather than a defect in the procedure leading to the issue of the order. That is to say, that it is to be complained of as a matter of structural invalidity (as uncertainty or ambiguity was above).
According to Bequick the Council’s failure to notify Mr Wooding of its decision or contemplation of demolition was in breach of its notice requirements under s 193 of the Local Government Act. It is submitted that Bequick was not informed of any of the following matters until after the demolition was complete:
(a) On 6 September 2018, the Council requested a quote to demolish the property (and the other fire-damaged properties). (b) On 21 September 2018, Mr Noonan recommended demolition of the four fire-damaged properties. (c) The Warren Report. (d) The Council’s resolution 4098. (e) On 23 October 2018, the Council retained Mr Newbold to demolish the four fire-damaged properties. (f) On 24 October 2018, the Council obtained a quote from Byrne Demolition.
(a) Demolition works commenced more than two months after the fire. (b) Fencing to restrict public access was installed on the day of the fire. (c) Mr Wooding put a lock on the back gate after the fire brigade had cut the previous lock (T101.11-12). (d) Mr Wooding erected acrow props under the cantilevered awning and had Mr Ezzey clean the footpath on 31 August 2018. (e) Mr Wooding installed further fencing abutting the property on 14 October 2018. (f) Mr Newbold on behalf of the Council had sprayed PVA sealant and dye to “saturate” the property debris in compliance with a direction to make safe: from the Council prior to commencing any demolition (T59.4-8).
Counsel for the plaintiff referred to Bequick’s pleadings both in the cross-claim and defence as “a mishmash of administrative law type allegations” (T250.41) and wholly refuted each of them.
The Council submitted that the presumption that a statutory power is granted with the requirement that procedural fairness be afforded in the exercise of that power can be displaced or modified by the particular statutory scheme.
The Council relied on Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ (2016) 259 CLR 180; [2016] HCA 29 to support that proposition where, at [75], the Plurarity stated:
“[75] … it must now be taken to be settled that procedural fairness is implied as a condition of the exercise of a statutory power through the application of a common law principle of statutory interpretation. The common law principle, sufficiently stated for present purposes, is that a statute conferring a power the exercise of which is apt to affect an interest of an individual is presumed to confer that power on condition that the power is exercised in a manner that affords procedural fairness to that individual. The presumption operates unless clearly displaced by the particular statutory scheme.”
“[26] It has long been established that the statutory framework within which a decision-maker exercises statutory power is of critical importance when considering what procedural fairness requires. It is also clear that the particular content to be given to the requirement to accord procedural fairness will depend upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. As Kitto J said in Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation:
“[T]he books are full of cases which illustrate both the impossibility of laying down a universally valid test by which to ascertain what may constitute such an opportunity [‘to correct or contradict any relevant statement prejudicial to their view’] in the infinite variety of circumstances that may exist, and the necessity of allowing full effect in every case to the particular statutory framework within which the proceeding takes place.”
In the present case, attention in argument, both in this Court and in the courts below, was directed more to the particular circumstances of the case than to the relevant statutory framework, but it is necessary to notice some aspects of that framework. Unless that is done, the argument proceeds at too high a level of abstraction and may proceed upon assumptions that are ill founded.”
As to the issue of the Order itself, the Council submitted that the relevant procedural requirements that must be observed by a council in these circumstances is set out in ss 129-135 of the Local Government Act. Those provisions are said to prescribe in detail the steps which must be taken to afford a person procedural fairness when giving an order under s 124 of the Local Government Act. Section 129(3)(b) provides that those provisions regarding procedural fairness are disengaged to an order given, and expressed to be given, in an emergency. It is said that the effect of s 129(3)(b) expressly excludes the obligation to afford procedural fairness in respect of an order given, and expressed to be given, in an emergency.
Given the terms of the Local Government Act, this Court cannot impose any additional or residual common law obligation to afford procedural fairness to any person who is the subject of an emergency order.
The Council also referred to Universal 1919 Pty Ltd v 122 Pitt Street Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 50 (Universal 1919 Pty Ltd) to support that proposition where at [21]-[23] Macfarlan JA (with whom Meagher and Gleeson JJA agreed) observed:
“[21] Certainly, a requirement under the general law to afford procedural fairness can only be excluded “by plain words of necessary intendment”, rather than “indirect references, uncertain inferences or equivocal considerations” (Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596; [1990] HCA 57 at 598; see also Minister for Immigration v SZSSJ (2016) 259 CLR 180; [2016] HCA 29 at [75]). The decisions in Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252; [2010] HCA 23 and Seiffert v Prisoners Review Board [2011] WASCA 148 are instances of courts finding that express statutory exclusionary provisions could operate to exclude or limit requirements for procedural fairness.
[22] The statutory scheme contained in Schedule 5 to the EPA Act in my view contained sufficiently “plain words” to exclude any right that Universal might otherwise have had to be afforded procedural fairness in relation to the issue of the DCO.
[23] Importantly, cl 7 in Schedule 5 provided that an enforcement authority such as the Council “is taken to have observed the rules of procedural fairness” if it complies with certain provisions of the Schedule. These provisions included the requirement under cll 8 and 14 to give notice of a proposed order to the person to whom the order was to be directed and to consider any representations made by that person. The legislation thus identified to whom notice of a proposed DCO was to be given and what had to occur in consequence. This specification was in my view exhaustive and left no room for Universal's argument that Universal was someone else to whom the Council was required to give notice of the proposed DCO.”
As to the Council’s exercise of its power under s 678 of the Local Government Act and its decision to demolish the property, it is submitted that the Council was not required to afford procedural fairness to Bequick prior to deciding to exercise its powers under s 678 where the Council was acting to give effect to the terms of an emergency order. This is because any obligation to afford procedural fairness in respect of a council’s decision to act to give effect to an emergency order pursuant to s 678 is expressly or impliedly excluded by the Local Government Act.
