1. The applicant, who was born in January 1992, commenced a relationship with Michelle Darragh in 2015. Subsequently, they rented premises at which they lived together in Huntingdon Avenue, Bayswater North. They had two sons together, Tait, who was born on 3 January 2018, and Reid, who was born on 16 March 2020. At the time of her death, Ms Darragh was 12 weeks pregnant with a third child.
2. The relationship between the applicant and Ms Darragh was quite unstable, primarily due to the applicant's use of drugs, and his long work hours. At the time of the offence they had separated, and Ms Darragh and the two children were living with her parents.
3. On the morning of 9 October 2021, Ms Darragh met the applicant at a park in Bayswater. She had taken the two children with her in order that they could spend some time with the applicant there. A mutual friend, Leroy Bartlett, also attended at the park. Subsequently, Ms Darragh returned to her parents' home. At about 2:30 pm, she left the two children with her mother, and drove to the premises in Huntingdon Avenue in order to collect some of her belongings.
4. Sometime after Ms Darragh arrived at those premises, the applicant attacked her and stabbed her three times with a large kitchen knife. One of the blows with the knife entered her back, penetrated her chest and neck, and entered the spinal canal, severely damaging the spinal cord. That injury would have led to immediate incapacitation and Ms Darragh's rapid death. After inflicting those wounds on Ms Darragh, the applicant inflicted five stab wounds on his abdominal area.
5. At about 7:25 pm on the same day, Ms Darragh's father, Ashley Darragh, drove to the Huntingdon Avenue premises, as he had become concerned that she had not returned to her parents' home. When he arrived at the premises, he located Ms Darragh lying on the floor in the rear bedroom. She had blood all over her face and was motionless. The applicant was lying next to her and was motionless. The applicant was subsequently conveyed to the Royal Melbourne Hospital where he underwent surgery.

1. The post-mortem examination of Ms Darragh was conducted by forensic pathologist, Dr Chong Zhou, at the Victorian Institute of Forensic Medicine. Dr Zhou found that three sharp force injuries had been inflicted to Ms Darragh. The principal injury was the penetrating stab wound to the right upper back, which penetrated the muscles of the right upper back and the back of the right neck and into the spinal canal, with a depth of penetration of approximately 12 cm. The second incised wound consisted of a penetrating stab wound to the lateral aspect of the left hip with a depth of penetration of approximately 4 cm. The third incised wound constituted a superficial incised injury to the right hand.
2. In addition, Ms Darragh had sustained other injuries that included contusions, abrasions and lacerations of the skin, upper and lower lips region, and contusions and haemorrhage involving the entire length of the right muscles of the neck. Dr Zhou also observed a single foetus with an estimated gestational age of 12 weeks.

1. The applicant was born in January 1992. When he was four years of age, the relationship between his parents broke down, and about one year later, his mother re-partnered with Andrew Caulfield. The applicant had a close relationship with his brother, and his two half-siblings.
2. The applicant attended The Basin Primary School. He then was sent to St Joseph's College in Ferntree Gully, where he completed year 10. In year 11, he began VCAL studies in horticulture. He did not complete the course and commenced employment with Warrandale Landscape Industries for about two years. He then commenced a shopfitting apprenticeship which he completed with Alphatech. Having completed the apprenticeship, he continued to work with Alphatech until 2016. He then commenced his own business called Coman Custom Joinery and Shopfitting. He worked hard to establish the business and spent a considerable amount of time doing so.
3. In the meantime, the applicant had commenced a relationship with Michelle Darragh in 2015. He had been a close friend of Michelle's brother, Aaron Darragh. In 2016, the applicant and Michelle Darragh began living together in a share house. Subsequently, they moved into the rental property in Huntingdon Avenue where their two children were born.
4. During his teenage years, the applicant commenced using substances, and in particular cannabis, initially for recreational purposes. However, over the course of time, his use of those substances increased significantly. He smoked cannabis recreationally from the age of 16 years, progressing to daily use by the age of 18 years. His daily use was heavy, generally in the evenings, but sometimes also during the day at work. In addition, the applicant was a heavy consumer of alcohol. When he was almost 18 years of age, he began using methylamphetamine. From 2019 (when he was 27 years of age), he also began to use cocaine. He subsequently reduced his use of cocaine, but in early 2021 his methylamphetamine use escalated to twice per week.

