Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force v Herth

Australian Trades Pty Ltd v Secretary Dept of Customer Service [2025] NSWCATAP 325

Bentran Pty Ltd v Sabbarton [2014] NSWCATAP 37

Eyres v Butt [1986] 2 Qd R 243

NSW Bar Association v Stevens [2003] NSWCA 95

PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (2012) 247 CLR 240; [2012] HCA 33

Western Australian Planning Commission v Southregal Pty Ltd [2017] HCA 7; (2017) 259 CLR 106

Wojciechowska v Commissioner of Police [2020] NSWCATAP 173

Second reading speech to the Terrorism and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2025, Legislative Assembly Hansard, 22 December 2025, page 12

Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force (Appellant)

[2025] NSWCATAD 303

1. The appellant (the Commissioner) revoked Mr Herth's firearms licence. The Tribunal set aside that decision. The Commissioner has appealed from the Tribunal's decision and has applied for a stay of that decision.
2. After the appeal was lodged, the firearms legislation was amended to remove a person's entitlement to apply to the Tribunal for review of firearms decisions. An issue arose as to whether the Appeal Panel has jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal.
3. I am satisfied that the amending legislation did not affect the Commissioner's appeal rights and that the Appeal Panel has jurisdiction in this appeal.
4. I have decided not to grant a stay of the Tribunal's decision for the reasons which follow.

1. Mr Herth is a cattle farmer who needs firearms to protect his livestock from feral animals and to put down any injured cattle. Allegations of domestic violence have been made against Mr Herth, as well as allegations of violence towards a neighbour. He has also been rude and aggressive towards police attending his premises.
2. The Commissioner contended, at first instance, that it was not in the public interest for Mr Herth to hold a firearms licence.
3. The Tribunal was not satisfied that it was contrary to the public interest for Mr Herth to hold a firearms licence and noted that he had never shown a disregard for the regulatory scheme aimed at ensuring public safety. In those circumstances, the Tribunal was satisfied that there was virtually no risk to the community presented by Mr Herth's possession of firearms and set aside the Commissioner's decision.
4. The Commissioner appealed from the Tribunal's decision on six grounds of appeal, all said to identify errors of law. These include:

(1) misconstruing or misapplying s 63 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 by setting aside the Commissioner's decision in circumstances where the Tribunal had concluded some action was warranted in respect of Mr Herth's firearms licence;

(2) finding that the period during which Mr Herth's licence was suspended or revoked would have focused his mind on his firearms obligations, in circumstances where there was no evidence to that effect and no submissions had been made in relation to such a finding;

(3) misconstruing or misapplying ss 3 and 24(2)(a) of the Firearms Act 1996 and cl 20(1)(a) of the Firearms Regulation 2017; and

(4) giving certain evidence no weight because the witness was not called to give evidence or made available for cross-examination, in circumstances where the witness was not required for cross-examination.

1. The Commissioner also applied for a stay of the Tribunal's decision.
2. On 20 January 2026, the Appeal Panel listed the appeal for an interlocutory hearing to determine:

(1) Whether the Appeal Panel should dismiss the appeal under s 55(1)(b) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NCAT Act) by reason of amendments to the Firearms Act;

(2) If not, whether the Appeal Panel should grant the Commissioner's application for a stay.

1. On 14 December 2025, two gunmen shot fifteen people at Bondi during a celebration of the Jewish holiday of Hanukkah. Following that incident, the legislature passed the Terrorism and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2025 (the Amendment Act).
2. The Amendment Act commenced on 24 December 2025. It removed the Tribunal's jurisdiction to administratively review most decisions of the Commissioner concerning firearms, including a decision to revoke a person's firearms licence. It also provided that certain applications in relation to firearms licences were taken to have been withdrawn.
3. In the second reading speech to the Terrorism and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2025 (Legislative Assembly Hansard, 22 December 2025, p 12), the Minister for Police and Counter-terrorism, Minister Catley, said:

The bill acts decisively to improve public safety by amending the Firearms Act 1996. It will limit the overall number of firearms that an individual can possess and use; further restrict the types of firearms that people can possess and use; strengthen the firearms licence and permit application and renewal process, including through more frequent licence renewals and by removing barriers to the use of criminal intelligence in determining licence and permit applications; and enhance the operation of approved clubs and shooting ranges. The reforms in the bill deliver on several of the National Cabinet's commitments to strengthen gun laws across Australia in response to the Bondi terrorist attack and previously unactioned recommendations from the Edwards coronial inquiry and the Audit Office of New South Wales. If passed, the provisions of the bill which amend the Firearms Act 1996 and Firearms Regulation 2017 will largely commence on proclamation.

