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The tenant must vacate the premises on or before 5 pm on Monday 29 June 2026.

…………Signed………… Senior Member J Francis REASONS FOR DECISION 1. The respondent, a 46-year-old man, is a tenant under a residential tenancy agreement with the lessor, the Commissioner of Social Housing 1 (Commissioner) at premises in the Australian Capital Territory (the premises). From 15 August 2025 to 21 June 2026, they were incarcerated at Alexander Machonichie Centre (AMC) for crimes to which they pleaded guilty (as well as serving out what was left of a 2023 sentence as a consequence of breach of a good behaviour order): ‘possess/use prohibited weapon; possess/sale/supply drug of dependence; traffic in controlled drug other than cannabis x 2 and possession etc of property suspected of being proceeds of crime’.

2. On 22 June 2026, (after the hearing and before this decision) the tenant was released on parole (the maximum sentence ends on 12 February 2027). I am unaware of where they are residing.

3. Because of the offending, the Commissioner applies for a termination and possession order under section 48(1)(a) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 2 (Residential Tenancies Act). They allege that the trafficking in a controlled drug was carried out at the premises which was a breach of standard residential 3 tenancy term 70(a) , which prohibits the use of premises for an illegal purpose.

4. The Commissioner also says that termination of the tenancy is, for the purposes of section 48(3)(b), justified. It was an egregious breach of the Commissioner’s trust. Drug trafficking does not just affect those involved. It presents a clear community safety risk. Their criminal history, admission to substance abuse since they were 13 years old and previous attempts to remain sober, cast significant doubt on the tenant’s capability to remain sober on release from AMC.

5. The tenant opposes the Commissioner’s application. They deny that the Tribunal has jurisdiction because they say that the notice to vacate is defective. It was not

1 The Commissioner for Social Housing is a statutory corporation established under section 9 of the Housing Assistance Act 2007. The Commissioner’s functions and obligations to its tenants have been the subject of a number of Tribunal decisions. See, for example, the discussion in Commissioner for Social Housing v Krutsky [2023] ACAT 55 at [4]. 2 Section 48 of the Residential Tenancies Act is set out in the Attachment 3 Standard residential tenancy term 70 is set out in the Attachment given to them in accordance with the requirements of standard residential tenancy 4 term 93. The notice to vacate was also not, as is required for a breach that is remediable, preceded by a notice to remedy.

6. The tenant also says that the Tribunal cannot be satisfied that the offence was conducted at the premises.

7. Finally, they say that termination is not justified. They have made considerable efforts to rehabilitate and, at this stage of their life, recognise the imperative of remaining clean. Their home, that they have known since 2013, is critical to their resolve.

Decision Summary

8. There is a great deal to be admired about how the tenant has applied themselves to rehabilitation during the period since they were sentenced. And their improved health and well-being outcomes are a welcome success. Those of us present at the Tribunal hearing were at one in wishing that their sobriety is maintained. The risk of homelessness for a middle-aged man who has only known substance abuse since they were 13 years old, and its possible consequences including recidivism, are considerable.

9. Whilst the tenant’s commitment to maintain their sobriety and the risk of homelessness are weighty considerations against termination, I am satisfied (for the reasons that follow) that the tenant has breached standard residential tenancy term 70(a) and that the termination of the tenancy is justified.

10. I am also not satisfied that the procedural matters the tenant raises as denying the tribunal’s jurisdiction are made out. The notice to vacate was given in accordance with the requirements of the Residential Tenancies Act. If the notice incorrectly stated the period from service by when the tenant must vacate the premises, the Tribunal may correct it. The breach was not remediable; a notice to remedy was not required.

4 Standard residential tenancy term 93 is set out in the Attachment

11. Accordingly, I have made a relevant order for termination and possession, suspended for three weeks.

Hearing

12. At the hearing, the Commissioner was represented by Ms Saikal-Skea of Counsel, instructed by Mr Van Arkel (ACT Government Solicitor), and Ms Luke, for the Commissioner. Ms Dun (Canberra Community Law) appeared with Ms Hegde for the tenant (with Ms Haddock in support). The Commissioner gave two sets of submissions, on 7 May 2026 and 5 June 2026. The tenant also gave two sets of submissions, on 5 May 2026 and 29 May 2026. Witness statements for Ms Bowles, director at the Commissioner (dated 19 March 2026), the tenant (dated 4 May 2026 and 29 May 2026) and their mother (dated 4 May 2026) were filed with the tribunal.

