Commonwealth Bank of Australia v MLD Financial Services & Management Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 1476 | Case summary

Summary judgment

Summary judgment is sought only for possession of the land and concerns, therefore, only the First Defendant.
The Court of Appeal has recently summarised the principles relevant to applications for summary judgment in O'Brien v Bank of Western Australia Ltd [2013] NSWCA 71. Macfarlan JA (with whom Beazley P agreed) said: [3] The High Court decision in Spencer v The Commonwealth [2010] HCA 28; 241 CLR 118 was concerned with s 31A(2) of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) but the following principles stated in it are of general application: (a) On a summary judgment application, the real issue is whether there is an underlying cause of action or defence, not simply whether one is pleaded (at [23]). (b) The critical question can be expressed as whether there is more than a "fanciful" prospect of success (at [25]) per French CJ and Gummow J) or whether the outcome is so certain that it would be an abuse of the process of the Court to allow the action to go forward (at [54] in the judgment of the plurality). Demonstration of the outcome of the litigation is required, not an assessment of the prospect of its success (ibid). (c) Powers to summarily terminate proceedings must be exercised with exceptional caution (ibid at [55]; see also French CJ and Gummow J at [24]).
Ward JA (with whom Beazley P also agreed) said: [66] The primary judge set out the principles on which the Bank's summary judgment application was to be determined at ([23]), noting that the relevant question was whether the proposed defence showed no triable issue or no prospects of success at all (it not being sufficient to say that the prospects of success might be slight), and citing in support of that statement of the test: Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioner (1949) 78 CLR 62; General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (New South Wales) (1964) 112 CLR 125; Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598; Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552; [2000] HCA 41; and Esanda Finance Corporation Limited v Peat Marwick Hungerford (1997) 188 CLR 241; [1997] HCA 8. It was recognised that the power summarily to dispose of a claim should be exercised with the utmost caution and only in very clear cases. On appeal, it was not suggested that there was any error in the articulation of the relevant principles by the primary judge. [67] The principles applicable on a summary judgment application were more recently considered by the High Court in Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 118. Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ there described the test identified by Dixon J in Dey as being a test requiring "certain demonstration of the outcome of the litigation, not an assessment of the prospect of its success", emphasising that unless it could be shown that it was "so certain" that the question to be determined must be answered in favour of the party seeking summary judgment (such that it would be an abuse of process of the court to allow the case to go forward) it would not be competent for the court to accede to such an application ([54]). French CJ and Gummow J (at [25]) commented that there seemed little distinction between the approaches set out in Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87 at 99 and Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256 at 275 (repeated in Agar v Hyde at 575-576) and the requirement of a "real" as distinct from "fanciful" prospect of success contemplated by s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) as applicable in Spencer. [68] The issue, therefore, in the present case is whether (having regard to the potential outcome of the litigation) there is an underlying defence that has a real (or more than a fanciful) prospect of success. If so, then summary judgment should not have been given in favour of the Bank. The existence of such a defence on the one hand, and the pleading of such a defence on the other, are distinct concepts as noted by Lindgren J in White Industries Australia Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 160 FCR 298 at 309 (cited in Spencer with apparent approval at [23]).
In the present case any proposed defence involving a dispute about the amount owing cannot provide a defence to the claim for possession. The only defence put forward to resist the claim for possession is what is said to be the equitable set-off that arises from the Plaintiff's negligence that led to the inability of the First Defendant to make the payments under the home loan and mortgage. In terms of the principles relevant to summary judgment applications, the issue to be determined is whether there is an arguable case that an equitable set-off is established and is capable of providing a defence to the Plaintiff's claim. It must be asked whether the set off has a real or more than a fanciful prospect of success.

The Defence

The Plaintiff submits that the Defence is simply a cross-claim which cannot defeat the Plaintiff's right to possession because that right arises under the loan agreement and mortgage. The Plaintiff submits that if the matters raised by the First Defendant are arguable they are caught by the principle discussed in Inglis v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia (1972) 126 CLR 161 at 165-167 and 169. The Plaintiff points to a number of other cases which it says clearly establish that a cross-claim or a set-off cannot amount to a defence to a claim for possession. The Plaintiff submits that the attempts to bring such a set-off or counter claim is contrary to cl 11.21 of the loan agreement.