1. In late 2019, the applicant's mental health deteriorated. He confronted Michelle with an entirely unfounded belief that she was having an affair with his best friend, Leroy Bartlett, and maintained that Bartlett, and not he, was the father of the two children. Although Michelle tried to reassure the applicant that there was no basis to his concerns, nevertheless, he continued to harbour those unfounded beliefs about her conduct.
2. The applicant's mental health reached a state that, on 15 February 2020, his father contacted mental health triage, reporting that the applicant was 'experiencing delusional and paranoid thoughts'.
3. On 26 February 2020, the applicant was found by Ms Darragh crying on the kitchen floor and apparently having a panic attack. She called an ambulance and the applicant was taken to and assessed at Maroondah Hospital. He agreed to have follow-up treatment within the community by the Crisis and Treatment Team (CATT), and was prescribed the antipsychotic medication, Olanzapine. Upon discharge from CATT follow-up on 20 March 2020, the applicant declined referral from case management and possible antidepressant treatment.
4. On 30 March 2020, the applicant left the relationship to live with his brother. He remained of the belief that Ms Darragh was being unfaithful to him. The separation lasted for less than one month and the couple then moved back in together.
5. In 2021, the applicant continued to have mental health difficulties. In July 2021, the applicant and Ms Darragh separated again. Initially the applicant lived in his factory, but he then moved back to the Bayswater North property, and Ms Darragh and their two children lived with her parents. After a period of time, Ms Darragh and the two children moved back into the house in Bayswater North to live with the applicant. It was during that period of time that Ms Darragh became pregnant again, some 12 weeks before the applicant killed her.
6. On Friday 10 September 2021, Ms Darragh returned to her parents' home in a state of distress, informing her parents that her relationship with the applicant was over. Three days later, on 13 September 2021, Ms Darragh attended the Huntingdon Avenue property. There she found the applicant slumped in his motor vehicle in the garage, with the engine running and a pipe connected from the exhaust into the window of the vehicle. Ms Darragh immediately obtained assistance for the applicant, and he was transported by ambulance to the Maroondah Hospital, where he remained as an inpatient in the mental health ward for three days. On the applicant's release from hospital on 16 September 2021, he returned to the Huntingdon Avenue property where he lived alone. During that time he was only permitted to have supervised visits with the two children.
7. By about 27 September 2021, and despite concerns raised by his mother that he was experiencing ongoing paranoia and delusions about Ms Darragh's alleged infidelity, the applicant was discharged from a CATT follow-up. Following that discharge, he continued to experience a diverse range of paranoid thoughts about people being out to 'get him', or trying to conspire against him or poison him. His mother and work colleagues noted that he was behaving oddly in the week immediately preceding the offending.

1. After the incident in which he murdered Michelle Darragh, the applicant was transported to Royal Melbourne Hospital, where he remained under police guard. On 17 October 2021, he was assessed, by a forensic medical officer, to be unfit for interview. On 19 October 2021, he was formally charged with the murder of Michelle Darragh.
2. The applicant was examined, and interviewed, on the instruction of the applicant's legal representatives, by Dr Andrew Carroll, a consultant forensic psychiatrist, on 14 November 2022.
3. In that interview, the applicant recounted the circumstances in which he murdered Michelle Darragh. The applicant told Dr Carroll that he was angry with Michelle for a number of reasons while she was at the house before the attack. The applicant blamed her for having left him and for taking the children away from him, and for making him feel guilty about not wanting the baby. The applicant said to Dr Carroll that while he was putting some dishes away, he saw a kitchen knife in the drying rack. He picked up the knife and secreted it in the pocket of his trousers. In his interview with Dr Carroll, the applicant claimed that at that time he was contemplating stabbing himself in Michelle Darragh's presence in order to traumatise her. He then went to the children's room and lay on the bed thinking about what he would do. When he was there he moved the knife to his shoes in order that Michelle Darragh would not see it.
4. In the moments before the critical incident, the applicant remembered that he was sitting next to Michelle Darragh on the bed. The applicant told Dr Carroll that, at that point, his thoughts abruptly altered from planning to harm himself to planning to harm Michelle Darragh. He recalled having the knife in his hand and having thoughts of killing her. He heard voices inside his head saying 'do it now, do it now'. He said that his plan changed from stabbing himself, to stabbing Michelle, because he 'couldn't take what she was doing any more'. He attributed his attack on her to a 'loss of temper'. He said he was 'pretty fired up' and 'just snapped'.
5. The applicant said (to Dr Carroll) that he might not have full recall of the fatal incident. He remembered getting into a fight over the knife. He thought at one point after lunging at Michelle Darragh he must have missed her, because they were still wrestling over the knife. He said (to Dr Carroll) 'once I lunged at her, I thought I've got to go through with this - she needs to die now'. At one point during the attack, Michelle Darragh was yelling out 'help, help'.
6. The applicant also said (to Dr Carroll) that he then attempted to kill himself with the knife, not because he thought he had killed Michelle Darragh, but he stabbed himself 'to traumatise her' and end his life because of 'the way I was feeling'.