As to the requirement to give notice of entry required under s 193 of the Local Government Act, the Council drew attention to the fact that notice is not required where “entry to the premises is required because of the existence or reasonable likelihood of a serious risk to health or safety” (s 193(3)(b)). The Council also noted that Bequick has not pleaded trespass on the basis that the demolition was in contravention of s 193.
The Council submitted that given the state of the property, in particular the extent of the asbestos contamination, it was not required to provide any notice of entry under s 193 of the Local Government Act, as the entry was required to carry out the clean-up work because of the existence or reasonable likelihood of a serious risk to health or safety.
The Council further submitted that in any event, it in fact did provide notice of the proposed entry in the Extension Order. The Extension Order is said to have notified Bequick that should it fail to comply with the Emergency Order by close of business on 15 October 2018, then the Council would “enter onto the premises without further notice to you and do all such things as are necessary or convenient to give effect to the terms of the Emergency Order”.
As to Mr Warren’s refusal to meet with Mr Wooding, the Council in their written submissions stated that this did not constitute a denial of procedural fairness (if Bequick had any right to procedural fairness). Mr Warren was not the relevant decision maker:
“…Rather, the relevant decision-maker was Mr Cock, who issued the Emergency Order and the Extension [Order]. The Emergency Order stated that any communications should be directed to Mr Cock. However, Mr Wooding enver attempted to contact Mr Cock to arrange a meeting. It is also not clear what further relevant information that Mr Wooding wanted to provide to Council in a face-to-face meeting beyond what he had provided in writing. Mr Wooding could not identify any specific matters he wanted to raise in such a meeting [T124 [22]-125 [12]. He agreed in cross-examination that his letter included all documents that he wished to put before the Council [T125 [10]-[12]]. Mr Wooding in fact had a meeting with Mr Bruce Quarmby on 15 October 2018, and Mr Quarmby was not cross-examined about any matters raised or discussed during that meeting.”
The starting point is that a duty to afford procedural fairness will ordinarily attach to the exercise of a statutory power where its exercise may affect a person’s rights or interests, unless that duty is excluded by statute.
Here, the relevant statute is the Local Government Act. Sections 129-135 prescribe in detail the procedural requirements that apply when a council proposes to give an order. Section 129(3)(b) provides that those requirements do not apply to an order given, or expressed to be given, in an emergency (as is the case here).
The Order in this case was issued pursuant to ss 124 and 129 of the Local Government Act. An inspection of the property on 23 August 2018 by Mr Cock of the Council revealed that the property was likely to contain asbestos which would pose a threat to public health as the asbestos is likely to have been distributed due to the recent fire at the property. The reasons for the Order also stated that the fire had left buildings in an unsafe manner and is a danger to public safety. In those circumstances, the Local Government Act displaces any additional or residual common law obligation to afford procedural fairness prior to the making of the order: Universal 1919 Pty Ltd.
As to the Council's exercise of its power under s 678 of the Local Government Act in giving effect to the Order, including the decision to enter the property and demolish the building. Those actions were taken to implement the terms of the Order. Any obligation to afford procedural fairness in respect of a council's decision to act to give effect to an emergency order pursuant to s 678 is expressly or impliedly excluded by the Local Government Act.
In the event such notice was required, the Council did provide notice of the proposed entry in the Extension Order. The Extension Order notified Bequick that should it fail to comply with the Order by close of business on 15 October 2018, then the Council would "enter onto the premises without further notice to you and do all such things as are necessary or convenient to give effect to the terms of the Emergency Order". That is said to constitute the requisite notice under s 193 of the Local Government Act.
In cross-examination Mr Wooding admitted that he on behalf of Bequick understood the Order to mean that, if he failed to comply, that in addition the Council may also choose to exercise its power pursuant to s 678 of the Local Government Act do all such things that are necessary or convenient to give effect to the Order and recover all costs incurred as a debt (T97.13-10).
The following exchange took place during cross examination of Mr Wooding in respect of the letter of 15 October 2018 and the denial of a meeting with Mr Warren (T124.22-125.12):
“Q. There's nothing else you could have said to the council in providing your correspondence of 15 October 2018 to explain your position with the council and to support your position that you say you complied; you told them everything you needed to tell them.
A. I tried to meet with them.
Q. Sorry?
A. I tried to hand deliver and meet with the fellow.
Q. You met with Mr Quarmby, but what I'm asking you is about your letter.
A. Yeah.
Q. The letter contained everything that you thought you needed to say to the council, to respond to the letter of 5 October 2018, is that right?
A. No, I felt I had to communicate face to face to these people.
Q. Concentrate on the letter please. I'm not asking you about trying to --
A. No, I didn't add any letters, and I didn't do anything.
Q. Sorry, what?
A. I'm answering the question. No, I didn't.
Q. I'm going to ask again so that the answer is clear. You included in your letter of 15 October everything you wanted to say to the council about your efforts to comply with the extension letter of 5 October. There was nothing you left out, was there?
A. Yes, there were a lot of things we could have said, but we expected to communicate with the people.
…
Q. There are no documents that you can think of that you would have included in your letter of 15 October 2018 to explain your position to the council.
A. No, correct.”
The evidence does not establish that Bequick was denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Mr Wooding provided the letter dated 15 October 2018 to the Council. It is clear from the above exchange that Mr Wooding agreed that there were no documents that he could think of that he would have further included in that letter to explain his position to the Council. While he sought an in-person meeting with Mr Warren, that request was not directed to the relevant decision maker and no additional matters were identified that would have been raised in such a meeting. There was no obligation for Mr Warren to meet with Mr Wooding. The refusal of Mr Warren to meet with Mr Wooding does not amount to a denial of procedural fairness. Bequick had the opportunity to put forward its position in writing and did so.
