statutory framework and Legal principles
25 Section 588FF of the Act relevantly provides:
(1) Where, on the application of a company's liquidator, a court is satisfied that a transaction of the company is voidable because of section 588FE, the court may make one or more of the following orders:
(a) an order directing a person to pay to the company an amount equal to some or all of the money that the company has paid under the transaction;
(b) an order directing a person to transfer to the company property that the company has transferred under the transaction;
(c) an order requiring a person to pay to the company an amount that, in the court's opinion, fairly represents some or all of the benefits that the person has received because of the transaction;
(d) an order requiring a person to transfer to the company property that, in the court's opinion, fairly represents the application of either or both of the following:
(i) money that the company has paid under the transaction;
(ii) proceeds of property that the company has transferred under the transaction;
(e) an order releasing or discharging, wholly or partly, a debt incurred, or a security or guarantee given, by the company under or in connection with the transaction;
(f) if the transaction is an unfair loan and such a debt, security or guarantee has been assigned - an order directing a person to indemnify the company in respect of some or all of its liability to the assignee;
(g) an order providing for the extent to which, and the terms on which, a debt that arose under, or was released or discharged to any extent by or under, the transaction may be proved in a winding up of the company;
(h) an order declaring an agreement constituting, forming part of, or relating to, the transaction, or specified provisions of such an agreement, to have been void at and after the time when the agreement was made, or at and after a specified later time;
(i) an order varying such an agreement as specified in the order and, if the Court thinks fit, declaring the agreement to have had effect, as so varied, at and after the time when the agreement was made, or at and after a specified later time;
(j) an order declaring such an agreement, or specified provisions of such an agreement, to be unenforceable.
…
(3) An application under subsection (1) may only be made:
(a) during the period beginning on the relation‑back day and ending:
(i) 3 years after the relation‑back day; or
(ii) 12 months after the first appointment of a liquidator in relation to the winding up of the company;
whichever is the later; or
(b) within such longer period as the Court orders on an application under this paragraph made by the liquidator during the paragraph (a) period.
26 In the absence of an order under s 588FF(3)(b) the period for the commencement of any proceeding pursuant to s 588FF(1) will expire on 17 March 2021. Relevantly that is the date that is 12 months after the first appointment of a liquidator in relation to the winding up of Phoenix, which is the later of the two periods specified in s 588FF(3)(a). The relation back day in relation to Phoenix is 21 March 2016: see s 91 (item 12) and s 513C of the Act.
27 In considering whether to grant an extension under s 588FF(3)(b) of the Act the Court undertakes "a balancing of the requirements of commercial certainty on the part of those who had past dealings with the corporation against the conflicting interest of the creditors of the company": see Fortress Credit Corporation (Australia) II Pty Ltd v Fletcher (2015) 254 CLR 489 at [8].
28 In Marsden (liquidator) v CVS Lane PV Pty Limited, in the matter of Pentridge Village Pty Limited (in liq) (receiver and manager appointed) (controller appointed) (2018) 124 ACSR 100; [2018] FCA 102 at [54]-[55] Gleeson J summarised the principles applicable to determining whether an order should be made under s 588FF(3)(b) as follows:
54 The Court is required to consider what is fair and just in all the circumstances: BP Australia Ltd v Brown [2003] NSWCA 216; (2013) 58 NSWLR 322 ("BP Australia") at [187]. The applicant for the extension must satisfy the Court that it should be granted: BP Australia at [183].
55 The matters that ordinarily inform the exercise of the Court's discretion are:
(1) the liquidator's explanation for the delay in taking action within the three year period provided for by the statute;
(2) the merits of the foreshadowed proceeding, assessed by a "preliminary review"; and
(3) any likely prejudice that would be suffered if the extension of time is granted: Parker, in the matter of Worldwide Specialty Property Services Pty Limited (in liq) v Worldwide Specialty Property Services Pty Limited (in liq) [2017] FCA 687 at [15]-[16]; Walker and Moloney v CBA Corporate Services (NSW) Pty Limited [2012] FCA 328 ("Walker") at [43].
29 In relation to the issue of merits of the proposed action, at [60]-[61] her Honour said:
60 Concerning merits, what is required is "an investigation as to whether such proceedings would be so devoid of prospects that it would be unfair, by granting an extension, to expose the other party to the continuing prospect of suit": Walker at [44] citing Green v Chiswell Furniture Pty Ltd (in liq) [1999] NSWSC 608 at [15]. However, a review of the merits may be unnecessary if the purpose of the application for an extension of time is to allow the liquidator time in which to properly decide whether or not to bring the proposed proceedings: Walker at [44].
61 In Taylor v Woden Constructions Pty Ltd [1998] FCA 1228, Finn J said:
Where the liquidator is not in a position to consider the merits but has proper grounds for inquiring into the matter because of suspicion it invites (or that is cast on it) or of the explanation it requires, then provided he can satisfactorily explain his delay in inquiring sufficiently into the matter, he should not be closed out from an extension because he is unable to say he has a meritorious claim. In some instances…it will be sufficient if he can say "I do not know if I do, but there is reason to inquire".