1. Dr Carroll examined the applicant on a number of occasions. The first two occasions were directed to the issue whether the applicant had available a defence of mental impairment. As we have noted, he was subsequently interviewed and assessed by Dr Carroll on 14 November 2022. Dr Carroll's report was tendered in evidence on 29 November 2022, and he also gave evidence on the plea.
2. Dr Carroll's report set out in some detail the applicant's background and his psychological history, which we have summarised.
3. Dr Carroll concluded that the applicant's developmental history was notable for a number of factors, including his family background, which had rendered him vulnerable to mental illness. His personality difficulties contributed to difficulties that he had in undertaking the adult roles of father, intimate partner and breadwinner, which in turn made him vulnerable to engaging in dysfunctional behaviour, and jealousy within his intimate relationship with Michelle Darragh. Further, from adolescence, the applicant had utilised substances on which he developed a psychological dependency. Dr Carroll noted that in the three or four years preceding the offence, the applicant's various mental health and psychosocial challenges had culminated in episodes of psychotic depression, in early 2020 and in the second half of 2021.
4. Dr Carroll considered that, at the time the offence occurred, the applicant was diagnosable with psychotic depression in the form of a Recurrent Major Depressive Episode with severe psychotic features. That condition occurred on the background of a pre-existing Delusional Disorder: jealous type, and a Mixed Substance Use Disorder which was in the early stages of remission.
5. Dr Carroll also considered that the methylamphetamine and cannabis binge engaged in by the applicant in early September 2021, probably precipitated a deterioration in his mental health, which resulted in his serious suicide attempt. Dr Carroll considered that the applicant's subsequent abrupt withdrawal from regular use of cannabis, alcohol and nicotine probably affected his state of mind. However, the overall timing of his psychotic and depressive symptoms, and, in particular, their persistence after he had ceased using substances for some two months, was not consistent with the substances being primarily explicable for his condition at the time of the offending, so that that condition was not a drug-induced psychosis.
6. Dr Carroll also considered that, by the date of the offence, the applicant's psychotic and mood symptoms were severe. He was of the opinion that there was a very close causal relationship between the applicant's psychotic depression and the offending. The applicant's account of the moments preceding the offence were consistent with a 'simmering anger ... that boiled over into acute rage, manifest as impulsive, disinhibited, fatal violence'.
7. Dr Carroll further considered that the applicant's anger was pathological, being primarily attributable to severely impaired judgment due to his psychotic depression. The final precipitating triggers to the applicant's rage consisted of three factors, namely: suicidal despair and resentment at Michelle Darragh for not bringing his boys to the house on the day of the murder; a sense that Michelle Darragh was not listening to his exhortations to leave, and was, instead, wanting to make him feel guilty about the termination of their relationship; and 'command hallucinations' (voices in his head) urging him to kill her.
8. Dr Carroll also stated that, notwithstanding those considerations, the applicant did not lose the ability to reason that killing Michelle Darragh would be considered wrongful by other persons. However, if not for the presence of the applicant's mental illness, the murder would not have occurred; in particular, the symptoms and the applicant's psychotic depression were a necessary and central part of the explanation for the offence.
9. On the hearing of the plea, Dr Carroll gave evidence in which he expanded on a number of some aspects of his report. He was cross-examined, at some length, and in detail, by senior counsel for the prosecution. The principal focus of the cross-examination was directed to the evidence of Dr Carroll that the applicant's condition at the time of the offence was not a 'drug-induced psychosis', but was a recurrent major depressive episode with psychotic features. In particular, counsel focused on the history taken by Dr Carroll that the applicant had abstained from drug use between 16 September and 9 October 2021. In response to questioning, Dr Carroll remained of the conclusion that the applicant was not subject to a substance-induced psychosis at the time of the offending. He considered that the substance use by the applicant over the years had probably played a role in the episode of psychotic depression, in the sense that it was a 'risk factor'. However, the appropriate diagnosis was not drug-induced psychosis.
10. When asked whether he could rule out that the applicant had a drug-induced psychosis on 9 October 2021, Dr Carroll responded:

... in the absence of drug screens and the like, I can't categorically rule out that possibility. ... I have to reach a concluded opinion at a level of more probable than not, based on all of the data available to me. Based on all of the data available to me, which in this case was substantial, I've reached the reasoned opinion that he was not suffering from a substance-induced psychosis at the relevant time.

1. In the course of re-examination, the judge asked a number of central questions of Dr Carroll.
2. In particular, his Honour asked Dr Carroll whether any of the conditions, from which the applicant suffered, deprived him of the ability to fully understand what he was doing when he stabbed Michelle Darragh in the back. Dr Carroll responded 'no ... he was aware of the nature and quality of that action'. The judge then asked Dr Carroll whether there was any respect in which the applicant 'would not have fully understood precisely' what he was doing. Dr Carroll also answered that question in the negative, noting that the applicant's own self-report was that he was aware of the likely consequences of what he was doing. Dr Carroll confirmed that the applicant told him that as he stabbed Ms Darragh in the back, he intended then to kill her.
3. When asked about whether the applicant understood the consequences, particularly of leaving two young children without a mother, Dr Carroll said that the applicant had 'very impaired reflective functioning' at the time, and his capacity for consequential thinking was severely compromised. However, there was no delusion of a kind that impacted his understanding of the consequences of what he was doing. He was conscious that Michelle Darragh was pregnant. Dr Carroll stated that there was nothing in the applicant's delusional belief system that rendered him unable to know that she was pregnant or unable to know that she was the mother of two boys. Further, Dr Carroll confirmed that there was nothing about the applicant's condition that would have led him to believe that it would be appropriate to kill Michelle Darragh.

1. The oral submissions made on the plea were focused primarily on the evidence given by Dr Carroll as to the applicant's mental state at the time of the murder. Senior counsel for the prosecution took specific issue with the conclusions of Dr Carroll to which we have just referred. Counsel submitted that the judge should not accept the account given by the applicant to Dr Carroll that he had been abstinent from drug consumption between 16 September and 9 October 2021. Counsel further submitted that if Dr Carroll's opinion were accepted, the applicant's moral culpability might be reduced, but there were other secondary non-pathological causes of the applicant's anger which drove his offending. Counsel noted that, unfortunately, a number of males who have no psychotic depression nevertheless 'snap' and kill their partner in violent circumstances. Accordingly, it was submitted that any reduction in the applicant's moral culpability should be limited.
2. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the judge should accept the evidence given by Dr Carroll. Counsel further submitted that if Dr Carroll's evidence were accepted, then the applicant's moral culpability, and general deterrence, should be substantially moderated.

