Conner & Conner [2025] FedCFamC1F 422 (20 May 2025)

17 January 2025 and 12 February 2025 be dismissed. 2. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Mother's Application in a Proceeding filed on 17 March 2025 (to remove the Independent Children's Lawyer) be dismissed. 3. The balance (paragraphs 3 to 90 inclusive) of the Mother's Application in a Proceeding filed on 17 March 2025 be dismissed. 4. The Father's Application in a Proceeding filed on 1 April 2025 be dismissed. 5. The Independent Children's Lawyer is to do all acts and things to secure funding from Legal Aid and organise for the preparation of a report from Dr C of D Health Service ("the psychiatric report writer") to be made available to the Court, with such report to deal with:

(a) The mental health and functioning of the Mother and Father;

(b) The extent to which any mental health issues impact upon the Mother and the Father's parenting capacity;

(c) Any treatment, therapy or plan that could be undertaken by the Mother and the Father to improve their wellbeing and parenting capacity;

(d) Any other matters that the psychiatric report writer considers important to the welfare or best interests of the child.

1. The parents attend for interviews on 18 June 2025 as directed by the Independent Children's Lawyer with the psychiatric report writer and participate fully as requested by the psychiatric report writer, D.D..
2. Costs of the Independent Children's Lawyer, of and incidental to the hearing on 20 May 2025 be reserved and adjourned to be heard at the conclusion of the Final Hearing listed to commence on 4 August 2025.
3. The Father's time with the child, X born 2021, shall recommence on Friday 23 May 2025, in accordance with Order 3(c)(i) of the Orders made by consent on 18 April 2025.
4. The Independent Children's Lawyer be at liberty to relist the matter upon the giving of five (5) days' notice.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

These reasons for Judgment were delivered Ex Tempore on 20 May 2025 and have been settled and corrected for grammatical errors and in order to convey the precise intention of the Court.

1. By Order dated 24 February 2025, the mother was ordered to file an Amended Application in a Proceeding setting out the orders that she seeks on an interim basis. It was stated in that Order that the Amended Application in a Proceeding shall be in substitution for the three Applications in a Proceeding filed by the mother on 27 November 2024, 17 January 2025 and 12 February 2025. Accordingly and to ensure that the Court record reflects the intention of the Court, those three earlier Applications in a Proceeding will be dismissed now by order of the Court.
2. The Court, on 31 March 2025, ordered that the Application in a Proceeding filed by the mother on 17 March 2025 be listed for interim hearing today. Order 2 of the Orders dated 24 February 2025, as amended on 15 May 2025 - (I pause to note that the amendment was minor, relating to a subpoena to be served on B Family Services) states:

"2. The Mother is to only include in her Amended Application in a Proceeding, Orders that can be reasonably dealt with at an interim stage noting that there is no right to cross examination of witnesses at an interim hearing and noting that Rule 5.09(1) limits the time of a hearing to two (2) hours."

1. The other Order I wish to note at the outset is one of the orders made on 31 March 2025, which is Order 4 which states that:

"4. On 20 May 2025 the parties must be prepared to address the Court as to whether or not the Mother's Application in a Proceeding filed on 17 March 2025 should be summarily dismissed as an abuse of process or some other reason."

1. I have read the transcript from the last occasion when the matter was here in Court on 24 February 2025. On that occasion the father appeared in the Courtroom in person. Ms O appeared in person as the Independent Children's Lawyer. The mother appeared by video link, as did a Country E interpreter. Because there were difficulties in the internet transmission and because the Court had difficulty in getting the mother to remain quiet while the interpreter was speaking and getting the mother to refrain from speaking when I was speaking, it became abundantly apparent to the Court that all further Court hearings must take place in person. An Order was made to that effect on 24 February 2025.
2. The mother sought leave to attend today by telephone link. That leave was refused. The reasons in respect of that refusal will be apparent from the face of the order itself where, in the notations, I set out the reasoning as to why that leave was refused. Notwithstanding the earlier orders that I made, the mother has, in Part D of the Application in a Proceeding filed 17 March 2025, (where the mother was required to list the orders that she was seeking) - the mother has included no fewer than 90 paragraphs. Many of the paragraphs are in the nature of a submission. Some of the paragraphs could be described as orders sought.
3. One paragraph within Part D of the Application in a Proceeding which appears to seek an order is paragraph 2. Under paragraph 2, there are a further nine paragraphs, some of which could be said to be in the nature of orders sought but I would say everything under that first heading relates to the Independent Children's Lawyer. In particular the mother seeks in paragraph 2 an order that the Independent Children's Lawyer, Ms O, be removed. The mother then seeks certain alternative orders.
4. Some of the other paragraphs that I have been able to discern which could be described as seeking orders, include paragraph 13, about the Court accepting service of documents, although I am not sure why it is needed.
5. In paragraph 28 the mother, for some reason, seeks discovery of documents, particularly relating to what she calls a fraudulent and defamatory letter authored by the mother's mother. There are quite a number of paragraphs dealing with that. At paragraph 56, the mother seeks a stay of the progression of time between the father and the child, and then there are a number of paragraphs below that. At paragraph 70, the mother seeks an order for the father to undergo a psychiatric assessment. At paragraph 76, the mother seeks an order preventing the father from bringing the child into contact with the mother's family of origin and an order preventing the child coming into contact with the paternal grandfather.
6. I would have to say, apart from the order sought in paragraph number 2 about the removal of the Independent Children's Lawyer, it is very difficult for the Court to discern precisely what else the mother seeks, noting that, in many respects, the paragraphs are confused. That is why I, in the order of 31 March 2025, included Order 4, whereby the parties were required to be prepared to address the Court today on whether or not the mother's Application in a Proceeding should be summarily dismissed as an abuse of process or for some other reason.
7. When the matter was before the Court on 24 February 2025, the Court stated (at page 6 of the transcript, from line 25):