13. Ms Bowles and the tenant gave evidence and were cross examined. The tenant’s mother attended in support.

Circumstances of tenancy including 2020 and 2022 complaints from third parties

14. The tenant has resided at the relevant premises since 2013 when they first entered a tenancy agreement. The tenancy is currently periodic. I thought I understood that the tenant moved there after their relationship with the mother of their children broke down but I see that the co-tenants include them and a child. There is no outstanding rental arrears.

15. The Commissioner also referred to complaints that had been made to Members of the Legislative Assembly on behalf of residents in the same street as the premises about suspected illegal activity in the street. After recording the occasions when complaints had earlier been made about the premises, a November 2020 letter to the Minister for Police from the Member for Brindabella said: “Residents in this area have become fearful about their neighbourhood’s safety given the amount of illegal activity taking place.” A December 2022 letter to the Minister for Housing from the Member for Brindabella, after noting a constituent’s suspicions that drug dealing was taking place at the premises, recorded: “My constituent is very concerned about the potential safety threat to residents, including children, from what they believe to be illegal drug activity in the street.”

Circumstances leading to the application for the termination and possession order

16. On 6 November 2025, the Commissioner gave the tenant a notice to vacate dated the same date, by hand delivery to their nominated address for service. The Commissioner also sent it by prepaid post to that address. The tenant’s case manager also gave them a copy of the notice on 12 or 13 November 2025. The required vacancy date was 2 December 2025.

17. The basis of the notice to vacate was that the tenant had breached standard residential tenancy term 70(a).

18. On 15 July 2025, the Australian Federal Police secured a warrant under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) to intercept and access telecommunications data on the tenant’s mobile phone.

19. The Statement of Facts (SOF) prepared for the tenant’s conviction and sentence includes a record of the following conversations/text exchanges: (a) 16 July 2025 (around 10:32 pm) The caller, AC: I’m nearly at yours, can you do me a favour? Can I have a shot? But you got any ice you can give me? A 10 ml rock as well. Tenant: I am not sure what you’re talking about, but I’ll have a look. See you soon. AC: I don’t even know why I said that. (b) 17 July 2025 (around 11:11 am) Caller, KD: Oh hey darl, you at home at all babe? Tenant: Um yeah but I have to go see my lad, I’m just trying to get a hold of him he won’t answer just yet. KD: Oh ok. Tenant: Yeah I can probably do one or something like that. KD: You can do one? Yeah? All right I’ll come over now then. Tenant: All right. No worries. KD: All right I’ll see you in a minute. (c) 17 July 2025 (around 9.48 pm) Caller, AC: Bro, can you hear me? Oi you at home? Can you do me a shot for the morning? I’ll pick it up? Tenant: Yeah mate. AC: I’ll be there in like six minutes all right. I love ya Tenant: All right bruh. AC: I’ll message you when I’m out the front. Tenant: See you soon. (d) 31 July 2025 (around 3:18 pm) Caller, AC: I’m nearly at your house and um I gotta pick Shaun up at … Fyshwick at 2, so can you give me two, a couple like 2 points cuz Tenant: Ah yeah AC: I didn’t mean to say that, I’ll see you when I get there, I’ll be there in five minutes.

(e) 7 August 2025 (around 12:09 am): the tenant received a text message from MF: MF: hey bro can you give something to t for me and i’ll fix it up tomorrow I’ll bring the coin around. (f) 7 August 2025 (around 6:23 pm): the tenant received a text message from TW: TW: Hey bro how much did u say u gave me? I gave u 300 but there only a half g here and my mate not happy.

20. The SOF also records that the police observed people attend the residence for a period of about 15 minutes at a time.

21. On 13 August 2025, the police ‘raided’ the premises after having arrested the tenant at a traffic stop. No illicit drugs were located at the premises. However, the tenant was found with 28.5 grams of methylamphetamines and 27.8 grams of heroin. The former was nearly five times the trafficable quantity (six grams) and the latter was more than five times the trafficable quantity (five grams). They also had $860 in cash, alleged by the prosecution to be, and accepted by the tenant’s guilty plea as, proceeds of crime.

22. At the hearing the Commissioner put some focus on the street value of this quantity of methylamphetamines and heroin, but I have not found it necessary to take it into account.

23. The tenant was clear that they did not plead guilty to supplying in their own home.

24. The tenant also said that they supplied illicit substances to their friends who pooled their money together to allow the purchase. Any proceeds from the sales were used to buy more illicit substances for their personal use.

