Comiskey & Anor v Fairhill Coking Coal Pty Ltd [2026] QLAC 2

AB (a pseudonym) v Independent Broad-based Anti-Corruption Commission [2024] HCA 10; (2024) 278 CLR 300

Comiskey v Fairhill Coking Coal Pty Ltd [2024] QSC 137

ERO Georgetown Gold Operations Pty Ltd v Henry [2015] QLAC 4

FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL [1988] HCA 13; (1988) 165 CLR 268

Fairhill Coking Coal Pty Ltd v Comiskey & Anor (No 2) [2025] QLC 9

Federated Engine-Drivers and Firemen's Association of Australasia v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd [1911] HCA 31; (1911) 12 CLR 398

Glencore Coal Queensland Pty Ltd & Ors v Keys & Ors (2014) 35 QLCR 194; [2014] QLAC 2

Hearne v Street [2008] HCA 36; (2008) 235 CLR 125

Hicks v Graham [2004] QLRT 47

Nothdurft v QGC Pty Ltd [2017] QLC 41; (2017) 38 QLCR 91

Owners of the Ship 'Shin Kobe Maru' v Empire Shipping Co Inc (1994) 181 CLR 404

JM Horton KC, with W Isdale (instructed by Suthers Taylor) for the appellants

GA Thompson KC, with A Nicholas (instructed by McCullough Robertson Lawyers) for the respondent

[1] Mr and Mrs Comiskey appeal from an order of the Land Court dismissing their application under s 283B of the Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld) (MRA) to review the compensation payable under an agreement with Fairhill Coking Coal Pty Ltd.

[2] Fairhill holds a mining lease which covers part of the Comiskeys' rural property. The compensation agreement made on 27 August 2020 (the 2020 Agreement) was a requirement of the grant of the mining lease.[1] It recorded Fairhill's agreement to compensate the Comiskeys for mining activities that would be carried out on their land under the authority of the mining lease and the Comiskeys' consent to Fairhill carrying out those mining activities.

[3] The agreed compensation was payable in three tranches. Fairhill did not pay the second and third tranches of compensation by the dates specified in the compensation agreement. Consequently, a significant amount of the compensation owed to the Comiskeys remained outstanding. The parties engaged in a dispute resolution process set out in the 2020 Agreement to resolve the issue of the outstanding payments.

[4] Before the dispute resolution process had concluded, the parties agreed that Fairhill would pay the outstanding compensation and default interest by 28 April 2023 and that if Fairhill failed to pay by that date, the parties would renegotiate the compensation payable to the Comiskeys (the 2023 Agreement). That renegotiation process would commence with the parties exchanging valuation reports.

[5] Fairhill did not pay the outstanding amounts by 28 April 2023.

[6] On 2 May 2023, the Comiskeys informed Fairhill that they had retained a valuer to undertake a further compensation assessment.

[7] On 12 September 2023, the Comiskeys informed Fairhill that their valuer's report was ready, and they wished to meet to begin renegotiating the compensation as soon as reasonably practicable.

[8] Fairhill responded on 20 September 2023, by paying the second and third tranches of compensation to the Comiskeys, together with interest. That payment was made approximately eight months after the second tranche of compensation was due, and approximately five months after the third tranche of compensation was due.

[9] Having paid those amounts, Fairhill informed the Comiskeys that it considered the dispute had been resolved. The Comiskeys disagreed, asserting that the parties were bound to follow the renegotiation process they had agreed in the 2023 Agreement. The parties participated in a mediation in April 2024. They did not reach an agreement.

[10] In June 2024, the Comiskeys commenced a proceeding in the Supreme Court of Queensland seeking declaratory and other relief directed at preventing Fairhill from exercising rights under the mining lease. Bradley J (as his Honour was then) dismissed the Comiskeys' application.[2] In coming to that conclusion, his Honour found that the renegotiation process provided for in the 2023 Agreement was intended to be legally binding and the parties were obliged to cooperate to either register any agreement to amend the original compensation or, if no agreement was reached, to enable the Land Court to review the original compensation under s 283B of the MRA.

[11] The Comiskeys, followed the second course referred to by his Honour, starting a proceeding in the Land Court seeking a review of the original compensation.

[12] To engage the jurisdiction of the Land Court under s 283B(1)(b) of the MRA, the Comiskeys must establish that, since the original compensation was agreed, there has been "a material change in circumstances for the mining lease".

