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[2010] ACTSC 117
respondent. Appeal dismissed; the Tribunal's conclusion that Dataflex was entitled to an 80% reduction under s 32 of the Taxation Administration Act 1999 (ACT) was affirmed; costs to be heard (paras 41-42).
Dataflex failed to register for payroll tax. The ACT Revenue Office sent a general survey letter on 13 December 2007 asking many employers to complete a questionnaire. Dataflex's advisers then disclosed the necessary information and registered. The Revenue assessed penalties. The Tribunal held Dataflex made its disclosure before being informed of an investigation and applied the 80% reduction in s 32; the Supreme Court agreed, finding the general enquiry letter was not a statutory notice under s 82 and did not amount to an 'investigation' for s 32/33 purposes. The Commissioner's appeal was dismissed.
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Dataflex Pty Ltd failed to register for payroll tax from 1 July 2005 despite being liable to do so [4]. On 13 December 2007 the ACT Revenue Office sent Dataflex a circular enquiry letter as part of a general survey of unregistered employers, requesting completion of an enclosed questionnaire and a copy of its most recent Statement of Financial Performance [5]. After receiving that letter Dataflex's accountants applied to register the company for payroll tax and provided reconciliations for the relevant years [6-7].
10 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
On 14 January 2008 the Commissioner issued assessments that included penalty tax set at 25% under s 31(1) of the Taxation Administration Act 1999 (ACT) [8, 11-13]. Dataflex objected; the objection was disallowed on 24 February 2009 [9]. Dataflex then applied to the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Senior Member Hatch) to challenge the rate of penalty. The Tribunal set aside the Commissioner's refusal to remit and concluded Dataflex was entitled to the 80% voluntary-disclosure reduction under s 32 [10, 18-26].
The Commissioner appealed to the Supreme Court of the ACT. Higgins CJ was asked to decide whether the word "investigation" in s 32 should be given a broad, ordinary-dictionary meaning (which the Commissioner argued would capture the December letter) or a narrower statutory meaning tethered to the statutory powers (including s 82) such that the circular enquiry would not qualify as an 'investigation' that the taxpayer had been informed of [27-36]. The Court concluded the latter: the December 2007 letter was a general request not a s 82 notice, and accordingly Dataflex's disclosure occurred before the Commissioner had informed it that an investigation 'relating to the taxpayer' would be carried out. The Tribunal's application of s 32 and its 80% reduction was therefore correct and the appeal was dismissed [25, 35-41, 42].
The decision turned on statutory interpretation of "investigation" in ss 32-33 of the Taxation Administration Act (TA Act) read against the background of Part 9.2 (which contains s 82 and related compulsory powers). Section 32 grants an 80% reduction if a taxpayer discloses in writing sufficient information "before the commissioner informs the taxpayer that an investigation relating to the taxpayer is to be carried out" [14]. Section 33 provides a lesser 20% reduction where disclosure occurs after such notification but before the investigation begins [14]. Section 82 (Div 9.2) authorises compulsory written notices requiring information, attendance or documents [22].
Higgins CJ assessed whether the 13 December 2007 letter could sensibly be read as a s 82 notice or as having the effect of informing the taxpayer that an investigation relating to it was to be carried out. The Court observed that the December letter was a circular addressed to many employers, framed as a request for information and accompanied by an informational brochure [5]. The letter did not use the mandatory language or form of a s 82 notice. The Judge held there was "no reasonable way of interpreting the letter of 13 December 2007 as other than a request for information" and that it was not a notice under s 82 [25]. On that footing the disclosure made by Dataflex and its accountants was "before the commissioner informs the taxpayer that an investigation relating to the taxpayer is to be carried out" and therefore within s 32 [41].
Two further strands reinforced the construction: comparison to other jurisdictions and policy considerations. The Court examined how NSW, Victoria and Tasmania tie the term "investigation" more closely to compulsory powers, and how South Australia provides explicit notice periods for 'tax audits' [30-34]. The Court rejected an interpretation that would render both ss 32 and 33 nugatory whenever the Commissioner sent a broad inquiry letter, because that would frustrate the legislative intention to incentivise voluntary disclosure and would be poor public policy [38-40]. The Court also referred to authorities on statutory construction of penal provisions, indicating no rigid rule requiring the strictest dictionary meaning if context indicates otherwise [39].