In correspondence from the Council to Bequick procedural fairness was afforded to Bequick. Bequick did not avail itself of these opportunities. They include some of the following:
In the Order the Council advised Bequick through Mr Wooding to obtain legal advice (T98.2-4). It did not do so.
Bequick was advised of its right to appeal the Orders but did not do so.
Bequick did not make any complaint to the Council that the terms of the Order were ambiguous or uncertain.
Rather, Mr Wooding informed the Council that he had complied with the terms of the Order (T123.1-16). In cross-examination of Mr Wooding this turned out not to be accurate.
In my view, s 193(3)(b) of the Local Government Act provides that the notice is not required where entry to premises is necessitated by the reasonable likelihood of serious risk to health or safety. The Council did not deny Bequick procedural fairness. Bequick’s issue of denial of procedural fairness raised in the cross-claim fails.
Given my conclusion that Bequick’s cross-claim fails, it is unnecessary to determine the remaining issues concerning damages. However, trial courts should, where possible deal with all issues in dispute so that, if an appeal succeeds, the matter does not need to be remitted for further hearing: Gulic v Boral Transport Ltd [2016] NSWCA 269 at [7]. For that reason, I will briefly address the method of calculation of damages for the post fire demolition and the parties’ submissions concerning damages that Bequick claims in its cross-claim.
As to the method of calculation of damages, Mr Noonan in the Barnson Report stated the following:
The masonry walls on all buildings are currently unrestrained by roof framing and thus have insufficient capacity to resist lateral loading. Therefore, the walls are in danger of collapse if sufficient wind or seismic loading was to occur. The Castlereagh Street awnings are also not adequately tied down and would fall from uplift wind forces.
It is recommended that the walls are demolished when the burnt roof debris is removed. The remaining shop front framing needs to be removed at the same time, along with the awnings on Castlereagh Street.
There may be heritage conservation issues, where the demolition of the building is regarded to be not desirable. However, most of the heritage construction, including the roofs and facades, have been lost by the fire.
The remaining shell of the buildings could not be repaired economically, compared to complete demolition and re-building.
Mr Matheson in the Geolyse Report opined that “[f]rom our inspection we have determined that the structure is not in immediate danger of collapse in normal conditions, and provided public access to the site has been restricted, we believe that there is currently no immediate danger to public health or safety…pending an engineering review of stability under wind/earthquake loading.”
Both the authors of the Barnson Report and Geolyse Report agree that the masonry walls that have no lateral restraint will collapse under sufficient wind. Additionally, the Barson Report opines that the awnings on Castlereagh Street are inadequately fixed and is in danger of collapse with wind loading. He recommended that the property be demolished.
What is in dispute is whether what remained of the property post-fire should have been demolished and assuming it had been reconstructed and at what cost.
The parties both made extensive submissions and led much evidence on the issue of damages. Briefly, Bequick’s position is that it should be given damages sufficient to erect a new structure. The Council’s position is that rather than suffering damage by its remediation works, Bequick was actually put into a better position: it formerly had a ruined, asbestos-contaminated site with extensive fire damages whereas it now has a healthy and safe parcel of land.
[34] In the case of a chattel, such as a car, destroyed or damaged by the defendant's fault, but of which the plaintiff has had the benefit of some use, a choice of the type referred to in Badham v Williams is more likely to be available than in the case of a building so destroyed or damaged. In Harbutt's the defendant, while installing equipment under contract in an old mill which the plaintiff used as its factory, destroyed the building by its negligence. The plaintiff was not permitted to rebuild the old mill which was five storeys high. It had to put up a new factory two storeys high though with no more accommodation. The question as posed by Lord Denning MR at 467 was whether the plaintiff was entitled to the actual cost of replacement or was limited to the difference in value of the old mill before and after the fire. At 468 his Lordship said:
‘The destruction of a building is different from the destruction of a chattel. If a second-hand car is destroyed, the owner only gets its value; because he can go into the market and get another second-hand car to replace it. He cannot charge the other party with the cost of replacing it with a new car. But when this mill was destroyed, the plasticine company had no choice. They were bound to replace it as soon as they could, not only to keep their business going, but also to mitigate the loss of profit (for which they would be able to charge the defendants). They replaced it in the only possible way, without adding any extras. I think they should be allowed the cost of replacement. True it is that they got new for old; but I do not think the wrongdoer can diminish the claim on that account. If they had added extra accommodation or made extra improvements, they would have to give credit. But that is not this case.’
…
[55] The facts in Hoad and British Westinghouse are distinguishable from the facts in this case. The plaintiff had no choice but to replace the defective pavement with new pavement. It could not do so by paying less for a four year old pavement. There was no evidence of any advantage to the plaintiff beyond the speculative proposition that the new pavement might last longer than the old one would have, if it had been properly laid. Moreover as Giles JA has remarked in his reasons for judgment, it is not appropriate to use a “crude percentage discount” to reduce the amount awarded. Ordinarily if such a reduction is to be made the formula mentioned in Waddams and referred to with approval by the Court of Appeal of Ontario should be applied. On the evidence in this case, no allowance should have been made for betterment and this ground of cross-appeal fails.”
“… The general principle of restitutio in integrum, so that a plaintiff should be compensated for its loss but not over-compensated, is undoubted. Its application will vary according to the circumstances. In the present case the owner was entitled to a sound pavement, and from the time it was laid the pavement failed and the owner did not have a sound pavement. It had to be replaced, and the owner could not replace it with a sound four year old pavement. Any benefit to the owner seems to be that, whereas it would otherwise have had to spend money repairing or replacing the pavement in (say) 2015, having reconstructed the pavement in 1999 it will now not have to spend money repairing or replacing it until (say) 2020. So the owner will have the use for five years of the money spent on the repair or replacement. If any allowance in favour of the architect is to be made, I do not think it should be by the crude percentage discount suggested by the owner.”
