Collins v Callaway

Category: Procedural rulings

Parties: Mary Collins (Plaintiff)
Kaysie Rose Callaway (Defendant)

Representation: Solicitors:
Mary Collins (In person)
Maddocks (Defendant)

File Number(s): 2025/447910

Publication restriction: Nil

JUDGMENT

Introduction

Background

1. Ms Collins (the Plaintiff) and Ms Callaway (the Defendant) have been neighbours for about four years.

2. The fence between them stops at the end of their garages and does not go all the way down to the street. An invisible boundary line continues. A small “ponytail” palm had been planted by the Plaintiff on an area of grass between the two driveways to their homes. The Defendant trimmed the palm on her side of the driveway, and the Plaintiff later removed it altogether, leaving a patch of grass and dirt surrounded by four stakes. The Defendant removed the two stakes on her side of the driveway, as it was impeding her in opening her car door.

3. On 16 October 2024, the Plaintiff, David Collins (her husband), the Defendant and her husband were in an altercation at the front of their houses in respect of ongoing tensions between them including in respect of the palm. Neither party was giving any ground and ultimately the Defendant knocked the Plaintiff’s phone from her hand. The phone fell to the ground. The Plaintiff had been pointing the phone towards the Defendant’s face, recording her. Both parties were arguing and a neighbour called police.

The Defamatory Statement

4. During the police attendance, the Defendant said words to the effect of, “How do I know she is not a paedophile? Mary is a liar. My children are not able to play freely on the street because of Mary” (the incident). This was recorded by the Plaintiff’s CCTV camera.

The Proceedings

5. About ten months later, on 1 September 2025, the Plaintiff served a Concerns Notice.

6. On 20 October 2025, the Plaintiff filed a statement of claim, alleging that the statement was defamatory and that the Plaintiff knew that it had been heard by neighbours, being “those persons who resided in the property at 4, 5, and 6” of the street and “a Mr Collins who lived in the property at number 10” (this is a reference to the Plaintiff’s husband). The Plaintiff sought damages and an injunction against further statements being made.

7. On 2 April 2026, the Defendant filed a Notice of Motion (“the Motion”) seeking the following orders:

8. Pursuant to s 10A(5) and (7) of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) (“the Act”) the question of whether the Plaintiff has established the serious harm element under section 10A(1) be determined prior to trial and on the pleadings and particulars alone.

9. A declaration that the Plaintiff has not pleaded facts capable of establishing that the statements complained of have caused, or are likely to cause, serious harm to the Plaintiff’s reputation.

10. The proceedings be dismissed pursuant to section 10A(4)(b) of the Act.

11. In the alternative, that the Statement of Claim be struck out and the proceedings dismissed.

12. The Plaintiff to pay the Defendant’s costs of the motion and the proceedings.

13. The Motion was heard on 19 May 2026. Ms Phillips appeared for the Defendant. The Plaintiff appeared in person.

14. The proceedings were heard just prior to me going on extended leave, which has delayed the delivery of this judgment. Although the parties were informed that this was to be the case, I nonetheless acknowledge that they have waited some months for it. It was further delayed more recently so that the Plaintiff could file further submissions, a matter to which I will return.

15. Order (1) of the Motion was agreed to by consent. This included that the matter effectively be determined on the papers. However, as the Plaintiff was unrepresented, some latitude was given to her in that regard and she cross-examined the Defendant. The Plaintiff and Mr Collins were not cross-examined.

The Evidence

The Plaintiff’s Evidence

11. The Plaintiff relied on her affidavit sworn on 30 April 2026. In addition to the background matters I have stated, I have considered the following relevant matters.

12. The Plaintiff asserted that:

13. Residents Shannon and Dale of number 4, Roy, Krina and Verika of number 5, and George, Christelle, Lachlan and Ashton of number 6 were “in the vicinity”. Residents of number 5 were in their house. For ease of reference and to protect their privacy, I have referred to them by their first names. No disrespect is intended.

14. Residents of number 4 and 6 were “present in the street” at the time the statement was made.

15. The statement was made “in front of” the residents of number 4.

16. Sound travels easily between all the houses numbered 4, 5, and 6 situated in the cul-de-sac.

17. Because of the volume of the statement and the proximity of the properties, she believes that the statement was heard by the residents of all the properties.

18. However, during the hearing it became clear that this was not the case and the fact and extent of publication became an issue. Concessions were made by the Plaintiff during the hearing, to which I will come, obviating the need for the Defendant to cross-examine the Plaintiff on that issue.

19. The statement was also made in the vicinity of the nine attending police officers, who were talking to various people. There is no evidence that any officer heard that being said although it does appear from the CCTV footage to be directed to an unidentified police officer or officers.

20. As to any change in circumstances since that time, the Plaintiff gave evidence that before the incident:

21. She maintained friendly and regular social contact with the resident of number 1 and the residents of numbers 4, 5, and 6, consisting of:

(a) Greetings and conversations in the street. (b) Visits between properties. (c) Telephone calls. (d) Exchanging text messages. (e) Attending social gatherings. (f) Ongoing neighbourly engagement.

2. She and the residents of number 6 would walk and dine together on a weekly basis and planned day trips together. She would watch their house whilst they were away. The Plaintiff and Mr Collins were married in their home.

3. The Plaintiff gave evidence that after the incident:

4. She immediately noticed a significant change in her relationship with the neighbours.

5. Krina ignored her on most occasions.

6. Roy who previously greeted her regularly, now did so significantly less often.

7. George and Christelle stopped speaking to her and began avoiding her on the street. They no longer greeted her, avoided eye contact and did not acknowledge her in passing.

8. Lachlan, who had been fond of her dogs and interacted with them, now showed no more interest in them.

9. In late October 2025, Christelle and Lachlan were walking on the opposite side of the road and did not acknowledge her or Mr Collins.

10. Shannon ceased to greet her, by “beeping and waving or interacting” with her.

11. Lachlan and Verika stopped attending her house.

12. Since then (although it is not clear when this was, given that some residents continued to interact with her after the incident to some extent), there have been no further interactions with the residents.

13. Neighbours in nearby streets, who had previously been friendly, ceased acknowledging her.

14. The Plaintiff also relied on Mr Collins’ affidavit sworn on 30 April 2024 relevantly on the following matters going to publication:

15. He was standing next to the Plaintiff when the Defendant spoke the words.

16. The words were spoken loudly.

17. The statement was made in the presence of the police officers, the Plaintiff, and residents of numbers 4 and 6, who were “nearby”. The residents of number 6 were sitting inside a car talking to the resident from number 4, who was standing by the car.

18. Sound carries easily between the properties.

19. As to any damage to the Plaintiff’s reputation, Mr Collins gave very similar evidence to the Plaintiff, that prior to 16 October 2024, to his observation:

20. The Plaintiff maintained friendly and regular social contact with the resident “Alex” at number 1 and the “other residents” of numbers 4, 5 and 6, consisting of greetings and conversations in the street, visits between properties, exchanging text messages, attending social gathers, and ongoing neighbourly engagement.

21. The Plaintiff has had very close, supportive and respectful relationships with “the neighbours”.

22. Mr Collins said that following the incident he has observed changes in the way “some neighbours” interacted with the Plaintiff, including “reduced greetings and social interaction”. He said that he too had experienced less acknowledgement from the neighbours, even when the Plaintiff was not with him.