Before this decision there was an ambiguity in the ACT regime about whether a general survey letter or an initial enquiry from revenue would trigger the 'after notification' rule in s 33 or whether such an enquiry left open the taxpayer's entitlement to the richer s 32 reduction. The ACT statutory scheme did not define "investigation", unlike some other States where definitions or notice regimes exist.
After Higgins CJ's decision, the controlling interpretation in the ACT is that "investigation" for the purposes of ss 32-33 is to be read with reference to the statutory investigative apparatus (eg s 82). A broad, non-compulsory, circular request for information does not amount to an 'investigation' or constitute the informing of a taxpayer that an investigation relating to that taxpayer is to be carried out. Consequently, taxpayers who respond to such general enquiries with full voluntary disclosure may be entitled to the full 80% reduction under s 32, provided the Commissioner has not otherwise notified them of an investigation specific to them. This aligns the ACT position more with the protective approach in South Australia and with a purposive emphasis on encouraging voluntary disclosure, and it prevents routine circular letters from automatically stripping taxpayers of the more generous s 32 concession [35-41].
Quoted passage (content of the December letter): "The ACT Revenue Office is currently conducting an investigation of all employers who pay or are liable to pay wages in the ACT..." [5].
Plain‑English translation: The Revenue sent a broad, informational survey to many employers to check whether they owed payroll tax. It said it was 'investigating' broadly, but not necessarily that any one business was the target of a statutory audit or compulsory notice.
Judicial finding: "I have to agree that there is no reasonable way of interpreting the letter of 13 December 2007 as other than a request for information. It is not a notice under s 82." [25].
Translation: The judge concluded the letter was simply a friendly request, not a formal statutory demand that would trigger the special rules about when an investigation has been notified to a taxpayer.
Policy observation: "The most telling argument ... is that if a letter such as that of 13 December 2007 is circulated to all taxpayers ... it automatically renders not only s 32 but also s 33 inapplicable." [40].
Translation: If every initial enquiry counted as notice of an investigation, the statutory incentive framework (which offers varying reductions for voluntary disclosure at different stages) would be nullified; that cannot have been intended.
Conclusion: "It follows that the Senior Member's conclusion ... was correct." [41].
Translation: The Court agreed with the Tribunal that Dataflex made its disclosure before being told an investigation specific to it would happen, so Dataflex gets the 80% reduction.
This decision is relevant where:
A revenue authority sends a general or non-targeted enquiry or survey to a class of taxpayers or potential taxpayers (eg 'have you paid payroll tax?') rather than a compulsory statutory notice directed at a particular taxpayer [5, 23-26].
A taxpayer responds to such a general enquiry with full written disclosure and registration before the Commissioner issues a formal notification that an investigation specific to that taxpayer will be conducted [6, 35-36, 41].
The revenue authority subsequently seeks to treat the initial enquiry letter as having informed the taxpayer that an 'investigation relating to the taxpayer is to be carried out', thereby arguing the taxpayer is relegated to the lesser s 33 reduction [27-29, 36-40].
If the enquiry is a targeted statutory notice under s 82 or an equivalent compulsory process, the precedent points the other way: the notification will be an 'investigation' for ss 32-33 purposes and the taxpayer will typically only qualify for the lesser s 33 reduction if it discloses thereafter [22, 31-33].
The judgment itself does not report subsequent appellate treatment or later cases; it affirms the Tribunal's application and sets the ACT Supreme Court's interpretation [41-42]. The decision draws on comparative statutory schemes in other jurisdictions (NSW, Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia) and principles from the High Court authorities cited (Scott v Cawsey and McGraw-Hinds) to support its interpretive approach [29-39].
Practitioners should check for any subsequent appellate decisions or appeals to higher courts after 24 September 2010 to see whether this construction has been affirmed by a higher court or applied in other factual contexts. The reasoning is, however, firmly grounded in a purposive/contextual approach to statutory interpretation and is likely to be persuasive in later ACT cases where the facts are similar: a general, non-compulsory enquiry letter followed by voluntary disclosure.
What precisely constitutes sufficient specificity to transform an enquiry letter into a communication which 'informs the taxpayer that an investigation relating to the taxpayer is to be carried out'? Higgins CJ focused on the December letter's generality and lack of s 82 attributes, but closer borderline cases (eg a personalised letter naming the taxpayer and requesting documents) may generate closer calls [23-26, 35-37].