It is necessary first to determine if the Defence and Cross-Claim sought to be relied upon by the First Defendant amounts to an equitable set-off. It is then necessary to see whether that set-off is capable of being raised when the contractual arrangements between the parties are considered.
In Murphy v Zamonex Pty Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 439 Giles J said at 465: Equitable set-off is available where the defendant establishes an equitable ground for being protected from the plaintiff's claim. That has been expressed in language to the effect that the defendant's set-off goes to the root of or impeaches the title of the plaintiff's claim, but also in language to the effect that the counter-claim is so directly connected with the claim that it would be unjust to allow the plaintiff to recover without taking into account the defendant's counter-claim.
Bryson J, having set out that passage in GE Capital Australia v Davis [2002] NSWSC 1146 at [81], went on to say: [82] Although counsel referred to a number of later authorities I do not understand them to make any further or better elucidation than that made by Giles J. There are many judicial formulations of the kind of claims which may be raised in this way, none of them exhaustively clear, and I will not attempt to reduce them to a single formulation or add to them. In a claim by a mortgagee against a mortgagor for the balance of the mortgage debt, the mortgagor would be entitled to raise a claim for equitable compensation for sacrifice of the mortgagor's interest in exercise of a power of sale as an equitable set-off of compensation against the contractual debt. To do so would be no more than a short form of claiming that an account be taken of the amount due under the mortgage.
However, it must be remembered that in Davis Bryson J was considering the right of a guarantor to raise an equitable set-off when the guarantor was being sued for the amount guaranteed rather than for possession of the land.
In Inglis v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia (1972) 126 CLR 161 Walsh J said: [13] A general rule has long been established, in relation to applications to restrain the exercise by a mortgagee of powers given by a mortgage and in particular the exercise of a power of sale, that such an injunction will not be granted unless the amount of the mortgage debt, if this be not in dispute, be paid or unless, if the amount be disputed, the amount claimed by the mortgagee be paid into court. [14] The rule, as it affects the exercise by a mortgagee of the power of sale, is stated in the following terms in Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd ed., vol. 27, p 301: "The mortgagee will not be restrained from exercising his power of sale because the amount due is in dispute, or because the mortgagor has commenced a redemption action, or because the mortgagor objects to the manner in which the sale is being arranged. He will be restrained, however, if the mortgagor pays the amount claimed into court, that is, the amount which the mortgagee swears to be due to him, unless, on the terms of the mortgage, the claim is excessive." Then there is a reference to a special case where the mortgagee was the mortgagor's solicitor. The plaintiffs contend, however, that such a rule can have no application in this case, in which the action brought by them is brought to establish a claim that upon balance there is no debt due by them to the defendant, but on the contrary, there is a balance due to them. They contend that that action is not one in which they seek to maintain rights in the capacity of mortgagors. [15] In my opinion, the authorities which I have been able to examine establish that for the purposes of the application of the general rule to which I have referred, nothing short of actual payment is regarded as sufficient to extinguish a mortgage debt. If the debt has not been actually paid, the Court will not, at any rate as a general rule, interfere to deprive the mortgagee of the benefit of his security, except upon terms that an equivalent safeguard is provided to him, by means of the plaintiff bringing in an amount sufficient to meet what is claimed by the mortgagee to be due. [16] The benefit of having a security for a debt would be greatly diminished if the fact that a debtor has raised claims for damages against the mortgagee were allowed to prevent any enforcement of the security until after the litigation of those claims had been completed. … [23] In Morgan & Son Ltd. v. S. Martin Johnson & Co. Ltd. (1949) 1 KB 107, a passage was cited from the judgment of Lord Cottenham in Rawson v. Samuel (1841) Cr & Ph 161, at p 179 (41 ER 451, at p 458), and in which Lord Cottenham referred to some earlier cases which he described as being cases where - I quote his words - "the equity of the bill impeached the title to the legal demand". [24] One of those early cases was Piggott v. Williams [1821] EngR 279; (1821) 6 Madd 95 (56 ER 1027). In that case a solicitor filed a bill for foreclosure of an estate pledged as a security for costs and there was a cross bill alleging that the costs demanded were occasioned by the negligence and want of skill of the solicitor, and that therefore nothing was due. A demurrer to the cross bill was overruled. The plaintiffs in the present case have sought to place some reliance upon Morgan & Son Ltd. v. S. Martin Johnson & Co. Ltd. (1949) 1 KB 107 , and upon the citation therein of the earlier authorities, to some of which I have referred. I have looked at the case of Rawson v. Samuel (1841) Cr & Ph 161 (41 ER 451) and I do not find in it any support for the argument of the plaintiffs in the present case, nor do I think that the decision in Piggott v. Williams [1821] EngR 279; (1821) 6 Madd 95 (56 ER 1027) assists them. That case was concerned with the question whether, against a plaintiff who had come to the court to enforce a security, the defendant could assert by a cross bill that nothing was due under the security, because the debt which it was intended to secure had never been incurred at all. That is not the situation in the present case.