The Defendant’s Evidence

20. The Defendant relied on her affidavit filed on 15 May 2026, signed on 19 May 2026.

21. The Defendant said that a few months after she moved into the neighbouring house, she began to encounter various issues with the Plaintiff, culminating in the issue with the palm. She explained her reasons for trimming the palm and setting aside the stakes once the palm had been removed by the Plaintiff, allowing her to open and close her car door without hitting the stakes. She agreed that she was in error regarding the dates on which those events occurred. Nothing turns on that error.

22. According to the Defendant, the incident started when Mr Collins approached her house and asked to talk to her. She said she did not wish to talk to him. The Plaintiff began yelling at her about the stakes. As the disagreement escalated, the Plaintiff commenced pointing her phone very close to her face and recording her. She tapped the phone from the Plaintiff’s hand. The video evidence establishes that the Defendant had been wrong about whether the Plaintiff came from the house or her car. Nothing turns on that error.

23. Overall, the video evidence establishes that the Plaintiff was recording in the way described by the Defendant, but that the Defendant did knock (rather than tap) the phone out of the Plaintiff’s hand, with some vigour.

24. In my view, both the Plaintiff and the Defendant sought to understate their actions. Ultimately, nothing much turns on the minutiae of who did what and in what way during the argument.

25. The police were called. Nine officers arrived and spoke to the Plaintiff and the Defendant separately. The Defendant said that some residents of numbers 4 and 6 “either spoke with police or were temporarily outside while walking to or from their own homes”. However, she said that when the statement was made, the only people outside and in proximity to her was her husband, the Plaintiff, Mr Collins and the police officers. She did not recall seeing any other residents outside at this time. The CCTV footage shows only that there were some residents some distance away. It is not possible to determine on the evidence whether they heard the statement being made.

26. The CCTV footage establishes that at the time the words were spoken, “Shannon is standing here”, about five houses away and that Christelle, George and their son were inside a car (also some distance away). They drove away.

27. At that point in the proceedings, it became clear that the Plaintiff had not arranged to garner any evidence from Shannon, Christelle or George.

28. The Defendant observed in her evidence that since January 2022, some of the Plaintiff’s neighbours did not have a strong relationship with the Plaintiff or her husband. In cross-examination, the Plaintiff asked how she formed that view. The Defendant relied on paragraph 23 of her affidavit.

29. This included text messages exchanged between the Defendant and Christelle, in which Christelle stated in respect of the Plaintiff,

“We “were” good friends for a short amount of time and then after that incident about the bins, she stopped talking to me. She felt I took your side I guess.”

…

“But it’s got nothing to do with what u did as to why we don’t talk”.

30. The issue with the bins had occurred before the defamatory statement was made. The reference to “what u did” is not clear but, in my view, it is likely to be a reference to the dispute on 16 October 2024.

31. The Plaintiff disputed the contents of the text message and stated that she and Christelle were very good friends, but that the friendship ended because of the statement made by the Defendant.

32. The text messages produced by the Defendant commence in March 2026. The Defendant had shown Christelle the Plaintiff’s particulars of these proceedings, which included a reference to Christelle and purported to show the depth of the friendship between Christelle and the Plaintiff prior to the statement being made. Christelle responded as I have set out.

33. Subject to dealing with the Plaintiff’s submissions regarding inadmissibility (set out in her reply submissions and to which I will come), where this is a text message from Christelle and where the Plaintiff has not called her to dispute it, I accept that it is likely that the reason why Christelle no longer speaks to the Plaintiff has nothing to do with the statement made by the Defendant on 16 October 2024.

34. The Plaintiff sought to explain away the clear message, saying that Christelle is a very conservative person, who gets afraid and she does not want to challenge people and that her statements to the Defendant are “not reliable because she is scared”. She said that she was going call Christelle to give evidence. However, Christelle was not at court. The Plaintiff also said that she had texts showing contact with Christelle after the “bin issue”. They were not produced at the hearing.

35. As to the question of adjourning the proceedings to call Christelle, the service of the Defendant’s affidavit was late by only one day and the Defendant's affidavit was not the first time that it had come to the Plaintiff’s attention that the relationship between the Plaintiff and her neighbours would be of significant relevance to the proceedings. In my view, it was always open to the Plaintiff to call evidence from Christelle, or any of her neighbours to say what, if anything, they heard and that the friendships deteriorated because of the statement made by the Defendant. The Plaintiff said in her pleading and in her evidence that there were people in the vicinity when the words were said. Just who, if anyone, heard the statement is axiomatically relevant to the Plaintiff’s case on harm.

36. Whilst some people were in the vicinity, the Plaintiff did not enquire and does not know whether they heard the words stated. She relied on the fact that after that day they stopped talking to her. However, as the example with Christelle makes clear, there may be other reasons why they no longer engage with the Plaintiff, a matter that should have been the subject of evidence and not speculation.

37. The Plaintiff’s case does not entirely rely on the statement damaging her reputation, but also because of “the presence of so many police officers and seriousness of the matter and assault and everything turned the whole scenario, in my opinion, into by saying that people started thinking that, okay, there has been something.”

38. This is a further difficultly with the Plaintiff’s case. If the neighbours stopped talking to her, as she feared, because the police arrived (or for some other reason), this cannot go to harm to her reputation caused by the statement. She has no evidence that any neighbour stopped talking to her because of anything said by the Defendant. The only evidence is evidence to the contrary, by way of Christelle’s text messages to the Defendant and matters later provided by the Plaintiff, to which I will return.

39. Indeed, when pressed, the Plaintiff said, “I believe no one would say that on that street, that they heard it and, and they actually changed their behaviour with me based on that.” The Plaintiff relied entirely on what she perceived as the timing of her neighbours no longer talking to her. She said, “I had very close relationship with all of them and all of a sudden after 16 October 2024, they all stopped talking to me… they even ignore me when they're walking across their street.”

40. The Plaintiff confirmed however that no witness would support her. She accepted “they won't say that.”

The Defendant’s Submissions

41. The Defendant’s submissions (both in writing and orally) can be summarised as follows:

42. The Plaintiff bears the onus of establishing on the balance of probabilities that the Defendant’s statement, caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the Plaintiff’s reputation.

43. This requires the Plaintiff to provide evidence of impact on her reputation and not just rely on the seriousness of the statement or the seriousness of the imputations themselves. It also requires the Court to have regard to the extent of the publication and the nature of the recipients, in this case being potentially the neighbours. Whilst Mr Collins and some police officers were also present, there is no suggestion that the Plaintiff’s reputation was diminished in the eyes of Mr Collins or any police officer by reason of the statement made, and no claim is made in that regard (I interpolate, for reasons I will come to, there is no evidence that any police officer heard or remembered the statement being made).

44. There is no evidence that any neighbour heard the statement being made, much less believed the imputations.

45. There is no evidence to support the Plaintiff’s pleading in the Statement of Claim that the residents of numbers 4, 5 and 6 heard the statement. The volume of the statement and the proximity to the neighbouring houses does not assist, given that there is no evidence as to what the residents were doing at the time, or that they were likely to have heard and understood the statement.

46. Alternatively, if the Court determines on the evidence that some or all of the residents of the street did hear the statement or are likely to have heard the statement, the publication remains limited. It is a small, localised publication. As an oral statement and without any evidence of actual impact, it does not amount to serious harm caused to the Plaintiff.