How will courts treat hybrid communications, letters that are personal and suggest investigation but stop short of invoking compulsory powers? The judgment suggests substance and context matter, but practitioners will still need guidance on the factual threshold for 'informed' notification of an investigation [35-37].
What evidence is necessary to prove that a taxpayer was 'informed' of an investigation? The case emphasises the formal characteristics of s 82 notices, but does not lay out an exhaustive list of indicators that an investigation has been notified. Future litigation may need to refine whether oral notifications, targeted emails or follow-up telephone calls trigger s 33 rather than s 32 [22, 36].
The decision leans on policy reasons (encouraging voluntary disclosure) and comparison with other jurisdictions; different fact patterns or legislative amendments could alter the balance. If the ACT legislature amends the TA Act to define 'investigation' or to prescribe notice requirements, that would change the legal landscape [16, 29-34].
Finally, because the decision addresses statutory construction rather than fact-specific discretion under s 37, there remains scope for the Commissioner to seek discretionary remission in exceptional cases, and courts may be asked to delineate the boundary between legislative concessions (ss 32-33) and residual discretion (s 37) in future disputes [15].
Conclusion: Commissioner for ACT Revenue v Dataflex establishes that in the ACT a broad, non-compulsory circular enquiry does not amount to an 'investigation' for voluntary-disclosure penalty-reduction purposes. The decision prioritises purposive, contextual reading of the TA Act, aligns the regime with comparable jurisdictions' objectives, and protects the policy aim of encouraging early, voluntary disclosure.
1. This is an appeal from a decision of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Senior Member Hatch). Mr Hatch, on 12 November 2009, set aside a decision of the appellant not to remit a penalty for non-payment of payroll tax by more than 20%. It was the contention of the respondent taxpayer that it was entitled to an 80% reduction in the statutory penalty for that default.
2. The appeal was removed to the Supreme Court by order of Appeals President Stefaniak on 8 February 2010 pursuant to s 83(1) of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT). Under s 79 the appeal to the appeals Tribunal may be on a question of fact or law. There is, separately, a right of appeal to the Supreme Court under s 86, also on any question of fact or law.
3. This appeal is, essentially, on a question of law. It turns on the meaning to be assigned to the term "investigation" in s 32 of the Taxation Administration Act 1999 (ACT) (TA Act).
4. There was no factual issue joined between the appellant and respondent. The respondent became obliged, under the Payroll Tax Act 1987 (ACT) (PT Act) to register for payroll tax purposes on and from 1 July 2005. It failed to do so.
5. On 13 December 2007, as part of a general survey of unregistered employers in the ACT, the appellant sent a letter to the respondent with respect to potential payroll tax liability. That letter was in the following form:
Dear Sir/Madam
RE: ACT PAYROLL TAX
The ACT Revenue Office is currently conducting an investigation of all employers who pay or are liable to pay wages in the ACT. This investigation is being undertaken to determine whether the employers have an existing or previous liability to payroll tax under the provisions of the ACT Payroll Tax Act 1987.
A search of the ACT Revenue Office database shows that Data Flex Pty Ltd has not lodged returns or paid payroll tax in the ACT. In order to determine whether Data Flex Pty Ltd has a payroll tax liability and to assist this Office with our investigation, you are requested to complete and return the enclosed questionnaire. To assist you in this, a brochure, 'Payroll Tax in the ACT' is enclosed for your information.
Your return of the completed questionnaire and a copy of Data Flex Pty Ltd's 2005/2006 (or most recent) Statement of Financial Performance (Profit and Loss Statement) within 28 days from the date of this letter would be appreciated.
Please note that giving false or misleading information is a serious offence.
Should you have any questions regarding this matter, I can be contacted on 6207 0100.
Yours faithfully
(signature)
6. Following this letter the respondent's accountants forwarded to Mr Amalos applications to register for payroll tax for the respondent's group of companies.
7. Payroll tax reconciliations for the years ending 30 June 2006 and 30 June 2007 were enclosed.
8. On 14 January 2008 assessments were issued including penalties assessed at 25% of the tax payable.
9. Objection was taken to that decision of 17 January 2008. On 24 February 2009 that objection was disallowed by the appellant.