As the learned authors of Meagher, Gummow and Lehane's Equity Doctrines and Remedies (5th Edition 2015 Lexis Nexis) make clear, for the claim to amount to an equitable set-off the claim must impeach the Plaintiff's claim or, in the case of a mortgage, impeach the Plaintiff's title to the mortgage. They say at [39-060(g)]: One ingredient of set-off in equity is that the Defendant's cross-claim must actually go to the root of, or be essentially bound up with, or "impeach", the title of the Plaintiff. The requirement is fulfilled where the Plaintiff's title to the legal demand would not have come about had the Plaintiff not breached some duty the Plaintiff owed to the Defendant. No requirement of impeachment exists at law, but in equity it is indispensable. It is not sufficient that there be countervailing claims, nor that those claims be mutual, nor even that they arise out of the same transaction. In order to make out an equitable set off, the Defendant must establish some equitable right to be protected from the Plaintiff's claim. See also Gummow J in James v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 37 FCR 445.
In Lord v Direct Acceptance Corporation Ltd (Receiver And Manager Appointed) (In Liq) (1993) 32 NSWLR 362 Sheller JA with whom Kirby P and Meagher JA agreed said at 367: Equitable set-off: Next the appellant argued that it had an equitable defence of set-off to the extent of the amount held on deposit. This argument necessarily proceeded on the assumption that the deposit had not been appropriated in satisfaction of the debt and remained a debt due to Me and Angus Pty Ltd that is to say a chose in action the property of Me and Angus Pty Ltd. For the defence to succeed the appellant needed to demonstrate some equitable ground for being protected by set-off against Direct Acceptance Corporation Ltd's demand to the extent of the deposit. The mere existence of a cross-demand would not be sufficient. The equity had to be such as impeached Direct Acceptance Corporation Ltd's title to demand payment. These propositions adopt the language of Lord Cottenham LC in Rawson v Samuel (1841) Cr & Ph 161 at 178-179; 41 ER 451 at 458, which was applied by the High Court in Hill v Ziymack (1908) 7 CLR 352 at 360-362: see also J & S Holdings Pty Ltd v NRMA Insurance Ltd (1982) 61 FLR 108; 41 ALR 539, a decision of the Full Federal Court (at 554). In subsequent cases the Lord Chancellor's language has been explained or diluted often in ways not entirely satisfactory: see the discussion by Gummow J in Re Just Juice Corporation Pty Ltd; James v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 109 ALR 334 at 349-352; sub nom James v Commonwealth Bank of Australia 37 FCR 445 at 459-462. The cases have been extensively examined by Woodward J in D Galambos and Son Pty Ltd v McIntyre (1974) 5 ACTR 10 and Giles J in AWA Ltd v Exicom Australia Pty Ltd (1990) 19 NSWLR 705 at 710-712. In Bank of Boston Connecticut v European Grain and Shipping Ltd [1989] AC 1056 at 1102, Lord Brandon of Oakbrook said that the concept of impeaching the title to the legal demand was not one familiar today and referred to the expression used in Government of Newfoundland v Newfoundland Railway Co (1888) 13 App Cas 199 at 212-213 that a claim may be set-off if "flowing out of and inseparably connected with the dealings and transactions which also give rise to the claim". The concept is better stated in Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, Equity, Doctrines and Remedies, 3rd ed (1992), par 3709(h) at 818, where the learned authors say that it is an indispensable requirement of equitable set-off that the set-off actually go to the root of, be essentially bound up with, "impeach" the title of the plaintiff. If available, the set-off would operate on judgment or perhaps earlier to diminish or extinguish Direct Acceptance Corporation Ltd's claim: see par 3709(g) at 818 and Stehar Knitting Mills Pty Ltd v Southern Textile Converters Pty Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 514 at 518.