47. In considering actual impact, the issue of the relationship between the Plaintiff and her neighbours is significant. There is evidence to support the notion that the Plaintiff’s relationship with her neighbours was already compromised, and that the evidence presented did not show a particularly close relationship in any event.

48. The text messages between the Defendant and Christelle disavow any link between the cooling of the relationship and the matter the subject of the defamation case.

49. The grapevine effect in this matter is not only limited; it is speculative and cannot establish serious harm.

50. The Defendant relied on the delay by the Plaintiff in bringing the proceedings. The incident took place on 16 October 2024. The concerns notice was issued on 1 September 2025, after 10 months and 16 days, consistent with there being no serious or ongoing harm.

51. As to the injunctive relief sought prohibiting the Defendant from repeating the statements or republishing the statements, there is no evidence of any risk of that occurring and the submission to that effect is inconsistent with the delay in bringing proceedings.

52. The Defendant further submitted that taking the Plaintiff’s case at its highest, the extent of publication is limited. There is no evidence that the recipients, if any, believed the imputations, and there is no objective evidence of the damage to the Plaintiff’s reputation amongst her neighbours. It is submitted that the Plaintiff has not adduced facts or evidence capable of establishing serious harm within s 10A of the Act.

The Plaintiff’s Submissions

43. The Plaintiff submitted orally as follows:

44. As to whether from mid or the end of 2022 she did not have a good relationship with her neighbour, it is an unfounded and ungrounded conclusion. For example, if there are fewer messages being exchanged, this could also be because of the neighbour's fear of other things, due to the tension that was going on to the street. However, this does not explain the fact that her neighbour’s “communication with me constantly drops; no hello, no greetings, turning their faces”.

45. Even without any evidence that the neighbours heard the statement, the Court could infer that they are now avoiding her due to hearing (and believing it) “[b]ecause there was no other reason for them to do that”. The Plaintiff rejected the assertion that they may have wished to avoid the upheaval of police involvement, explaining that this would mean that “their reaction to both sides should have been either diminished, their friendship should [have] been diminished or affected”.

46. I engaged with the Plaintiff at the hearing as to the speculative nature of the submission in the absence of any evidence as to why the neighbours no longer engage with her, relying only on, the Plaintiff says, the timing of the statement. The difficulty with the Plaintiff’s submission was that, where she bears the onus of proof, she is required to satisfy me that it is more likely than not that at least one of her neighbours heard the statement and responded in the way they did, where there was no evidence that anyone heard it. Given the circumstances of the statement, it was a further difficulty for the Plaintiff, that even if I was satisfied that someone had heard it, that they took it seriously. The Plaintiff accepted that her neighbours might simply be “sick of the drama”, a matter fatal to her case.

47. At that point in her submissions, the Plaintiff said that she had a text message that would prove her case, but she had decided not to deploy it in the proceedings because she was concerned about her neighbours and worried that the Defendant would provide that information to her neighbours and so only included evidence referring to herself.

48. As described, that evidence established only that the Defendant is still on good terms with her neighbours, and the Plaintiff is not, and that she perceived that the cooling of relationships between she and her neighbours began after the day the police arrived, the day the statement was made. Again, the Plaintiff accepted that they were likely “sick of the drama”. The Plaintiff said however, that she was not the one who was causing trouble on the day and, I infer, that her neighbours would have thought this.

49. The CCTV footage however does not bear that out. Rather, it shows the parties loudly and demonstrably engaging with each other. The two stood almost toe to toe on the driveway, neither was taking a backward step, both were shouting and pointing at each other. The Plaintiff was pointing her phone in the Defendant’s face, filming her. The Defendant swiped her phone away. The police were called.

50. There is no evidence as to what the Plaintiff’s neighbours thought about who was responsible for the “drama”.

51. In short, in my view, this case involves a spat on a driveway with no evidence that anybody heard the statement other than the parties and their husbands. I accept that it is possible that a police officer may also have heard it, given it appears to have been directed by the Defendant to police. However, the officers took no stock in it (and one officer did not recall it only days later, a matter to which I will return).

52. Whilst the imputation is very serious, it was not, in my view, delivered seriously. As I observed from the video, it was a rash, unpleasant response to police suggesting that the children might be playing on the street.

53. At this point in the submissions, the Plaintiff complained that she was not allowed to provide her evidence during cross examination, because she was not cross examined. It is worth nothing at this juncture that whilst the Plaintiff appeared self-represented, she has been assisted in the preparation of her case by lawyers. I explained to the Plaintiff that cross-examination was not an opportunity for her to bolster her case. She has persisted in that submission notwithstanding, a matter to which I will return.

54. The Plaintiff then read the following statement in final submissions.

Your Honour, I understand the issue before the Court today is not whether damages should ultimately be awarded, but whether the publication pleaded in the statement of claim caused serious harm to my reputation and the meaning of, within the meaning of s 10A of the Defamation Act. I respectfully submit that the serious harm threshold is clearly met and the gravity of the allegations, the circumstances of publication, the grapevine effect, and the practical consequences to my reputation are considered together.

On 16 October 2024, both my husband and I were assaulted by the Defendant following a reference to my damaged tree. It was not tapping my phone, but a very hard smack at the back of my hand that caused my phone to fall on the ground. This incident made my neighbours call the police. During the police attendance, the police officers, neighbours, and my husband and others were present, the Defendant loudly stated words to the effect of "How do I know she is not a paedophile? Mary is a liar. My children are not able to play freely on the street because of Mary". Your Honour, these were not quiet, private remarks. They were shouted publicly in a small residential cul-de-sac, where sounds carry, carries easily between properties. The statements were captured clearly on the CCTV recording, which demonstrates both the volume and public nature of the publication.

Who heard it? Residents from number 4 and 6 Grose Place were present or nearby at the time. Residents from number 5 were home and Roy, the father, just walked in while police were on the street. There were also attending police officers present. Your Honour, the allegation that someone is a paedophile or poses a risk to children is among the most serious and vile accusations that can be made against a person in modern Australian society. Such an allegation naturally causes people to avoid, distrust, fear or think seriously less of the person accused, particularly in a neighbourhood containing families and children. The Defendant did not merely insult me. She associated me, my name publicly, with one of the gravest character allegations imaginable.

Prior to 16 October 2024, I had good and active relationships with residents at numbers 1, 4, 5, 6 Grose Place. I had regular conversations with them, attended social gatherings, maintained ongoing communication and was particularly close to the occupants of number 6.

…

They trusted me to watch their home when they were away at times to check on their child, their children regularly interacted with me and my dogs. Importantly, those relationships remained intact despite the ongoing dispute with the Defendant until 16 October 2026, sorry, 2024. They still reach out to me for help watching their house, watching their kids and I have provided a part of proof for that in my evidence bundle. I request that based on s 136 of the Evidence Act, Crystal Dardegas' evidence to be given limited weight. It is unverified and selected.

After the publication of the statement, those relationships changed significantly. Communications substantially reduced or ceased altogether. Neighbours who previously greeted and interacted with me began avoiding me. Children who previously said hello, approached me and interacted with my dogs, stopped doing so. I observed neighbours continuing to associate and communicate with the Defendant while withdrawing from me. This was a marked and obvious change from the years of prior interaction. With regard to grapevine effect and publication, I respectfully submit that the evidence supports the inference that the allegations could republish through the grapevine effect as a natural and probable consequence of the Defendant's conduct.