1. Minister Catley also referred in that speech to limiting the Tribunal's powers to review firearms decisions. She said:

The bill makes amendments to limit the types of decisions made under the Firearms Act that a person can seek to have reviewed by the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal [NCAT]. These changes will commence immediately upon assent. Currently, a person may apply to NCAT for an external review of decisions set out in section 75 of the Act. This includes various decisions related to licensing, permits and firearms registration. Under new section 75A, a person will only be able to apply to the NSW Police Force for an internal review of most of these decisions and will not be able to apply to NCAT for an external review. The NSW Police Force recognises that procedural fairness is an important component of administrative decision-making and will ensure there is and continues to be a robust internal review process. The Government gives its assurance to stakeholders that we will carefully design this internal review process to ensure it is fair and just.

Section 3 of the Act clearly provides that firearm possession and use is a privilege that is conditional on the overriding need to ensure public safety. The current review process has, at times, inhibited the NSW Police Force from using criminal intelligence in firearms-related administrative decisions, which is not in the interest of public safety. This is due to the NSW Police Force being unable to share intelligence information from other agencies to an external body like NCAT. For this reason, it is appropriate to remove the right to an external review by NCAT. Notwithstanding the above, importantly, I must note that the bill does preserve existing review arrangements for decisions regarding firearms prohibition orders as set out in new section 75. Retaining the NCAT external review pathway for certain decisions regarding firearms prohibition orders reflects the settings of these orders, including that these orders are made by the NSW Police Force and have no expiry.

1. The Amendment Act inserted a new Part 13 of Schedule 3 to the Firearms Act. Clause 44 of Schedule 3 (within Part 13) provides:

44 Review rights for certain other decisions

(1) An application to the Civil and Administrative Tribunal under Part 8 in relation to a relevant decision made, but not finally determined, before the commencement is taken to have been withdrawn by the person who made the application.

(2) In this clause -

commencement means the commencement of this clause.

relevant decision means a decision other than a decision to make a firearms prohibition order against a person.

1. There is no dispute that the decision to revoke Mr Herth's firearms licence is a "relevant decision" or that his application to the Tribunal was made before "the commencement" of clause 44.
2. The parties both accepted that the Appeal Panel has jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal. Nevertheless, the Appeal Panel must satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction, as the parties cannot confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal by consent (see, for example, Eyres v Butt [1986] 2 Qd R 243; Wojciechowska v Commissioner of Police [2020] NSWCATAP 173 at [68]; PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (2012) 247 CLR 240; [2012] HCA 33 at [16]).
3. In support of his submission that the Appeal Panel has jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal, the Commissioner submitted that it was not the Commissioner that is the subject of clause 44; it is the respondent who made the application to the Tribunal. Secondly, the Commissioner submitted that it would be contrary to the purpose of the Amendment Act to prevent the Commissioner from challenging the suitability of a person for a licence, as this would not be conducive to minimising risk.
4. It may be accepted that the Commissioner did not apply to the Tribunal, such that there is no application by the Commissioner which is taken to have been withdrawn by clause 44. However, if Mr Herth's application was not "finally determined" when the Amendment Act commenced, the effect of clause 44 would be that his application would be taken to have been withdrawn and the Appeal Panel would have no jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal. Accordingly, the circumstance that the appellant is the Commissioner is not relevant to the question of whether the Appeal Panel has jurisdiction.
5. The Commissioner's argument that it would be contrary to the purpose of the Amendment Act to preclude an appeal by the Commissioner from a decision of the Tribunal is not persuasive for similar reasons. I accept that the extrinsic materials indicate that the purpose of removing a person's entitlement to apply to the Tribunal for external review of a firearms decision was connected to minimising risk. However, the question of whether an applicant's application to the Tribunal is taken to have been withdrawn, by operation of clause 44, would have the same answer irrespective of which party was appealing. In other words, if an applicant's application to the Tribunal was not "finally determined" after the Tribunal had made a decision at first instance, neither party would have a right of appeal. In both cases, the application would be taken to have been withdrawn.
6. The parties did not address the issue of whether Mr Herth's application to the Tribunal was "finally determined" in their submissions. That is the critical question when deciding whether the Appeal Panel has jurisdiction to determine the appeal.

