FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
[2]
The Application in a Proceeding by the mother on 4 August 2025 is dismissed.
Orders 2 to 4 of the Orders dated 18 April 2024 be discharged.
Order 6 of the Orders dated 24 February 2025 be discharged.
Order 8 of the Orders dated 20 May 2025 be discharged.
The Father shall have sole decision making and parental responsibility for the long-term issues (as defined in section 4 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) in relation to X born in 2021.
The child X born in 2021 live with the Father.
The mother shall deliver the child (X born in 2021) to the Father and this changeover shall occur at 8.00pm on 21 November 2025 at the City F Police Station at City F.
Any time the child spends with the Paternal Grandfather must be supervised by the father.
The child shall spend time with the mother as agreed in writing between the parties.
In the absence of an agreement in writing between the parties, the child shall spend time with the Mother supervised at the Z Contact Service City V with the parties to share the costs of the Contact Centre equally. Both parties are required to register with the Z Contact Service City V forthwith.
In the event that the Z Contact Service City V is not able to supervise the child's time with the Mother for any reason, time will occur at AA Contact Centre.
The parties are authorised to provide a copy of these Orders to any relevant Contact Centre.
Further, the Mother and Father shall do all acts and things necessary to register at the City V Contact Centre and in the event that the other two aforementioned Contact Centres are unavailable for any reason, then the child's supervised time with the Mother shall take place at the City V Contact Centre.
That in the event that the Mother and/or the Independent Children's Lawyer wish to make a written submission concerning the Father's application for a Vexatious Litigants Order under section 102QB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), then they may do so by no later than 4.00pm on 5 December 2025 - noting that after that date the Court shall proceed to determine the application in Chambers.
The Independent Children's Lawyer has liberty to relist the matter on the giving of 48 hours notice.
[3]
In the event the child is not returned to the Father pursuant in accordance with Order 7 herein, a Recovery Order will issue for the return of the child. The Recovery Order is to lie in the Registry to be uplifted upon the Father's Legal Representatives emailing the Associate to the Honourable Justice Howard by email informing the Court as to the failure of the Mother to return the child to the Father's care in accordance with Order 7 herein.
Pursuant to s 67U of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), a Recovery Order do issue authorising and directing the Marshal, all officers of the Australian Federal Police and all officers of the Police Forces of all the States and Territories of the Commonwealth of Australia, with such assistance as may be required, and if necessary by force:
[4]
(a) to find and recover the child X born in 2021 ('the child') and to deliver the said child to the Father at such place as the Father and the person effecting such Recovery Order agree to be appropriate; and
(b) to stop and search any vehicle, vessel or aircraft and to enter and search any premises or place in which there is at any time reasonable cause to believe that the said child may be found.
[5]
The Mother, her servants and/or agents are hereby restrained from removing or attempting to remove or causing the removal of the child from the Father's care until further order of the Court.
All Police Officers and agents referred to in this Order be at liberty to proceed on an email copy of this Order.
This Order remains in force for twelve (12) months or until further order.
[6]
The Mother had the benefit of a Country E interpreter (to the extent that she wanted to utilise an interpreter) for the duration of the Interim Defended Hearing (21 November 2025).
[7]
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
[10]
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
[11]
These reasons were delivered Ex Tempore on 21 November 2025 and have been settled and corrected for grammatical errors and in order to convey the precise intention of the Court.
[12]
The matter before the Court is an interim parenting application. This application has been brought by the father.
The father in this case is Mr Conner. The mother is Ms Conner. There is one child who is the subject of the proceedings, X. X was born in 2021. The parents have not been able to implement parenting orders that have been made by this Court.