There was obvious public interest in the event on the 16 October 2024 involving police attendance and a public confrontation in a small cul-de-sac. In those circumstances, it was entirely foreseeable that the allegation would spread beyond the immediate recipients. The grapevine effect in defamation recognises that reputational harm is often amplified as rumours spread between people, particularly in closed residential communities where stories can evolve or become distorted over time. Prior to police attendance, neighbours were aware of a dispute and had observed an assault allegation.

However, during the incident, the Defendant loudly introduced allegations connected to children and paedophilia in the presence of neighbours and police officers. The sudden combination of police attendance, assault allegations concerning children and the accusation of paedophilia had the capacity to significantly alter the narrative surrounding the incident within the community. In my respectful submission, it was reasonably foreseeable that people within the neighbourhood could associate the police presence and surrounding event with those allegations, despite the fact that police had attended because of an assault report. The particular breakdown in my relationship with neighbours after the publication supports the inference that the allegations spread beyond the immediate publication and caused serious reputational harm within my local community.

The consequences to me have been profound. I experienced shock, humiliation, anxiety, loss of confidence and significant emotional distress. I became socially isolated within my own community. I experienced difficulty functioning normally, including difficulty seeking and maintaining employment. I was also hospitalised following significant stress connected to those matters and did not receive a smallest note or text message from a single neighbour.

My final submission, your Honour. This is not a technical or trivial complaint. The publication involved allegations of the gravest possible kind, made quickly, made publicly in a residential setting following a significant deterioration in my standing within my local community. The evidence demonstrates both actual reputational harm and the natural and probable republication of the allegation through the grapevine effect. Your Honour, prior to and during these proceedings, I spoke with a number of lawyers about this defamation case. It appeared to me that there is a widespread perception - excuse my naiveness for saying this, I'm speaking what happened to me - that defamation law is merely relevant to celebrities, millionaires or powerful business owners, where a significant financial value is attached to the claim.

However, as a victim of defamation, I can say that while my case may not involve a million dollar loss or celebrity status, it has nevertheless profoundly shadowed and impacted my life. My life, like many others, may not carry a high monetary value, but it's the only life I have. I have not been able to regain the person I once was, a happy and successful individual who contributed meaningfully both to society and to her immediate community. My case is the case of an ordinary person who is grieving and missing the life, reputation, relationships and the sense of belonging that she spent years building and which can be severely damaged by a single statement of this nature.

I believe there are many people in similar situations who never bring such matters before the Court. Perhaps I am simply among the few who chose to stand up, invest in the process and seek vindication through the legal system. In that sense, this case reflects the experience of ordinary people whose reputation and dignity can be seriously harmed yet often feel powerless to reclaim their standing once it has been damaged in their local community.

Your Honour, in this case, in that sense, an attempt by an ordinary childless person to reclaim her honour, integrity and place within her community after suffering serious reputational harm for facing paedophile allegations. It's not only about the legal principle, but it's about the lived reality of what happens when one's name and character are publicly called into question in a small and close-knit environment. I respectfully submit that the Court should focus on the gravity of the allegation, the circumstances in which it was published, and the practical, reputational consequences that followed in that basis was submit that the serious harm threshold under section 10A is clearly met.

Resolution of the Issues

Publication

53. The Plaintiff must establish that the Defendant published the defamatory matter concerning her to at least one person other than herself: Dow Jones & Co Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575 at [25]–[26], in this case as pleaded, to at least one of her neighbours, or perhaps a police officer. The Plaintiff does not rely on the fact that Mr Collins, the Defendant’s husband and police heard the words. That is understandable because it is not suggested that any of those people thought less of the Plaintiff by reason of the statement being made.

54. Whilst neighbours are nominated in the pleading as having heard the statement, there is no direct evidence from any neighbour that they heard the words. The Plaintiff relied on speculation that they must have, given their stated proximity to the Defendant at the time and the volume at which it was stated, together with the fact that from that time she was shunned and avoided.

55. I am not satisfied that the matter was published to any neighbour for the following reasons:

56. The statement was made once to police.

57. The evidence of the volume of the statement made by the Defendant (beyond being “loud”), as recorded on the CCTV footage, is unreliable. There is no evidence as to how close the Defendant was to the microphone that recorded the statement or that it was played in Court at an accurate volume.

58. There is no evidence from any neighbour that they heard the statement, either directly or on the “grapevine”.

59. The CCTV video evidence shows no sign that a neighbour, who was standing about “five houses” away, heard the statement made, or took any particular interest in what was being said, much less, believed the statement.

60. There is no adjacent corroborative evidence, such as a text message, to suggest that they did.

61. The speculative assertion that someone must have heard and believed the statement, because the Plaintiff’s neighbours thereafter avoided the Plaintiff, is rejected. There needs to be some evidence of publication. There is none.

Identification of the Plaintiff

57. The Plaintiff was clearly identified in the statement. Her name is “Mary” and she was being referred to at the time.

Presumption of Harm

58. Damage to the reputation of the defamed person need not be proved; rather, it is presumed: “the law presumes that some damage will flow in the ordinary course of things from the mere invasion of the Plaintiff’s right”: Andrews v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1980) 2 NSWLR 225, 258; Bristow v Adams [2012] NSWCA 166 at [20]-[31].

59. However, “the extent of that harm is not” presumed: Eppinga v Kalil [2023] NSWCA 287 at [100].

60. Since changes to the Act in 2021, there is a need to consider “serious harm” as an element of the cause of action and a threshold question: s 10A of the Act.

The Legislative Framework

61. Section 10A of the Act relevantly provides that:

(1) It is an element (the “serious harm element") of a cause of action for defamation that the publication of defamatory matter about a person has caused, or is likely to cause, serious harm to the reputation of the person.

…

(3) The judicial officer is to determine whether the serious harm element is established.

(4) Without limiting subsection (3), the judicial officer may (whether on the application of a party or on the judicial officer’s own motion):

(a) determine whether the serious harm element is established at any time before the trial for the proceedings commences or during the trial; and

(5) If a party applies for the serious harm element to be determined before the trial for the proceedings commences, the judicial officer is to determine the issue as soon as practicable before the trial commences unless satisfied that there are special circumstances justifying the postponement of the determination to a later stage of the proceedings (including during the trial).

…

62. The question whether the serious harm element is established or not is a matter for the judge and not the jury: s 10A(3) of the Act. The decision is a discretionary one, which ought to be determined judicially.

63. The legislative intent of the provision is to provide a fair and flexible mechanism to protect the parties from being put to the inconvenience and expense of a full hearing, only to have the Plaintiff fail on the element of serious harm. It is directed in particular to cases where the parties, the courts and the community are asked to bear the costs of a defamation case where they arise, for example, by a publication of limited circulation, where the imputations are not particularly serious or where they are not likely to be believed, and where the burden placed by the litigation is vastly disproportionate to the interests at stake: Supaphien v Chaiyabarn [2026] ACTCA 5 at [39].

64. The wrong the provision attempts to right is the increasing use of defamation proceedings to air trivial, spurious and vexatious backyard claims at a cost and level of stress to those defendants (usually private individuals), who find that defending such a claim is prohibitive. The provision is designed to weed out, at the outset, those cases where a defendant would otherwise have had a s 33 defence of triviality available to them without having to have the entire matter litigated.

Seriousness of the Imputation

65. Allegations of paedophilia are amongst the most serious allegations that can be made: Rodgers & Anor v Gooding [2023] QDC 115; Grattan v Porter [2016] QDC 202.