"...I have been able to discern, at least one application that the mother would be entitled to pursue at an interim stage..."

"...In the document filed on 22 January 2025, the mother has sought, in paragraph 3, an order that the ICL be removed. The mother is entitled to pursue such an application, provided she files and serves an accompanying affidavit which would seek to justify such a step. I make no other comment in relation to the other paragraphs or orders sought by the mother - I will start that again. I make no other comment in relation to the other orders sought by the mother in the three documents. It's a matter for the mother to take up herself, on her own part, or with the assistance somehow of a lawyer. But as I said earlier, many of the orders sought by the mother, at this interim stage, would have to be described as manifestly untenable. So I'm going to leave the matter there for today. The ball is in the mother's court, if she wants to file an amended application in a proceeding..."

1. The mother did file the Amended Application in a Proceeding. It was filed on 17 March 2025. Earlier, on 24 February 2025, I had also said to the mother, (on page 6):

"...it may be that the mother needs to go to a legal service; perhaps the Women's Legal Service, or another legal service in [City F], if she can't afford to pay for a lawyer, or make an application for Legal Aid..."

1. The mother has told the Court today that Legal Aid have told her, as I understand it, that aid is only granted for the trial, under section 102NA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"). But my attention has not been drawn to any explanation from the mother about whether she tried to access a free service, whether, by reference to the Duty Lawyer in this Court, or the Women's Legal Service or another legal service in City F. The Court went to the trouble of giving the mother another chance to consolidate her applications and hopefully pay attention to the orders that were made, in particular the Order of 24 February 2025, in Order 2, where it was stated that:

"2. The Mother is to only include in her Amended Application in a Proceeding, Orders that can be reasonably dealt with at an interim stage noting that there is no right to cross examination of witnesses at an interim hearing and noting that Rule 5.09(1) limits the time of a hearing to two (2) hours."

1. As I anticipated last time, there was one application that could at least be discerned within the morass that is the 90 paragraphs of orders sought by the mother; that is, the application to remove the Independent Children's Lawyer. I heard from the mother today in relation to her application. She relied on her written submissions. I heard from the Independent Children's Lawyer. In a decision entitled Horner & Horner [2018] FamCA 487 ("Horner & Horner"), a decision of Justice Tree, his Honour carefully went through and reviewed all the relevant authorities in relation to an application to remove an Independent Children's Lawyer. His Honour set out the specific duties of an Independent Children's Lawyer, as articulated in section 68LA of the Act; in particular, section 68LA(5). I note that some further duties have been imposed since the recent amendments.

"68LA Role of independent children's lawyer

(5) The independent children's lawyer must:

(a) act impartially in dealings with the parties to the proceedings; and

(b) ensure that any views expressed by the child in relation to the matters to which the proceedings relate are fully put before the court; and

(c) if a report or other document that relates to the child is to be used in the proceedings:

(i) analyse the report or other document to identify those matters in the report or other document that the independent children's lawyer considers to be the most significant ones for determining what is in the best interests of the child; and

(ii) ensure that those matters are properly drawn to the court's attention; and

(d) endeavour to minimise the trauma to the child associated with the proceedings; and

(e) facilitate an agreed resolution of matters at issue in the proceedings to the extent to which doing so is in the best interests of the child.

