2. The parties agree that it remains a matter of discretion for the Tribunal to determine what additional evidence, if any, may be permitted at the hearing of the remittal. In considering how to exercise that discretion, I must keep in mind the obligation to ensure each party is given a reasonable opportunity to present their case, as mandated by s 55 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth).

1. The evidence the applicant seeks to adduce in the remittal is contained in a remittal affidavit of the applicant dated 9 September 2025 and an Exhibit marked TMB-4. The remittal affidavit references, in particular, the applicant's First Affidavit dated 8 November 2017 filed in the AAT proceedings and the bundle of documents marked TMB-1 identified in that affidavit.
2. The remittal affidavit and TMB-4 seek to address the following issues:

(a) Other Accounts Amount: > > > (i) Paragraphs [13]-[37] of the remitter affidavit and the documents in TMB-4 cross-referenced in those paragraphs address aspects of the Other Accounts Amount related to properties found to have been held by the applicant on trust. On the basis of a concession made by the Commissioner in his written submissions, the effect of which was confirmed after the interlocutory hearing, the applicant does not press those paragraphs and documents. > > > > (ii) Paragraphs [38]-[115] of the remitter affidavit are said to be concerned with the second aspect of the Other Accounts Amount comprising deposits to the applicant's various personal accounts. As indicated below, some of these paragraphs also venture into matters related to the Investec account and the Gucce loan issue. > > (b) Evasion and penalties: Paragraphs [116]-[128] of the remittal affidavit are concerned with the evasion and administrative penalties issues. Some of these paragraphs also venture into the Investec account and Gucce loan issue.

3. Significantly, as noted, the remittal affidavit seeks to adduce evidence regarding the Investec and Gucce loan issues. That evidence cannot be used to re-open the issues that have already been determined by the AAT and not disturbed on appeal. However, the applicant submits that the further explanation sought to be provided is relevant to the evasion and penalties issues. In particular, in relation to the Gucce loan, the applicant seeks to adduce evidence as to why she "believed" the payment related to a loan.
4. While the Commissioner made submissions objecting to individual parts of the remittal affidavit, the Commissioner's primary submission was that the remittal affidavit should be excluded in its entirety.
5. In my view, there would be some efficiency and convenience in gathering together or identifying in one affidavit the evidence relating to the remaining issues to be resolved, rather than requiring counsel and the Tribunal to trawl through the far more extensive evidence before the AAT relating to a range of other issues to identify evidence relevant to the remittal. That would indeed be a helpful synthesising of the relevant evidence before the AAT.
6. Having said that, though, I do not accept Mr Dziubinski's proposition that further evidence should be permitted on the basis that the remaining issues concerning the Other Accounts Amount were "rats and mice" matters relative to the higher order other issues before the AAT. The remittal of the Other Accounts Amount matter for determination by the Tribunal does not provide a wholesale opportunity to make good perceived deficiencies in the evidence that could have been adduced before the AAT. If the AAT had not erred, the issues would have been finally decided on the basis of the evidence the applicant chose to adduce at that time. As challenging as that may be when there is a range of issues for which evidence may be required, including in relation to issues that are, individually, less significant or even trivial, the remittal is not an opportunity to do now what could have been done for the purposes of the AAT hearing.
7. In any case, even if the remittal affidavit is admitted into evidence, it will be necessary to refer back to the First Affidavit and especially its exhibits. That is not a criticism, merely a reflection of the reality that accepting the remittal affidavit would not greatly contribute to efficient conduct of the remittal hearing. To the extent that reference to evidence before the AAT is required, that can be achieved by a written outline of submissions, for which directions have already been made, supplemented by oral submissions.
8. Paragraphs [1]-[12] of the remittal affidavit contain uncontroversial background information. They were not the subject of specific objections by the Commissioner. As noted above, the applicant no longer presses paragraphs [13]-[37] of the remittal affidavit. These paragraphs therefore would be excluded in any case as not relevant to any controversy to be resolved by the Tribunal.
9. Following the approach in the remittal affidavit, I consider the remaining paragraphs [38]-[115] and [116]-[128], in relation to the Other Accounts Amount and the Evasion and Penalties issues respectively, and the pages of TMB-4 referenced in those paragraphs, below.

SHOULD THE PROPOSED EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE OTHER ACCOUNTS AMOUNT BE PERMITTED? (PARAGRAPHS [38]-[115])

1. The starting point for consideration of this issue is that this is not a case where a procedural error or misunderstanding resulted in relevant evidence not being led in the AAT proceedings.[11] Rather, the error was in the failure of the AAT to properly consider the evidence in relation to the Other Accounts Amount.
2. Additionally, the Court has explicitly limited the evidence that may be permitted in relation to the Other Accounts Amount to:

such further evidence as the Tribunal directs to be adduced as to . . . the synthesising of the material before the Tribunal concerning the 'Other Accounts Amount'. > > (Emphasis added.)