Was Mr Herth's application to the Tribunal "finally determined" when the Amendment Act commenced?

1. The Firearms Act does not contain a definition of the words "finally determined." There are several possible constructions of the words as they appear in clause 44 of Schedule 3 to the Firearms Act. They could refer to a final determination of an application at first instance (that is, the Tribunal deciding to affirm, vary or set aside the respondent's decision). Another possibility is that an application is not "finally determined" until the period in which a party is entitled to appeal has passed without a person lodging an appeal, and/or until any appeal which has been lodged has been determined.
2. The reference in clause 44 to an "application ... under Part 8" being finally determined gives support to the conclusion that a decision at first instance finally determines such an application. That is because, before the Amendment Act commenced, s 75 of the Firearms Act, within Part 8, conferred a right to apply to the Tribunal for an administrative review of the category of decisions now referred to in clause 44 as "relevant decisions." A right to appeal to the Appeal Panel, on the other hand, is conferred by s 80(1) of the NCAT Act.
3. On the other hand, the word "finally" could be thought to be superfluous if the first construction were to be preferred. The application has been "determined" when the Tribunal has made its decision to affirm, vary or set aside the decision under review. It could be argued that the application to the Tribunal remains open to redetermination until any appeal has been finalised (at which point the application is "finally determined"). That is because the Appeal Panel has power to confirm, affirm, vary, quash or set aside the decision under review and, if it sets it aside, it may substitute another decision for the decision under review (NCAT Act, s 81(1)). When doing so, it may exercise any of the functions conferred on the Tribunal at first instance (NCAT Act, s 81(2)). In other words, on one construction of the legislation, the application for review under Part 8 continues to have some legal status, even if dismissed by the Tribunal at first instance, until it is "finally determined" by a decision of the Appeal Panel in the event of an appeal.
4. There is no guidance in the Firearms Act as to the meaning of the words "finally determined."
5. Those words are, however, used in the NCAT Act, albeit in different contexts.
6. Section 11 of the NCAT Act provides for the appointment to NCAT of occasional members. Subsections 5 and 6 of s 11 provide:

(5) A person who is appointed as an occasional member holds office as such until the proceedings in relation to which the member has been appointed as an occasional member have been finally determined, unless the person sooner vacates office.

(6) The proceedings in relation to which an occasional member has been appointed as an occasional member are not finally determined for the purposes of subsection (5) until -

(a) the proceedings are withdrawn by a party before the substantial merits of the proceedings are considered by the Tribunal, or

(b) the proceedings are dismissed by the Tribunal (as constituted by or with the member) before the substantial merits of the proceedings are considered by the Tribunal (including, where required, the giving of reasons for the dismissal and the determination of costs), or

(c) the Tribunal (as constituted by or with the member) has completed all the processes necessary to decide the substantial merits of the proceedings (including, where required, the giving of reasons for the decision and the determination of costs),

1. As can be seen, s 11(6) of the NCAT Act effectively provides a definition of proceedings which have been "finally determined," which may occur at the time of the Tribunal's final decision. It does not factor in time for an appeal period to expire.
2. Savings and transitional provisions in the NCAT Act take a different approach. They provide for the transition of pending proceedings in other tribunals, before those tribunals were abolished and their jurisdictions transferred to NCAT on its establishment.
3. Provision is made for the transfer of "part-heard proceedings" in existing tribunals to NCAT (NCAT Act, Sch 1, cl 7(2)). The term "part-heard proceedings" is defined, for the purposes of Division 3 of Sch 1 to the NCAT Act, as a subcategory of "pending proceedings" (NCAT Act, Sch 1, cl 6(1)). The term "pending proceedings" is defined (NCAT Act, Sch 1, cl 6), for the purposes of Division 3 of Sch 1 to the NCAT Act to mean:

pending proceedings are proceedings (including appeals) that -

(a) were instituted or commenced before the establishment day, and

(b) have not been finally determined before that day by the court or existing tribunal in which the proceedings were instituted or commenced.

1. Clause 2(3) of Sch 1 to the NCAT Act, in Part 2 of Sch 1, provides for when proceedings are not finally determined as follows:

(3) For the purposes of this Part (except clause 5), proceedings are not finally determined if -

(a) any period for bringing an appeal as of right in respect of the proceedings has not expired (ignoring any period that may be available by way of extension of time to appeal), or

(b) any appeal in respect of the proceedings is pending (whether or not it is an appeal brought as of right).