“[260] Where it appears that a plaintiff may in some respects be better off as a result of expenditure it has incurred in consequence of a defendant's wrong or breach of contract, difficult questions can arise. This is particularly so where the plaintiff is left with an enduring asset that may be of greater value than an asset which had to be replaced because of the defendant's conduct. The basic principle is that the plaintiff is to be compensated for its loss, and no more, and there is no more particular statement of principle that will determine the result in all cases; but in my opinion, the authorities do support a number of subsidiary propositions.
[261] First, if a plaintiff choses to acquire a more valuable asset than that which had to be replaced, where the plaintiff could for a lesser expenditure have acquired an asset that would have been as satisfactory as that replaced, the plaintiff cannot recover more than that lesser expenditure: British Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. Ltd v Underground Electric Railways Co. of London Ltd [1912] AC 673.
[262] Second, even if there is no alternative available to a plaintiff other than to acquire a more valuable asset, a plaintiff may have to give credit reflecting the greater value of this asset to the plaintiff, if there is a benefit to the plaintiff which is not remote in time or speculative, and which can be quantified. In Hoad v Scone Motors Pty Ltd [1977] 1 NSWLR 88, it was accepted that the plaintiff had no reasonable alternative other than to acquire a new tractor; but since the plaintiff was shortly to sell his business including this tractor, the greater second-hand value of this tractor over that which had been destroyed would have to be deducted from the plaintiff's damages. No such deduction was made in Harbutt's “Plasticine” Ltd v Wayne Tank & Pump Co. Ltd [1970] 1 QB 447, where the plaintiff rebuilt a destroyed factory; but there was no suggestion that the new factory would be sold in the foreseeable future. Nor, apparently, was there any evidence or even any suggestion that there would be gains by way of productivity or economies of maintenance of the new factory: had there been evidence to that effect, the result would I think have been different. Similarly, in Hyder Consulting (Australia) Pty Ltd v Wilh Wilhelmsen Agency Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 313, there was no deduction where a pavement with a life expectancy of twenty years collapsed after four years, and was replaced by one with a similar life expectancy: the prospect that, about sixteen years in the future, the new pavement would probably continue for four years longer than the original pavement should have done, was considered too remote and speculative. Had the life expectancy of the asset that failed after four years been (say) eight years rather than twenty years, I think the result would have been different; but in my opinion the deduction from damages would have been substantially less than 50%, because the benefits would have become available between four and eight years in the future, and been less than 100% certain.
[263] Third, where any benefit received by the plaintiff is considered as not truly caused by the defendant's conduct and expenditure undertaken in consequence of it (and paid for by the defendant), but rather considered as being collateral, no credit is given for it: Monroe Schneider Associates (Inc) v No.1 Raberem Pty Ltd (1991) 33 FCR 1.
[264] Fourth, although the plaintiff has the general onus of proof of damages, there can be legal or at least evidentiary onuses cast on the defendant. If a defendant wishes to say that the plaintiff incurred loss or expenses that it could have avoided by taking reasonable steps in mitigation, the onus of proof is on the defendant: Roper v Johnson (1873) LR8 CP 167. If a defendant wishes to say that some part of the loss would have occurred in any event, there may be an onus on the defendant to “disentangle the causes”: Watts v Rake (1960) 108 CLR 158 at 159, Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164 at 168, Shorey v PT Ltd (2003) 77 ALJR 1104 at [46]-[47]. If a defendant wishes to say a benefit received by the plaintiff was caused by the defendant's conduct or by expenditure caused by that conduct, it appears that the defendant bears an onus: Monroe Schneider. The onus or at least standard of proof may also be affected by considerations of who has the capacity to offer proof (Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63 at 65; 98 ER 969) and, where events have prejudiced the provision of proof, who is responsible for those events (Murphy v Overton Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 78 ALJR 324 at [74]).”
The reasons of Sheller JA in Hyder and those of Hodgson JA in Tyco were approved and applied by the Court of Appeal in Walker Groups Constructions Pty Ltd v Tzaneros Investments Pty Ltd (2017) 94 NSWLR 108; [2017] NSWCA 27 at [201]-[206] (Bathurst CJ, Beazley P and Gleeson JA agreeing).
Otherwise, Bequick submitted that any ambiguity as to the appropriate quantum of damages arising from the question of the structural integrity of the walls which stood after the fire should construed against the Council. It is submitted that it is the Council who has deprived this Court of better evidence on the walls and should not be given the opportunity to benefit from any such ambiguity. In that regard, Bequick referred to Houghton v Immer (No 155) Pty Ltd (1997) 44 NSWLR 46 (Houghton) where Handley JA, with whom Mason P and Beazley JA agreed, observed at [59]:
“... The defendants, having improved common property without lawful authority, and attempted to effect a fraud on the minority, are wrongdoers, and their failure to keep and produce proper accounts of their actual expenditure on the common property has made it difficult to assess the compensation due to the plaintiff: compare Armory v Delamirie (1722) 1 Stra 50 593 ER 664. In my judgment the Court should assess the compensation in a robust manner, relying on the presumption against wrongdoers, the onus of proof, and resolving doubtful questions against the party whose actions have made an accurate determination so problematic: see LJP Investments Pty Ltd v Howard Chia Investments Pty Ltd (1990) 24 NSWLR 499 at 508.”
The Council submitted that Bequick would be entitled to compensatory damages only if it proves that the Council’s actions of entering the property and carrying out the works caused physical damage or destruction to the property which diminished the value of the land or fixtures. Otherwise, Bequick would be entitled to nominal damages only in respect of the Council’s trespass to the property.