[13] Pursuant to an order of the Land Court, the Comiskeys filed particulars which identified four facts, matters and circumstances said to comprise, individually and collectively, a material change in the circumstances for the mining lease. They were:

(a) Fairhill's breach of the mining lease by failing to make all payments of compensation in accordance with the 2020 Agreement;

(b) the parties' 2023 Agreement to renegotiate the compensation payable to the Comiskeys;

(c) the finding by Bradley J that, failing agreement between the parties to amend the original compensation, Fairhill was obliged under the 2023 Agreement to cooperate to enable the Land Court to review the original compensation; and

(d) a substantial rise in the value of the land affected by the grant of the mining lease in the time since the original compensation was agreed, such that the mining activities on that land would result in a greater diminution in the value of that land than was the case when the original compensation was agreed and a substantial increase in the losses occasioned to the Comiskeys by the grant of the mining lease.

[14] Fairhill filed an application to determine, as a preliminary question, whether the facts, matters and circumstances relied on by the Comiskeys constituted a material change in circumstances for the mining lease within the meaning of s 283B(1)(b) of the MRA.

[15] The Member below found that the facts, matters and circumstances set out in the particulars did not constitute a material change in circumstances for the mining lease. He found that the duty to cooperate identified by Bradley J did not require that Fairhill refrain from pressing its application or compel it to accept that s 283B was engaged. The Member dismissed the Comiskeys application under s 283B.

[16] The Comiskeys appeal that order on two grounds, namely that the Member erred in failing to find that:

(a) one or more of the facts, matters and circumstances relied on by the Comiskeys constituted a material change in circumstances for the mining lease within the meaning of s 283B(1)(b) (Ground 1); and

(b) Fairhill is bound by an obligation to cooperate to enable the Land Court to review the original compensation under s 283B, which duty precluded it from bringing and pressing its application and from contending that s 283B(1)(b) was not satisfied (Ground 2).

[17] For the reasons which follow the appeal must be dismissed.

[18] The Member found that none of the matters identified in the Comiskeys' particulars was a material change in circumstances for the mining lease for the following reasons:

(a) Although Fairhill's failure to pay compensation on time was serious and substantial, and likely a breach of a condition of the mining lease, that breach did not engage s 283B. When the parties negotiated the compensation agreement, they contemplated the possibility that there might be non-compliance with aspects of it. They included a dispute resolution mechanism in the compensation agreement to address that possibility.

(b) The renegotiation process required by the 2023 Agreement was a separate contractual process which did not come within the meaning of a material change in circumstances for the mining lease.

(c) The findings made by Bradley J in dismissing the Comiskeys' proceeding in the Supreme Court did not compel the Land Court to conclude that there had been a material change in circumstances for the mining lease.

(d) The increase in the value of the land in the period between the dates the compensation ought to have been paid and the date it was paid was not so unexpected or unusual as to make the late payments a material change in circumstances for the mining lease. Fairhill paid interest on the outstanding compensation. The Comiskeys could pursue any further loss they claim to have suffered by reason of the breach of the mining lease and breach of the compensation agreement in an action for damages.

[19] The following issues arise for determination:

(a) What is a "material change in circumstances for the mining lease" within the meaning of s 283B(1)(b)?

(b) Do one or more of the facts, matters and circumstances set out in the Comiskeys particulars fall within that description?

What is the meaning of the phrase "a material change in circumstances for the mining lease"?

[20] The Comiskeys submit that ERO Georgetown[3] established that s 283B(1)(b) will be satisfied when:

(a) there is a difference between the circumstances at the time when the compensation was originally agreed or determined and at the date the change is said to have occurred;

(b) the difference (change) is material; and

(c) the difference (change) relates to circumstances relevant to the agreement about or determination of compensation.

[21] They submit that the Member erred by giving s 283B(1)(b) a narrow construction which limits its operation to operational changes and, in doing so, failed to apply the broad construction given to the section in ERO Georgetown.

[22] The Member stated that the Comiskey's construction of the third condition in ERO Georgetown was cast too broadly because, in that case, the Court was referring to circumstances of the mining lease that had been relevant to the way in which compensation had originally been set, such as deprivation of possession, access arrangements or noise intrusion.