1. It may be seen that the legislature has expressly provided that the final determination of proceedings does not occur until an appeal period has expired and any appeal which is pending has been determined.
2. The different definitions of the term "finally determined" in the NCAT Act are not determinative of the meaning of that expression in the Firearms Act. However, they illustrate a number of matters.
3. First, the term "finally determined" is used in s 11 of the NCAT Act to describe the determination of a matter at first instance, such that if the word "finally" is superfluous, the legislature has used it anyway. This is consistent with the observations of Kiefel and Bell JJ in Western Australian Planning Commission v Southregal Pty Ltd [2017] HCA 7; (2017) 259 CLR 106 at [55]:

[W]hilst it must be accepted that words chosen by the legislature should be given meaning and endeavours should be made to avoid them being seen as redundant, they should not be given a strained meaning, one at odds with the scheme of the statute. Moreover, it has been recognised more than once that Parliament is sometimes guilty of 'surplusage' or even 'tautology'. The possibility that Parliament may not have appreciated that the reference in [legislation] was not necessary, and was liable to confuse, is not a reason for giving it a literal interpretation.

1. Secondly, where the legislature has chosen to define the term "finally determined" by reference to an appeal period in the NCAT Act, it has been necessary to make express provision for this. Without such provision, questions would arise as to whether a matter was finally determined when the appeal period had expired but an extension of time for an appeal could still be granted; whether, if not, a matter would be finally determined at the end of an appeal period, then would again become not finally determined if an extension of time to appeal was granted; and so on. It is unlikely that the legislature would leave these questions unanswered if it intended the final determination of a matter to depend upon appeal rights.
2. Further, the legislature has made no provision for how the Tribunal's orders should be dealt with in circumstances where the Tribunal had made orders favourable to an applicant when determining an application for administrative review, but the appeal period had not expired at the commencement of clause 44 of Schedule 3 to the Firearms Act. It would be expected that, if the legislature intended the words "not finally determined" to apply to an application determined by the Tribunal, where the appeal period had not expired, the legislature would have made some provision for the mechanism by which the Tribunal's orders would cease to have effect, as a result of the statutory withdrawal of the application. There is no such provision in the Firearms Act.
3. Finally, notwithstanding my comments at paragraph 24 above, the phrase "finally determined" accurately describes the Tribunal's act in making final orders when reviewing a firearms decision, even though different orders may be made on appeal. Any orders on appeal which affected the decision under review at first instance (for example, by varying it) would be made pursuant to ss 80 and 81 of the NCAT Act. They are not made in the course of determining the application for review, but rather in the course of determining an appeal. The application to NCAT "under Part 8 [of the Firearms Act] in relation to a relevant decision" is therefore "finally determined" when the Tribunal makes a decision as to whether to affirm it, vary it, or set it aside under s 63 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act, even though it is open to the Appeal Panel to vary the decision exercising powers under Part 6 of the NCAT Act.
4. For these reasons, I consider that the better construction of the words "finally determined" in clause 44 is that they mean that the Tribunal has made an order determining the administrative review application, or that the proceedings are otherwise determined because they have been withdrawn or dismissed. Accordingly, Mr Herth's application to the Tribunal under Part 8 of the Firearms Act was "finally determined" when the Tribunal set aside the Commissioner's decision to revoke his firearms licence in early December 2025, and clause 44 does not apply to that application.
5. The appeal is not moot, because a possible outcome is that the Appeal Panel will uphold the appeal and affirm the decision to revoke Mr Herth's firearms licence (NCAT Act, ss 80(3) and 81(1), (2)).
6. It follows that the Appeal Panel has jurisdiction to hear and determine the Commissioner's appeal.

1. It remains to consider the Commissioner's application for a stay of the Tribunal's decision to set aside the Commissioner's decision to revoke Mr Herth's firearms licence.
2. The Commissioner provided written submissions in support of the stay application, as well as a "court book" and a reply bundle, filed the day before the stay hearing. The reply bundle contained some material which was not before the Tribunal at first instance, which the Commissioner sought to rely upon in relation to the stay application but not in relation to the substantive appeal.
3. Mr Herth provided written submissions opposing the stay application.
4. Section 43(2) of the NCAT Act provides that an appeal does not affect the operation of the decision to which it relates, unless the Tribunal makes an order staying or otherwise affecting the operation of that decision. Section 43(3) provides as follows:

(3) The Tribunal may make such orders (whether with or without conditions) staying or otherwise affecting the operation of a decision to which a pending general application or appeal relates as it considers appropriate to secure the effectiveness of the determination of the application or appeal.