10. Application was then made to the Tribunal challenging the rate of penalty. Mr Hatch, in a decision handed down on 12 November 2009, upheld that challenge.
11. The respondent had contended that it was entitled to the benefit of s 32 of the TA Act. The primary penalty applied was calculated pursuant to s 31(1) of the TA Act. It provides:
The amount of penalty tax payable in relation to a tax default is 25% of the amount of tax paid, subject to this division.
12. Subsections (2), (4) and (5) apply greater rates if the appellant was satisfied of the various aggravating circumstances, therein described. Subsection (6) provides that, if the taxpayer had taken "reasonable care" to comply or if non-compliance happened solely because of circumstances as beyond the taxpayer's control, then no penalty is payable.
13. The respondent accepted that s 31(1) applied. The appellant accepted that ss 31(2),(4) and (5) did not apply. Neither party disputed that the respondent was not eligible for the concession allowed by s 31(6).
14. The contention in dispute related to whether the respondent fell under s 32, as it contended, or under s 33, as the appellant contended.
32 Reduction in penalty tax for voluntary disclosure
The amount of penalty tax determined under section 31 is reduced by 80% if, before the commissioner informs the taxpayer that an investigation relating to the taxpayer is to be carried out, the taxpayer discloses to the commissioner, in writing, sufficient information to enable the nature and extent of the tax default to be determined.
33 Reduction in penalty tax for disclosure before investigation
The amount of penalty tax determined under section 31 is reduced by 20% if, after the commissioner informs the taxpayer that an investigation relating to the taxpayer is to be carried out and before it is begun, the taxpayer discloses to the commissioner, in writing, sufficient information to enable the nature and extent of the tax default to be determined.
15. There is, under s 37, a residual discretion for the appellant to remit penalty tax otherwise payable in whole or part in exceptional mitigating circumstances. Neither party contended or accepted, as the case may be, that s 37 was engaged.
16. It is apparent that what previously was a general discretion to remit penalty tax has been, to some extent, regulated in favour of a mandated outcome. The explanatory memorandum recites the effect of ss 31-33 but does not explain what is meant by "an investigation into the taxpayer's affairs".
17. Clearly, however, for s 33 to have effect, it is contemplated that, before an investigation is commenced, the taxpayer will be notified of an intention on the part of the appellant to commence such an investigation. The process of "investigation" is not further defined.
18. Mr Hatch noted that, even before the letter of 13 December 2007, the respondent, alerted by its accountant to the issue, had begun to take steps to ascertain its payroll tax liability, with a view to disclosure. Nevertheless it was not disputed that, before receipt of that letter, the respondent had not disclosed relevant information to the appellant. Nor it disputed that following that letter, without any threat of an "investigation relating to the taxpayer" (ss 32 and 33), full disclosure was made.
19. I note that the words used in the Explanatory Memorandum are a little different, that is, it refers to an investigation "into the taxpayer's affairs". It seems to me, however, that the two expressions are intended to convey the same meaning.
20. Mr Hatch noted that the only issue raised before him was as to the application or not of s 32.
21. The Senior member, at [20] of his decision said:
The final issue therefore is whether there can be a reduction pursuant to section 32 of the Taxation Administration Act 1999. For completeness I do not find section 33 of the Taxation Administration Act 1999 is relevant. No evidence was presented to suggest that the [Appellant] advised that an investigation was going to be carried out and that it had not yet begun. The issue in this matter was whether there was an investigation at all, or if there was the [Respondent] was informed of that.
(1) The commissioner may, for a purpose related to the administration or enforcement of a tax law, by written notice served on a person, require the person -
(a) to provide to the commissioner (either orally or in writing) information that is described in the notice; or
(b) to attend and give evidence before the commissioner or an authorised officer; or
(c) to produce to the commissioner a record or other document described in the notice that is in the person's custody or control.
(2) If a notice to a person under subsection (1) is made to determine that person's tax liability, the notice must state that the requirement is made for that purpose, but the commissioner is not otherwise required to identify a person in relation to whom any information, evidence, record or other document is required under this section.
(3) The commissioner -
(a) may specify whether information or evidence to be provided or given under this section must be given orally or in writing; and
(b) may require any information or evidence given in writing to be in the form of, or verified by, a statutory declaration; and
(c) may require any information or evidence given orally to be given on oath or affirmation.