The parties began living together in 2017, and they married in 2019. They separated in March of 2022 when X was an infant. Initially, post-separation, X's time with the father occurred via video calls and then supervised time at a Contact Centre commenced in September 2022, and unsupervised time between the father and X commenced in June of 2023. This information can be found in the Family Report, which is Exhibit 2 in this interim application. That report was prepared by Dr S. The report was released to the parties on 1 August 2024. The report shows that the child enjoyed close relationships with both the mother and the father. I note in particular, paragraph 55 and paragraph 54, where it was stated, amongst other things, that:
[13]
"54. [X] is a delightful, confident, and bright toddler. Information from the parents combined with observations suggest [X] is meeting her developmental milestones and [redacted] is becoming more independent as she develops control over her environment. [X] demonstrated confident and secure behaviour in each parent's care and any subtle shifts in temperament and interaction can be easily attributed to the differing self-reported styles of parenting of Mr [Conner] and Ms [Conner] and the way this influences [X's] relationship with each parent. There were no issues for [X] transitioning between the care of her mother and father, with no uncertainty or hesitation evident and an easy, comfortable, and positive attachment was observed in both interactions
[14]
It is evident that [X] enjoys close relationships with both Ms [Conner] and Mr [Conner]. Ms [Conner] and Mr [Conner] are committed to actively parenting [X] and want to see her thrive as she grows, however, each has different experiences of and approaches to parenting, as well as differing views on what arrangements are best for [X]."
[15]
"56. Arguably, the parents are in agreement that [X's] primary relationship is with her mother but that time with her father to develop her relationship with him is also crucial, albeit currently achieved through limited blocks of time spent in somewhat artificial settings."
[16]
At the time of the Family Report both parents, including the mother, were in agreement that X's time with her father was crucial. The recommendation of that report writer at that particular time allowed for an increase of X's time with her father. In particular, in paragraph 89, the recommendation was that:
[17]
"89. That, after [X] turns 3.5 years of age, and upon Mr [Conner] obtaining suitable accommodation which affords [X] her own provide space, Mr [Conner's] time with [X] be extended to overnight time, commencing Friday and concluding Sunday."
[18]
It is apparent from that report, and it is indeed the case, that at that stage X had not spent overnight time with her father after separation, and still today, X has not yet spent any overnight time with her father since the separation.
That report, Exhibit 2, was released in August 2024. Before that report was prepared, the father had instituted parenting proceedings. The matter went before Senior Judicial Registrar Norrington on 18 April 2024. I can only assume that Senior Judicial Registrar Norrington was in Darwin at the time, but the parents probably appeared by video link. The orders were made by consent. The Orders provided that:
[19]
"c. Upon the child attaining the age of three and a half (3 ½) years as follows:-
In week one from 9:00am AEST to 5:00pm AEST on Friday and Sunday;
In week two from 1.30pm AEST Friday to 11:00am AEST Saturday."
[20]
Furthermore, Order 4, in accordance with the consent order, provided that:
[21]
"4. That all changeovers take place through the [K] Contact Centre and to this end each parent will continue to meet their own changeover membership fees for the Centre."
[22]
A restraint was imposed upon the father to restrain him from consuming alcohol at all times the child is in his care and for 24 hours prior to X coming into his care. Another restraint was placed upon the father preventing the father from bringing the child into contact with the paternal grandfather, Mr Q, or permitting others to do so.
These interim parenting proceedings (as is the case with all interim applications) were conducted in a truncated manner. Only two hours today was allocated for this, but already about five or six hours today has been spent on the matter. The mother has attended today by video link. The mother had the benefit of a Country E interpreter until the mother informed the Court very clearly in English that she preferred to make her submissions herself in English. Mr Jordan of Counsel appears on behalf of the father, and Ms Hawdon, the Independent Children's Lawyer appears. Both Mr Jordan and Ms Hawdon are in attendance in the courtroom here in Brisbane. The mother, I apprehend, is present in City F.
The mother sought an adjournment of the hearing, but the adjournment application was dismissed, and I provided reasons at the time.
The father's interim application was filed on 6 August 2025, and the significant and most important order sought by the father was an interim change of the residence of the child whereby the child would move from the mother's primary care to the father's primary care. The father did amend the orders that he seeks on 18 November 2025 and to that end there was an Amended Application in a Proceeding filed, but it remains the case that the single most important issue raised by the father in the Application in a Proceeding filed in August and the Amended Application in a Proceeding filed in November is that the father seeks an interim change of the child's residence from the mother to the father.
The mother opposes that order. The mother informed the Court that she did not wish to pursue her Application in a Proceeding that she had filed on 4 August 2025. During the course of the morning, and indeed, early on, the mother informed the Court that what she was pursuing today by way of orders were the orders that were contained in her Amended Response to an Application in a Proceeding filed on 20 November 2025.