1. Previous Appeal Panels have summarised the relevant principles when deciding whether to grant a stay as follows (see Bentran Pty Ltd v Sabbarton [2014] NSWCATAP 37 at [9]; Australian Trades Pty Ltd v Secretary Dept of Customer Service [2025] NSWCATAP 325 at [50]):

(1) Generally a successful party is entitled to the benefit of the decision or orders that the party has obtained at first instance, but a stay may be granted where the appellant has demonstrated an appropriate case to warrant the exercise of discretion in its favour.

(2) In practical effect the onus is on an applicant for a stay to make out a case that it is appropriate for the court to make such an order.

(3) The mere lodgment of the notice of appeal is insufficient, of itself, to demonstrate that it is an appropriate case to warrant the granting of a stay.

(4) An order staying the operation of a decision or orders will generally be appropriate where such an order is reasonably necessary to secure the effectiveness of the appeal. This is similar to, if not the same as, the considerations applied by the Courts that where there is a risk that an appeal will prove abortive if the appellant succeeds and a stay is not granted or where unless a stay is granted an appeal will be rendered nugatory, the discretion should generally be exercised in favour of granting a stay.

(5) The Tribunal may also take into account the strength or otherwise of the case of the party seeking the stay. This consideration may be particularly relevant when it is plain that an appeal, which does not require leave, has been lodged without any real prospects of success and simply in the hope of gaining a respite against immediate execution of the decision.

(6) The Tribunal's power to grant a stay includes a power to make such an order subject to such conditions as the Tribunal specifies.

(7) In exercising the discretion the Tribunal will also weigh the balance of convenience and the competing rights of the parties and may impose appropriate conditions so as to achieve a result that is fair to all parties.

(8) Finally, the overriding principle in an application for a stay is to ask what the interests of justice require. (citations omitted)

1. It may be relevant to consider the public interest when determining whether to grant a stay under legislation with an underlying principle of improving public safety (Firearms Act, s 3(b)). The Firearms Act plainly is a law designed to protect the public.
2. In Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1996] HCA 3; (1996) 134 ALR 460 (Bryant) at 464, Kirby J observed:

In the exercise of the jurisdiction to provide a stay, it has often been emphasised that cases involving a stay of the operation of the criminal law or of laws designed to protect the public (eg deregistration of a professional lawyer or medical practitioner) are in a class different from cases involving no more than the suspension of the operation of orders affecting two private litigants only. (footnote omitted)