25. The tenant said that they had struggled with their mental health since they were about 13 years old. After a period of being ‘clean’ when their daughter was quite young, they “picked up drugs again’ because of the relationship breakdown with 5 their ex-partner”.

26. Whilst in prison they were prescribed an antidepressant and were supported in prison by a psychologist. Their type 2 diabetes is sufficiently under control that it is not presently necessary to take insulin. They said that they felt “a lot healthier 6 now and I want to make sure that I stay this way”.

27. On release from prison, they hoped to be admitted to a program at Karralika. I am unaware whether this materialised, but I understand that the Sentence Administration Board was supportive of them being released to Karralika. The tenant said that they understood that “once I am at Karralika they will work with me so I can decide when I am ready to go home and leave the residential part of 7 the program.”

28. The tenant professed that their home was “incredibly important to me remaining 8 clean” when they finish the residential rehabilitation program. They wrote in their witness statement: If I was to lose my property I wouldn’t have anywhere else to go. In the last five months I feel like I have finally started to get healthy and take some steps to address my drug use and mental health. If I was to be homeless or

5 Tenant’s witness statement dated 4 May 2026 at [17] 6 Tenant’s witness statement dated 4 May 2026 at [20] 7 Tenant’s witness statement dated 29 May 2026at [9] 8 Tenant’s witness statement dated 4 May 2026 at [22] end up in emergency accommodation, I think this would be the biggest back step possible. I need to make sure I have somewhere safe as that is the only 9 way I can ensure that I stay clean.’ I am finally doing well and if I was to end up in Ainslie Village or Havelock House I know I would probably just end up back using again and in 10 prison.

29. At the hearing, the tenant agreed with the Commissioner that they held a strong view that apart from the premises there was no other suitable accommodation option for them. Although their mother was supportive, living with them was not a practical option. They were also concerned that Justice Housing, a support program for people exiting prison including engaging with services to stable housing, would not be a helpful place to live. It would mean cohabiting with other persons who had exited AMC.

Consideration

30. As necessary and appropriate I refer to the parties’ submissions in the course of my consideration for each issue.

31. The first issue the tenant raised was the Tribunal’s want of jurisdiction because of the failure to comply with standard residential tenancy term 93: (a) the notice to vacate was not, as was required by standard residential tenancy term 93(a) (because the breach of standard residential tenancy term 70(a) was capable of remedy) preceded by a notice to remedy; and (b) by failing to correctly specify the date of vacant possession within ‘2 weeks after the date of service’ of the notice, the notice was not given as required by the Residential Tenancies Act and it is therefore, by section 59, expressly excluded from being remedied. Is the tenant’s alleged breach of standard residential tenancy term 70(a) capable of remedy so as to require a notice to remedy?

32. For the purposes of this discussion, it is appropriate to first set out my findings on the separate issue of whether the premises were used for the illegal purpose of drug trafficking.

9 Tenant’s witness statement dated 4 May 2026 at [25] 10 Tenant’s witness statement dated 4 May 2026 at [27] Use of the premises for an illegal purpose – section 48(3)(a) of the Residential Tenancies Act

33. As earlier noted, the tenant says that they did not plead guilty to ‘doing drugs at home’.

34. Nevertheless, I am satisfied that the tenant breached standard residential tenancy term 70(a), that the premises were used for an illegal purpose (drug trafficking). The SOF records that the police observed “people attend the residence for a period of about 15 minutes at a time”. There are five conversations/text exchanges from mid-July to August 2025 that refer to ‘yours’, to the tenant being ‘at home’ or being ‘nearly at your house’. The location of the premises is known. I understand that ‘a shot’, ‘ice’, being able ‘to do one’, ‘two points’ and ‘half a g’ are terminology used to describe quantities of controlled drugs. The callers/texters were engaged with the tenant to purchase the drugs.

35. There is a real connection between the use of the premises and the drug trafficking 11 for which the tenant was convicted. That when the police raided the premises (after detaining the tenant at a vehicle stop) they found no illicit drugs at the premises, does not upset my satisfaction. The callers were attending the premises to purchase drugs.

36. Returning then to the procedural issue raised, which is whether the tenant’s breach of standard residential tenancy term 70(a) is capable of remedy. In effect the inquiry is directed to determining whether it should have been the subject of a notice in accordance with standard residential tenancy term 93(a) requiring the tenant, within two weeks after the day of service, to remedy the breach.