There are ordinarily two alternative measures for compensatory damages for physical damage to land and fixtures: (1) the cost of repair or full reinstatement of the property; and (2) compensation for the diminution in the value of the land and the fixtures caused by the damage. In any event, the Court must assess what is reasonable in the circumstances. The Council relied upon Roberts v Goodwin Street Developments Pty Ltd (2023) 110 NSWLR 557; [2023] NSWCA 5 (Roberts) to support these propositions where Kirk JA and Griffiths AJA stated:
“[108] Some of the relevant principles in relation to tortious damage caused to real property were identified by Donaldson LJ in Dodd Properties Ltd v Canterbury City Council [1980] 1 WLR 433 at 456–457 (as approved, for example, in Hansen v Gloucester Developments Pty Ltd [1992] 1 Qd R 14 at 15):
“The general object underlying the rules for the assessment of damages is, so far as is possible by means of a monetary award, to place the plaintiff in the position which he would have occupied if he had not suffered the wrong complained of, be that wrong a tort or a breach of contract. In the case of a tort causing damage to real property, this object is achieved by the application of one or other of two quite different measures of damage, or, occasionally, a combination of the two. The first is to take the capital value of the property in an undamaged state and to compare it with its value in a damaged state. The second is to take the cost of repair or reinstatement. Which is appropriate will depend upon a number of factors, such as the plaintiff’s future intentions as to the use of the property and the reasonableness of those intentions. If he reasonably intends to sell the property in its damaged state, clearly the diminution in capital value is the true measure of damage. If he reasonably intends to continue to occupy it and to repair the damage, clearly the cost of repairs is the true measure. And there may be in-between situations.”
…
[119] In summary, what relevantly emerges from the case law is the following:
(1) A claimant suing for damage to real property — caused by a breach of contract or a tort — has some choice as to how their claim for damages is quantified. The two leading possibilities, at least when a property owner has possession or shortly is to resume possession of the land, are seeking the costs of rectification of the consequences of breach or seeking the diminution in value of the property. There may be other possibilities, reflecting the fact that it is the compensatory principle which ultimately governs, and that adjusts to all the circumstances of the case.
(2) Rectification/Reinstatement damages are not merely a proxy for loss of capital value of the property. Being awarded the cost of rectification is prima facie reasonable. It is not generally necessary for the claimant to put on evidence that the cost of rectification is not disproportionate to any diminution in value, in the absence of the issue having been raised with evidentiary support by the defendant…
(3) Because there is an overall limitation that the damages awarded must be reasonable in all the circumstances, it is open for a defendant to seek to persuade the court that the costs of reinstatement should not be awarded. In the context outlined there is at least an evidentiary onus on the defendant to make out that such costs are unreasonable. The costs might be unreasonable because there is no actual intent to reinstate, or in some cases it may be that there is such a disproportionality to the diminution of capital value that to award rectification costs would be unreasonable.”
While Mr Wooding on behalf of Bequick expressed the opinion that the concrete floors and walls were structurally sound none of the structural engineers held this view. There was however, one area that was still viable. That was the undamaged eastern wall and where the safe and the bathroom were located at the rear of the property.
Mr Wooding gave unchallenged evidence that on 13 September 2018, the exterior walls, the internal brick walls, the amenity block and roof, and the solid brick safe with a steel door were intact.
Ms Redden gave unchallenged evidence that at the back of the building there was a skillion (sloping) roof over the compressors, that the kitchen and bathroom were still intact, with some damage to the roof over the toilet.
There are photographs of this which Ms Redden included in her 22 January 2019 plans.
I accept that this part of the property could have been restored.
Mr Luscombe is a building estimator who wrote two reports on damages dated 2 April and 5 July 2024. He gave conclave evidence together with Mr Fares, quantity surveyor who also prepared reports on behalf of the Council and was called to provide expert evidence for Bequick. Mr Luscombe’s curriculum vitae states that he has over 45 years’ experience in the building industry. He began his career as an apprentice carpenter and joiner at about which time he obtained Certificates of Technology in Building Construction and in Building Estimating. He has worked on and been involved with building projects ranging from small domestic projects to large multi storey buildings in the capacities of tradesman, project estimator, project manager, contract administrator and principal builder. He was first registered as a building practitioner with the Victorian Building Practitioners Board in 1988 and held both unlimited Domestic and Commercial Registrations until 2016. He established his company, Luscombe Consulting Pty Ltd in 1993 and continues to act as its director and principal. Luscombe Consulting assists owners, architects, builders and sub trades with preparation of building cost estimates and bills of quantities.
On 2 April 2019, Mr Luscombe provided Bequick a building cost estimate for the reconstruction of the building to a post-fire condition. The estimated cost was $841,945.01, including a builder’s margin and GST (a builder’s margin is the percentage or mark-up that a builder adds to the cost of construction works, materials, and subcontractors).
On 5 July 2024, Mr Luscombe provided a further report and calculated a building cost estimate of $1,243,168.61 including builder’s margin (15%) and GST. As with the 2 April 2019 estimate, this was the cost estimate for a proposed reconstruction up to the post-fire stage (not the pre-fire stage). The increase since the 2 April 2019 estimate is said to arise from the costs of labour in materials as increased in the past five years. He also increased the estimate by 20% to account for the fact that Coonamble is outside a major city and in a remote region. Mr Luscombe relied on Rawlinsons Australian Construction Handbook 2024 (Rawlinsons Cost Data 2024 ed. 42).
Mr Luscombe did not inspect the property.
He based his reports on following documents:
Ground floor plan post-fire, prepared by Redden Design dated 22 January 2019.