Requirement to meet with the child and give the child the opportunity to express their views

(5A) Subject to subsection (5B), the independent children's lawyer must perform the following duties (not necessarily at the same time):

(a) meet with the child;

(b) provide the child with an opportunity to express any views in relation to the matters to which the proceedings relate.

Note: A person cannot require a child to express the child's views in relation to any matter (see section 60CE).

(5AA) The independent children's lawyer has discretion in relation to the following matters (subject to any order or direction of the court with respect to the matter, for example under paragraph 68L(2)(b) or paragraph (5D)(b) of this section):

(a) when, how often and how meetings with the child take place;

(b) when, how often and how the child is provided with an opportunity to express views.

(5B) The independent children's lawyer is not required to perform a duty if:

(a) the child is under 5 years of age; or

(b) the child does not want to meet with the independent children's lawyer, or express their views (as the Court requires); or

(c) there are exceptional circumstances that justify not performing the duty.

(5C) Without limiting paragraph (5B)(c), exceptional circumstances for the purposes of that paragraph include that performing the duty, would:

(a) expose the child to a risk of physical or psychological harm that cannot be safely managed; or

(b) have a significant adverse effect on the wellbeing of the child.

(5D) If the independent children's lawyer proposes not to perform a duty because of paragraph (5B)(c), the court must do the following before making final orders:

(a) determine whether it is satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist that justify not performing the duty;

(b) if the court determines that those circumstances do not exist - make an order requiring the independent children's lawyer to meet with the child or provide the child with an opportunity to express their views (as the Court requires).

Note: The court may also make such other orders it considers necessary to secure the independent representation of the child's interests (see paragraph 68L(2)(b))."

1. More particularly, in relation to the possible removal of an Independent Children's Lawyer, I note what his Honour said in paragraph 10 of the decision in Horner & Horner:

"[10] A number of authorities have considered the removal of an Independent Children's Lawyer, and specifically, the circumstances which may justify such a course. From those, the following points may be discerned:

• It is not inconsistent with the independent and professional discharge of an Independent Children's Lawyer's obligations for her or him to advocate that a particular course of action adverse to, or inconsistent with, the position of a party, ought be taken by the court;
• Whilst in a unique position, the Independent Children's Lawyer owes the same professional obligations to the court as does any licenced legal practitioner;
• On occasion, the Independent Children's Lawyer will be in an invidious position, but nonetheless they should be no less courageous, no less firm and no less cogent, in advocating for results or findings;
• Inevitably the role of the Independent Children's Lawyer involves an exercise of professional judgment which may, on occasion, be precarious and difficult;
• It is not appropriate for a litigant to endeavour to micro-manage the Independent Children's Lawyer, or critique every step that they take;
• It is certainly not the case that, even if an Independent Children's Lawyer does make a mistake, the court will necessarily accede to an application to have them discharged. Significantly more than that is required;
• It is inevitable that the high standards of competence which the court expects of Independent Children's Lawyers are not always met. Independent Children's Lawyers are, like anybody, liable to human frailty;
• A court should be slow to discharge an Independent Children's Lawyer on the basis of largely unsubstantiated complaints of one of the parties"

1. Tree J made reference to a large number of cases, including Dean & Susskind [2012] FamCA 897, Sawyer & Sawyer [2015] FamCA 982, Knibbs & Knibbs [2009] FamCA 840, Paco & Racina [2014] FamCAFC 195, Leroux & Leroux [2015] FamCA 1128.
2. I have had assistance from the submissions made by the Independent Children's Lawyer today, and the mother has referred me to two lots of written submissions filed by her, one filed on 16 May 2025 and one filed on 19 May 2025. In many respects, the mother's two sets of submissions are similar, but there are differences as well. I have marked them Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2 (with the submissions of 19 May 2025 being marked Exhibit 1). I have had regard to those. I have also heard from the mother further today. She has the assistance of a Country E interpreter, and, on some occasions, the mother addressed the Court in English at the mother's request.
3. It will be apparent that the Court has, for some time, been concerned about the state of the interlocutory applications prepared and pursued by the mother. Hence the orders that were made on 24 February 2025, as amended on 15 May 2025, and hence the order made in chambers on 31 March 2025. On that occasion, I included Order 4, which said that:

"4. On 20 May 2025 the parties must be prepared to address the Court as to whether or not the Mother's Application in a Proceeding filed on 17 March 2025 should be summarily dismissed as an abuse of process or some other reason."