37. The tenant’s contention that the breach could be remedied relied on the meaning of ‘remedy’ as a noun, ‘medicine that relieves or cures a disease or injury’, 12 referring to L Schuler AG v Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd (Schuler) in support. They acknowledge that the cure cannot remove the past effect or result of the disease before the cure took place. However, they say that the cure is in the tenant’s commitment, with proper supports, to change their behaviours to cease

11 Director of Housing v Tk [2010] VCAT 1839 12 [1974] AC 235, 249-250 drug use and thereby cease any use of the premises for an illegal purpose. In this way, the tenant’s breach of standard residential tenancy term 70(a) can be remedied. They said that this is ‘particularly pertinent’ for drug offences. The focus was on the opportunity for the tenant and the absence of persistent risk of liability for the lessor.

38. The tenant also referred to the decision of the Victorian Civil and Administrative 13 Tribunal in Homes Victoria v Mantzalas (Mantzalas) in which the Tribunal said that there was no evidence there that the relevant drug trafficking was continuing and therefore that it needs to be remedied.

39. I prefer, however, like the Commissioner, to apply Androvitsaneas v Members 14 First Broker Network Pty Ltd (Androvitsaneas) ; that the appropriate focus is on whether there is scope to ameliorate the effects of the breach. Specifically, the 15 Victorian Court of Appeal said: With respect, we agree that if the ability to remedy a breach of contract is not to be confined to erasing the historical fact of the breach itself (an ‘impossible task’) then to give the concept some practical content requires a focus on the potential for amelioration of the effects of that breach. Much will depend on the nature of the particular obligation breached, and the consequences of that breach in any given case. Variations of language in particular clauses might also require a different interpretation.

40. An aspect of the passage the tenant quoted from Schuler (but to which they did not draw attention) is instructive on what should be the focus – the nature of the obligation that is breached and its consequences: “[T]here are cases where it would seem a misuse of language to say that a breach can be remedied. For example, a breach of clause 14 by disclosure of confidential information could 16 not be said to be remedied by a promise not to do it again”. That obligation and the consequences of its breach so threaten the very capacity to continue to deliver on the contract that a promise of cessation of the offending behaviour is insufficient.

13 [2025] VCAT 293 at [75] 14 [2013] VSCA 212 15 Androvitsaneas at [69] 16 Schuler at 249-250

41. The tenant’s argument that cessation of the behaviour leading to the commission of the breach of standard residential tenancy term 70(a) would remedy it “betrays 17 a misconception of the nature of the breach”. Its nature is akin to which the Court referred to in Schuler, a disclosure of confidential information; it threatens the very contract as a residential tenancy.

42. Indeed, the effects of a breach of the kind alleged, trafficking drugs, are in no way addressed, much less remedied, by a commitment to cessation of behaviour. I accept the Commissioner’s contention that is in the nature of illicit drug dealing that it must be done where the dealer has control over their environment. The evidence of the five conversations/text exchanges, in particular, supports the conclusion that the premises were used, and were well known, as a place where persons could source drugs. It was not merely a scene of a crime, a passing connection. The premises aided the commission of the offence; they were central and essential to the commission of the offences.

43. The use of the premises for the illegal purpose of drug trafficking challenged the very performance of a residential tenancy agreement. Ms Bowles said that “trafficking activity in public housing undermines community trust in the Commissioner’s capacity to provide safe housing and to manage public housing 18 responsibly.” The effects on the negative perception of the premises, and, on whether the Commissioner is capable of managing them consistently with community safety, are so significant as to not be capable of remedy by the tenant’s promise of cessation.

44. As to the tenant’s reliance on Mantzalas, whilst appropriately considered by the Tribunal, I am not bound by it. Further, the Tribunal in Mantzalas was concerned with whether it was reasonable and proportionate to make a possession order under section 330A of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 (Vic) having regard to whether the relevant breach has been remedied. It is difficult to be sure, but it appears that the Tribunal assumed capability to remedy the drug trafficking breach. But it could have been, as the Commissioner contended, a focus on the

17 Androvitsaneas at [74] 18 Androvitsaneas at [20] activity of drug trafficking rather than its effect. Nevertheless, it does appear that not much, if any, consideration had been given to the question of capability to remedy the relevant breach. There was, for example, no discussion of the kind included in Androvitsaneas and the line of cases there considered, including Schuler. I am not persuaded that it assists to resolve the issue of whether the tenant’s breach is capable of remedy. I do not rely on Mantzalas.

45. Accordingly, I agree with the Commissioner that the tenant’s use of the premises for drug trafficking is not remediable. Standard residential tenancy term 93(b) applies and a notice of remedy was not required to precede the notice to vacate.