A 3D perspectives-Post fire, prepared by Redden Design dated 22 January 2019.
A photograph of the property pre-fire.
A photo which depicts a floor plan of the building with handwritten measurements and a handwritten comment reading “30 sqm of concrete remains” which depicts the amount of concrete remaining at the rear door to the property (north of lot 63) and what concrete needed to be replaced for the proposed reconstruction of the property to the post-fire stage.
An earlier version of the two plans above, and some photographs of the property pre-fire and post-fire.
He assumed the documents as set out above are an accurate representation of the state of the property post-fire and all measurements are accurate.
Mr Luscombe’s estimation of damages is summarised below (CB, p 503):
| DESCRIPTION | MARKUP | TOTAL | | PRELIMINARIES | | $169,598.40 | | HIRE ITEMS | 20% | $59,154.68 | | SITE PREPARATION | 20% | $19,574.16 | | DRAINER | 20% | $13,884.00 | | TERMITE PROTECTION | 20% | $3,678.00 | | CONCRETOR | 20% | $158,924 | | WINDOWS | 20% | $13,788.00 | | STRUCTURAL STEEL | 20% | $97,987.51 | | ROOF PLUMBER | 20% | $16,471.04 | | TOP BRICKLAYER | 20% | $398,829.55 | | PLUMBER | 20% | $1,620.00 | | RENDERER | 20% | $10,980.00 | | EXTERNAL WORKS | 20% | $8,316.00 | | SITE CLEAN | 20% | $9,936.00 | | Subtotal | $982,741 | | Margin | $147,411.30 | | Post margin | $1,130,153.28 | | G.S.T. [10%] | $113,015.33 | | Total | $1,243,168.61 |
However, Bequick then accepted that the correct estimate of its damages ought not to include rendering and decorative moulding on the external walls (as this would be inconsistent with the building’s chief material, sandstock bricks). It is conceded that this allowance would reduce Mr Luscombe’s calculation by $13,176 (including margin and rural allowance).
It is also conceded by Bequick that on account of a detail about plumbing which transpired during the hearing (T230.30-33), the allowance for “drainage” (listed as “DRAINER” in the table above) ought to be reduced to $13,737.60 (including margin and rural allowance). This seems to amount to a reduction of $146.40.
As I understand it, this means that Bequick seeks a quantum of damages of $1,228,513.97 (including the builder’s margin, the rural allowance and GST).
Mr Fares is a quantity surveyor who wrote reports and gave expert evidence on behalf of the Council. Mr Fares’ CV states that he has over 20 years’ national and international experience working on a variety of building projects. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Interior Design from the C&E American University located in Lebanon; a Master of Science in Quantity Surveying from Salford University located in England; and a Diploma of Project Management from the Global Training Institute, located in Australia. Mr Fares is a member of both the Australian Institute of Quantity Surveyors and of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors.
Like Mr Luscombe, Mr Fares did not visit or inspect the property. He reviewed other reports prepared by other consultants as well as video and photographic evidence.
In short, Mr Fares’ opinion is that the cost estimate provided by the Bequick Export Report 1 is “extremely high” and includes pricing for things that the Council is not liable for. In Appendix F of the Council Expert Report (CB, p 418-422), Mr Fares provides a partial rebuild cost of $508,221.56. That is the cost to reproduce the fire-damaged property. Mr Fares’ estimation is summarised below (CB, p 419):
| DESCRIPTION | TOTAL | | SITE PREPARATION | $58,000 | | PARTIAL CONSTRUCTION WORKS | $316,620 | | SUB-TOTAL 1 | $374,620 | | PRELIMINARIES | $27,250 | | MARGIN (8%) | $32,150 | | SUB-TOTAL 2 | $434,020 | | CONSTRUCTION CONTINGENCIES | Excluded | | SUB-TOTAL 3 | $434,020 | | PROFESSIONAL FEES ALLOWANCE | $20,000 | | AUTHORITY FEES ALLOWANCE | $8,000 | | TOTAL ESTIMATED COSTS (Excl GST) | $462.020 | | GST (10%) | $46,202 | | TOTAL ESTIMATED COSTS (Incl GST) | $508,222 |
| DESCRIPTION | TOTAL | | BRICK WALLS BRACING | | | SITE PREPARATION | $148,000 | | PARTIAL CONSTRUCTION WORKS | $584,500 | | SUB-TOTAL 1 | $732,500 | | PRELIMINARIES | $111,500 | | MARGIN AND RISKS (12%) | $101,280 | | SUB-TOTAL 2 | $945,280 | | CONSTRUCTION CONTINGENCIES | Excluded | | SUB-TOTAL 3 | $945,280 | | PROFESSIONAL FEES ALLOWANCE | $42,500 | | AUTHORITY FEES ALLOWANCE | $13,000 | | TOTAL ESTIMATED COSTS (excl GST) | $1,000,780 | | GST (10%) | $100,078 | | TOTAL ESTIMATED COSTS (Incl GST) | $1,100,858 |
The Joint Expert Report dated 23 July 2025 addressed the areas of agreement (there were few) and disagreement between Mr Luscombe and Mr Fares concerning the estimated costs of the brick walls and slab re-construction and the brick wall bracing works for the property.
The quantum experts have discussed each item in detail and explained each’s scope of work, construction methodology, assumptions, inclusions and exclusions in detail. In general, the quantum experts did not reach an agreement in the Joint Expert Report. They also did not reach any further agreement when giving conclave evidence during the hearing.
Bequick submitted that an important part of the context in which this question arises is that the Council’s unlawful demolition of its property has deprived the Court of expert evidence on the structural integrity of the walls.
Bequick submitted that the evidence available on this question does not establish that the walls that remained standing after the fire were structurally unsound.