1. It was only fair that the Court draw that to the attention of the parties. The Court did so, after having read the mother's Application in a Proceeding filed 17 March 2025 (this was the mother's Amended Application, containing 90 different paragraphs under the heading, "Orders Sought". As I said, on 24 February 2025, I was able to discern one application, in particular, which was the application to remove the Independent Children's Lawyer. It cannot be said that such an application could be said to be an abuse of process.
2. As to the question of abuse of process, I will address that issue after I finalise this application concerning the Independent Children's Lawyer. Perhaps it is the case that Order 4 of 31 March 2025 ought to have separately delineated the application to remove the Independent Children's Lawyer and excised it from the expression of a possible application for summary dismissal. But on the other hand, the presentation of the case, not only in terms of the content of the application in a proceeding filed on 17 March 2025, but for instance, the two large affidavits filed by the mother - one on 9 May 2025 and one on 15 May 2025 - still, it seems to me, would have or could have left it within the realms of possibility that the Independent Children's Lawyer or the father may have pursued an order for summary dismissal of the application concerning the Independent Children's Lawyer. There is simply no explanation from the mother, and no justifiable reason as to why she would file two affidavits - both of which are between 150 and 200 pages, counting annexures. There is no justifiable reason why she would file two affidavits within six days. It is an example of the mother's approach to this litigation.
3. Returning to the matter at hand, namely the application to dismiss or remove the Independent Children's Lawyer. The mother complains that the removal of the Independent Children's Lawyer is justified on the basis that the Independent Children's Lawyer has not properly briefed the experts, including the family report writer. But my attention has been drawn to the most recent family report by Dr G, and Dr G sets out what documents she has read and taken into account. And the documents that Dr G has referred to certainly appear, to the Court, to be those relevant documents that would properly enable Dr G to conduct the family report interviews and write the family report. I would make it very clear to the parties - the mother and the father - it is not for the parties to direct the Independent Children's Lawyer as to precisely what should or should not be sent to an expert.
4. It is okay for a parent to make a suggestion as to what should or should not be sent to the experts but, at the end of the day, the discretion lies with the Independent Children's Lawyer. In this case, I note that Ms O is the Independent Children's Lawyer, a solicitor with many years' experience in this area and practising in this jurisdiction, including as an Independent Children's Lawyer. The mother also complains that the Independent Children's Lawyer failed to put certain matters before the Court, relating to child safety documentation and police. One particular complaint by the mother is that apparently in an interim hearing before Senior Judicial Registrar Spink - the Independent Children's Lawyer failed to put certain documents before the Court.
5. But the Independent Children's Lawyer points out that she did, in fact, put documents pursuant to section 69ZW of the Act before the Court, documents from the police and documents from child safety. In any event, the mother, on that occasion, was legally represented by a lawyer from J Lawyers. There is no merit in that argument put forward by the mother. As to the issuing of subpoenas, the issuing of subpoenas, once again, is always a matter of discretion for the Independent Children's Lawyer. It is okay for a parent to suggest other bodies or entities who ought to be subpoenaed. In fact, I note, in this case, if my recollection is correct, that the mother had specifically asked for a subpoena to be served upon B Family Services, and that is why the Court amended the 24 February 2025 order. The mother asked for it. The request went via the Independent Children's Lawyer, then to the Court, as I understand it. If I don't have that chain of events correct, it matters little, but what I do know is that it was the mother who made that specific request. The Court granted leave for the Independent Children's Lawyer to issue a subpoena to B Family Services.
6. It is okay for a parent to make suggestions about the issuing of subpoenas, but a parent cannot direct an Independent Children's Lawyer to issue a subpoena. I note that by Order 4 of the 24 February 2025, the Independent Children's Lawyer was granted leave to issue subpoenas directed to the Queensland Police Service; Department of Family, Seniors, Disability Services and Child Safety; the J Health Centre; the K Children's Contact Centre, and finally, B Family Services. There is no merit in that argument concerning the subpoenas, framed as it is apparently, as a complaint about the Independent Children's Lawyer. In general, the mother complains that there is bias displayed by the Independent Children's Lawyer. I have had regard to the mother's written submissions. They are exhibits today. I heard what additional submissions the mother had to say. I note the mother has filed two affidavits. To the extent that I consider them relevant to the application for the removal of the Independent Children's Lawyer, I am unable to find any merit hidden away, by way of a submission, in the affidavit material. I am not satisfied that there is any evidence that would justify a finding of bias against the Independent Children's Lawyer. The mother has a particular further complaint in relation to the use of fraudulent documents. My attention was drawn, in particular, to a document at page 114 of 197 of the affidavit filed by the mother on 15 May 2025. I asked the mother today, exactly who it is alleged by the mother that wrote the document.
7. The mother said it was written by her own mother. It was sent to the father. The father then sent it to the mother in this case.
8. The father included it in an affidavit. The mother is very concerned about the document. She has called it a "fraudulent document". She has called it defamatory and, I recall "libellous" was another word she used. It may be one or all of those things, I do not know. That is a matter for the trial, if the mother's legal representatives at the trial consider that it is important to pursue such a line of inquiry. I asked the mother specifically today, why it was that she made reference to this document. It is because the mother maintains that it is the Independent Children's Lawyer's role to investigate potentially fraudulent documentation. When I asked the mother who told her that, she told the Court "it is the law". Well, I have to tell the mother - it is not the law.
9. It is not the Independent Children's Lawyer's role to investigate an allegation made by one parent that a document is fraudulent. If a document is fraudulent and a parent thinks it is relevant to the parenting proceedings, then at the trial of the matter, the document can be put before the Court. It will need to be explained why it is relevant to the parenting proceedings, and the Court will then be able to make findings, having heard relevant cross-examination and submissions, as to whether or not the document is fraudulent. The Court could also consider, at that stage, whether it is defamatory. On the basis of the current evidence and submissions, and noting this argument is put forward as a reason to support the removal of the Independent Children's Lawyer - I would say there is no merit in that argument either.