66. To be labelled a child abuser or a paedophile is one of the worst possible things that could be said about someone. It is one of those statements which, despite denial, may have a tendency to persist and leave a lingering and permanent mark on a person’s reputation. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible to dispel this: Atholwood v Barrett [2004] QDC 505.

67. In a similar vein, Gibson DCJ said in North Coast Children's Home Inc. trading as Child & Adolescent Specialist Programs & Accommodation (CASPA) v Martin [2014] NSWDC 125:

“[w]hile imputations of dishonesty, incompetence and neglect are serious issues, imputations of involvement in child abuse of any kind must be viewed as the most serious imputations capable of being made.”

68. Because paedophilia most often occurs in secret, proof of its denial is almost impossible. There is almost nothing a person can do to prove it not to be true to anyone who might hear it.

69. In French v Fraser [2015] NSWSC 1807, McCallum J (as her Honour then was) took into account the likelihood that the tone and content of the publications was such that some might have dismissed them as irrational rants.

70. In my view, the way in which this statement was delivered, even if it had been heard by people who knew the Plaintiff well and at that time had been friendly with her, was such that it would likely to have been dismissed.

71. The statement was said once, in passing, in response to police questions, and, in my view, it was presented by the Defendant in a way that was sneering, sarcastic and unlikely to be accepted. Indeed, the police did not appear to respond to it.

The Grapevine Effect

72. The “grapevine effect” is a metaphor to help explain the basis upon which harm can be done when heard second or third hand: Palmer Bruyn & Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons (2001) 208 CLR 388.

73. The grapevine effect recognises that “the dissemination of defamatory material is rarely confined to those to whom the matter is immediately published” and that the “‘poison’ of a libel may spread beyond the immediate recipients of the initial publication”: Hoser v Pelley [No 3] [2023] VSCA 257 at [221]; Crampton v Nugawela [1996] NSWSC 651; (1996) 41 NSWLR 176, 194-195.

74. This is done because it is impossible to ascertain and establish the real damage caused by defamatory publications. It is impossible to track the scandal to know what quarters the poison may reach. It is impossible to weigh at all closely the compensation which will recompense any plaintiff for the insult offered or the pain of a false accusation.

75. Accordingly, the assessment of any likely harm done to the Plaintiff’s reputation must include consideration of the extent of the publication and the possibility of spreading along “the grapevine” and to appear at other places that might be unknown to the Plaintiff.

76. Whilst there is some evidence that residents in streets away also avoided the Plaintiff, there is no evidence, where the words were spoken and were thus ephemeral, that the “scandal” was heard beyond Mr Collins, the Defendant’s husband, and the attending police.

77. Without any evidence to support the contention that anyone relevant heard the words or that anyone at all believed the statement or attached suspicion to it, there is almost no harm done to the Plaintiff’s reputation and no grapevine effect operates.

Harm to the Plaintiff of Other Kinds that Cannot be Taken into Account

78. Section 10A of the Act requires that I consider only harm to the Plaintiff’s reputation. In this case, I accept that the Plaintiff feels very hurt and injured by the statement. The Plaintiff appears to me to be a proud and sensitive woman who feels very aggrieved by what was said, given the serious content of the allegation that was made.

79. I accept the Plaintiff’s submissions that:

80. The consequences to her have been profound.

81. She experienced shock, humiliation, anxiety, loss of confidence and significant emotional distress.

82. She has become isolated within her community.

83. She had difficulty functioning normally, including difficulty seeking and maintaining employment.

84. She was hospitalised following significant stress connected to these matters.

85. She has not been able to regain the person she once was, a happy and successful individual who contributed meaningfully both to society and to her immediate community.

86. As an “ordinary childless person” she feels she has lost her honour, integrity and place within her community.

87. However, that evidence, whilst compelling and corroborated by Mr Collins, is not relevant to an assessment of any damage to the Plaintiff’s reputation.

Further Correspondence from the Plaintiff

81. Upon the matter being listed for judgment, on 10 September 2026, the Plaintiff contacted my Associate by email to “place a procedural matter before the Court concerning the Defendant’s submissions” and forwarded an email sent by the Defendant’s solicitor on 18 May 2026, which attached the Defendant’s written submissions. The Plaintiff wished for the relevant chronology to be put before the Court.

82. That chronology is as follows:

83. 18 May 2026 at 6.09pm: the Defendant’s substantive 10-page submissions were filed.

84. 18 May 2026 at 8.41pm: the Defendant’s solicitor sent the submissions to the Plaintiff by email.

85. 19 May 2026 at 10.00am: the hearing commenced.

86. The Plaintiff contended that she did not see or become aware of the Defendant’s submissions before the hearing and that the first time she became aware of their substantive contents was during the hearing on 19 May 2026, when the Defendant’s solicitor presented the arguments contained in them.

87. The Plaintiff stated that she had prepared her closing submissions based on the material she had received prior to the hearing, namely the Defendant’s affidavit. She also asserted that during the hearing, she had only a limited opportunity to take notes of the Defendant’s “new” arguments and to incorporate some matters into her closing submissions.

88. The Plaintiff initially said that she has provided this information to the Court so that the Court is aware of the circumstances in which she first became aware of, and was required to respond to, the Defendant’s written submissions before judgment was delivered.

89. Although this appeared to be a complaint about a lack of procedural fairness, the Plaintiff did not at that stage complain about the timing of the provision of the written submissions when they were handed up in court at the hearing and did not seek further time to respond to them. Further, the Plaintiff explicitly stated in her email of 10 September 2026 that she was not seeking by her email to make further substantive submissions. The Plaintiff stated, “I simply wish to ensure that the above procedural circumstance, together with the original email evidencing the time of service, is before the Court and on the Court file”.

90. On 24 September 2026 I was due to give judgment. Before doing so I raised these matters in Court.

91. At this time the Plaintiff indicated that she did wish to provide a substantial written response to the Defendant’s submissions. I allowed her that opportunity and granted her leave to reply strictly to the Defendant's submission by 1 October 2026. No orders were made for further evidence, or for the Plaintiff to raise fresh issues.

92. In that circumstance, I have not relied on any submission made, or evidence proffered, by the Plaintiff to the Defendant’s detriment, which relied on evidence not tendered at the hearing.

The Plaintiff’s Written Reply Submissions

90. On 1 October 2026, the Plaintiff provided 19 pages of further written submissions and (without leave) further evidence by way of an affidavit sworn on 2 October 2026. The submissions can be summarised as follows:

91. The alleged deterioration of neighbourly relationships prior to the statement being made are factually erroneous, legally flawed, and reliant upon contaminated, inadmissible evidence.

92. The Plaintiff’s pleadings fully satisfy the s 10A "serious harm" threshold.

93. The Defendant’s reliance on Newman v Whittington [2025] NSWSC 275 and Rader v Haines [2022] NSWCA 198 to argue that the pleadings contain mere assertions of subjective emotional hurt, rather than concrete evidence of objective reputational damage, is misplaced.