46. There is also no basis for the Tribunal to exercise the discretion in section 48(2)(a)(ii) to refuse to make a termination and possession order because the tenant has undertaken to remedy the breach within a reasonable period and is reasonably likely to do so.

Termination notice is not invalid; if date of vacant possession was incorrect, it is capable of Tribunal correction

47. First, I agree with the Commissioner that the termination notice was not invalid. It correctly specified the date of vacant possession as 2 December 2025, two weeks after it was given to the tenant by the Commissioner via pre-paid post. This is not affected by the earlier delivery personally to the tenant of the notice to vacate.

48. Nevertheless, even if there was a failure to correctly specify the date of vacant possession as within ‘2 weeks after the date of service’, that failure does not affect 19 the validity of the notice’s service.

49. Whether a notice is validly given in accordance with the Residential Tenancies Act is determined by whether it has been served in accordance with the means prescribed by regulation 5 of the Residential Tenancies Regulation 1998 (Residential Tenancies Regulation). Because the notice to vacate was delivered personally to the tenant as well as being sent by prepaid post to them at the

19 See section 250 of the Legislation Act 2001 and section 160 of the Evidence Act 2011 and also see Mohammadian v Samani & Anor (Residential Tenancies) [2021] ACAT 125, at [62] - [64] premises, it was served in accordance with regulation 5(a)(i) and (ii) respectively of the Residential Tenancies Regulation. It was given in accordance with requirements of the Residential Tenancies Act.

50. Accordingly, if the notice to vacate incorrectly specified the date of vacancy, a period that was not two weeks after the notice was given to the tenant, the Tribunal maintains its jurisdiction, under section 59(1)(b) of the Residential Tenancies Act, to make a correction to that date. It is a defective termination 20 notice given in accordance with this Act. The error of date by which vacant possession was required says nothing about whether the notice was given in accordance with the Residential Tenancies Act.

51. The Tribunal’s opportunity to make the correction is subject to the proviso that the notice ‘did not, and is not likely to, place the tenant in a significantly worse position than the tenant would have been had the notice not been a defective 21 termination notice.’ A date that falls on a date beyond the two-week period, being more generous to the tenant, would be capable of rectification. To suggest that a more generous period in which to vacate the premises is not consistent with the Residential Tenancies Act is counterintuitive.

52. I turn to address the issues that the tenant raises in support of their contention that the Tribunal should reject the Commissioner’s application for a termination and possession order because the use for the illegal purpose does not justify that order.

Use of the premises for the illegal purpose justifies termination of the tenancy – section 48(3)(b) of the Residential Tenancies Act

53. It is apparent from section 48(4) of the Residential Tenancies Act indicating three issues for the Tribunal to consider when considering whether the Tribunal is satisfied the circumstances in section 48(3) exist, that the use of the premises for an illegal purpose is a necessary but not sufficient consideration for whether the illegal use justifies termination.

20 See the meaning of ‘defective termination notice’ in the Dictionary 21 Residential Tenancies Act 1997 s 59(3)

54. The nature of the illegal use, previous illegal use and previous history of the 22 tenancy are all, as follows, relevant to that deliberation. 23 24

55. The explanatory statement to the Bill which inserted sections 48(3) and (4) into the Residential Tenancies Act explains that nature of the “illegal use may include, for example, the risk that the illegal use presents to others, the extent to which the illegal use damages the property, and the impact of the illegal use on the neighbours and the landlord”.

56. The history of the tenancy includes anything associated with the tenancy, including for example, that there is no rental arrears. The explanatory statement to the relevant Bill explains: “[T]he Tribunal might consider whether there were alternative remedies available to the landlord, whether the illegal use was more likely than not to cease, and the difficulties that would be faced by the tenant if 25 evicted. The report of the Standing Committee on Justice and Community Safety (Legislative Scrutiny Role) into that Bill also says, about the operation of sections 48(3) and (4): ‘This will allow the Tribunal to consider the circumstances of the illegal use and the impact on the tenant in considering whether it is 26 appropriate to terminate the tenancy’. 27

57. Finally, in Re Magistrate Raelene Natasha Johnston; Ex parte Wallam , the Supreme Court of Western Australia considered a similar, but not identical, provision of the Residential Tenancies Act 1987 (WA) saying (at [43]-[44]): The ordinary meaning of the word 'justify', according to the Macquarie Dictionary Online, is 'to show an act to be just, right or warranted', and according to the Oxford Dictionary Online, 'to show or prove that something is right or reasonable'. The Macquarie Dictionary suggests that the word 'justify' is used in a legal context to mean 'to show a satisfactory reason or excuse for something done'.