10. I am not persuaded by any of the mother's arguments. I am not persuaded by any of the mother's material, or her submissions, that there is any basis whatsoever to justify the removal of the Independent Children's Lawyer. That application is dismissed.
11. Beyond that paragraph 2, there then remains paragraphs 3 through to 90 inclusive of the mother's Application in a Proceeding filed on 17 March 2025. I would have to say that, in relation to the balance of the application in a proceeding, I am concerned. I note that, as I said earlier, there are some paragraphs that could be said to be orders that may be pursued by a person at an interlocutory stage, but I am concerned at the way that the mother's material has been presented to the Court.
12. Many of the paragraphs are submissions, and it's difficult to ascertain precisely what is sought. This is precisely why I included an Order on 31 March, from Chambers, and I notified the parties, so that they would be on notice and prepared to address the Court as to whether or not the mother's Application in a Proceeding filed on 17 March 2025 (or some part of it) should be summarily dismissed as an abuse of process or for some other reason. As I indicated earlier, the application to remove the Independent Children's Lawyer was, an application I was able to discern and follow, and an application that the mother was entitled to pursue, and she did pursue it.
13. The fact that, as it turns out, there is no merit in it, is another matter altogether. As to the balance of the document, I will hear from the Independent Children's Lawyer, and then from the mother, then the father, as I did last time.
14. The father has handed up a couple of documents, including an outline of a case document and a letter from the contact centre, the relevance of which currently escapes me, but I will come back to it, if necessary. I dealt earlier today with the mother's application for the removal of the Independent Children's Lawyer, and that application was dismissed, and reasons were provided. The balance of the mother's Application in a Proceeding is problematic, to say the least. In 18 years deciding family law cases as a Judge, I have never seen an application quite like it. It comprises 90 separate paragraphs, some of which contain some sentences which could be construed as orders sought. I am talking now about all the paragraphs between paragraph 3 and 90 (inclusive). I have already dealt with paragraph 2. I sought some submissions from the Independent Children's Lawyer first, and then the mother made some submissions, and the father as well. Much of what I think is being sought by the mother, are matters that can only be determined at trial. For instance, in paragraph 19, there is a reference to the history of family violence, and the assessing of risk factors. They are matters for trial, as is what is contained in paragraph 20. No order is sought in either of those, although perhaps it could be said the mother is seeking that, the father file an affidavit.
15. That's a matter for the father's trial affidavit. There is no need for that Court to make an order about it. If the father's medical and psychological history becomes relevant at the trial, well, I will deal with it at the trial. The Independent Children's Lawyer seeks an order that the father be psychiatrically assessed, and I will be making that order. The Independent Children's Lawyer also seeks an order that the mother be psychiatrically assessed, and I will come to that later in these reasons. Much of what the mother seeks are matters that can only be properly ventilated at a final hearing. They are not appropriate for an interlocutory application. Much of what the mother seeks in this document is very confused. Much of it is what I would call manifestly untenable.
16. The mother, at some length in this document, makes references to fraudulent documentation. In particular, when I asked her about this more than once today, it relates to one document to which reference was made earlier, a letter written by the maternal grandmother. The mother is highly agitated about this document and wants the Court, according to the mother's verbal submissions made today, to refer the matter to the Federal Police on the basis of apparent perjury and the obstruction of justice, and various other submissions made by the mother. It is concerning to the Court, that, notwithstanding the order that I made in February this year, directing the mother to only include in her application in a proceeding when consolidated, to only include orders that can reasonably be considered or made at an interim hearing - notwithstanding that direction, the Court has been swamped with 90 separate paragraphs in the Application in a Proceeding, practically all of which are confused and much of which is bordering on incoherency. It is a general, it seems to me, complaint by the mother about everything she can possibly think of that could be connected to the father. There has been no discernment showed by the mother whatsoever in the drafting of that document, nor in the preparation of the two very large affidavits that I have seen.
17. It is a great concern to the Court that notwithstanding the direction I made in the order of February, that this is what the Court is faced with. It was for that reason that I sought submissions from the parties about a summary dismissal. I did not receive any submissions from either parent, or the Independent Children's Lawyer about such an approach, although it must be said they have all been given an opportunity - in particular, the mother has - to address the Court about it, but she has not. I will come back to that aspect of the matter later in these reasons. One of the matters complained about by the mother in the Application in a Proceeding relates to an alleged contravention that is before the National Assessment Team of this Court for consideration. It is not listed for hearing today. It is not appropriate this Court make any order about it, at this stage.
18. The mother seeks a whole list of orders relating to the father's provision of an affidavit concerning his knowledge of the paternal grandfather's past conduct. These are all matters, if they are relevant, that can be ventilated at a final hearing. They cannot possibly be ventilated at an interim stage. I am in no position whatsoever to require the father to swear any document about his own father, at this point in time. The mother continues to raise the topic of an event that occurred, I understand in December 2024, when the grandfather may have inadvertently been at the same location as the child, contrary to an order.
19. But my recollection is, from an earlier Court event, that there was evidence that the child had not actually come into contact with the grandfather. I leave that to one side, because they are matters for the trial. If they are relevant to the question of risk, they will be addressed at the trial. The mother seeks one extraordinary order requiring the father to undergo a DNA test to establish whether he is the father of a child called L, the daughter of his former partner Ms N. It is said by the mother in this case, at paragraph 26 of the Application in a Proceeding, the father has abandoned that child. I have no idea whether that is correct or not. Under no circumstances, based on this document, or any of the material put forward by the mother, would I be persuaded to make such an order. It is an extraordinary order to seek. If the mother at the trial of the matter wants to run an argument that the father is not trustworthy and that he has failed to care for a child or to provide for a child for whom he should be providing, then it could be relevant. But I am not going to make an order requiring a person to undergo a DNA test. There is no proper basis whatsoever to support the making of such an order.