94. L**atham v Greenwich [2026] FCAFC 82 (‘Latham v Greenwich’) directly defeats the Defendant’s position in that:

(a) The serious harm threshold is not an "especially high threshold" demanding an exhaustive or excessive evidentiary burden from an applicant at the interlocutory stage. (b) The Full Court rejected the rigid spectrum approach previously derived from Rader v Haines which sought to place serious harm somewhere "above substantial, though below grave". (c) “Serious harm" must be given its plain and ordinary meaning, determined by drawing inferences from the circumstances as a whole, including the inherent gravity of the imputations, the medium, and the localised extent of the publication. (d) The relevant assessment is therefore whether the publication caused, or is likely to cause, serious harm to the Plaintiff’s reputation, having regard to the publication as a whole and all relevant circumstances. These include the inherent tendency of the slurs, the nature and relationship of the recipients, the likelihood of a "grapevine" percolation effect, and the visible impact within the community. (e) The starting point for drawing an inference of serious harm is the extreme gravity of the slurs. The Defendant did not merely engage in mild neighbourhood friction; the Defendant loudly and publicly branded the Plaintiff a "paedophile," a danger to neighbourhood children, and a criminal who fabricates police reports. Within a tight-knit residential street, accusations of child sexual offences, compounded by the Defendant's loud, public shouting of false accusations - that the Plaintiff gestured offensively “showing a middle finger to a child” - sit at the absolute pinnacle of social and reputational destruction. The gravity of the words creates an overwhelming, immediate inference of profound reputational damage. (f) The damage is tangibly demonstrated by the fact that the local police's approach toward the Plaintiff changed significantly following these publications. Law enforcement subsequently failed to treat a distinct assault upon the Plaintiff and her husband with appropriate gravity, actively undermining the Plaintiff's evidence while appearing to favour the Defendant's unverified narratives. This left the Plaintiff and her husband unprotected and with no alternative but to formally escalate the incident within the police system, establishing a concrete, real-world downturn in the plaintiff's standing with authority figures. (g) The framework does not require the Plaintiff to establish, recipient by recipient, that each individual neighbour explicitly formed a worse view of her. Serious reputational harm may be safely inferred from the surrounding factual matrix as a whole. (h) Nor does a recipient’s preexisting adverse view of a party insulate a defendant from liability for a fresh, distinct defamatory publication.

5. Accordingly, the question is whether, considering the venomous nature of the imputations, their public dissemination, the concentrated residential audience, and the surrounding evidence, the harm caused to the Plaintiff's reputation is properly characterised as serious within the meaning of s 10A.
6. The Plaintiff relied on evidence that immediate residential neighbours, Shannon, Christelle, and members of Christelle's family, witnessed both the underlying physical assault and the following loud, public dissemination of the defamatory slurs in police’s presence by the Defendant. This publication of slurs occurred in the immediate presence of nine police officers and five police vehicles, as demonstrated by the video footage tendered at the hearing. The Plaintiff contends that law enforcement's subsequent failure to take formal action or record statements regarding the assault post-publication was an observable consequence of the publication's immediate impact on the attending officers' perceptions. These combined circumstances clearly altered the third-party views of the Plaintiff within her immediate environment and are highly relevant to assessing the actual, localised reputational impact under s 10A.
7. The Defendant’s assertion that the extent of publication cannot be definitively established for various reasons suggested is a matter of conjecture that flies in the face of the objective evidence. The Plaintiff established a robust, prima facie case of extensive, localised publication based on objective, observable, and concrete facts:

(a) The video footage and layout configurations of the houses prove that the core community network (Christelle, her husband, her son, and Shannon) were physically present outside and within clear earshot of the defamatory broadcast. (b) The physical distance between Roy and Karina’s residence (No. 5) and the location of the Defendant's broadcast is equal to the distance where Christelle and Shannon were positioned and is identical to the distance where the Plaintiff and her husband were standing. There is no logical or geographical basis to infer that Roy and Karina failed to hear a publication that was broadcast so loudly and publicly that it commanded the immediate attention of everyone else on the street. (c) The extraordinary presence of nine police officers and five police vehicles would naturally capture the immediate, overriding attention of all local residents as a priority, leaving absolutely no room for the Defendant's speculative assertions regarding household distractions, television, or headphones.

8. The Defendant concedes that Christelle possessed active, direct knowledge of the defamatory publications.

9. Telecommunication logs attached to the Plaintiff’s Affidavit (sworn 2 October 2026) reveal a consistent, active, and friendly relationship spanning from 2021 late into 2024. This is followed by an immediate "hard stop" and absolute social isolation occurring exclusively after the primary publication on 16 October 2024.

10. I pause to observe that whilst no leave was granted to the Plaintiff to rely on any additional text messages, those that were provided do not establish a “consistent, active, and friendly relationship spanning from 2021 late into 2024” with Christelle. What they show is that there had been no text messages from Christelle since 22 June 2024 and that what can be made of them shows mostly perfunctory responses or no response. They are set out as follows:

11. Four messages were exchanged between 15 and 24 March 2023, including a statement by the Plaintiff which ended with a smiley face emoji, and an offer two days later by the Plaintiff to give Christelle something, neither of which were responded to by Christelle. The rest of the messages have been redacted by the Plaintiff.

12. The next exchange occurred on 29 April 2023, instigated by Christelle. Other than the word “what” that commenced Christelle’s text, they have been redacted by the Plaintiff. The redaction markings show them to be very short exchanges.

13. There are no further text messages for a period of about six weeks. There is an exchange on 15 June 2023. However, again, the redaction by the Plaintiff provides no context to support a close friendship between the two.

14. The next exchange occurred on 30 June 2023. Almost all of the six messages have been redacted by the Plaintiff, with the only comment from Christelle being “Oh Really” to something the Plaintiff said. Christelle did not to comment further.

15. There are no further exchanges for almost a year. There is an exchange on 22 June 2024 instigated by Christelle, all of which has been redacted by the Plaintiff.

16. The last contact with Christelle is a text from the Plaintiff on 8 February 2025, which has been redacted by the Plaintiff and is not responded to by Christelle.

17. The exchanges set out in MC5 which show screenshots of other messages are indecipherable and I have not taken them into account.

18. Returning to the Plaintiff’s submissions in reply, the Plaintiff submitted:

19. The matter is deeply defamatory if it tends to cause right-thinking members of society to "shun and avoid" the subject (Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Ltd (1934) 50 TLR 581). The Plaintiff has observed, recorded, and meticulously documented a severe and ongoing "shun and avoid" reaction from the residents of the cul-de-sac. This behavioural shift was observed over a period of months, providing a tested, long-term evidentiary baseline. The combination of these facts creates an airtight, objective causal link.

20. The Defendant published a heinous, intolerable slur directly into the Plaintiff's residential sanctuary; the neighbours immediately heard it (as conceded by the defence); and those neighbours immediately altered their daily behaviour to isolate the Plaintiff.

21. Relying on Latham v Greenwich, the Plaintiff has established a visible, real-world "harm of a higher order" that easily satisfies the threshold under s 10A.

22. The Defendant’s attempt to artificially segment the Plaintiff's relationship with her neighbours into isolated date ranges, or to claim that the relationship legally ceased to exist after "mid-2022" (para 28 of the submissions), must be rejected. A close, positive residential relationship is not a transactional or commercial arrangement that requires daily or hyper-frequent text messages to maintain its legal or social existence.

23. The Plaintiff also sought to rely on the Defendant’s “conflicting claims across different jurisdictions, seeking to rely on a statement in other proceedings. I have not taken that matter into account because:

24. The Plaintiff was not granted leave to rely on this additional material.

25. The Plaintiff did not cross-examine the Defendant on it and it would be unfair in that instance to rely on it in submissions “strictly” in reply.