3. In his Honour's accompanying reasons, after noting that no procedural error occurred, Colvin J stated:

Rather, it is submitted that the Tribunal would be aided by receipt of further evidence in considering whether the deposits that comprised the 'Other Accounts Amount' (as described in this Court's reasons on the appeal) were assessable income. This is said to be justified by the fact that it would assist in synthesising material in circumstances where such matters were not the primary focus of the Tribunal. It is not said that there was any misunderstanding or misapprehension of the issues that resulted in the proposed further evidence not being led before the Tribunal at the initial hearing. These are matters that stand against allowing further evidence as to this aspect. However, on the other hand, what is proposed is a synthesis of material already before the Tribunal that would be of assistance to the Tribunal.[12]

4. Unaided by counsels' submissions, I would have been inclined to the view that 'synthesing' would be limited to collating and directing the Tribunal to evidence before the AAT and would not permit new evidence. However, both parties accepted that the order would permit the Tribunal to allow new evidence to be adduced. Mr Dziubinski, who appeared for the applicant, submitted that interpretation of the orders is appropriate on the basis that merely collating and directing to existing evidence would not require an order permitting additional evidence because that would, in effect, merely amount to a submission identifying relevant existing evidence rather than evidence of any fact.
5. Mr Dziubinski went on to submit that the order would permit new evidence referable to evidence before the AAT or linked to a contention the applicant advanced before the AAT. In my view, the second limb of that formulation goes too far; it would effectively allow a whole range of new evidence as long as it related to the applicant's existing contentions.
6. Mr White, who appeared with Ms Coci for the Commissioner, accepted that the terms of the order could allow new evidence to be adduced provided it was directly related to material that was before the AAT. For example, the Tribunal might in its discretion allow evidence that attempted to clarify or give a further explanation of evidence before the AAT. Mr Dziubinski submitted that in any case the evidence the applicant seeks to adduce would satisfy the Commissioner's explanation of what his Honour intended could be permitted.
7. The applicant's First Affidavit contained tables of contested entries in each of the accounts comprising the Other Account Amount with the applicant's explanations of the entries. In some of the tables, the explanation column was left blank for some entries.
8. The remittal affidavit concerned with the Other Account Amount contains similar tables but "updated" with additional information. Generally, although there are exceptions that would go further, the updated explanations would provide further information and documentary evidence in relation to the earlier evidence. That evidence would fall within the Commissioner's concept of "synthesing" the earlier evidence.
9. For example, the First Affidavit contained a table at [545]. Several of the original explanations of entries in that table are: "Income from Mammoth Nominees Pty Ltd". The updated table at [39] in the remittal affidavit adds "returned in salary/wages in my income tax return for 30 June 2009". Subject to any submissions that might be made at the substantive hearing, I would have thought it is implicit in the wording of this kind in the tables in the First Affidavit that the amounts were returned as income in any case.
10. Another example of entries in this table in the First Affidavit refers to an amount deposited to fund a share trade by a nominated individual while the updated table in the remittal affidavit states that the amounts are to reimburse payments for specific share acquisitions; for example, for 100 ordinary shares in BHP.
11. The paragraphs following the tables in respect of each account elaborate upon and reference new documentary evidence in TMB-4. For example, in relation to amounts said to be reimbursement of amounts relating to share acquisitions, a copy of a "trade confirmation" and cheque said to evidence the share trade are referenced in the body of the remittal affidavit and included in TMB-4.
12. Although evidence of this kind falls within the Commissioner's accepted concept of "synthesing" the earlier evidence, it does not follow that the evidence should be permitted. The applicant has offered no explanation for why the evidence could not have been provided before the AAT other than references to further material being located.
13. Additionally, other evidence sought to be adduced does not directly relate to evidence that was before the AAT. For example, in paragraph [39] of the remittal affidavit, a table refers to a deposit of $2,002.45 to an account on 11 June 2009. The relevant First Affidavit table contained no explanation of this entry. The remittal affidavit asserts that the deposit relates to three cheques for which details are provided. In my view, that goes well beyond synthesing evidence that was before the AAT. In any case, it is unlikely that the applicant would be able to depose at this time to the details of such cheques from her own memory.
14. The proposed evidence relating to the Investec account and the Gucci loan is particularly problematic. The Court has not disturbed the AAT's findings on these issues. Those findings must stand. Yet the applicant seeks to provide further evidence regarding those matters. For example, at [64], [66(b)], [90] and [94]-[104], the applicant refers to entries said to be relevant to "my loan to Gucce Holdings Pty Ltd" or similar references to the alleged loan. Similarly, at [68], the remittal affidavit would give extensive new evidence regarding the Investec account. The applicant says evidence relating to the Gucce loan may be relevant to the evasion and penalty issues but did not elaborate significantly upon how this evidence would assist the applicant in that regard.
15. If that evidence were to be allowed, it would almost inevitably result in further extensive cross-examination with corresponding cost and delay in finalising this longstanding dispute. It would also be inconsistent with the Court upholding the findings of the AAT on the Gucce loan and Investec issues. It is difficult to understand how the Tribunal could sensibly deal with evidence that is inconsistent with findings that were upheld on appeal and not part of the remitter. Further, to the extent that the applicant seeks to adduce this evidence in connection with the Other Accounts Amount, as the location of this evidence in the remittal affidavit indicates she seeks to do, that would be inconsistent with the express exclusion of those issues from his Honour's description of the Other Accounts Amount.
16. In my view, and despite Mr Dziubinski's submissions to the contrary, allowing evidence of the kinds I have outlined above would amount to providing the applicant with an opportunity for "another bite at the cherry"; that is, to make good deficiencies in the evidence that could have been adduced before the AAT. It would have a significant impact on the time and cost involved in the remittal in circumstances where the applicant had every opportunity to put her case before the AAT in a hearing that ran for some 10 days. It would introduce difficult issues concerning the Investec and Gucce loan issues. It would go beyond synthesing the evidence that was before the AAT as contemplated by the Court's order.
17. For these reasons, I would not permit the proposed evidence for the purpose of determining whether the applicant has discharged the burden of proof regarding the Other Accounts Amount. To the extent that any such evidence is said to be relevant to the evasion and penalty issues, I would not allow it for the same reasons set out below in relation to paragraphs [117]-[128].