20. The other paragraphs of the document, to the extent that they could be construed as the request for orders, most of them are matters that need to await a final hearing.
21. There are some aspects I should address, though. The mother wants the stay of the progression of time between the father and the child, and I am looking now at between paragraphs 55 and onwards up to the 69. To say that this list of paragraphs is confused does not do it justice. On the one hand, the mother says she wants to stay the progression of time - that is in 56. In 59, the mother says she wants an order for the suspension of all contact. Under 61, the mother seeks interim orders for the child's safety, and says in 62, the father's time with the child shall occur in a supervised setting at the contact centre in City F. Then in the next paragraph, 63, the mother seeks an order that the father shall not take the child outside the City F and Region M area without written agreement from the mother. On the one hand the mother seeks supervised time, on the other hand the mother seeks an order that the father not be permitted to take the child outside of City F or Region M.
22. The orders sought, to the extent one could describe them as orders, are confused, incoherent in many respects, are internally inconsistent, such that the Court cannot properly discern exactly what it is that the mother seeks. The mother did tell the Court today, when she addressed the Court personally, in English I note, that it breaks her heart because her own child has been saying she wants to spend time with the father, she wants to see her father. The mother has formed a view that this could only be achieved by supervised time, and she leaves it to the Court as to whether the time should be supervised or whether it should be suspended altogether.
23. The lack of coherency in the mother's approach is a matter of concern for the Court. The mother has told the Court that she is a legal professional, I presume registered or trained in her country of origin, which I understand to be Country E. The current apparent lack of coherency to her arguments and her presentation of the evidence, in itself, is sufficient for the Court to accept the submission by the Independent Children's Lawyer that not only the father should be the subject of a psychiatric assessment but so should the mother. I do not propose to provide any further reasons to support the order that the mother undergo a psychiatric assessment.
24. The mother seeks these various alternative orders concerning parenting on an interim stage, and in no way does she adequately address anywhere why it is that there would need to be any variation to the order that the mother agreed to in April 2024, the order of Senior Judicial Registrar Norrington of 18 April 2024 when an order was made by the Court with the consent of the parties. In that Order, there was no mention of supervised time. Changeovers would take place at the City F contact centre. The mother, of her own volition, has decided not to follow those orders. The mother provides no proper justification for her actions. It is certainly not supported by the Independent Children's Lawyer, nor is it supported by the father. Apparently, at the moment, the mother is permitting the child to talk by video link with the father on occasions, notwithstanding this young child's own requests to the mother to spend some time with the father.
25. The mother has made some submissions alleging further instances of domestic violence, and apparently these matters are before a State Court. Well, I do not know about that, except that the mother makes allegations. It may be that the mother does make allegations of domestic violence - but they are matters for determination by this Court at the trial. They are, of course, a matter for separate determination by a State Court if there is an application on foot there. But it is not a justification for this mother, of her own volition, to suspend the time orders. The mother has no right to suspend unilaterally the operation of the orders that were made by the Court. It is not up to the parties to decide what should happen with parenting orders. It is up to the Court.
26. As I say, this application (brought by the mother), so far as it relates to the possible variation of those April 2024 orders, does not come close to convincing the Court that there should be some change to those orders. The mother vehemently seeks an order that the father undergo a psychiatric assessment, and equally vehemently opposes such psychiatric assessment for herself, but I have already indicated that I will be making an order that the mother does undertake such an assessment. That order is sought by the Independent Children's Lawyer.
27. The mother seeks all other manner of possible outcomes, including a prohibition on the father from permitting the child to contact the applicant mother's own family of origin. The mother seeks an order that the father not expose the child to the paternal grandfather. There is already an order about that.
28. This presentation of this application, once again I say, is of very great concern to the Court. Out of nowhere, and included at the paragraph numbered 77, is a further reference to the father being prohibited from removing the child from the City F and Region M area, and an order that the child only spend time within this geographical region, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.
29. The mother seeks an extraordinary order in paragraph 84 that the respondent father and his legal representatives, (I note that the father, Mr Conner, does not have any legal representatives), nonetheless, the mother seeks an injunction prohibiting the father and his lawyers from taking any further action in the proceedings, along with prohibiting the father from the filing of any documents and making submissions or pursuing any legal steps until he has fully complied with all orders set out in the present application.
30. This is precisely why I had urged the mother, when the matter was before me in February 2025, to seek some form of assistance. There are legal services available to individuals in the mother's position to get some indication as to how to present a matter, or to get some indication as to whether there are any prospects of succeeding.
31. I am not going to make any particular reference to any of the other paragraphs contained in the document that is said to be the Application in a Proceeding filed on 17 March 2025. My summary of that document, leaving aside paragraph 2 which sought the removal of the Independent Children's Lawyer, is that the application is confused, it is manifestly untenable and, accordingly, the application is an abuse of the process of the Court.
32. In that regard, I would draw the parties' attention to two particular High Court of Australia cases, one of Tomlinson & Ramsey Food Processing [2015] HCA 28; [2015] 256 CLR 507 ("Tomlinson"), and a case of UBS AG & Tyne (as Trustee of the Argo Trust) [2018] HCA 45; [2018] 265 CLR 77. In Tomlinson at paragraphs 24 and 25, the Chief Justice, along with Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ, stated, in particular in paragraph 25:

" [24] To explain contemporary adherence to the comparatively narrow principle in Ramsay v Pigram, it is appropriate also to explain the relationship between the doctrine of estoppel and the doctrine of abuse of process as it has since come to be recognised and applied in Australia. The doctrine of abuse of process is informed in part by similar considerations of finality and fairness. Applied to the assertion of rights or obligations, or to the raising of issues in successive proceedings, it overlaps with the doctrine of estoppel. Thus, the assertion of a right or obligation, or the raising of an issue of fact or law, in a subsequent proceeding can be simultaneously: (1) the subject of an estoppel which has resulted from a final judgment in an earlier proceeding; and (2) conduct which constitutes an abuse of process in the subsequent proceeding.

[25] Abuse of process, which may be invoked in areas in which estoppels also apply, is inherently broader and more flexible than estoppel. Although insusceptible of a formulation which comprises closed categories, abuse of process is capable of application in any circumstances in which the use of a court's procedures would be unjustifiably oppressive to a party or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It can for that reason be available to relieve against injustice to a party or impairment to the system of administration of justice which might otherwise be occasioned in circumstances where a party to a subsequent proceeding is not bound by an estoppel."

1. This is what concerns the Court in this case. The use by the mother in this case of the Court's procedures in such a way that can be they are unjustifiably oppressive to the father, and to the Independent Children's Lawyer. Not only that, the mother's application does bring the administration of justice into disrepute, not only in the presentation of the application in the proceeding, but the contents of those two affidavits filed, as I pointed out earlier, within six days of each other.
2. In the decision in UBS AG & Tyne (as Trustee of the Argo Trust) [2018] HCA 45; [2018] 265 CLR 77, the Chief Justice along with Bell and Keane JJ stated, inter alia, in paragraph 1:

"1 ...The varied circumstances in which the use of the court's processes will amount to an abuse, notwithstanding that the use is consistent with the literal application of its rules, do not lend themselves to exhaustive statement. Either of two conditions enlivens the power: where the use of the court's procedures occasions unjustifiable oppression to a party, or where the use serves to bring the administration of justice into disrepute...