26. There is no evidence that the Plaintiff has sought, much less received, leave to rely on the statement obtained in other proceedings.

27. The Plaintiff submitted that she enjoyed a profoundly close social relationship with Christelle, as evidenced by the Plaintiff holding her wedding ceremony in Christelle's backyard. It is submitted that as a matter of ordinary human experience and common sense, a relationship of such baseline closeness, intimacy, and mutual trust does not instantly vanish simply because telecommunication touchpoints become more "sporadic" over subsequent years.

28. The Plaintiff further submitted that the shifting frequency of text messaging in 2023 and 2024 is entirely explained by normal, non-adversarial life changes. These include the lifting of COVID-19 restrictions and a return to unrestricted external life (such as increased travel and full-time employment commitments), expanding domestic responsibilities (specifically, the Plaintiff raising three pets instead of one from July 2022), and the exhausting burden of dealing with legal friction initiated by the Defendant and her partner from early to mid 2023, which required significant engagement with the police and courts. None of these independent lifestyle factors support the Defendant's leap in logic that the Plaintiff’s relationship with the residents had deteriorated prior to October 2024 because of a smaller number of text messages exchanged.

29. The Plaintiff submitted that text messages and photographic records spanning 2022, 2023, and 2024 - regardless of an arbitrary "quantitative" count - constitute a clear, unbroken pattern of harmonious and positive neighbourly contact right up until the primary defamatory incident on 16 October 2024. The Plaintiff submitted that despite a neighbourhood issue regarding bins on 14 March 2023, numerous cordial text messages continued to flow between the Plaintiff and Christelle throughout 2023 and 2024, which the Plaintiff did not initially tender simply because she did not feel legally obliged to flood the court file to prove an undisputed baseline of peace.

30. They are the messages I have set out in detail. Given the way they were redacted by the Plaintiff, I do not accept that submission. Further, there can be no qualitative assessment of the text messages presented in this limited way. Where the Plaintiff chose to reveal some parts of the messages that show a level of familiarity, I take the view that the redacted sections would not assist her case.

31. The Plaintiff further submitted that the historical absence of frequent, daily text messaging between the Plaintiff and other residents in the street does not prove a negative or hostile relationship. It merely reflects normal, respectful suburban boundaries which were completely shattered when the Defendant broadcast her slurs to the entire cul-de-sac.

32. The Plaintiff sought to rely on further material to “definitively correct the Defendant's distorted timeline”; being an “explicit log of written and face-to-face communications with Christelle and the broader street network”, which directly exposes the falsity of paragraphs 26–30 of the Defendant's submissions.

33. I have not taken that further evidence into account and have ignored that submission. The Plaintiff was not granted leave to rely on it and did not cross-examine the Defendant on it. It would be unfair to allow the Plaintiff to deploy it now. It is not a submission in reply, but rather an attempt by the Plaintiff to reopen her case.

34. The Plaintiff repeats her submission that the text message between Christelle and the Plaintiff, citing a falling out over the “incident with the bins”, is inadmissible; that it relied entirely upon a single, unverified, and highly selective SMS thread purportedly dated March 2026. The Plaintiff submitted that no other corroborating evidence or independent witness testimony has been adduced by the Defendant to support this claim. The Plaintiff submitted that the text message thread is “fundamentally unreliable, artificially engineered, and highly misleading.”, that it “consists of three isolated snapshots, only the final one of which bears a visible date (8 March 2026). The preceding snapshots are entirely undated, and the complete, end-to-end communication history between the Defendant and Christelle has been purposefully and deceptively withheld from the Court.

35. This is an allegation of fraud and other criminal conduct by the Defendant, which has not been substantiated at all by the Plaintiff. It was not suggested to the Defendant when she was being cross-examined that the messages are in any way fabricated or altered, or that their context was misleading in the way now asserted. Christelle was not subpoenaed to give evidence by either party. Allowing for the fact that the Plaintiff is unrepresented, but noting her legal submissions showing a certain knowledge and diligence in that regard, the Plaintiff would do well to inform herself that such allegations ought not be made without clear evidence, where the Defendant was not challenged in this regard, where no contrary evidence was provided, and certainly not in a reply submission. I do not accept the submission.

36. The Plaintiff submitted that the text messages between the Defendant and Christelle constitutes an out-of-court assertion introduced specifically to prove the truth of their contents and that they are inadmissible hearsay pursuant to s 59 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW).

37. Further the Plaintiff submitted that, whilst the text messages provide some evidence that Christelle knew “what [the Defendant] did”, she disavows any reliance on that being the reason she no longer talks to the Plaintiff. If the Plaintiff wishes to rely on the text message as being truthful for that reason, the document is in for all purposes, and I have already ruled it as being admissible.

38. Putting the text message aside, the Plaintiff has accepted (where she bears the onus of proving serious harm) that she made a forensic decision not to call Christelle and that Christelle would not support her contention that it was the defamatory matter that caused a cooling of relations between them.

39. That leaves the Plaintiff in the position that she has not been able to establish that any neighbour (other than her husband and the Defendant’s husband - whose views were not changed by the statement and who provide no evidence of damage to her reputation) heard the statement being made, much less relied on it. There is no suggestion that the police put any stock in the statement.

40. The Plaintiff further submitted that the video footage proves that Christelle and her family witnessed the incident live. There is no doubt that they were in the footage, located some distance away. For the reasons I have already stated, that provides no evidence that they heard, much less believed, what was said. The most that could be said is that they would likely have gained the impression that the Plaintiff and Defendant were involved in some kind of altercation, which ultimately resulted in police being called to break up a disturbance of the peace in their street.

41. The Plaintiff relied on the fact that the Defendant continues to speak with her neighbours (and not to her) and says it is likely that this is because of the defamatory statement. However, she also submitted that the Defendant is a manipulative person who can turn her neighbours against her. That is equally possible. Where the Plaintiff bears the onus of proof to prove serious harm caused by the statement, she must provide some reliable evidence that the reason why her neighbours no longer engage with her (or not to the same extent) is because of some acceptance on some level of the allegations upon which she sues. In this case, she has provided none, other than to rely on the timing of the statement and the reduced engagement. As I have held, where the Plaintiff relied on possibilities, not probabilities, I have not been satisfied that this is so, particularly where the Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant has been engaged in other “witness contamination” by reason of her talking to the neighbours.

42. As to whether an adverse inference is to be drawn by reason of the Plaintiff’s failure to call Christelle, the Plaintiff submitted that she was “afforded a mere three days following the service of the Defendant’s affidavit material on 15 May 2026 to attempt to contact a neighbourhood witness who has consistently avoided her.” There is no evidence that the Plaintiff attempted to make such contact and she did not seek an adjournment of the proceedings to subpoena her. The Plaintiff accepted that Christelle’s evidence would likely not assist her case. I have not drawn an adverse inference. It remains the case however that there is no clear evidence as to why Christelle and the Plaintiff do not talk, other than by reason of the incident with the bins as set out in the text.

43. The Plaintiff relied on the Defendant’s clear admission that because she "talks to the neighbours" and discusses the Plaintiff and this case, therefore “she has formed the view that the Plaintiff and her husband don’t have good relationship with the neighbours” constitutes an active, ongoing replication and republication of the defamatory material. I do not accept that this is so. At most, it provides evidence that the Defendant has told the neighbours that the Plaintiff has sued her, with there being no evidence that the Defendant has repeated the slur as a matter of fact.