1. In comprehensive reasons for sentence,[1] the judge outlined, in detail, the relationship between the applicant and Michelle Darragh, the events that preceded the offending on 9 October 2021, and the circumstances of the offence. His Honour then considered in some detail the evidence of Dr Carroll and the competing submissions relating to it.
2. In considering the central issues raised on the plea in relation to Dr Carroll's evidence, the judge referred to the consideration by this Court in Director of Public Prosecutions v O'Neill[2] of the principles outlined in R v Verdins.[3]
3. His Honour concluded, 'with some hesitation', that he should accept the opinion expressed by Dr Carroll, namely, that the applicant's psychotic condition at the time of the offending was not a drug-induced condition.[4] In expressing that view, the judge noted that it did not mean that he should accept all of the opinions stated by Dr Carroll, and, further, it did not automatically lead to an identifiable outcome on the application of the Verdins principles.[5]
4. In particular, the judge did not accept the proposition, stated by Dr Carroll, that he could not find strong evidence of any non-pathological instrumental motive for the offending. The judge noted that, long before the onset of any psychotic illness, the applicant had harboured ill-founded suspicions about the fidelity of Michelle Darragh. His Honour stated:

Whether that was purely the product of your personality type, or related to your long-term abuse of ice ... the reality is that you were a jealous, and on the evidence, somewhat controlling man for some years before your crime and before the development of psychotic depression. At the time of your crime, your partner had left you, and was in the process of moving her possessions out of the house. Both of those things caused you distress and anger.[6]

1. The judge then noted that Dr Carroll was of the opinion that the applicant's mental condition at the time of the offence did not cause him to lose the ability to reason that killing Michelle Darragh would be considered wrong by other people, and that Dr Carroll considered that the applicant was fully aware of the nature and quality of his actions.[7]
2. The judge further noted that there was nothing in the psychiatric evidence which suggested that the applicant suffered any general loss of 'grip with reality' immediately before and at the time of the offence. The applicant knew that Michelle Darragh had decided that she wished to leave him, the applicant harboured anger against her for doing so, and he secreted a dangerous knife on his person with the intention of killing himself in her presence. Then, in response to his anger, he made the conscious decision to attack her and harm her with the knife. In doing so, he then decided to kill her.[8]
3. The judge then observed:

You carried out a significant attack upon Michelle before the infliction of the fatal wound, which the evidence indicates was the final part of the attack. She sustained bruising and abrasions to her face and limbs, as well as the two less serious stab wounds. There must have been a number of separate applications of force. All the while, you knew that the person you were attacking was your partner and the mother of your young children. You knew that whatever may have been your ill-founded beliefs as to her fidelity towards you, you had no right whatsoever to attack her. She screamed out for help and struggled to resist you. You suppressed her screams and continued on regardless.

Then there was the fatal blow with the knife. You must have stabbed her from behind in what could only have been a very violent, forceful and deliberate manner. You plunged the knife deep into her back and neck, damaging her spinal cord and causing her rapid death. There was nothing in the evidence to indicate that at the time of this murderous action, you were deprived of the ability to fully understand the shocking nature of what you were doing, and the terrible consequences it would wreak on Michelle, her children, and her unborn child.[9]

1. The judge noted that Dr Carroll expressed the opinion that the applicant's simmering anger at the time he attacked Michelle Darragh was primarily attributable to his severely impaired judgment due to psychotic depression. Thus, the judge accepted that there was a necessary causal contribution by the applicant's condition to the commission of his offence. However, his Honour noted that the effect of that consideration on the applicant's moral culpability was 'a matter of degree'.[10] In the present case, the applicant knew 'full-well' what he was doing when he attacked and killed Michelle Darragh. His mental condition had a bearing on the magnitude of the anger he felt towards her, and perhaps on his ability to control himself, but not on his understanding of precisely what it was that he was doing. In those circumstances, the judge concluded:

I consider that the moderation to your moral culpability on account of the causal connection between your illness and your crime should be quite modest. Your moral culpability would necessarily remain high.[11]

1. The judge noted further that the applicant had a full appreciation of the wrongfulness of his conduct. Accordingly, it would not be appropriate for there to be any more than a 'modest reduction' in the application of general deterrence in the determination of the applicant's sentence.[12]
2. In evaluating the applicant's moral culpability, the judge concluded that the offence by the applicant was a 'very serious example' of the crime of murder.[13] His Honour stated:

Your crime involved the killing inside the recently-shared family home of your female domestic partner, the mother of your two young children, in respect of whom you were in a position of trust and responsibility. You were also in a position of relative physical strength. She was vulnerable and defenceless by virtue of the size and strength differential, and entirely unsuspecting and innocent. She was an especially vulnerable person in light of her pregnancy, of which you had full knowledge. Your killing of her occurred in circumstances where she had left you, and made it clear that this would remain the case. You killed her with the use of a dangerous weapon which you had earlier obtained and then secreted, intending to use it for violent purposes. Your crime was carried out for reasons of anger and resentment. Your attack involved multiple thrusts with the knife and further physical attacks upon Michelle. The fatal thrust was a particularly brutal one, inflicted with the intention to kill. In acting upon that intention, you knew full well that your conduct would leave your children without a mother, and lead to the death of Michelle's unborn child.[14]