The father's Application in a Proceeding, the original one that was set down for today, was filed 6 August 2025. The mother's original Application in a Proceeding was filed on 4 August 2025. In order, therefore, to ensure that the record is correct, the mother indicated she did not wish to pursue the Application in a Proceeding which she filed on 4 August 2025 and, as I have said, she sought to rely on the Amended Response to an Application in a Proceeding that she filed on 20 November. Hence, the mother's Application in a Proceeding that was filed on 4 August 2025 will be dismissed.
This matter has been in my docket now for approximately one year. The parents have appeared before me, whether in person or by video link, on numerous occasions.
The Order that was made by Senior Judicial Registrar Norrington on 18 April 2024, in essence, required the mother to make the child available to spend time with the father on an unsupervised basis after the date that the child reached the age of three and a half years in accordance with Order 3(c), as I outlined above. If those orders had been complied with, the child would have seen the father on dozens of occasions this year.
The father relies on an affidavit filed on 18 November 2025, and he states how many times he has seen the child this year. It is very limited indeed.
Unfortunately, the wheels came off the interim parenting orders to a significant degree in August of this year. The father has not seen the child since 1 August 2025. It is the case that changeovers were to take place through the K Contact Centre.
I pause here to note that in the provision of these Reasons for Judgment, and in relation to the orders that will be made on an interim basis today, I do not rely upon any contested conversations that occurred between the mother and the father. What I do rely upon are documents that have been obtained under subpoena, and I do rely upon the affidavits submitted by the parents. But as I say, at any point where there is some contest between them in relation to such things as conversations, but not limited to those, I do not rely upon such contested material.
Leave was sought and obtained for a subpoena to be served upon the K Contact Centre. The K Contact Centre complied with the subpoena and the documents produced are Exhibit 4 for the purpose of this interim application.
The mother objected to the parties viewing or copying the subpoena material and filed a Notice of Objection to the subpoena. That matter came before the Court on 13 November 2025, at which time the father appeared and the Independent Children's Lawyer appeared, but the mother did not appear, and the objection was dismissed and orders were made for the Independent Children's Lawyer to, first of all, read the material to make sure that the mother's home address was not included in there, and the Independent Children's Lawyer did that. There was no indication of the mother's home address, hence there was no need for any redactions to occur, and the documents became available. The Court issued a direction yesterday to the Subpoena Room here at the Court to send to the parties copies of those notes. The notes now are Exhibit 4.
The K Contact Centre was the place for changeovers as ordered by the Court. On 30 July 2025, the Contact Centre wrote an email to Ms Conner, and it was signed by the manager of that centre, Ms T. Amongst other things, the email says to the mother:
[23]
"...Given the concerns raised against our organisation, we believe it is no longer appropriate to provide any further services to your family and our service is now withdrawn.
Following this letter, we will be putting all parties on notice of our withdrawal of services, including the Independent Children's Lawyer."
[24]
The concerns raised "against" the K Contact Centre were concerns raised by the mother. The mother, these notes reveal, on 26 July 2025 at 2.10 pm, wrote a long email to the K Contact Centre. In the subject line, it is stated:
[25]
"Formal Notice and Complaint - Breach of Operational and Legislative Duties by [K] Contact Centre"
[26]
The mother then provides a list of complaints against the centre - I would describe them as a list of allegations - with references to various pieces of legislation, including a reference to the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), known commonly as the Queensland Criminal Code. The mother alleged that certain conduct by the Contact Centre:
[27]
"...constitutes a **serious breach of procedural fairness** and potentially **perverts the course of justice** under **Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), s 140*."
[28]
In the face of that email from the mother, it is little wonder that the Contact Centre withdrew their services.
I note an annexure to an Affidavit sworn by the mother on 4 August 2025 (and the Court is only taking into account the Annexure which appears at page 32 of 44). It was annexed to an Affidavit sworn by the mother when she filed her original Application in a Proceeding for today. Next, because it has been drawn to my attention and referred to in the submissions of the Independent Children's Lawyer, page 32 of 44 of the Affidavit sworn by the mother on 4 August 2025 shall be extricated from that affidavit, and it will be made Exhibit 16 in this interim application.
Not surprisingly, as soon as the Independent Children's Lawyer had heard from the Contact Centre about the withdrawal of their services, the Independent Children's Lawyer (Ms Hawdon) contacted the mother for clarification. The mother responded with an email to the Independent Children's Lawyer where the mother denied that she had threatened to sue the K Contact Centre. The mother says this is entirely false and unsupported by evidence. The mother did admit that she had made a complaint.