The Barnson Report stated that it had “not [been] based on any detailed internal inspection, except for that visible from the street” (CB, p 705). That report did not state that the brick walls were inherently unsound as a consequence of the fire, but that the walls were “in danger of collapse, if sufficient wind or seismic loading was to occur” (CB, p 713). If lateral loading was restored to the walls as part of a reconstruction exercise, this problem would have been ameliorated.
Neither Mr Wooding nor Ms Redding noticed structural damage to the bricks, such as cracking. Nor did Mr Newbold give such evidence.
Photographs after the fire and the video of 7 November 2018 did not show any such cracking, compared with some scorching to part of some walls and some peeling/bubbled paint.
Mr Newbold’s evidence in his affidavit that the walls fell easily is of no probative significance in the light of his acceptance in cross-examination that the walls of an ordinary structure would have fallen easily when confronted with a 20 tonne excavator, and which he agreed was a “very powerful piece of machinery”, pictures of which are in evidence.
The Geolyse Report opinion that “the structure is not in immediate danger of collapse in normal conditions”.
The Council submitted that the Geolyse Report does not assist Bequick in that respect. The conclusion of the structural engineer, at its highest, Mr Matheson opined that the structure was not in immediate danger of collapse, and that there was no immediate danger to public health or safety so long as public access to the site is restricted. He also recommended that an engineering review of stability under wind and earthquake loading be carried out, but that was not done. Further, Mr Matheson's opinion must be given no or little weight in circumstances where he was not called by Bequick to give expert evidence in the proceedings.
Bequick submitted that Mr Fares did not in cross-examination refer to his own opinion that the walls had suffered damage. Bequick submitted that the opinion expressed in his report is of no weight because, inter alia, first he did not have the qualifications to express that opinion. His curriculum vitae discloses no engineering qualifications or memberships, but only degrees in interior design and quantity surveying; and the relevant opinion was one within the field of a structural engineer. The requirements for registration to practice as a structural engineer in NSW (reg 34 and Sch 2, cl 33 of the Design and Building Practitioners Regulation 2021 (NSW)) is that they have a degree or equivalent in civil or structural engineering.
Secondly, Bequick his opinion is based on an assumption that the fire against the walls of the property was a sufficient heat for more than 90 minutes. This assumption is not correct because:
Mr Wooding gives evidence that says he was notified of the fire at 12:30am and that the roof collapsed within 30 minutes of the fire entering onto the property.
The photographs taken before the fire do not show a highly flammable load against the walls, with the building being empty. The flammable material appears to have been in the roof only, being Oregon wooden trusses and that burned relatively quickly.
Mr Fares appears to make his assumption that the duration of the fire exceeded 90 minutes based on the Accident/Vandalism Report which states that Peter Hurst (the off-duty Council employee) attended the fire at 1:00am and that site handover occurred at 4:10am. This is a misreading of that document. Mr Cock signed the document at 4:10pm. This is confirmed by the fact that the fire truck was present later in the day in broad daylight. In any event, the fact that the fire brigade turned official “handover” of the site to the Council does not mean that was the time the fire stopped burning. It is much more likely, it is submitted, that the fire brigade only hand over responsibility of the property after it felt there was no immediate danger, well after the last embers had been extinguished.
During the hearing, the Council submitted that Mr Fares made his assumption about the fire against the walls based on the technical data and specifications of brick fire rating which is outlined in the research material in Appendix H of the Council Expert Report.
Bequick further submitted that the Court could not be satisfied that what remained of the walls and slab of the property was structurally unsound, apart from the need to eventually provide them with some lateral loading. The walls had stood for over two months and did not collapse in the vicinity of a 20 tonne excavator and 12 and 25 tonne trucks until they were demolished. Nor did any witness’ report that the bricks themselves were damaged. Mr Newbold gave evidence to the contrary. In the event that the Court finds, contrary to these submissions, that the walls of the property were not structurally sound after the fire such that they required demolition (and not just the restoration of lateral loading previously provided by the roof), and that as a consequence that Bequick is not entitled to the scope of work assessed by Mr Luscombe, Bequick submitted that even on such a scenario, it is entitled to damages representing the loss of its bricks and their cartage (items 63 and 64 of its Scott Schedule (CB, p 135)), plus statutory interest.
This question related to whether Mr Luscombe was correct to price for rebuild of the structures at the rear of the property.
As I have above mentioned, I accept that this part of the property could have been restored.
On the question of the awning, Bequick submitted that there is no evidence that it was damaged. The acrow-props installed by Mr Wooding were a temporary support for the awnings. The videos after the fire show no damage to the awning. Neither Mr Noonan in the Barnson Report, nor Mr Newbold in his evidence, expressed the opinion that the awnings were damaged.
As to the following items, I make no comment other than to record the parties’ submissions. The Barnson Report stated that the awning was not appropriately tied down and in danger of collapsing.
The presence of the steel inside the premises is confirmed by Ms Redden’s plans and a photo taken by her of the interior. Mr Noonan does not mention them because he did not enter the premises, and the Geolyse Report provided that the steel lintels did not appear to have been affected.
Mr Fares’ opinion regarding the internal steel, as expressed in Annexure C to the Joint Expert Report, to which he made no reference in cross-examination, is to be disregarded as outside his expertise and because it has insufficient foundation.
Bequick submitted that the Council could have requested Mr Fares to quantify the cost of such a clean-up. Bequick submitted that its failure to do so means no such deduction ought to be made because there is no safe means of calculating that cost.
If any deduction is to be made nevertheless, Bequick submitted that it ought not to be made based on the Walton Smith Report, which in turn included several costs which would not have been charged if Bequick remove the debris. Bequick submitted that in such an event, the quote of Byrne Demolition provides a starting point for the relevant cost, with appropriate deductions so that the estimate does not include the cost of demolition, or the cost of removing debris from the other properties.