[23] In addition to ERO Georgetown, the Member also analysed cases in which s 283B, or its analogue in other legislation, has been construed by:

(a) this Court;[4]

(b) the Land Court;[5] and

(c) the Land and Resources Tribunal.[6]

[24] Based on that analysis, and his Honour's reading of the text of s 283B(1)(b) in context, the Member expressed the meaning of the section as follows[7]:

(a) it involves a two stage test - first that the circumstances have changed and second that the change is material;

(b) it is not engaged by a change in market value over time;

(c) it encompasses the effect of operational changes on the person entitled to the compensation;

(d) most operational changes are easy to identify as a material change in circumstances for the mining lease - closing a road, creating more noise than expected or cutting off water supply are obvious;

(e) changes that manifest 'on paper'- but with no other change to the way the mining is done - are more difficult to assess. An 'on paper' change to the length of the mining activity would be likely to constitute a material change in circumstances for the mining lease because the impact on the landowner would be prolonged. An 'on paper' change that causes no noticeable difference for the landowner would be a different matter;

(f) an indication that a change amounts to a material change in circumstances for the mining lease, would include a change that would have influenced the original negotiation for compensation. That is, an aspect of the mining activity that the landowner would have to adjust to - but as a result of the change, would now have to adjust to in a different way.

[25] Section 283B(1)(b) falls to be construed in the context of the MRA as a whole. As his Honour identified by reference to ERO Georgetown,[8] these sections are relevant to that exercise:

(a) section 279, which prevents the grant or renewal of a mining lease unless compensation has been agreed or determined;

(b) sections 281 and 282, which provide for the determination of compensation by the Land Court, and a subsequent appeal, if compensation cannot be agreed;

(c) section 283A, which permits the parties, by agreement, to amend an earlier agreement for, or Land Court determination of, compensation; and

(d) section 286, which provides that a mining lease cannot be renewed for a period for which compensation has not been determined or agreed.

(a) section 283B(3), which provides that sections which apply to a determination of compensation by the Land Court, and a subsequent appeal - being ss 281(3) to (7), 282 and 282A - apply with necessary changes to a review of compensation as if it were an application under s 281(1).

(b) section 363, which gives the Land Court jurisdiction to hear proceedings with respect to any determination or review of compensation[9] and the enforcement of any agreement for compensation.[10]

[27] As the Court said in ERO Georgetown, the legislative context strongly suggests that the circumstances referred to in s 283B(1)(b) are "those related to the identification of compensation", that being consistent with the purpose of s 283B to confer on the Land Court jurisdiction to review compensation at some time after it was originally determined or agreed.

[28] The Court did not describe a construction which focussed on operational changes, and the effects of such changes on the person entitled to compensation, as a narrow construction. To the contrary, the Court expressly recognised[11] that the effect of the example of a material change in circumstances provided in s 283B(1)(b) - namely, a different mining method that changes the impact of mining operations under the lease - was to extend the operation of the provision, from what it might have been without the example, to include cases involving such changes or effects.

[29] The Court's statement[12] from which the Comiskeys derived the construction of s 283B at [20] above, cannot be read in isolation. It must be read together with the preceding[13]tatement13 that the circumstances referred to in s 283B(1)(b) are those "related to the identification of compensation". The circumstances must be connected with the mining lease in such a way that a change in them materially alters the effects of the grant or renewal of the mining lease for which a landowner is entitled to be compensated.

[30] Section 283B(3) states that s 281 applies to the review as if it were an application of that section. Section 281 sets out the bases on which the Land Court can determine compensation. These are the compensable effects of the grant or renewal of the mining lease to be considered in determining whether there has been a material change of circumstances for the mining lease. They include:

(a) deprivation of possession of the surface of the land - s 281(3)(a)(i);

(b) diminution of value of the land or any improvements thereon - ss 281(3)(a)(ii) and 281(3)(b)(i);

(c) diminution of the use made, or which may be made, of the land or any improvements thereon - ss 281(3)(a)(iii) and 281(3)(b)(ii);

(d) severance of any part of the land from other parts of thereof or from other land of the owner - s 281(3)(a)(iv);

(e) any surface rights of access - s 281(3)(a)(v);

(f) all loss and expense that arises, including loss of profits calculated by comparison of the use of the land prior to the application for the grant of a mining lease and the use that could be made of the land after the grant - ss 281(3)(a)(vi), 281(3)(b)(iii) and 281(4)(d);

(g) the costs incurred by the owner where it is necessary to obtain replacement land, or resettle on another part of the land or relocate livestock or other chattels to other parts of the land - s 281(4)(a); and

(h) if the owner proves that the status and use being made of the land is such that a premium should be applied - s 281(4)(c).