It may not have been correct to characterise the mother's email to the Contact Centre as a threat to sue but it was obviously an email which implicitly amounted to a threat to the Contact Centre that the mother would take further steps - including a possible step whereby she would complain, I can only presume to the Police, that the Contact Centre had perverted the course of justice and had committed a breach of section 140 of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld). It is no wonder that the K Contact Centre withdrew their services.
That left this family with no place for changeovers to occur because the only other place in City F that does permit these changeovers in a supervised way is the same organisation where Dr S, the Family Report Writer runs her practice, and that organisation concluded that their involvement would amount to a conflict of interest and declined to provide a service to this family. Hence, the family was left with no Contact Centre in City F.
The mother has indicated that she is not able to drive anywhere else in Queensland to another Contact Centre. City V was ventilated in this Court on more than one occasion. But the mother asserts an inability to drive. Indeed, the mother had, at an earlier time, been ordered by this Court to attend Court in person, but consistently failed to do so. The mother provided to the Court one excuse after another. One excuse related to a car accident that the mother said had occurred on the morning of a hearing. In any event, the Court eventually, and in order to try to ensure this litigation moved forward, commenced giving the mother leave to attend by video link.
The effect of the mother's long email to the K Contact Centre was to effectively frustrate the Orders made by this Court for changeovers to take place at that centre. This Court has not been provided with one iota of evidence from the mother of anything done (or not done) by the K Contact Centre which would constitute some negligence or failure to provide a duty of care or, commission of a criminal offence. Not one iota of evidence has been provided by the mother to support the allegations that she put in writing to that Contact Centre, which now form part of Exhibit 4, and which the mother did her utmost to prevent the Court from viewing by filing an objection to the subpoena. I have made reference to that earlier.
This explains very clearly why it is that this little one, X, has not seen her father since 1 August 2025. It coincides with the mother frustrating the Orders, leading to the withdrawal of the Contact Centre services. I have already made it clear that it is not as though the mother came up with any viable alternative in relation to a supervised changeover arrangement.
In giving these Reasons for Judgment, the Court, of course, at all times takes into account all the matters required by Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), including consideration of allegations of family violence and the other matters referred to in section 60CC(2A), as well as all of the matters referred to in section 60CC, and I draw the parties' attention to section 60CA, where it is stated that:
[29]
"60CA Child's best interests paramount consideration in making a parenting order
In deciding whether to make a particular parenting order in relation to a child, a court must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration."
[30]
What the mother's conduct has effectively done is to cease the father's relationship with the child by effectively stopping that time, by frustrating the Order concerning the use of the Contact Centre. The Contact Centre withdrew their services. The only other available place in City F was conflicted out, and the mother will not travel anywhere else to effect a changeover.
In terms of the question of allegations of family violence, the Court has received assistance from the Independent Children's Lawyer, and I note the documents that have been put before the Court, including Exhibit 5, Exhibit 6 and all the way up through to Exhibit 15.
Exhibit 5 is about the paternal grandfather. I do not need to refer to the paternal grandfather, Mr Q, any further.
Exhibit 6 is a history of the father's criminal offending, which is at least 17 or 18 years ago. Some of the matters are as long as 21 years ago. These all relate to, it seems, making a public nuisance of himself, and I infer from the document and from other evidence that they are related to alcohol consumption. In that regard, the Independent Children's Lawyer helpfully points out, and my attention is now focused on Exhibit 7, which is a pathology report which shows that the Independent Children's Lawyer has been requesting from the father blood tests to monitor his consumption of alcohol. The Independent Children's Lawyer says, and Exhibit 7 confirms, that there is no indication of recent or ongoing excessive alcohol use by the father. That is the upshot of the documents that comprise Exhibit 7.
So far as the consumption of alcohol is concerned - it amounts to a very low risk only.
Exhibit 8 is from Police records dated December 2024. I have had regard to it. There is nothing in there that concerns me in terms of risk from the father's perspective. Exhibit 9 is another Police document dated January 2025. I have had regard to it. There is nothing in there that concerns the Court in terms of the father posing any risk to the child with the child in the father's unsupervised care.