In the present case, the wrongdoing on the Bank's part is said to postdate significantly the entry into the loan agreement and the mortgage. It is not suggested that there was any wrongdoing at the time of the entry into the contractual arrangements. This is not a case where, for example, misrepresentation or misleading and deceptive conduct leading to the making of the agreement is alleged nor where there is unconscionablity or an unjust contract is made. Such matters, if established, can be said to impeach the Plaintiff's title to the land because of the way that title was obtained.
The present complaint is independent of the entry into the contractual arrangements. It arises from subsequent conduct of the Bank which is said to have impeded the ability of the mortgagor to observe the terms of the contractual arrangements. In that way it cannot be said to impeach the title of the Plaintiff to the mortgage on which the Plaintiff now seeks possession of the land. Again, the complaint about the Plaintiff is not directly connected with the claim, that is, the right to obtain possession as a result of the default under the mortgage.
The need to impeach the title to establish an equitable set-off is made most clear in cases where mortgagees are seeking possession only of the property. In Westpac Banking Corporation v Corry [2011] NSWSC 1014 the defendants attempted to resist summary judgment for possession by asserting that they relied on the bank manager's advice not to sell some properties at a price which would have substantially reduced their indebtedness to the bank. They contended that reduction of the level of indebtedness at that stage would enable them to continue meeting other loan repayments and would have put them in a better position to refinance and protect the property of which possession was now sought by the bank.
Johnson J said: [33] I have expressed in relatively brief terms the basis upon which the Defendants assert that there is an arguable defence to the Plaintiff's claim for possession of land. A fundamental problem with the Defendants' argument is that they seek to attack or impugn the mortgage entered into and registered in 2003 by reliance upon representations said to have been made in and after 2006. The Defendants do not contend that the alleged representations were made in circumstances surrounding the entry into the mortgage. In my view, this is a fundamental problem for the Defendants on the present application. [34] To the extent that the Defendants seek to rely upon a form of set-off by way of defence or cross-claim, I note that a cross-claim or set-off is not a defence to a claim for possession of land: Inglis v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia [1972] HCA 74; 126 CLR 161 at 165-167, 169; Horrobin v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (1996) 40 NSWLR 89 at 99-100.
In National Australia Bank Ltd v C & O Voukidis Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 384 Campbell J came to a similar conclusion where the defence said to amount to a set-off asserted: (a) That the Bank wrongfully and unconscionably caused the surplus funds for the sale of the other Burwood property to be paid into the controlled money account rather than applying them to the reduction of the second portfolio facility; (b) In December 2012 "wrongfully and unconscionably caused' the term deposit to be paid in reduction of the Bills Facility, rather than in reduction of the debts secured by the mortgage on the Burwood property.
Campbell J said: [27] Nothing brought forward in the Amended Defence, or by way of argument, vitiates the Bank's title under its mortgage. To the extent to which the various matters raised by the first defendant might be arguable, and it is not obvious to me that they are, they are caught by the principle discussed in Inglis. That is to say, these matters do not undermine the Bank's title as mortgagee to possession, but rather arise by way of counterclaim or setoff and as such cannot defeat the claim for possession. [28] The first defendant's averments may after a hearing on the merits give rise to claims which sound in damages or equitable compensation and they should be permitted to continue. But that does not mean that the Bank is not entitled to possession.