1. It is the same test the High Court adopted in Tomlinson. I draw this to the attention of the parties, in particular the mother, in the hope that this type of approach is not continued by the mother.
2. The mother must have been on notice that the Court was concerned about her documentation. Reference to the orders of 24 February ought to have been enough to put the mother on notice. If that was not enough, what I said, with the help of an interpreter, on 24 February ought to have been enough. What I said to the mother directly in Court, (she was via video link), 24 February this year, ought to have been enough to put the mother on notice, to give her some reason to pause and examine her approach and her conduct. It seems it did no such thing. The mother, without pausing, proceeded to file the document, which is the Application in a Proceeding on 17 March 2025.
3. In addition to the reasoning I have already provided - the application, (the balance of it beyond paragraph 2), is utterly confused, manifestly untenable, and amounts to an abusive process - in addition to those reasons, I agree with the submissions by the Independent Children's Lawyer, which I alluded to earlier, namely, that the vast amount of what the mother seeks relates to matters that can only be ventilated and decided at a trial.
4. The balance of the mother's application is dismissed. The parenting orders made by Senior Judicial Registrar Norrington on 18 April 2024 remain in full force and effect.
5. The order sought by the Independent Children's Lawyer, namely, that the parents both be psychiatrically assessed, and in the terms sought by the Independent Children's Lawyer, those orders are made for the reasons stated. I did not understand the father to object to an order for his own psychiatric assessment.
6. As far as I understand, the matter remains an application for parenting orders, including an application sought by the mother, whom it appears to the Court has fallen asleep in the Courtroom, including an application by the mother to relocate the residence of the child to Country E.
7. There remains one other aspect of the documentation presented to the Court to which I should make some reference. At one stage in her documentation - it is contained in the affidavit file on the 9 May 2025 - there is a part called Part 7 and the mother is unhappy with my conduct as the Judge. In the event, of course, that a person, in this case the mother, would seek such an order, I would say two things. Firstly, she is perfectly entitled, as is any litigant, to seek such an order that a Judge recuse himself, but if that were to be an order sought, it would have to be properly contained within an Application in a Proceeding, served and filed with an accompanying affidavit that supports the making of such an order, and the other parties would need to be given a chance to respond. I will say nothing more about it at this stage.
8. There is no reason whatsoever that I can ascertain as to why the time with the father should not recommence immediately in accordance with the April 2024 consent orders. I will make a specific order as requested by the Independent Children's Lawyer.
9. Suffice to say that in making this order, I am satisfied with all of the matters I am required to be satisfied under Part VII of the Act - now being well-versed with what is actually going on in this case by reason of the large amount of material that has been placed before the Court, in particular by the mother. In that large morass of material there is currently nothing that would persuade me that there ought to be some variation to the consent order that the parties agreed to in April last year.
10. The father tells the Court that the contact centre in City F can facilitate the changeovers. The time has to recommence. It is not up to the mother to decide unilaterally not to comply with Court orders. The problem with taking that approach, unilaterally deciding not to follow Court orders, is that there may be consequences in the event that an application were to be filed, for instance, for an interim change of residence. Now, I do not know if that is going to happen or not. But all I am saying is, at this point in time, the consent orders from April 2024 have to be followed by the mother and the father.
11. The Orders from today include: the dismissal of the mother's application for the Independent Children's Lawyer's removal; the dismissal of the balance of the mother's Application in a Proceeding filed 17 March 2025; an order that the parties attend psychiatric assessments; an order dismissing the mother's earlier Applications in a Proceeding because they'd been consolidated in the mother's 17 March 2025 application; the Court addressed the father's Application in a Proceeding, and it will be dismissed except that the Court will make an Order requiring the recommencement of time according to the 2024 consent order - with the time to recommence from Friday 23 May 2025.
12. The Independent Children's Lawyer has leave to re-list the matter (liberty to apply) on five days' notice in the event the mother does not facilitate time between the child and the father in accordance with the order made today, and in accordance with the consent order of 18 April 2024. Costs will be reserved, and the application for costs will be determined at the conclusion of the trial.

I certify that the preceding sixty-four (64) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Ex Tempore Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Howard.