SHOULD THE PROPOSED EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE EVASION AND PENALTIES ISSUES BE PERMITTED? (PARAGRAPHS [117]-[128])

1. In relation to whether further evidence should be permitted in respect of the evasion and penalty issues, Colvin J stated:

7. It is also said that [the applicant] should be given an opportunity to adduce further evidence relevant to the fraud or evasion issue and the penalties issue. As to this aspect, [the applicant] relies upon the demonstration of factual error which was not ultimately found to be an error of law. It is said that the relevant findings were fairly emphatic criticisms founded on an entirely false premise. In effect, as a matter of fairness, it is said that [the applicant] should have an opportunity to adduce further evidence by way of explanation and context for these omissions. These matters appear to support evidence as to that aspect. > > 8. However, the Tribunal will be in a better position to form a view as to whether it would be fair or appropriate to adduce additional evidence as to these two aspects. It was not suggested that there should be a general opportunity to adduce further evidence.[13] > > (Emphases added.)

2. The "factual error which was not ultimately found to be an error of law" appears to reference the AAT's erroneous conclusion that one of the components of the $1,000,000 Gucce loan amount comprised interest and, from that erroneous foundation, made observations regarding the improbability of the capital and interest amounting to precisely $1,000,000.
3. It is not clear on the face of the judgment which "omissions" his Honour had in mind when referencing the submission that the applicant "should have an opportunity to adduce further evidence by way of explanation and context for these omissions". That is, whether, as the Commissioner submitted, his Honour was referring only to omissions relating to the Other Accounts Amount or also encompassing the Investec and Gucce loan amounts.
4. Aside from the interest issue, the AAT's criticism also included an erroneous statement that there was, in respect of the Other Accounts Amount, little more than the applicant's assertion that the funds were not used for her benefit, whereas the evidence in fact included bank statements and other documents annexed to the First Affidavit.[14]
5. The Commissioner submitted that the "omissions" could only be those related to the Other Accounts Amount. For two reasons, I do not accept that submission. First, it would be curious to brand as "omissions" from the applicant's returns amounts which were to be remitted for determination of whether the amounts should have been returned as income. Secondly, reference to the applicant's written submissions in relation to the orders to be made by the Court, which his Honour referenced, suggests his Honour's reference to the submissions regarding context for the omissions were not confined to the Other Accounts Amount.[15]
6. Aside from the Investec and Gucce loan issues already mentioned, the applicant seeks to adduce new evidence regarding the process involved in the preparation of her income tax returns and her interaction with and reliance upon her accountant; her belief regarding the accuracy of her returns; and the documents made available to the Commissioner during the relevant audits.
7. It is common for taxation cases to be conducted on the footing that the taxpayer denies the primary tax liability but, if unsuccessful in that regard, provides evidence and submissions regarding associated penalties, such as the engagement and reliance upon a tax agent's services. Exceptionally, the Tribunal may deliver a decision regarding the primary tax liability and then invite the parties to make submissions regarding the appropriate penalty decision. The applicant will have that opportunity in this case. It is not generally the practice of the Tribunal to invite parties to put on further evidence regarding penalty issues after deciding the primary tax issues.
8. I accept that the AAT member's erroneous conclusion that part of the Gucce loan amount included an unlikely interest component and erroneous conclusion that the applicant's case in respect of the Other Accounts Amount was based on mere assertions, and inferences drawn from those conclusions and associated criticisms, may have infected the member's consideration of the evasion and penalty issues. However, it does not follow that the applicant should necessarily be permitted to adduce a range of new evidence that could have been, but was not, adduced before the AAT. This Tribunal as part of the remittal will be required to consider the evidence relevant to those issues itself and reach its own conclusion. The AAT's errors make that necessary. They do not make the case for giving the applicant the opportunity to revisit and improve upon the evidence that could have been adduced before the AAT.