Again, in Australian & New Zealand Banking Group v RQA Accountants Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 165 one of the defendant's complaints in seeking to resist possession was that the Bank fraudulently transferred money from one account to another rendering it unavailable as working capital. It was alleged that the Bank behaved unconscionably in that way and others. Adamson J held at [51] that even if the Bank were in breach, that would not prevent it from relying on the mortgagors' breaches to found its right to possession of the property.
In each of Corry, Voukidis and v RQA Accountants summary judgment for possession was sought and obtained notwithstanding the claims that were sought to be made. In each case those claims amounted to alleged wrongdoing on behalf of the Bank which somehow prevented the mortgagors from meeting their commitments under the mortgage and loan agreement. In that way they are indistinguishable from the complaints in the present case.
The First Defendant placed some reliance on cases involving competing disputes between landlords and tenants such as British Anzani (Felixstowe) Ltd v International Marine Management (U.K.) Ltd [1980] 1 QB 137, and Beasley v Darcy (1800) 2 Sch. & Lef. 403 which is referred to in British Anzani. Mr Colman took me in particular to a passage concerning Beasley set out in British Anzani (at pp 150-1) where Lord Redesdale LC had said in O'Mahony v Dickson (1805) 2 Sch. & Lef. 400 at 412: "In the case in the House of Lords," that is, Beasley v Darcy, "there was no question 'whether so much rent was due or not'; there was no doubt on that subject; and therefore the case there must have been decided on a distinct ground: viz, that although the rent was due yet the money that was due to the other party for an unliquidated demand, ought, in point of conscience, under the circumstances, to have been paid by the landlord, in order to enable the tenant to pay his rent; the nature of the demand for damages, supposing a loss by the tenant of the produce of the land, arising from the act of the landlord. I must presume that that decision was right…"
However, there is no analogy here between landlords and tenants on the one hand, and mortgagees and mortgagors on the other. Landlords and tenants owe mutual ongoing obligations. In many cases a tenant may be able to set off rent against a claim for damages for a failure to repair, for example. There is no issue about impugning the landlord's title as there is in relation to a mortgagee's right to possession.
The First Defendant submitted in reliance on McDougall J in RHG Mortgage Securities v BNY Trust [2009] NSWSC 1011 at [75] to [80] that it cannot be said on an a priori basis that relief against forfeiture would not be available, and that it was arguable that equity would intervene here when all the facts were exposed at a final hearing. However, as McDougall J made clear at [5], the first issue he had to decide was whether there was a serious question to be tried as to whether an Event of Default had occurred. The remarks concerning relief against forfeiture must be viewed in that context. In the present case there is no dispute that a default has occurred. The issue here is whether the cause of the default can be raised as a set-off to the claim for possession including a consideration of the contractual terms between the present parties.
The matters raised by the First Defendant in the present case do not impeach the title of the Plaintiff, nor can they be said to so directly connected with the claim that it would be unjust to allow the Plaintiff to recover without taking into account the First Defendant's counterclaim.
However, even if the matters raised by the First Defendant could be said to amount to a set off the First Defendant would not be entitled at this stage to raise the matters by virtue of clause 11.21 of the loan agreement.
Clause 11.21 provides as follows: All payments to be made by you under the Contract must be made without set-off or counterclaim and free and clear of any withholding or deduction, unless prohibited by law.