(4) A person must not, without reasonable excuse, fail -
(a) to comply with the requirements of a notice under this section within the period specified in the notice or any further period allowed by the commissioner; or
(b) to comply with any other requirement of the commissioner about the giving of evidence or how information or evidence is to be provided or given under this section.
Maximum penalty: 50 penalty units.
(5) A person required to attend before an authorised officer to give oral evidence must be paid expenses in accordance with the scale of allowances determined under section 139.
(6) Subsection (5) does not apply to a person, or a representative of a person, giving evidence in relation to the person's own tax liability.
23. The appellant had submitted that the letter of 13 December 2007 should be construed as a notice pursuant to that section. Was it more than a mere request for information?
24. Mr Hatch was of the view that it was not, noting:
... The letter also gives the appearance of being a circular letter which is being sent to a large number of employers who may be liable to pay ACT Payroll Tax. I cannot find that this letter amounts to a written notice as required by section 82 of the Tax Administration Act 1999.
25. I have to agree that there is no reasonable way of interpreting the letter of 13 December 2007 as other than a request for information. It is not a notice under s 82. In that assumption Mr Hatch was undoubtedly correct.
26. He concluded, therefore, that no investigation had begun before the respondent replied to the letter of 13 December 2007 and, hence, the respondent was entitled to the reduction specified in s 32 of the TA Act.
27. The appellant contends that the Tribunal failed to accord to "investigation" its natural and ordinary meaning.
28. In effect, the appellant contends that the powers in Div 9.2, including s 82, of the TA Act are in aid of an "investigation" necessarily already commenced. Hence the letter of 13 December 2007 should be viewed as a notice of intent to commence an investigation if full disclosure be not made thus enabling the taxpayer to engage s 33 of the TA Act but not s 32.
29. Mr Walker, for the appellant, pointed out that whilst similar provisions have been enacted in other Australian jurisdictions, the ACT was the last to do so and should, therefore, be regarded as having done so with knowledge of those other provisions. Thus it should be concluded that "investigation" was intentionally left undefined.
30. In New South Wales, Victoria and Tasmania, the legislature has chosen to define "investigation" in the context of the equivalent reduction of 80% of the penalty tax, in terms engaging the compulsory processes equivalent to those contained in Div 9.2 of the TA Act.
31. The Taxation Administration Act 1996 (SA) , under s 31 thereof, provides for reduction of penalty tax, similarly to the ACT, in the event that the taxpayer makes a sufficient disclosure "... while not subject to a tax audit". If the disclosure is made "while subject to a tax audit" the reduction is the lesser figure of 20%.
32. Subsection (3)(a) of that section provides that:
(a) a taxpayer becomes subject to a tax audit in relation to a tax default under a taxation law when the Commissioner serves written notice on the taxpayer advising that the Commissioner is to investigate the tax liability of the taxpayer under that taxation law, and the taxpayer remains subject to the tax audit for 28 days after service of the notice on the taxpayer or such longer period as the Commissioner may specify by written notice;
33. Whilst a "tax audit" is not defined as a process engaging the Commissioner's compulsory disclosure powers under Pt 9 of the South Australian Act (see Div 2 thereof), it clearly does indicate a particular scrutiny of the relevant affairs of the particular taxpayer.
34. I observe that the South Australian regime is more favourable to the taxpayer than the New South Wales, Victorian and Tasmanian regimes in that the decision to subject a particular taxpayer to scrutiny of his, her or it's affairs for tax liability will be preceded by a notice allowing at least 28 days to make disclosure before a 'tax audit' commences. Under the regime in the latter States, a decision to carry out an "investigation" involves a decision to engage the compulsory investigative processes of the relevant Act. A taxpayer would not necessarily have notice of such a decision. Nevertheless, it is more favourable than the regime contended for as applicable to the ACT by the appellant. There is no doubt that the letter of 13 December 2007 would not qualify as indicating that the compulsory powers of investigation had been or were likely to be engaged in respect of a particular taxpayer.
35. I agree with Mr Walker that an investigation may be commenced into the affairs of a taxpayer without the engagement, in the first instance, of compulsory powers. On the other hand, the taxpayer is entitled to the benefit of s 32 even if the taxpayer becomes aware that the Commissioner may be contemplating or may be alerted to the desirability of an investigation provided that the Commissioner has not informed the taxpayer that he or she has decided to carry out an investigation into the taxpayer's affairs for payroll tax purposes. Once he or she does so, of course, s 33 is engaged.