22 Residential Tenancies Act 1997 s 48(4) 23 Explanatory statement to the Residential Tenancies Amendment Bill 2019 24 Residential Tenancies Amendment Bill 2019 25 Explanatory statement to the Residential Tenancies Amendment Bill 2019 26 Standing Committee on Justice and Community Safety (Legislative Scrutiny Role), Scrutiny Report No 36 to the ACT Legislative Assembly (15 October 2019) page 5 <https://www.parliament.act.gov.au/\_\_data/assets/pdf\_file/0005/1431437/Report- 36.pdf> 27 [2017] WASC 226 Each of these ordinary meanings encompasses an element of reasonableness. A legal standard of reasonableness requires consideration of all of the relevant circumstances pertaining to the act, decision or conduct.

58. Justice Pritchard went on to say that it is necessary to consider the implications of terminating the tenancy agreement for the tenant alongside the circumstances of the relevant behaviour. This would include consideration of the tenant’s age, health and financial position and whether they were likely to experience difficulty in securing alternative accommodation. Whether termination is ‘justified’ also requires all other relevant circumstances to be taken into account.

59. The tenant also referred the Tribunal to the decision of the ACT Supreme Court 28 in Commissioner of Housing of the Australian Capital Territory v Nicole Smith 29 in which the Court observed at [30]: It follows that hardship to a tenant and leniency in respect of arrangements to remedy past breaches will obviously loom larger as relevant matters than would be the case in respect of a commercial letting.

60. That case is not entirely on point here because the observations were made about the Tribunal’s exercise of discretion to grant a termination and possession order where there were no express statutory factors for consideration. But it is a reminder, when turning to consider exercising the discretion generally, of the task before the Tribunal for a tenancy agreement of the Commissioner’s.

61. Turning then to consider the application of section 48(3)(b) to the tenant’s circumstances. Whilst there were third party suspicions of it, there is no evidence of previous use of the premises for an illegal purpose.

62. It is true that there have been only a few occasions over the 12-year period of the tenancy in which the Commissioner has recorded concerns about the tenant or persons visiting the premises and their behaviour. However, as Ms Bowles said, at the hearing in response to the tenant’s proposition of the seemingly positive implications of the four-year periods separating each of the complaints, the low number of complaints is not the only consideration for the Commissioner.

28 Commissioner of Housing of the Australian Capital Territory v Nicole Smith [1995] ACTSC 17 29 Commissioner of Housing of the Australian Capital Territory v Nicole Smith [1995] ACTSC 17 at [30] The nature of the incidences on which the complaints are made, appropriately and not inconsistently with the Residential Tenancies Act, impacts the Commissioner’s considerations. This is also relevant for the Tribunal.

63. The materials to which the Commissioner referred evidencing concerns from the local community about alleged drug trafficking at the premises and the behaviours evidenced in the street are part of the history. However, they are dated six and four years ago and were not tested at the hearing. I have not given them any weight.

64. The history also includes that there is no rental arrears.

65. The nature of the illegal purpose for which the premises was used is at the severe end of the spectrum. That there is evidence of only one such transgression in the 12 years of the tenancy does not ameliorate its gravity. As Ms Bowles said when remarking on the persons attending the premises to purchase controlled drugs: “This creates serious safety implications for surrounding residents. Trafficking activity carries inherent risks of violence, coercion, retaliation and other behaviours associated with drug supply, networks, placing neighbours at further 30 risk.”

66. I have also found that cessation will not remedy the breach.

67. On the other hand, I accept, including from my observations at hearing, that the tenant is genuine in their professed commitment to remaining sober and that they believe that they are now in a good position on which to deliver on that commitment. They have successfully completed the Solaris Therapeutic Community program. Their health has improved considerably since being at the AMC, including that they are no longer insulin dependent. They also said would like to continue to be administered Buvidal, a slow-release medication for patients with opiate dependence, to aid their commitment. Karralika residency would also assist.

30 Ms Bowles’ witness statement dated 19 March 2026 at [18]

68. The tenant has also experienced periods of homelessness in the past. They suffer from depression, anxiety and PTSD. As set out at [28], they say that not only is a stable home, in their case that they have known since 2013, critical to their resolve, it would have served as support for the Sentence Administration Board to agree to the tenant’s parole. I was uncertain of its continuing relevance to the Board. Even if there were alternative emergency accommodation available, the tenant said that it would undermine their capability to maintain sobriety.