Bryson J had to consider a similar clause in a guarantee in GE Capital Australia v Davis. That clause provided: SUSPENSION OF GUARANTOR'S RIGHTS 8.1 As long as the Guaranteed Money or other money payable under this guarantee and indemnity remains unpaid, the Guarantor may not without the consent of GE Capital: (a) in reduction of its liability under this guarantee and indemnity, raise a defence, set-off or counterclaim available to itself, the Debtor or a co-surety or co-indemnifier against GE Capital or claim a set-off or make a counterclaim against GE Capital;
Bryson J said: [93] Primacy of the plaintiff's right to payment: ouster of jurisdiction. The effect of the obligations in cl.8.1 is that the guarantors were contractually bound to pay the amount of money owing by the debtor when it was demanded. It was a contract to make an amount of money available when it was demanded. It was not an element of the obligation that it was subject to or limited by any process of ascertaining whether the debtor should be allowed any credits or set-offs, in respect of the security or of any other matter. Irrespective of the existence of security, and irrespective of the state of progress of any attempt at realising the security, it was and remains the obligation of the guarantors to provide to GE Capital the money amount of the debtors' obligation. The provisions relating to suspension of the guarantor's rights including cl.8.1 give effect to the amplitude of this obligation, and remove the possibility that the guarantors might in any way compete with GE Capital in attempts to recover from the debtors. Clause 8.1 does not bar the guarantors from making any claims or enforcing any rights against either GE Capital or the debtors; it suspends those rights so long as the guaranteed money remains unpaid, and the suspension can be ended at once if the guarantors meet their contractual obligation and pay the amount of the guaranteed money. Once they do that, they can bring any proceedings they wish against GE Capital or against the debtors, notwithstanding cl.8.1; but the effect of cl.8.1, and of cl.8 generally, is that until they make that payment they are contractually bound to the proposition that they are not entitled to bring any claims or proceedings or to act in any of the manners referred to. The jurisdiction of the Court is not ousted in any respect, the rights of the guarantors are suspended but otherwise not impaired, and they can pursue their rights as they wish if they first comply with what the Guarantee and Indemnity makes their primary obligation. … [97] The jurisdiction of courts and the rights of parties to make claims before courts are not conferred by contract and cannot be ousted by contract. However there is in my opinion no infringement of this principle where parties agree that in stated circumstances a particular sum of money will change hands without the opportunity at the same time to obtain judicial disposition of any other claim between them. In the contract of guarantee there is no infringement of the principle where parties agree to ensure that the guaranteed sum will be paid, and make this the more certain by postponing litigation raising any cross-claim or set-off. [98] The effect in substance of the provisions of the guarantee including cl.8.1(a) is that there is no limit on the right to resort to the courts if the guarantor first meets the obligation the protection of which is the primary purpose of the guarantee and indemnity, and pays the amount of the debt. It is well established in this area of the law that the guarantor can have recourse to securities given by a principal debtor to indemnify himself, but that he cannot do so until he has paid the whole debt. The validity of modifications of what would under the general law be the rights of guarantors is well established. These contractual provisions extend the ways in which the guarantors' remedies are postponed, and extend the creditor's freedom from competition in enforcement of its rights. The condition which must be fulfilled is directly related to the purposes of the agreement. (emphasis added)
In answer to this the First Defendant pointed to the absence in the mortgage of a clause similar to clause 11.21 of the loan agreement. This was said to be significant on a summary judgment application because it was a matter that formed part of the factual matrix for argument at the final hearing.
This submission should not be accepted. It is a matter of law on the construction of the documents whether clause 11.21 of the loan agreement operates although there is no corresponding provision in the mortgage. There is no challenge to the circumstances of the entry into the loan agreement and mortgage. In that way there is no factual matrix to which this argument could be relevant. Nothing in the mortgage suggests in any way that clause 11.21 of the loan agreement does not operate with full effect. A clause limiting any right of set-off would not be expected to be found in a mortgage which is ultimately a document of title. It is a clause ordinarily found in loan agreements and guarantees. The mortgage is a security for the obligations in the loan agreement and any guarantee.
There were certain deficiencies in the evidence to make out the defence raised. It was apparent, for example, that the inability of the First Defendant to meet the requirements under the loan agreement and mortgage predated the alleged wrongdoing of the Bank in forwarding mail to wrong addresses. Moreover, there was little evidence of the First Defendant's financial position so that a link could be made between the inability to pay the instalments due under the loan agreement and the loss of the contracts with Select Cellars and PMO Global Consulting.
However, for the purposes of the summary judgment application I have assumed in favour of the First Defendant that the First Defendant had established the link between the inability to pay the instalments and the loss of the contracts. I have also assumed in the First Defendant's favour that the acts of the Bank in forwarding the correspondence to the wrong addresses was done negligently and in breach of other duties which existed between the Bank and the First Defendant.

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v MLD Financial Services & Management Pty Ltd

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (7 paragraphs)

Parties

Legislation Cited (3)

Cases Cited (28)

Cited By (7)