Exhibit 10 is an Application to Vary a Domestic Violence Order, and that relates to a Domestic Violence Order that had been made in early 2022. It is a five-year Order. The mother is the aggrieved, the child is mentioned as a child of the aggrieved, and contact was prohibited except for the purpose of compliance with orders of the Court.
The Order was made on the allegations of the mother. It is not clear whether the father consented without admissions or whether he consented or not. It was submitted that he did Consent, but I cannot quite tell that from the Order. If Ms Hawdon can draw that to my attention at the conclusion, I will amend these Reasons.[1]
There was an Application filed to Vary a Domestic Violence Order, which I understand was filed by the Police in mid 2025 - it is Exhibit 10. Exhibit 11 shows that that Application to Vary was withdrawn by the Police later in 2025.
In relation to the documents so far as they relate to allegations of domestic violence, there is nothing contained therein which would concern the Court to such an extent that the father's time would have to be supervised. There is nothing in there that would prevent the Court from making an order, or convince the Court not to make an order on best interests grounds, for the child to spend overnight time or indeed live with the father.
To the extent that the mother alleges family violence against the father, the mother makes broad-ranging assertions of coercive control which she says was perpetrated by the father, without descending into particulars. My attention has not been drawn to any evidence that would convince me that the Court would not make an order for the child to live with the father on an interim basis on the grounds of family violence concerns. This is borne out by the fact that the mother consented in 2024 to an order for unsupervised time between the child and the father, including an order for overnight time.
I have had regard to the documents from the Department of Child Safety, which are Exhibit 12. There is nothing contained therein which is of concern. On 16 May 2025, the conclusion which is on page 42 of Exhibit 12, is that:
[31]
"There is no indication at this time that [X] is at a probable risk of future harm or has sustained a significant harm."
[32]
That conclusion is in relation to complaints made that the father would be a risk of harm to the child.
The Family Report Writer came to the same conclusion. From Exhibit 2, it is apparent that the Family Report Writer did not hold any concerns in relation to the father being a risk to the child. The mother herself held no concerns about the father being a risk to the child when she consented to the Interim Order that was made by Senior Judicial Registrar Norrington on 18 April 2024.
The parties appear to be conflicted in relation to some issue relating to ear, nose and throat matters for the child, but I do not need to go into any detail about that or take it into account to any extent.
The mother made much of a document, which is now Exhibit 14, which seems to be subpoenaed material from B Family Services. In May of 2025, B Family Services, it seems, conducted some sort of risk assessment. It is unclear to this Court whether that risk assessment was conducted by reference only to the mother or by reference to the mother and the father. But in any event, I note, and the mother has drawn it to my attention, that some concerns are raised in that document, including that they believe "the aggrieved" (which I infer from everything I have been told from the parties, including the mother - was the mother) was at risk:
[33]
"I believe the aggrieved may be at risk of serious harm."
[34]
"The respondent has used tactics of coercive control, economic abuse, verbal and psychological abuse..."
[35]
It is apparent from those matters contained in paragraph 8.2 of Exhibit 14 - that they are precisely the sorts of complaints the mother makes against the father. Notwithstanding these comments, which it seems were conveyed to B Family Services by the mother in May of 2023, the mother consented to an Interim Order for unsupervised time between the child and the father, including overnight time, and that is the Order of 18 April 2024. I do not need to refer any further to the documents from B Family Services.
My attention was drawn to a number of other matters, including the psychiatric assessment conducted by Dr C, and I have had regard to that. I note that Dr C says, amongst other things, at paragraph number 7 on page 66 of 114 pages, as part of a summary, that:
[36]
"7. I am of the opinion that Ms [Conner] has impaired capacity to be a sole parent and will require support to co-parent effectively in the best interest of her child."
[37]
At paragraph 62, which is at page 80 of 114, the opinion of the expert was that:
[38]
"62. Ms [Conner] was assessed as having an impairment in personality function that manifests in her self-functioning, both identity and self-direction, and interpersonal functioning with the presence of significant compulsive, turbulent and schizoid pathological personality traits."
[39]
I only make reference to those items. That particular expert has not been the subject of cross-examination. I provide some weight to the opinions, but I do not rely upon those opinions to any significant degree whatsoever, and my judgment today rests upon other matters and the orders that will be made would have been made whether or not I had any regard whatsoever to the report of Dr C.