[31] It is logical that the jurisdiction of the Land Court to review the original compensation is conditioned upon a change in circumstances that materially alters these compensable effects.

[32] It is also consistent with statements by this Court in the earlier case of Glencore Coal[14] to which the Member below also referred. The Court observed that the example given in s 283B(1)(b) and the explanatory memorandum's identification of "operational change" as the circumstance which would make an adjustment to compensation appropriate, suggest that s 283B is not engaged simply because of a change in market value over time.

[33] That conclusion must be correct. A change in the market value of the land, without more, is not a circumstance related to the identification of compensation and so is not relevant to the agreement or determination of the original compensation in the sense described in ERO Georgetown.

[34] A change in market value might alter the compensable effects of the grant of the mining lease. For example, as the Comiskeys submit in this case, an increase in market value over time might mean that the diminution in the value of the land affected by the mining lease is greater than was anticipated when compensation was agreed or determined. But such an increase in the market value of the land occurs independently of, and despite the existence of, the mining lease. In such a case, the requisite connection between the changed circumstances and the mining lease does not exist. Whatever might result from the change in the market value of the land, it is not a change in circumstances "for" the mining lease.

[35] The Member's statement that the third part of the jurisdictional condition which the Comiskeys derived from ERO Georgetown (see [20] above) was cast too broadly was not a rejection of the Court's construction in that case. Instead, his Honour concluded that the Court in ERO Georgetown did not construe the section as broadly as the Comiskeys submitted.

[36] That conclusion was correct. The Court in ERO Georgetown was not saying that s 283B(1)(b) would be satisfied by a difference or change in any circumstance that could be said to be relevant to the agreement about compensation in any way. Rather, for the reasons set out above, the Court was saying that the condition is satisfied where there is a material difference or change in circumstances related to the identification of compensation, being circumstances connected with the mining lease in such a way that the change in them alters the compensable effects of the grant.

[37] To construe s 283B(1)(b) in this way does not involve making implications or imposing limitations which are not found in the express words of the provision.[15] By its express terms, s 283B(1)(b) imposes a limitation on the jurisdiction of the Land Court to review compensation. The construction of that limitation set out above follows from an orthodox application of the relevant principles - ascertaining the meaning of the provision by considering its text in context, including its purpose and the mischief it is seeking to remedy.[16]

[38] On this construction of s 283B(1)(b), none of the facts, matters and circumstances set out in the particulars, individually or collectively, constitute a material change in circumstances for the mining lease. That is because none of those particulars involve circumstances related to the identification of compensation. However, it is prudent to consider each particular in turn.

[39] Fairhill's failure to pay compensation amounts when they were due is relevant to the agreement about compensation in the sense that, if Fairhill had proposed to pay compensation only on the later date it actually paid, the parties might have agreed upon a larger amount of compensation to reflect the time value of money and the effects of inflation.

[40] There is also a connection between the delay in payment and the mining lease. A delay in payment is a breach of a condition of the mining lease by force of s 276(1)(j) of the MRA at the time the 2020 Agreement was executed.[17] However, that breach is not sufficient to satisfy s 283B(1)(b). The breach was not one that materially altered the compensable effects of the grant of the mining lease.

[41] Although the Comiskeys were held out of money they were entitled to be paid, the fact that payment of compensation was delayed did not make the compensable effects of the grant of the mining lease any better or worse for them. Because the compensable effects of the grant of the mining lease remained the same regardless of the date the compensation was paid, the delay in payment is not a material change in circumstances for the mining lease within the meaning of s 283B(1)(b).

[42] The Comiskeys submit that the effect of this construction is that no breach comprising a failure to pay compensation when agreed - no matter how substantial, egregious or extended - could amount to a material change in circumstances for the mining lease within the meaning of s 283B. That is correct, but it does not mean the construction should be rejected. The purpose of s 283B(1)(b) is to confer jurisdiction on the Land Court to review compensation where it is shown that changed circumstances have materially altered the compensable effects of the grant of the mining lease. Its purpose is not to provide redress for breaches of a compensation agreement or the conditions of the mining lease which do not alter the compensable effects of the grant. Parliament has provided other remedies for such breaches, including a failure to pay compensation that has previously been agreed or determined.