69. The tenant also said that their resolve is also aided by their clear appreciation of being at an age (46 years old) where they need to change.

70. However, there are reasonable grounds on which to be concerned about their capability to realise their ambition of consistent sobriety, even if they reside at the premises. The pre-release report prepared for the Sentence Administration Board said that the tenant “has been assessed as a maximum risk of general reoffending, his risk factors includes his history of substance use, history of reoffending, mental health and financial gain to support his substance use.” The report also noted the tenant’s lengthy criminal history and, the breach of the majority of numerous community-based orders due to reoffending, failing to report and substance abuse.

71. Additionally, none of the considerations detailed at [67] – [69] say anything about the implications of their offending. As earlier noted, trafficking drugs at premises for which the Commissioner is responsible is a gross breach of their trust.

72. Indeed, I agree with the Commissioner, that the tenant’s continual reference when asked, to the fact that their plea of guilty did not include that the trafficking occurred at the premises, that the premises were not used as a ‘drug dealing house’, betrays a failure to take responsibility for the substance of the Commissioner’s complaint. The tenant’s insight was tunnelled into the implications of the offending for themselves and the potential loss of their home. The community safety issue associated with trafficking, both on the users themselves as well as the community more broadly, along with the implications for the Commissioner and their management of their stock, was left to the Commissioner to reflect on.

73. Further, as the Commissioner contended and Ms Bowles said, drug trafficking of any kind is a known safety risk for the community, particularly those in close residence of it. This is so readily known as to not be open to debate and so not requiring evidence in support. To the extent that it assists, relevant crime stoppers sites say that it “directly leads to increased crime – more shoplifting, burglary and 31 car theft, as well as litter and anti-social behaviour.”

74. Despite, therefore, the tenant’s resolve to maintain sobriety and their clarity that the premises were integral to it (including the risk that homelessness presents), there is objective credible evidence that the tenant’s risk of reoffending persists.

75. The nature of the offence and its implications for the community and for the Commissioner’s discharge of their functions are also grave. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the tenant’s breach of standard residential tenancy term 70(a) justifies the termination of the tenancy.

76. I must also consider whether, as a matter of discretion, I should order the tenant’s eviction.

77. The considerations which I would take into account in exercising this discretion mirror those I have taken into account when deciding whether the termination is justified. I do not therefore repeat those considerations here.

78. I turn to address the human rights considerations. As the Tribunal noted in Commissioner for Social Housing v Krutsky (Krutsky) “as to the human rights considerations, the Tribunal must determine what weight should be afforded to the tenant’s human right not to have their home interfered with unlawfully or 32 arbitrarily.”

79. Also, like Krutsky, there is nothing before the Tribunal that evidences that the Commissioner has failed to consider a relevant human right or otherwise acted in

31 See for example, noting it is from the United Kingdom which does not preclude its relevance. See Crimestoppers Trust, ‘The South West: no place for drugs’ (Web Page, 13 July 2026) <https://crimestoppers-uk.org/get-involved/campaigns/no-place-for-drugs\> and Crime Stoppers South Australia, ‘Make the Call, Cut the Supply, Stop the Hurt ICE Campaign’ (Web Page, 13 July 2026) <https://crimestopperssa.com.au/case/make-the-call-cut-the-supply-stop-the-hurt-ice-campaign/\> 32 Commissioner for Social Housing v Krutsky [2023] ACAT 55 at [70] a manner that is unlawful. There is no evidence before the Tribunal to indicate that the decision to serve the termination notice, or to commence this application, was arbitrary in the sense that the Commissioner has not failed to apply internal policies or acted inconsistently with due process, or contrary to any legal process.

80. I turn to consider whether the ‘effect upon the tenant is disproportionate and 33 therefore arbitrary.’

81. As earlier recorded, the offence is a serious one and, among other things, constitutes a severe breach of the Commissioner’s trust, negatively impacts their capacity to manage the public housing system responsibly, and to manage risks to the neighbouring community. Indeed, it seriously challenges community safety.

82. On the other hand, I am acutely aware of the detriment to the tenant of an eviction, particularly the risk of homelessness, the risk that presents for recidivism and for 34 their rehabilitation. These risks are weighty. However, they do not make the eviction disproportionate when considered against the clear purpose of section 48 in circumstances where the relevant premises has been used to traffic drugs.

83. Accordingly, I am satisfied that eviction is not unlawful, arbitrary or otherwise disproportionate. I am satisfied that I should exercise my discretion in favour of the Commissioner and grant the termination and possession order.