My attention was drawn to the mother's affidavit filed yesterday, 20 November 2025 at paragraph 41. Paragraph 41 of the mother's affidavit states:
[40]
"41. I respectfully submit that there an abunce of evidence before the Cort of my Court abiding approach to these proceedings and to the rules stated the Family Lae Act 1975 (Cth), cooperation, flexibility and unwavering support for the child to have meaningful relationship with her father (e.g. supporting the child's request to spend more time with the Father than the Court Ordres actually allowed)."
(as per original)
[41]
The mother said that she respectfully submits that there is an abundance of evidence before the Court of her court-abiding approach to these proceedings. That has actually not been borne out by the evidence. The evidence is that the mother has conducted herself in such a way that the orders have been frustrated by the mother without any proper justification on her part.
In paragraph 88 of the affidavit of the mother filed 4 August 2025, which was referred to in submissions by Mr Jordan of Counsel on behalf of the father, my attention was drawn to an assertion by the mother that:
[42]
"88. The father's ongoing conduct exemplifies a pattern of parental alienation..."
[43]
Given that the father has not seen the child for several months, and noting that the father's time between even the beginning of this year and August did not go ahead in its entirety in accordance with the Orders of the Senior Judicial Registrar Norrington of 18 April 2024, there should have been 62 occasions this year, between the beginning of February and now, when the child should have spent time with the father, but because of the mother's conduct, the child has only spent time with the father on 21 occasions.
This is extraordinary, because my attention has not been drawn by the mother or anyone else to any evidence that would convince the Court that the ordered time between the child and the father should have been so reduced. I do not recall ever amending Order 3(c) that was made by Senior Judicial Registrar Norrington. That is to say, Senior Judicial Registrar Norrington had ordered overnight time. I do not recall that I ever amended that.
On more than one occasion I made it clear to the mother by Order that she was required to comply with that Order, and my attention was drawn to two such occasions when I did that. One such occasion was 24 February 2025 and there was one other occasion on 20 May 2025 this year. That was explicit in paragraph 8:
[44]
"8. The Father's time with the child, [X] born [in] 2021, shall recommence on Friday 23 May 2025, in accordance with Order 3(c)(i) of the Orders made by consent on 18 April 2025 2024."
[45]
Unfortunately for this child, the mother, by her actions, has failed to comply with this Order. It does appear to be the case that the mother does not consider herself to be bound by orders, or if she thinks that she may be bound by orders, it does appear to be the case that the mother then comes up with reasons why the orders cannot be followed. Parents in this jurisdiction, indeed all litigants, are required to follow Court orders. There are no options. It is not up to the parents to decide when time should start or not start. It is not up to the parents to decide whether time should go ahead. The Court makes orders. The parents are to comply with the orders.
I have taken into account any matters relevant to risk. I do not consider that the father poses a risk of harm to this child, should this child move to live with him at this interim stage. I am well aware that the evidence shows that more likely than not the child's primary attachment is to the mother, but there is weight in the argument put forward by Mr Jordan on behalf of the father that unless the Court changes the residence of this child now, this child will not have a relationship with her father because the mother will continue to frustrate any orders that are made by the Court and prevent the father from seeing the child.
I note that one of the matters that the Court is to consider is the benefit to the child of being able to have a relationship with the child's parents. That is always taken by the Courts to have meant a meaningful relationship, even though those words themselves are no longer present in the legislation - but it is an important consideration. The Family Report Writer was clear. This child has a good relationship with both parents, and the child should be spending time with both parents, but the mother's conduct has served to frustrate the situation, and instead of 62 occasions during the course of this calendar year (from 1 February), the child has only seen the father on 21 occasions, and on zero occasions since 1 August 2025.
Whilst I say I would accept a submission that the primary attachment is with the mother, something has to happen, there needs to be a circuit breaker. This matter will not get on for trial until some date, presently unknown, next year. The way things have been progressing, with the mother taking what steps she can to limit the father's time and to reduce it now to zero, the child, if the Court leaves this matter unattended to, will not get to see the father for many, many more months into the future. This is not a situation that the Court will abide. There is no reasonable justification put forward by the mother for taking the steps that she has taken, which have effectively frustrated this father's time with the child and has indeed frustrated the child's relationship with the father.