[43] A landowner can bring a proceeding in the Land Court to enforce the compensation agreement under s 363(2)(g) of the MRA. Breach of the condition requiring that the holder of the mining lease make all compensation payments and comply with all terms of a compensation agreement might lead to the Minister cancelling the mining lease under s 308(1) of the MRA. A landowner who is not paid compensation in accordance with a compensation agreement also has remedies available under the common law, including termination of the compensation agreement and bringing a claim against the licence holder for damages.

[44] As Bradley J observed in the Supreme Court judgment, it appears from the parties' agreement to renegotiate compensation that they recognised there had been (or would be if the outstanding compensation was not paid by 28 April 2023) a material change in circumstances warranting a review of the original compensation for the effects of the grant the mining lease.

[45] The 2023 Agreement is relevant to the 2020 Agreement about compensation in that it included an agreement to revisit the amount of compensation the parties had previously agreed. There is also a connection between the 2023 Agreement and the mining lease.

[46] The Comiskeys rely on statements by Bradley J that the parties' conduct in agreeing to renegotiate the compensation "assumes" that there had been a material change in circumstances relevant to the compensation amount (which his Honour said was logically the same as the circumstances for the mining lease), and that the exchanges between the parties that evidence the 2023 Agreement indicate that they "were then at one in thinking" that if the outstanding compensation had not been paid by 28 April 2023 then the circumstances for the mining lease had materially changed.[18]

[47] Those statements suggest that there might have been other circumstances which changed in a way that materially altered the compensable effects of the grant of the mining lease, and the parties recognised the existence of that material change in circumstances by agreeing to renegotiate the compensation. While that may be accepted, to engage the jurisdiction of the Land Court under s 283B(1)(b) the Comiskeys would have to prove the existence of those other circumstances. It is not enough to rely upon an assumption arising from the parties' conduct in agreeing to renegotiate the compensation.

[48] In any event, on this appeal the Comiskeys relied on the facts, matters and circumstances set out in the particulars, including the 2023 Agreement itself. The connection that agreement has to the mining lease is not sufficient to satisfy s 283(1)(b). Regardless of what that agreement might indicate about the parties' thinking, the making of the agreement itself did not alter the compensable effects of the grant of the mining lease. It did not make those compensable effects any better or worse for the Comiskeys than if there had been no such agreement. The parties' agreement to renegotiate the compensation is not, of itself, a material change in circumstances for the mining lease within the meaning of s 283B(1)(b).

[49] The Comiskeys submit Bradley J's finding - that if the parties did not agree on amending the previously agreed compensation the 2023 Agreement gave rise to an obligation on Fairhill to cooperate to allow the Land Court to review the compensation - is relevant to the determination of compensation because it concerns the process by which that determination would occur.

[50] That is insufficient to satisfy s 283B(1)(b). The circumstances referred to in s 283B(1)(b) must be relevant to the compensation agreed or determined at an earlier time, in the sense that a change in those circumstances materially alters the compensable effects of the grant of the mining lease. Although Bradley J's finding about the obligation to cooperate appears to have been premised on an assumption about the existence of circumstances which altered the compensable effects of the grant of the mining lease, that finding did not, of itself, alter those compensable effects. The making of the finding did not make those compensable effects any better or worse for the Comiskeys than if there had been no such finding. Accordingly, the making of that finding is not a material change in circumstances for the mining lease within the meaning of s 283B(1)(b).

[51] The Comiskeys accept that, in an ordinary case, an increase in the value of the land subject to the mining lease is unlikely to amount to a material change for the purposes of s 283B.[19] They submit that, in such a case, a landholder would have the benefit of compensation paid in a timely way and could invest it so that increases in value after the compensation has been paid would not demonstrate any greater loss for which the landowner ought to have been further compensated.

[52] They say that their case, however, is different. The increase in the value of their land in the three years between the compensation being agreed in August 2020 and it eventually being paid in September 2023 meant that the mining activities carried out under the authority of the mining lease would result in a greater diminution in the value of the affected land. By the time they received the bulk of the compensation the real value of the money they received had been meaningfully eroded. The previously agreed sum no longer fairly compensated them for the diminution in the value of their property brought about by the grant of the mining lease.