1. The judge concluded that the offending by the applicant was a crime of 'a very high degree of seriousness', which would fall above the middle range of seriousness for the crime of murder.[15] His Honour reiterated that the moral culpability of the applicant remained high, notwithstanding his mental condition at the time.[16]
2. As mitigating factors, the judge took into account that the applicant had pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity. His plea was of great utilitarian value and was reflective of genuine remorse which he had manifest at an early stage.[17] In addition, the applicant had pleaded guilty during the currency of the COVID19 pandemic, so that it should be accorded more substantial weight in mitigation. His Honour also accepted that the applicant had good prospects of rehabilitation.
3. In conclusion, the judge considered that the sentencing purposes of denunciation and general deterrence were of particular importance.[18]

Application for leave to appeal - submissions

1. In support of the proposed ground of appeal, counsel for the applicant submitted that the judge 'set an artificial bar' for the moderation of moral culpability that approximates to a full defence of mental impairment. In particular, it was submitted that the judge placed an inappropriate emphasis on, and incorrectly accorded primacy to, the knowledge by the applicant of his actions and their consequences, and in doing so he failed to give appropriate weight to the evidence of Dr Carroll that the applicant was suffering a severe episode of psychotic depression against the background of a delusional disorder. In that respect, counsel noted Dr Carroll's opinion that the applicant's conduct would not have occurred but for the strong causal contribution of his mental illness to his offending behaviour.
2. Counsel submitted that Dr Carroll's conclusions were clearly relevant to an evaluation of the subjective culpability of the applicant for the murder of Michelle Darragh. In that respect, counsel emphasised Dr Carroll's conclusions that the applicant's behaviour was driven by severe symptoms of a mental illness. Accordingly, it was submitted, by according primacy to the knowledge by the applicant of the wrongfulness of his actions, the judge erred in his assessment of the applicant's moral culpability. In particular, it was submitted that, in doing so, the judge failed to take into account the evidence of Dr Carroll that the applicant's disproportionate anger, which drove him to murder Michelle Darragh, had its foundation in his psychiatric condition. In those circumstances, it was submitted that the judge erred by determining that the fact that the applicant knew and understood the wrongfulness of his actions had the effect that any reduction of his moral culpability should be quite modest.[19]
3. In response, counsel for the respondent submitted that the judge arrived at his assessment of the applicant's moral culpability by a careful process of evaluating the evidence of Dr Carroll. Counsel noted that, in accordance with the principles stated in Verdins, the judge was required to assess the nature and extent of the effects of the applicant's mental impairment on his behaviour at the time of the offending. In doing so, the judge was not required to accept all of the opinions expressed by Dr Carroll. Instead, it was submitted, the judge carefully evaluated Dr Carroll's evidence in light of all the other evidence.
4. In particular, counsel noted that the judge took into account the following relevant circumstances. First, the undisputed evidence that the applicant's offending was motivated by anger that was only 'in part pathological'. Secondly, before the attack on Michelle Darragh, the applicant armed himself with a knife which he secreted beneath his clothing. Thirdly, the applicant formed a specific intention to kill Michelle Darragh. Fourth, at the time that he inflicted the fatal injury, the applicant was fully aware of the nature and quality of the acts that he was performing and he knew they were wrong. Fifthly, as Dr Carroll accepted, the applicant was not suffering any delusion that impaired his ability to know and understand the consequence of his actions.
5. Counsel for the respondent noted that the judge accepted that the applicant's mental condition had a bearing on the magnitude of his anger and his ability to control himself. However, in that respect, the judge also noted that the applicant was a jealous and controlling man, that he harboured anger against Ms Darragh, that his decision to attack Ms Darragh and then kill her was a conscious decision made in response to anger, and that the applicant was able to fully understand what he was doing and the serious nature of it. Further, counsel noted that there was no evidence to suggest that the applicant had suffered any loss of grip on reality immediately before or at the time that he murdered Michelle Darragh.
6. In those circumstances, counsel submitted, it is not surprising that the judge only moderated the extent of the applicant's moral culpability to a limited degree.

1. By its nature, domestic violence, otherwise referred to as intimate partner violence, necessarily constitutes serious offending. Such conduct involves a breach of trust by the offender which is a basic element of the relationship. Almost invariably, the violence is perpetrated by a stronger male against a female, and as such, it violates fundamental moral values of a civilised society. In such cases, it is recognised that, in the exercise of the sentencing discretion, the purposes of general deterrence and denunciation must be given particular, if not primary, weight.[20]
2. In its recent decision in Njovu v The King,[21] this Court stated those principles in the following terms:

The offence that was the subject of charge 2 occurred in circumstances which are commonly described as domestic or family violence. In such cases it is recognised that the sentencing purposes of general deterrence and denunciation must be given particular weight. In view of the prevalence of offences of the kind committed by the applicant in this case, it was necessary that the judge impose a sentence that was sufficient to convey a clear message that those persons, who choose to become engaged in such offending, will, on conviction, lose their right to remain at liberty in society for a significant period of time. It is only in that way that the courts can discharge their role in protecting other vulnerable persons in family situations from similar acts of violence.