9. On the other hand, the Tribunal will be called upon to make findings regarding whether the applicant has discharged the burden of proving she has not engaged in blameworthy conduct - relevant to the evasion issue - or that her tax shortfalls were not the result of intentional disregard of the law, recklessness or lack of reasonable care - relevant to penalty issues (along with associated considerations in relation to remission of any penalty). The AAT member who decided the AAT proceedings is not a member of this Tribunal. Therefore, the Tribunal necessarily will be differently constituted. Accordingly, if no further evidence is allowed, the Tribunal will be required to make findings on these significant issues without the benefit of hearing directly from the applicant.
10. This gives rise to a dilemma that requires careful balancing of competing considerations. On the one hand, as indicated, if new evidence is not allowed, the Tribunal will be making important judgements without hearing from the applicant directly. On the other hand, allowing further evidence is particularly problematic given the difficulties in allowing evidence regarding the Investec and Gucce loan amounts that would be quite inconsistent with the AAT's undisturbed findings.
11. Additionally, the Commissioner potentially would be prejudiced if new evidence regarding the applicant's interactions with her accountant were to be allowed. The Commissioner's solicitor gave uncontested evidence by affidavit that, if the applicant had sought to adduce before the AAT the new evidence regarding her interactions with the accountant, the Commissioner would have sought to compel production of documents and the attendance of the accountant at the hearing.[16] Mr Dziubinski offered that, if the Commissioner held a concern about procedural fairness in this regard, the applicant would consent to an adjournment. However, that would further delay finalisation of this dispute and would not meet the difficulty of the degradation of the potential value of any evidence that might now be given by the further passage of time since the AAT hearing when the evidence could have been adduced.
12. In considering this matter, I have inquired of the Tribunal's staff and been assured that video recordings of the AAT hearing are available and functioning. Therefore, if urged to do so by the applicant, it would be open to the Tribunal to view and listen to identified parts of the evidence before the AAT.[17]
13. Balancing all of these factors, and in particular having regard to the difficulties with evidence traversing the Investec and Gucce loan amount issues; the potential for prejudice to the Commissioner in respect of new evidence; the opportunity the applicant has already had to put her case; and the desirability of bringing the proceedings to a conclusion as soon as reasonably possible in a way that ensures the applicant has had a reasonable opportunity to present her case, I have concluded that the preferable course is not to permit the proposed new evidence regarding the evasion and penalty issues.
14. It follows that none of the evidence contained in the remitter affidavit and TMB-4 may be relied upon in the remittal hearing.

1. The applicant has exercised her right to a private hearing. The Tribunal is therefore required to ensure that, as far as practicable, its reasons do not reveal her identity.[18] There are obvious practical impediments to avoiding identification of the applicant when it is necessary to reference Federal Court proceedings in which she is identified. Nevertheless, I will give the applicant a short period to make any submissions in that regard before these reasons are published in the usual way.

[1] There is also a special assessment in respect of the 2016 income year. The AAT affirmed the Commissioner's objection decision in respect of that assessment. That matter is no longer in contention. The evidence sought to be adduced in the remittal is concerned only with the 2009-2011 income years.

[3] Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), s 170(1), item 5.

[4] Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), s 14ZZK.

[6] There were some 230 properties included in the Commissioner's original calculation of unexplained wealth, but by the time of the AAT proceedings the Commissioner had conceded that all but eight properties should not be included in the calculations as they were not beneficially owned by the applicant: Bazzo, [22].

[10] Denver Chemical Manufacturing Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [1949] HCA 25; (1949) 79 CLR 296, 313.

[15] Application Book for Interlocutory Hearing, 3977, [8].

[16] Application Book for Interlocutory Hearing, 3907.

[17] Although not ideal, it would not be the first time a tribunal had relied upon a video recording of evidence heard by another tribunal member: Jarvis-Lavery and Commissioner of Taxation [2019] AATA 5409; Jarvis-Lavery v Commissioner of Taxation [2023] FCA 1382.

[18] Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), ss 14ZZE, 14ZZJ.