[53] This submission cannot be accepted. The only difference between the Comiskeys' position and what they describe as an ordinary case involving an increase in the market value of land is Fairhill's delay in paying the agreed compensation. The impact of any increased value would not be the result of the delayed payment. Such increase, and any corresponding increase in the diminution in value caused by the grant of the mining lease, would have occurred whether compensation was paid when it was due, or not. For the reasons already explained in addressing particular 1, the delay in payment does not engage s 283B. Otherwise, any greater diminution in the value of the land affected by the mining lease resulting from an increase in market value is not, for the reasons explained above, a change in circumstances "for" the mining lease. Assuming such an increase was proved, it would not satisfy s 283B(1)(b).

[54] The Member below did not err in finding that none of the facts, matters and circumstances set out in the particulars, individually or collectively, constitute a material change in circumstances for the mining lease. In those circumstances, the Land Court did not have jurisdiction to review the original compensation under s 283B. For that reason, the Comiskeys' appeal against the order dismissing their proceeding must fail.

[55] Having reached that conclusion, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to consider ground 2.

[56] At the commencement of the hearing of the appeal, senior counsel for the Comiskeys acknowledged that if ground 1 was decided against them, then a finding that Fairhill was subject to a duty to cooperate would not overcome the absence of jurisdiction.

[57] The Comiskeys were required to establish jurisdiction of the Land Court under s 283B regardless of Fairhill's obligations under the 2023 Agreement. They have failed to establish that the Land Court had jurisdiction to hear their application under s 283B.

[58] If the conclusion on ground 1 is later found to be wrong, the Comiskeys will have succeeded in establishing that the Land Court has jurisdiction to hear their application to review the original compensation. On that basis they would be entitled to have the order dismissing their proceeding set aside. Ground 2, however it might be determined, would not take the matter any further.

[59] In these circumstances, an alternative submission by the Comiskeys - that the duty to cooperate meant Fairhill was precluded from having the question of jurisdiction determined as a preliminary point - should not be accepted.

[60] It was appropriate to address the question of jurisdiction at an early stage of the proceeding.[20] The conclusion reached on ground 1 means that the matter should not be remitted for further consideration of that question.

1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. By 4.00pm on Tuesday, 5 May 2026, the parties may file a written outline of submissions no longer than five pages as to the costs of the appeal.

[1] See s 279 of the Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld).

[2] Comiskey v Fairhill Coking Coal Pty Ltd [2024] QSC 137.

[3] ERO Georgetown Gold Operations Pty Ltd v Henry [2015] QLAC 4.

[4] Glencore Coal Queensland Pty Ltd & Ors v Keys & Ors (2014) 35 QLCR 194; [2014] QLAC 2.

[5] Nothdurft v QGC Pty Ltd [2017] QLC 41; (2017) 38 QLCR 91.

[6] Hicks v Graham [2004] QLRT 47.

[7] Fairhill Coking Coal Pty Ltd v Comiskey & Anor (No 2) [2025] QLC 9 at [48].

[9] MRA s 363(2)(f).

[10] MRA s 363(2)(g).

[13] At [43] of ERO Georgetown and see also the Court's discussion of the meaning of the word "for" at [45].

[14] Glencore Coal Queensland Pty Ltd & Ors v Keys & Ors (2014) 35 QLCR 194; [2014] QLAC 2 at [43].

[15] See Owners of the Ship 'Shin Kobe Maru' v Empire Shipping Co Inc (1994) 181 CLR 404 at 421; FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL [1988] HCA 13; (1988) 165 CLR 268 at 283-284.

[16] See AB (a pseudonym) v Independent Broad-based Anti-Corruption Commission [2024] HCA 10; (2024) 278 CLR 300 at 312 [21].

[17] Now see MRA s 276(1)(k).

[18] Comiskey v Fairhill Coking Coal Pty Ltd [2024] QSC 137 at [30]- [31], [37].

[19] Citing Glencore Coal Queensland Pty Ltd & Ors v Keys & Ors [2014] QLAC 2; (2014) 35 QLCR 194 at [43].

[20] Hearne v Street [2008] HCA 36; (2008) 235 CLR 125 at 135 [17]; Federated Engine-Drivers and Firemen's Association of Australasia v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd [1911] HCA 31; (1911) 12 CLR 398 at 415.