In addition, the sentencing purpose of denunciation is of particular significance. The kind of violence engaged in by the applicant in this case, and which occurs all too frequently, strikes at the basis of the family unit, which is a fundamental and indispensable element of a civilised society. As occurred in the present case, such conduct almost invariably involves violence inflicted on a female by her stronger and physically superior male partner. That conduct can only be properly described as shameful and cowardly. It is necessary that sentences imposed in such cases be sufficient to properly express the condemnation by the courts and by the community, of such egregious conduct.[22]

1. In the present case, there were a number of factors which aggravated the objective gravity of the offending, and, prima facie, the moral culpability of the applicant, in respect of the offending.
2. Shortly before she was murdered by the applicant, Michelle Darragh attended the premises, which had previously been their family home. She did so in order to collect her belongings, having made the decision to finally terminate their relationship, which was her right. It was not suggested that Michelle Darragh in any way precipitated, provoked or incited the applicant to assault her in the manner in which he did.
3. In doing so, the applicant used a sharp knife to attack and murder Michelle Darragh. At all times, she was entirely vulnerable and defenceless. The applicant deliberately stabbed her three times. His admitted intention in doing so was to kill her, that is, to terminate the life of the woman who was the mother of his two young children, and who was pregnant by him with a third child. The inevitable effect of the applicant's murderous assault was not only to deprive Michelle Darragh of her life, but also to deprive her young children of their mother.
4. It was based on those considerations that the judge assessed the objective gravity of the applicant's offending as 'very high', and as falling above the middle range of seriousness for the crime of murder.[23] On this application, counsel for the applicant, quite correctly, did not take issue with that characterisation of the objective seriousness of the offending.
5. It was in that context that the judge was required to assess and determine the extent to which the evidence, concerning the applicant's psychological state, mitigated his moral culpability, which would, otherwise, properly be evaluated as being of a very high degree of seriousness. The critical issue on this application is whether the judge erred in concluding that, notwithstanding Dr Carroll's evidence concerning the connection between the applicant's psychotic depression and the offending, the applicant's moral culpability for the offending remained high, so that there should only be a modest reduction in the application of the sentencing purposes of general deterrence and denunciation.
6. In determining that issue, two points are of particular relevance.
7. First, an assessment by a sentencing judge of the moral (subjective) culpability of an offender is not a mathematical or scientific exercise. It involves a considered and informed evaluation of the subjective blameworthiness and responsibility of the offender, taking into account, among other considerations, the objective gravity of the offending, and any subjective personal factors which might affect the offender's culpability.
8. Secondly, and as an aspect of that consideration, the issue, on an application for leave to appeal in respect of such an assessment by the judge, is not whether the appellate court might have reached a different conclusion concerning the subjective culpability of the offender. Rather, the question, which arises in this case, is whether the judge materially erred in that evaluation.
9. In Verdins, the Court discussed how, in an appropriate case, the effect of a psychological or psychiatric disorder might affect an assessment of the offender's moral culpability:

It is of the nature of the sentencing discretion that views will differ as to how, and to what extent, impaired mental functioning may reduce the blameworthiness of the offender's conduct. The effect on the Court's assessment of culpability will, of course, vary with the nature and severity of the condition, and with the nature and seriousness of the offence. It is not appropriate for an appellate court to be prescriptive in this regard, nor is it possible to be exhaustive. It may assist sentencing judges, nevertheless, if we list the various ways in which impaired mental functioning has been held - correctly, in our view - to be capable of reducing moral culpability.

Impaired mental functioning at the time of the offending may reduce the offender's moral culpability if it had the effect of -

(a) impairing the offender's ability to exercise appropriate judgment;

(b) impairing the offender's ability to make calm and rational choices, or to think clearly;

(c) making the offender disinhibited;

(d) impairing the offender's ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct;

(e) obscuring the intent to commit the offence;

(f) contributing (causally) to the commission of the offence.

As we have said, this is not to be taken as an exhaustive list.[24]

1. It has been emphasised in a number of cases that there must be an appropriate evidentiary basis upon which a court may conclude that any of the sentencing principles, summarised in Verdins, may apply to a particular case. It has also been emphasised that the sentencing court must exercise intellectual rigour in determining that question.
2. In Director of Public Prosecutions v O'Neill,[25] this Court stated:

Clearly, there must be an established evidentiary basis for moderating the principles of general deterrence in a particular case. For that to occur, it is not sufficient that the offender suffer from a particular mental impairment. There must be proper, and informed, consideration of how that impairment might have either materially diminished the capacity of the offender to reason appropriately at the time of the offence concerning the wrongfulness of his or her offending, or of how the offender's condition might make the full application of the principles of general deterrence repugnant to the underlying sense of humanity which guides proper sentencing.

1. In a further passage, the Court in O'Neill stated:

Fifth, cogent evidence, normally in the form of an expert opinion, is necessary to establish the existence of the mental impairment, either at the time of the offence, or at sentence, or both, and the nature, extent and effect of the mental impairment experienced by the offender at the relevant time.