36. The question is whether the letter of 13 December 2007 evidences an "investigation" that has been commenced. If it does, then the despatch of the letter to each of the taxpayers on the list to receive it would deny any rebate under s 32 or s 33 to any such taxpayer. The appellant concedes that this respondent is entitled to a rebate under s 33. That however, implies a contention that the letter is a notice that an investigation "relating to the taxpayer" is to be carried out but has not yet begun. It is difficult to justify that suggested distinction.
37. If the "investigation" of which the letter is a part is not the investigation to which ss 32 and 33 refer, what then is it? The first distinction which the appellant's concession must imply is that the investigation to which ss 32 and 33 applies is specific to the affairs of a particular taxpayer and might then engage the powers of investigation under Pt 9.2. That is consistent with the provisions in the States other than South Australia. Even there, however, the concept of a 'tax audit' is not very different. It is an investigation of the relevant affairs of the target taxpayer, not a blanket survey of all or all of a class of taxpayers. It is true that the New South Wales, Victorian and Tasmanian model does not mandate any warning to a taxpayer that his, her or its financial affairs are to be examined thus providing the opportunity for, at least, a s 33 disclosure.
38. Nevertheless, if, fortuitously, the appellant, by requesting information from taxpayers, prompts compliance without giving notice that that particular taxpayer is a target for a tax audit or investigation, it does not seem contrary to the effect of similar legislation elsewhere in the Commonwealth which would allow the application of the equivalent of s 32, for prompt compliance.
39. The contrary view, that the ACT legislature was determined to put in place the most draconian regime in the Commonwealth is not one that would be consistent with the presumed intention of a reasonable legislature. Nor is it consistent with good public policy which would favour taxpayers voluntarily disclosing their liability with minimal prompting from or expense occasioned to those administering the tax regime. In my view, both public policy and legislative consistency favours the view that the ACT regime is not intended to be less beneficial in relation to defaulting taxpayers than those in comparable states. It is apparent that the reform of the various Acts was intended to be uniform or, at least, consistent as between jurisdictions. I am mindful that there is no general presumption that a penal statute should receive a strict construction (see Isaacs J in Scott v Cawsey [1907] HCA 80; (1907) 5 CLR 132, 154). However, it does no violence to the language of ss 32 and 33 to conclude that the term "investigation" is used in a more limited sense than the general dictionary definition. It cannot, in context, be construed as referring to some wider inquiry than the sense in which it is used in s 82. That is, as Ms Burnett for the respondent submitted, consistent with the High Court's approach in McGraw-Hinds (Aust) Pty Ltd v Smith [1979] HCA 19; (1979) 144 CLR 633, 643-4 per Gibbs J.
40. The most telling argument against the appellant's contention is that if a letter such as that of 13 December 2007 is circulated to all taxpayers who have not apparently complied, it automatically renders not only s 32 but also s 33 inapplicable. Each such taxpayer is thrown back upon the general power of discretionary remission which these sections were designed to limit (see Explanatory Memorandum p 3). Certainly, the ACT Revenue Office explanatory documents indicate to taxpayers that, at least in "most cases", the investigator will telephone the taxpayer "to let you know an investigation will be conducted". That indicates that not even the appellant was of the view that sending an enquiry letter to taxpayers is or is part of an investigation under the Act.
41. It follows that the Senior Member's conclusion that the respondent had made disclosure before being notified that an investigation was to be conducted into its affairs was correct. It follows that the respondent was entitled to the rebate of penalty prescribed by s 32 of the TA Act.
42. The appeal is dismissed. I will hear the parties as to costs.
I certify that the preceding forty-two (42) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of his Honour, Chief Justice Higgins.
Solicitor for the Appellant: ACT Government Solicitor
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Williams Love & Nicol
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal
Commissioner for ACT Revenue
Dataflex Pty Ltd and ACT Civil Administrative Tribunal [2010] ACTSC 117
(1907) 5 CLR 132
(1979) 144 CLR 633
Appeal dismissed; the Tribunal's conclusion that Dataflex was entitled to an 80% reduction under s 32 of the Taxation Administration Act 1999 (ACT) was affirmed; costs to be heard (paras 41-42).