84. Nevertheless, having regard to the tenant’s circumstances as they apply themselves to the task of maintaining their sobriety, I consider it appropriate to stay the termination and possession order for a period of three weeks. In addition to assisting with the considerable task of extricating themselves from the premises and finding alternative secure accommodation, it will also give the tenant the opportunity to consider, with the benefit of legal advice, whether to appeal this decision.

85. Accordingly, I order:

33 Commissioner for Social Housing v Krutsky [2023] ACAT 55 at [73] 34 Commissioner for Social Housing v Krutsky [2023] ACAT 55 at [66] 1. The residential tenancy agreement is terminated at 5 pm on Monday 29 June 2026.

2. The tenant must vacate the premises on or before 5 pm on Monday 29 June 2026.

3. If the tenant fails to vacate the premises as required by paragraph 2 of the order, the lessor may request the Registrar of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal to issue a warrant for eviction.

4. The operation of paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of this Order is stayed until 4:00 pm on Monday 20 July 2026.

……………………………….. Senior Member J Francis Date of hearing: 12 June 2026 Counsel for the Applicant: Ms S Saikal-Skea Solicitors for the Applicant: ACT Government Solicitor Solicitors for the Respondent: Canberra Community Law ATTACHMENT

Residential Tenancies Act 1997

48 Certain breaches of standard residential tenancy terms (1) On application by a lessor, the ACAT may make a termination and possession order if— (a) satisfied that— (i) the tenant has breached the standard residential tenancy terms (other than by failing to pay rent that has become payable); and (ii) the lessor has served a termination notice on the tenant based on the breach; and (iii) the tenant did not vacate the premises in accordance with the notice; and (iv) the breach of the standard residential tenancy terms was not in accordance with a term of the residential tenancy agreement endorsed by the ACAT; and (v) the breach justifies the termination of the tenancy; or (b) the ACAT— (i) has made an order under section 83 (1) (b); and (ii) is satisfied that the tenant has breached that order; and (iii) is satisfied that the breach justifies the termination of the tenancy. (2) The ACAT may, if satisfied that it is appropriate and just to do so in relation to an application mentioned in subsection (1)— (a) refuse to make a termination and possession order if— (i) the tenant has remedied the relevant breach; or (ii) the tenant undertakes to remedy the breach within a reasonable specified period and is reasonably likely to do so; or (b) make a termination and possession order but suspend it for a period of no more than 3 weeks if satisfied that— (i) were the order not suspended for a specified period of no more than 3 weeks the tenant would suffer significant hardship; and (ii) that hardship would be greater than the hardship that would be suffered by the lessor if the order were suspended for the specified period. (3) For subsection (1) (a) (i), if the application is about the use of premises for an illegal purpose, the ACAT must also be satisfied that— (a) the tenant has used the premises, or permitted the premises to be used, for an illegal purpose; and (b) the illegal use justifies the termination of the tenancy. (4) For subsection (3), the matters the ACAT may consider include the following: (a) the nature of the illegal use; (b) any previous illegal use; (c) the previous history of the tenancy. Schedule 1 Standard residential tenancy terms

. . .

Tenant must not use the premises for illegal purposes and must not disturb the neighbours . . .

70 The tenant must not: (a) use the premises, or permit them to be used, for an illegal purpose; or Note The tribunal must not make a termination and possession order for a breach of this term unless satisfied of certain matters (see Residential Tenancies Act, s 48 (3) and (4)). (b) cause or permit nuisance; or (c) interfere, or permit interference, with the quiet enjoyment of the occupiers of nearby premises.

Termination of tenancy for breach other than nonpayment of rent 93 The tribunal may order the termination of the tenancy and eviction of the tenant on the ground of breach of the tenancy agreement in the following circumstances: (a) the lessor must serve a written notice requiring the tenant within 2 weeks after the day of service to remedy the breach if it is capable of remedy; (b) if the breach is not remedied within 2 weeks after the day of service or if the breach is not capable of remedy—the lessor must give a notice to vacate the premises within 2 weeks after the date of service of the notice to vacate; (c) if the tenant does not vacate the premises within the period of 2 weeks after the date of service of a notice to vacate—the lessor may apply to the tribunal for an order terminating the tenancy and for the eviction of the tenant; (d) if the tenant breaches the terms of the tenancy on 3 occasions on any ground—on the 3rd occasion the lessor may serve a notice to vacate and need not give the tenant 2 weeks to remedy the breach.