Sixth, the assessment by the sentencing judge must be undertaken with rigour, as was made clear in Verdins itself and has since been repeatedly emphasised by this Court on appeal.[26]

1. On this application, the central submission, advanced on behalf of the applicant, was that the judge erred by according 'primacy' to the evidence of Dr Carroll that, at the time at which the applicant murdered Michelle Darragh, he had a full appreciation of the nature of the act that he was performing, and of the wrongfulness of that conduct. It was submitted that that error led the judge to determine that any reduction in the applicant's subjective culpability for the offending should only be 'quite modest'.[27]
2. In considering that question, it is necessary, first, to understand how, and to what extent, the judge did assess the applicant's subjective culpability on the basis of the evidence given by Dr Carroll.
3. As we have noted, his Honour, correctly, evaluated the objective gravity of the applicant's offending as 'very high'.[28] Having expressed that conclusion, his Honour considered that the reduction in the applicant's moral culpability, by reason of his psychological disorder, should be 'quite modest', so that his moral culpability for the offending remained 'high'.[29] It is quite clear, from the language so used by the judge, and more importantly, by the context in which he made that evaluation, that he did materially reduce the assessment of the applicant's moral culpability for the offending by reason of the effects of his psychological condition, albeit that his Honour, nevertheless, considered that the applicant's moral culpability, for the offending, should in the circumstances necessarily remain 'high'.
4. In considering whether, in some way, his Honour erred in making that assessment, it is important to give careful consideration to the actual circumstances in which the applicant murdered Michelle Darragh.
5. When the applicant attended the park in Bayswater on the morning of 9 October 2021, Leroy Bartlett, observed that everything was 'fine' with him. Leroy Bartlett asked the applicant if he was 'clean', that is, not using illicit substances, and the applicant confirmed that that was correct. Leroy Bartlett was a longtime friend of the applicant who had had regular interactions with him. He made no observations that indicated that the applicant, at that time, was any different to his normal presentation.
6. It was about three hours later, on the same day, that Michelle Darragh attended the premises in Huntingdon Avenue to collect her belongings. The only description of what then occurred consisted of the account given by the applicant to Dr Carroll. In that respect, as the judge noted, some of the features of the account, given by the applicant, did not 'sit at all comfortably' with the reality of the injuries inflicted by him on Michelle Darragh, and in particular, the fatal injury.[30]
7. Relevantly, the applicant told Dr Carroll that when Michelle Darragh arrived at his home, he felt angry, because she originally was going to bring the children with her, and she had subsequently messaged that she was leaving them with her parents at their home. The applicant then told Dr Carroll that while Michelle Darragh was packing her belongings, he was attending to dishes in the kitchen, and in doing so he observed the kitchen knife in the drying rack. He said that it was at that point he picked it up and placed it in his pocket, contemplating that he would stab himself in front of Michelle Darragh.
8. The applicant explained to Dr Carroll that he felt angry with Michelle Darragh for a variety of reasons, namely: Michelle Darragh left the applicant when he 'needed her the most'; Michelle Darragh 'took the kids away'; the applicant had expected Michelle Darragh to try to talk to him and start crying to make him feel bad, and the applicant thought that she had not brought the children with her because she was planning to do that; each occasion on which they met, Michelle Darragh asked 'whether I wanted the baby'; and the applicant resented Michelle Darragh for making him feel guilty, and he resented that because, from his perspective, it was Michelle Darragh who had ended their relationship.
9. Each of those five reasons given by the applicant to Dr Carroll were, essentially, rational. While they were by no means an appropriate reason or justification for becoming homicidally enraged with Michelle Darragh, nevertheless they were each matters which, from the applicant's perspective, might be accepted as being logical bases for his anger.
10. In his account to Dr Carroll, the applicant described how, in the moments before he killed Michelle Darragh, he was sitting next to her on a bed, during which Michelle Darragh became emotional. He told Dr Carroll that it was at that point that his thoughts switched from planning to harm himself to planning to harm Michelle Darragh. He said that he heard voices, which 'did play a bit of a role' in his decision. However, and most relevantly, he told Dr Carroll that he changed the plan, from stabbing himself to stabbing Michelle Darragh, because he 'couldn't take what she was doing anymore' and he attributed his attack on Michelle Darragh to consequent 'loss of temper'. He described the attack that he then perpetrated on Michelle Darragh as 'an impulse thing that shouldn't have happened'; he told Dr Carroll that he was 'pretty fired up' and he 'just snapped'.
11. Thus, it is quite evident, that on his own account, the predominant, if not overwhelming, cause of the homicidal attack, which the applicant then launched on Michelle Darragh, was his loss of temper, which was fuelled by anger caused by, and arising from, the circumstances and reasons that he recounted to Dr Carroll.
12. In his analysis and conclusion, Dr Carroll analysed the final precipitating 'triggers to his rage' to have been:
    • The applicant's suicidal despair and resentment at Michelle Darragh for not bringing his sons to the house after initially saying she would.
    • A sense that she was not listening to his exhortations to leave and was, instead, wanting (again) to make him feel guilty about the termination of their relationship.
    • Command hallucinations (voices in his head) urging him to kill Michelle Darragh.
13. Two points, concerning that conclusion by Dr Carroll, are evident. First, the fatal rage in which the applicant murdered Michelle Darragh was driven by personal factors. While Dr Carroll also attributed that rage to 'command hallucinations', in the description of the circumstances given by the applicant to Dr Carroll, he himself stated that the 'voices' only played 'a bit of a role' in his decision to kill Michelle Darragh.
14. Further, as Dr Carroll concluded, and as he confirmed in his evidence on the plea, the applicant did not lose the ability to reason that killing Michelle Darragh would be considered wrongful by other persons. That is, he murdered Michelle Darragh in circumstances in which he fully understood the nature and quality of the act that he was performing, he performed those acts with the specific intention of killing Michelle Darragh, and he did not lose the capacity to understand that killing Michelle Darragh would be considered wrongful by other people; that is, he knew there was no basis on which his intended murder of Michelle Darragh could be justified.
15. It was in that context that, in his evidence, Dr Carroll, in answer to questions by the judge, confirmed those fundamental propositions, namely, that the applicant was aware of the nature and quality of his actions, and that he had the capacity to reason and understand that killing Michelle Darragh would be considered wrongful by other people.
16. Further, it was in that context that the judge noted that, while the applicant's mental condition had a bearing on the magnitude of the anger that he felt towards Michelle Darragh, and perhaps on his ability to control himself, nevertheless it did not impair his capacity to understand what he was doing, how serious it was, and what the consequences of his actions would be.[31] It was on that basis that the judge concluded that the moderation to the applicant's moral culpability, due to the connection between his psychiatric illness and his offence, should be 'quite modest' and that his moral culpability for the offence would necessarily 'remain high'.[32]
17. As we have noted, the fundamental submission advanced on this application was that the judge wrongly 'gave primacy' to the applicant's knowledge of the wrongfulness of his actions as the principal factor in assessing and determining his subjective culpability for the offence.
18. The foregoing analysis of his Honour's reasons, and of the evidence, demonstrates that that proposition, relied on by the applicant, is, with respect, overly simplistic.
19. The judge did not, without more, simply give 'primacy' to the evidence by Dr Carroll that the applicant knew and understood the wrongfulness of his actions when he murdered Michelle Darragh. Rather, in the context set out in the sentencing reasons, and in the context of the description given by the applicant of the circumstances in which he murdered Michelle Darragh, it is evident that the judge, in determining the moral culpability of the applicant, did so by reference to the fact that, notwithstanding the applicant's psychotic disorder, nevertheless his offending was driven by his fierce anger. The judge accepted that the applicant's mental condition had a 'bearing on the magnitude' of that anger, but it is clear, from the judge's analysis of the evidence, that the anger was not a product of his mental condition. Further, the judge correctly evaluated the extent to which the applicant's mental condition contributed to the magnitude of his anger, by taking into account that, notwithstanding his psychological condition and his anger, he had maintained the capacity to understand precisely what he was doing, how serious it was, and what the consequences of his actions would be.
20. Considered in the context of the evidence, and the judge's careful consideration of it, it must therefore be concluded that the judge did not err in determining that the moderation to the applicant's moral culpability for his offending should be quite modest, and that his moral culpability would necessarily remain 'high'.
21. For those reasons, the proposed ground of appeal could not succeed. That is, it has not been demonstrated that the sentencing judge erred in placing 'disproportionate emphasis' on the applicant's knowledge that his actions were wrong and in doing so 'failed' to appropriately moderate the applicant's moral culpability for the offending.
22. It follows that if the applicant were granted an extension of time, his application for leave to appeal against sentence would necessarily fail. Accordingly, the application for an extension of time to file and serve the notice of application for leave to appeal must be refused.