Will the child suffer emotional harm by a change of residence? I am not certain, but I can imagine that the child will be emotionally upset. The child may even suffer some emotional harm. The child may suffer some distress, but one can only imagine that the child is already suffering emotional harm and upset and distress because she has not seen her father for three months. My attention was drawn by Ms Hawdon to evidence of the mother, and indeed I seem to recall submissions that the Mother had earlier made to the Court, whereby the child had asked to spend more time with the father, but the mother, for her own reasons, has taken steps to frustrate the father's time with the child.
The Mother has, it seems, become obsessed with certain issues - for instance, who might be living in the father's household or whether he might be in a relationship with someone else. One of the orders sought by the mother today was an order that the father not be permitted to bring the child into contact with any person who had not been vetted. My attention was drawn to this in Part E of the Outline of Case filed by the mother on 21 November 2025 in respect of today. In 18 years on the bench, I have not ever seen a request for such an order.
The mother made a large number of submissions today, but none of them really got to the nub of the issue. None of them are persuasive. The mother had sent emails to the Court today and the relevant email at 10.21am is Exhibit 1. Exhibit 1 from the mother states to the Court that she is:
[46]
"...**medically unwell** and have been ***advised to limit speaking and physical exertion**. My condition significantly affects my capacity to speak for prolonged periods and to meaningfully participate orally in the hearing."
[47]
That email was sent by the mother at 10.12 am. That email was contradicted by the mother's long oral submissions she made by video link today whereby she, in an articulate way, noting that English is her second language (once she, to coin the vernacular, sacked the interpreter) made her own oral submissions and did speak for prolonged periods and did meaningfully participate orally in the hearing. So, her actions today, once the adjournment application was dismissed, would tend, it seems to me, to prove that the content of the email the mother sent to the Court, and which is Exhibit 1, was not correct.
I have taken into account possible emotional harm to the child. I have balanced it when I have balanced the best interests of the child. I am satisfied that the father will facilitate time between the child and the mother in accordance with orders that will be made, and in that way the child will be able to maintain her relationship with her mother, and in balancing questions of risk, harm, emotional harm, best interests, it seems to me to lead to the conclusion that there needs to be an interim change of residence.
I am well aware that this sort of order is not made regularly, particularly where a child has been with their primary attachment figure and their primary caregiver, the mother, but the circumstances surrounding this case are such that unless the Court acts now and moves the primary residence of this child to the father, this child will no longer have a relationship with her father because the mother is taking steps to frustrate Court orders which have had the effect of ensuring the child does not get to see the father.
I have considered everything that I need to in Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). I have kept in mind that the paramount consideration is the best interests of this child. It seems to me these parents will have no chance of equal shared parental responsibility, given the mother's attitude towards the father and the steps she has taken at every turn to frustrate his time and his relationship with the child.
Certain orders have been sought in the Amended Application in a Proceeding. Most of those orders will be made on an interim basis.
The Independent Children's Lawyer has submitted that the time with the mother should be supervised. I agree with the submission made by the Independent Children's Lawyer in this regard.
The father also seeks at Order 9 what is effectively a vexatious litigants order under the Family Law Act1975 (Cth) pursuant to section 102QB. I'm going to give the mother a fortnight to provide a written submission in response to the application for that order. I will also give the Independent Children's Lawyer two weeks as well to provide submissions.
The Court has ordered a change of residence. It is not up to the mother or any other party to indicate to the Court or tell the Court when that order will take effect. This is yet another example of the mother's conduct throughout these proceedings whereby she seems to think, for some unknown reason, that she has the authority to countermand a Court order. The mother has no such authority and I will be now issuing an Order, once I get some particulars of a time and place this evening where the mother is required to make this child available for changeover. If the mother fails to comply with the Order - there will be a Recovery Order. The mother has indicated she is not going to comply. These Orders must be complied with. In the event that the mother fails to attend the changeover in accordance with the Order this Court has just made - the Recovery Order will be acted upon. And the child will be recovered by the Police from the mother's possession and handed to the father.
[48]
I certify that the preceding seventy-five (75) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Ex Tempore Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Howard.
[49]
[1] No such amendment to the Reasons was necessary.
Legislation Cited (4)
Law Act 1975
Family Lae Act 1975(Cth)
Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021