The Council repeated its position that Bequick is not entitled to any compensatory damages in respect of the Council’s actions, because the Council’s actions conferred a benefit on Bequick as the owner of the property. Had the Council not carried out the works, Bequick would have had to carry out that work at its own cost. By the Council carrying out such work, Bequick has avoided incurring the cost of doing so. The Council’s actions did not cause any physical damage or destruction to the property but rather improved the property from its damaged and contaminated state, leaving it as a clear uncontaminated site.
Mr Newbold’s evidence supports a conclusion that the brick walls and concrete slab were structurally unsound, given his observations that the concrete slab was very brittle in places and cracked, and crumbled easily, and that the brick walls “gave way” as “soon as they were touched” by the excavator. Further, he carried out his work in the only safe manner it could be carried out.
If the Council had not carried out the clean-up and demolition work on the property, Bequick would have had to do so at some stage.
If the Court finds that Bequick is entitled to compensatory damages, those damages should be measured by reference to the diminution in the value of the land and the fixtures, rather than by the cost of repair or reinstatement of the land and fixtures. That is so for two reasons.
The first reason is that the land and fixtures which were cleaned up and demolished by the Council were very old structures and in a severely damaged and contaminated state, and therefore it is difficult, if not impossible, for the Court to assess the cost to reinstate those severely damaged and contaminated structures on the property in their state immediately before demolition. The quantity surveyor’s evidence does not assist the Court with that task because, as Mr Luscombe acknowledged in his evidence, the quantity surveyors have estimated the cost to construct a brand new building, rather than the cost to reinstate the severely damaged and contaminated remnant walls and concrete slab which were cleaned up and demolished by the Council (T183.31-35).
The second reason is that , if the quantity surveyors’ evidence as to the cost of rectification were accepted, then awarding damages measured by reference to the cost of repair or reinstatement of those severely damaged and contaminated structures on the property which were cleaned up and demolished by the Council would be unreasonable and entirely disproportionate to the value of the property. Bequick purchased the property for $150,000 in November 2016. That is the approximate capital value of the property (accepting that the property may have appreciated in value since 2016 but post-fire it was no longer in that state). However, the parties’ quantity surveyors estimate that it would cost very much more than $150,000.00 to reinstate the structures on the property which were cleaned up and demolished by the Council. Mr Luscombe estimates such cost to be $1,243,168.62, while Mr Fares estimates such cost to be $508,221.56. That being the case, it would not be reasonable in the circumstances of this case to award damages to Bequick measured by reference to the cost of repair or reinstatement of the land and fixtures.
Rather, the Court would award damages to Bequick measured by reference to the diminution in the value of the land and the fixtures. On the most favourable assessment to Bequick, given the purchase price of the property in November 2016, such damages would be approximately $150,000.00-$200,000.00, being the approximate capital value of the property as at the date of the trespass (assuming it appreciated in value by 25% in the 2 years following its purchase).
If the Court were to award damages to Bequick measured by reference to the cost of repair or reinstatement of the land and fixtures, and quantifies such damages by reference to the quantity surveyors’ evidence, Bequick submitted that Mr Fares’ evidence ought to be rejected because he has made an incorrect assumption regarding what survived the fire, and his reasons for disallowing certain items are not convincing.
The Council, however, submitted that the Court should prefer Mr Fares’ evidence to Mr Luscombe’s evidence. That is because Mr Fares’ estimate of the reinstatement costs is more reasonable than Mr Luscombe’s estimate. That being the case, the Court would award damages in the sum of $508,221.56 (at most), less the costs incurred by Council in carrying out the clean-up and decontamination of the property in the sum of $148,106.61), such damages being $360,114.95 (at most). If Bequick is registered for GST, the Court would not award GST and so would deduct an additional amount for the GST component of Mr Fares’ estimate (being $46,201.96).
The result is there is judgment in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant on the cross-claim.
On the plaintiff’s claim for debt, the defendant is to pay the plaintiff in the sum of $148,106.61 plus interest.
The plaintiff is to provide an updated amount of interest to the date of judgment.
Costs
The Court orders that:
The cross-claim is dismissed.
The defendant is to pay the plaintiff’s costs of the proceedings and the cross-claim.
The parties are to agree on the sum of interest owed up until the date of this judgment.
**********
Coonamble Shire Council
Bequick Pty Ltd
[2006] HCA 63
[2011] WASCA 148
(2005) 139 LGERA 167
(2012) 187 LGERA 63
(2014) 88 NSWLR 10
(2023) 280 CLR 515
(2023) 410 ALR 508
(2023) 97 ALJR 575
(1997) 44 NSWLR 46
(2025) 426 ALR 621
(2016) 259 CLR 180
(2017) 248 FCR 311
(1991) 171 CLR 635
(2016) 94 NSWLR 159
(2023) 110 NSWLR 557
(2019) 101 NSWLR 160
(2006) 228 CLR 152
(2002) 122 FCR 349
(2024) 115 NSWLR 489
(2017) 94 NSWLR 108
(2021) 250 LGERA 136
(2008) 74 NSWLR 102
(2017) 258 FCR 521
(2013) 85 NSWLR 514
(2001) 115 LGERA 130
(1945) 71 CLR 184
(1946) 71 CLR 210
(1906) 4 CLR 835
(2007) 72 NSWLR 647
(1985) 159 CLR 550
(1990) 170 CLR 596
(2010) 241 CLR 252
(1991) 33 FCR 1
(1960) 108 CLR 158
(1965) 114 CLR 164
(2003) 77 ALJR 1104
(2004) 78 ALJR 324
(1990) 24 NSWLR 499