[1] DPP v Coman [2023] VSC 159 ('Reasons').

[2] (2015) 47 VR 395; [2015] VSCA 325 ('O'Neill').

[3] [2007] VSCA 102; (2007) 16 VR 269, 276 [32] (Maxwell P, Buchanan and Vincent JJA); [2007] VSCA 102 ('Verdins').

[20] Pasinis v The Queen [2014] VSCA 97, [57] (Neave JA and Kyrou AJA); Kalala v The Queen [2017] VSCA 223; (2017) 269 A Crim R 1, 18 [59] (Maxwell P, Redlich and Osborn JJA); [2017] VSCA 223; DPP v Reynolds (a pseudonym) [2022] VSCA 263; (2022) 71 VR 336, 352 [71]-[77] (T Forrest JA and Kidd AJA); [2022] VSCA 263; Dragovic v The King [2024] VSCA 95, [31]-[33] (Kennedy and T Forrest JJA).

[22] Ibid [43]-[44] (Priest and Kaye JJA).

[24] Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; (2007) 16 VR 269, 275 [25]-[26] (Maxwell P, Buchanan and Vincent JJA).

[25] [2015] VSCA 325; (2015) 47 VR 395, 410 [59] (Warren CJ, Redlich and Kaye JJA).

[26] O'Neill [2015] VSCA 325; (2015) 47 VR 395, 415 [77]-[78] (Warren CJ, Redlich and Kaye JJA). See also R v Zander [2009] VSCA 10, [29] (Dodds-Streeton JA); Brown v The Queen [2020] VSCA 212; (2020) 62 VR 491, 507-8 [61]-[62] (Maxwell P, Niall, T Forrest, Emerton and Osborn JJA); [2020] VSCA 212; Langton (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2022] VSCA 79, [32]-[33] (Maxwell P, McLeish and Macaulay JJA); Alessawi v The King [2025] VSCA 23, [105]-[109] (Emerton P, Taylor J and Kidd AJA); Hu v The King [2025] VSCA 60, [62]-[65] (Walker, Boyce and Kaye JJA); Idrizi & Anor v The King [2025] VSCA 286, [72]-[74] (Priest and Kaye JJA).