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[2000] VSC 259
Supreme Court of Victoria
2000-06-20
Warren, J.
Original judgment source is linked above.
(1) Which proceeding was commenced first? (2) Whether the determination of one proceeding is likely to have a material effect on the other. (3) The public interest. (4) The desirability of two courts competing to see which of them determines common facts first. (5) Consideration of circumstances relating to witnesses. (6) Whether work done on pleadings, particulars, discovery, interrogatories and preparation might be wasted if the stay is not granted. (7) The undesirability of substantial wasting of time and effort if it becomes a common practice to bring actions in two courts involving substantially the same issues. (8) How advanced the proceedings are in each court? (9) The application of the principle that the law should strive against permitting multiplicity of proceedings in relation to similar issues. (10) Generally balancing the advantages and disadvantages to each party, that is, weighing up issues of justice and convenience.
(2) Whether the determination of one proceeding is likely to have a manifest effect on the other
(4) The undesirability of two courts competing to see which of them
(5) Consideration of circumstances relating to witnesses
(6) Whether work done on pleadings, particulars, discovery, interrogatories
(7) The undesirability of substantial waste of time and effort if it becomes a
common practice to bring actions in two courts involving substantially the same issues
(8) How far advanced the proceedings are in each court
(9) The law should strive against permitting multiplicity of proceedings in relation to similar issues
(10) Generally balancing the advantages and disadvantages to each party
"The approach has to be cautious because an injunction restraining a person within the jurisdiction of the English court from pursuing a remedy in a foreign court where, if he proves the necessary facts, he has a cause of action is, however disguised and indirect, an interference with the process of justice in that foreign court. Caution is needed even in a 'forum convenience' case, ie, a case in which a remedy is available in the English as well as in the foreign court. Caution is clearly very necessary where there is no remedy in the English court in respect of the cause of action which, if the facts be proved, is recognised and enforceable by the foreign court."
"The inherent power to grant anti-suit injunctions is not confined to the examples just given. As with other aspects of that power, it is not to be restricted to defined and closed categories. Rather, it is to be exercised when the administration of justice so demands or, in the context of anti-suit injunctions, when necessary for the protection of the court's own proceedings or processes. Quite apart from the inherent power of a court to protect its own processes, a court may, in the exercise of the power deriving from the Chancery Court, make orders in restraint of unconscionable conduct or the unconscientious exercise of legal rights. If the bringing of legal proceedings involves unconscionable conduct or the unconscientious exercise of a legal right, an injunction may be granted by a court in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction in restraint of those proceedings no matter where they are brought. In some cases, the equitable jurisdiction to restrain unconscionable conduct may be exercised in aid of legal rights. Thus, as the respondents correctly contend, if there is a contract not to sue, an injunction may be granted to restrain proceedings brought in breach of that contract, whether brought here or abroad. Similarly, an injunction may be granted in aid of a promise not to sue in a foreign jurisdiction constituted, for example, by an agreement to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the forum."
"'Comity', in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws."
Commonwealth Bank of Australia
White
The bank seeks severance of the third party claim from its principal proceeding against White. Rule 11.12(b) of Chapter I of the Rules of this court provide that unless a court otherwise orders a third party may attend and take part in a proceeding and the issues between the defendant and the third party are to be tried concurrently with the questions between the plaintiff and the defendant. In determining whether to sever a third party claim from substantive proceedings a fundamental principle is applied. The power to order severance is only exercised in exceptional circumstances: AMP Fire & General Insurance Co Limited v Dixon and Anor [1982] VicRp 83; [1982] VR 833. The bank asserts three principal grounds that it relies upon to establish exceptional circumstances to warrant severance of the third party claim. I deal with reach ground separately.
(1992) 34 FCR 287
(1996) 185 CLR 571
(1997) 189 CLR 345
(1939) 62 CLR 464
(1953) 88 CLR 1