1. To similar effect, Spigelman CJ observed, in the context of an application for a stay in disciplinary proceedings, that "the protection of the public is a matter entitled to significant weight on an application for a stay once it appears that a professional person has acted improperly to a substantial degree" (NSW Bar Association v Stevens [2003] NSWCA 95 at [91]).
2. An "appropriate case" for a stay is often shown by demonstrating that there are arguable grounds for an appeal and irremediable prejudice to the appellant if a stay is not granted (Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd (Receivers Appointed) (1985) 2 NSWLR 685; Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak; Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Najem (No.2) [2009] NSWCA 130 at [2]).
3. I am required to consider whether the appeal has arguable grounds on the basis of "judicial impression" (or, in the present context, "tribunal member impression") (Bryant at 463). I am satisfied, from consideration of the appeal grounds and from the Commissioner's submissions, that the Commissioner has arguable grounds of appeal. It was not seriously contended otherwise, even though Mr Madden submitted that the Commissioner's grounds were not strong.
4. The second issue is whether a stay "is appropriate to secure the effectiveness of the determination of the ... appeal" within s 43(3) of the NCAT Act. Mr Madden conceded on behalf of the Commissioner that a stay was not necessary to avoid rendering the appeal nugatory, but submitted that when the decision in question concerns public safety, the risk posed by Mr Herth is a factor to be given significant weight.
5. As Mr Hanton submitted for Mr Herth, the effectiveness of the determination of the appeal does not depend upon whether a stay is granted. If a stay were not granted, and Mr Herth's firearms licence were returned to him before the hearing of the appeal, any orders made by the Appeal Panel if it allowed the appeal would be effective. It would simply be a matter of Mr Herth having to surrender his licence at that point. The Commissioner has not discharged his onus of demonstrating that the determination of the appeal would be any less effective if a stay were not granted.
6. That is determinative of the application for a stay. The Appeal Panel only has power "make such orders ... as it considers appropriate to secure the effectiveness of the determination of the ... appeal." I do not consider that the stay order sought would secure the effectiveness of the determination of the appeal or have any significant bearing on such effectiveness. In such circumstances, I do not have power to make the order sought.
7. I will, however, deal briefly with other matters put forward by Mr Madden in support of the Commissioner's application for a stay.
8. As indicated above, the Commissioner sought to rely upon material not before the Tribunal at first instance, in support of his stay application. This comprised an email from Mr Herth's solicitor to the Commissioner's solicitor dated 11 December 2025, stating that Mr Herth was not aware that he had to hand his licence in to police, but that Mr Herth would do so the following day. The Commissioner also sought to rely upon a "COPS event" (a police record) indicating that Mr Herth surrendered his licence on 13 December 2025, with accompanying photographs of the surrendered licence card.
9. Mr Madden submitted that the relevance of this evidence is that it shows Mr Herth was not aware of his obligations to police, contrary to the Tribunal's remark that he had had time to focus his mind on his obligations to the Commissioner. Mr Madden said the evidence went to the strength of the appeal, and to the public interest.
10. I have decided not to admit this evidence. It was submitted in reply, when it was available to the Commissioner at the time his primary evidence was filed. It is not properly characterised as being responsive to Mr Herth's submissions, and prejudices Mr Herth as he has not been given an opportunity to file evidence in reply. Secondly, as Mr Hanlon submitted, the relevance of the evidence is low. Mr Herth's lack of awareness that he had to hand his licence in, despite having been informed of this several times, may suggest that he is not sufficiently aware of his obligations under the Firearms Act; but it does not establish that he would pose a risk to public safety if a stay were not granted, particularly in circumstances where it is not alleged that he has ever acted unsafely with a firearm in the decades in which he has held a firearms licence.
11. If am wrong and the evidence should be admitted, it would not change my decision in any event, for the reasons given above.
12. I accept that the authorities of Bryant and NSW Bar Association v Stevens permit, or in some circumstances require, the consideration of the public interest when granting a stay, in the contexts relevant in those cases. Here, however, the Commissioner has not explained how the public interest is relevant to considering whether a stay is "appropriate to secure the effectiveness of the determination of the ... appeal". The public interest would be relevant to the Appeal Panel's discretion to grant a stay if it were satisfied that a stay was appropriate to secure the effectiveness of the determination of the appeal.
13. For these reasons, I have decided to dismiss the Commissioner's application for a stay. I have, however, timetabled the appeal to a hearing, so that it may be determined expeditiously.

1. On 20 February 2026, I made the following orders:

(1) The Appellant's Application for a Stay is dismissed.

(2) The Respondent is to lodge with the Appeal Registry and give to the Appellant a copy of the Reply to Appeal by 27 February 2026.

(3) The Appellant is to lodge with the Appeal Registry and give to the Respondent by 20 March 2026:

(a) All the evidence given to the Tribunal at first instance on which it is intended to rely;

(b) Any evidence not provided to the Tribunal at first instance in making the decision under appeal, on which it is intended to seek leave to rely;

(c) The Appellant's written submissions in support of the appeal; and

(d) If oral reasons were given and/or what happened at the hearing at first instance is being relied on by the Appellant in the appeal, a typed transcript of the relevant parts of the hearing, together with the sound recording of the entire hearing.

(4) The Respondent is to lodge with the Appeal Registry and give to the Appellant by 10 April 2026:

(a) All the evidence provided to the Tribunal at first instance on which it is intended to rely;

(b) Any evidence not provided to the Tribunal at first instance in making the decision under appeal, on which it is intended to seek leave to rely;

(c) The Respondent's written submissions in opposition to the appeal; and

(d) If oral reasons were given and/or what happened at the hearing at first instance is being relied on by the Respondent in the appeal, a typed transcript of the relevant parts of the hearing (except to the extent already provided by the Appellant), together with the sound recording of the entire hearing (unless already provided by the Appellant)

(5) The Appellant is to lodge with the Appeal Registry and give to the Respondent any written submissions in reply by 17 April 2026.

(6) The Appeal is listed for HEARING on 01 May 2026 at 2:15 PM in Sydney for a half day.

(7) The issue of whether the Appeal Panel should allow fresh evidence or evidence in addition to evidence received by the Tribunal at first instance is to be determined at the hearing of the appeal.

(8) Leave is given to the respondent and his legal representatives to attend the hearing by audio-visual link.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.