44. The Plaintiff submitted that she sought an adjournment to facilitate Christelle’s attendance. Ultimately that was not the case in circumstances where the Defendant objected to it and given the Plaintiff’s concession that Christelle would likely not give the evidence the Plaintiff was hoping for.

45. The Plaintiff accepts that there is no “direct corroboration” that any neighbour heard the statement but says that there are reasonable inferences available from the evidence before the Court and then says that the “objective reality of witness reluctance and local intimidation is starkly illustrated by the conduct of the attending law enforcement officers.” According to the Plaintiff, when asked shortly afterwards whether a police officer who had been positioned merely half a metre away from the Defendant during the incident, had heard the Defendant shouting paedophile slurs, the police officer said he could not remember anything. The Plaintiff further asserted that there had been some kind of attempt to pervert the course of justice by the officer, stating, that he “actively avoids corroborating the event on the record”. I reject that assertion. It is a serious allegation made entirely without evidence.

46. In my view, it is equally consistent with the officer either:

47. Not giving any credence to the abuse that the Defendant was making of the Plaintiff, such as to not remember the content of it within a short period of time. The idea that the officer would be intimidated by the Defendant is not, in my view, “starkly illustrated”; or

48. Not hearing it, rendering it even less likely that any neighbour heard it, given his proximity and likely attention to what was occurring.

49. As to whether the officer does not want to become involved in what the Plaintiff accepts was part of a “sensitive neighbourhood dispute”, whilst that might be so, it does not assist in the Plaintiff’s proof of serious harm caused by the particular statement.

50. Where I am not satisfied that the officer “actively avoids corroborating the event on the record”, I am not satisfied that “[it] is a matter of ordinary human experience and common sense that if a trained public official actively avoids corroborating the event on the record, civilian neighbours residing in a tight-knit cul-de-sac will naturally exhibit extreme reluctance to step forward, sign affidavits, or entangle themselves in litigation at this preliminary stage.”

51. The Plaintiff submitted that the Defendant “cannot weaponise the natural self-preservation and silence of the neighbourhood - which her own heinous conduct induced - to seek an adverse inference against the Plaintiff”. I am not satisfied that this occurred.

52. I accept that Latham v Greenwich is authority for the proposition that direct evidence from people saying “I thought less of the Plaintiff” is not necessarily required, as serious harm can be inferred from the circumstances. It does however require some evidence (even inferentially) that someone relevant heard the statement being made. There is, in my view, no evidence from which I can infer that the reason why the Plaintiff is now avoided is due to the hearing of the defamatory statement or any grapevine effect; particularly where (taking into account the whole of the circumstances) the Plaintiff herself puts forward a suggestion that it may be because of the manipulation by the Defendant of friendships in that regard and where the Plaintiff and the Defendant appear to have had multiple disputes (including in respect of the circumstances of the Plaintiff’s earlier divorce) and neighbours appear to have taken sides.

53. The Plaintiff submitted that the "grapevine effect" has been generated by the Defendant’s course of conduct and “a persistent campaign” and that the evidence demonstrates that the Defendant has repeatedly broadcast defamatory imputations regarding the Plaintiff through diverse mediums - including direct verbal statements to immediate neighbours, formal complaints to law enforcement, and highly visible public conduct - firmly establishing a clear, inferable intent to destroy the Plaintiff's reputation. If that was so (about which there is no clear evidence) it is further evidence that might explain the neighbours distancing themselves from her, for reasons which are not referrable to the matter complained of.

54. Finally, the Plaintiff relied on the fact that the Defendant has undertaken a sustained course of conduct “designed to permeate the Plaintiff’s immediate social and residential sphere”, including:

55. Public oral broadcasts.

56. Express confessions by the Defendant that she discusses the Plaintiff with neighbourhood residents.

57. Paired with loud, public confrontational outbursts on the street, including false accusations shouted publicly claiming that the Plaintiff showed a middle finger to the Defendant's daughter.

58. The deliberate daily playing of offensive music with targeted lyrics at high volume directly outside the Plaintiff’s and neighbouring residences effectively turning the public street into an aggressive "jukebox", via a selected offensive playlist (said to repeat the imputations but about which no evidence is given, only the Plaintiff’s opinion of them in submissions). It is said that they were given with “highly specific timing and daily frequency”, including playing them loudly inside the Defendant’s house so they echo throughout the cul-de-sac and says that this proves “a deliberate, ongoing act of defamation”.

59. One could speculate that this might be so. It may also be the case, if the Defendant is so intimidatory, that the neighbours have decided that peace in the cul-de-sac is best achieved by aligning behind the Defendant, not because the statements have harmed the Plaintiff’s reputation. This is consistent with the neighbours somewhat also avoiding Mr Collins.

60. In that regard, the Plaintiff relied on the fact that in the hours after the Plaintiff filed and served her affidavit evidence, the Defendant left her property, entered her vehicle, and drove past the homes of the Plaintiff and other neighbours while blasting offensive music and loudly singing along to the lyrics: “You’re a fucking bitch. Hope you know that. You can never trust a whore. Better learn that quick”. If that is so, it is hardly surprising that the neighbours do not want to associate with the Plaintiff but might wish to ingratiate themselves to the Defendant.

61. The Plaintiff submitted that there has been a “consistent, ongoing pattern of exclusion which was reinforced by the Defendant’s frequent, extended visits to the residents' properties”. I am not satisfied, absent evidence that this was to “keep the defamatory slurs alive via the grapevine effect”. In the context of the Plaintiff’s allegations of general intimidation, whilst not accepted on the evidence given, such a conclusion cannot be made.

62. I do note, however, that none of this was put to the Defendant in cross-examination and I make no findings as to whether this occurred. I did not give the Plaintiff leave to rely on further, untested evidence. I did not allow it if it was detrimental to the Defendant. In any event, it does not assist the Plaintiff’s case on serious harm. It provides information that there may be other reasons why she is being shunned and avoided other than the defamatory statement.

63. The Plaintiff submitted that the Defendant, in seeking to determine the question of serious harm determined on the papers, “the Defence” has deployed persistent tactical measures to block further explanation and evidence by the Plaintiff and her husband prior to and during the hearing on 19 May 2026. She submitted that this was executed in response to a late-filed, 10-page submission served by the Defence on the eve of the hearing.

64. This involves a slur upon the lawyers advising the Defendant and I do not accept it. In my view, Ms Phillips has always conducted herself professionally.

65. Furthermore, the Plaintiff consented to the matter being heard that way.

66. The Plaintiff has also misapprehended the role of cross-examination. It is not the role of cross-examination to allow the Plaintiff “the live opportunity to answer the assertions contained in the Defendant's 18 May 2026 submissions”, as I had explained to her previously.

67. The Plaintiff’s complaints about the “late” filing of the submissions are also misplaced. Often submissions are handed to parties as they stand at the bar table ready to address. The Plaintiff has been given an opportunity to respond to them and has, notwithstanding clear Court orders, sought to use that opportunity to tender further evidence and make unfounded allegations against police officers and an officer of the Court. I appreciate that the Plaintiff is not legally represented, and I have simply put those matters to one side.

68. As to the delayed issuance of the Concerns Notice consistent with a lack of serious harm, I accept the Plaintiff’s contention that this is not necessarily the case and that there was good reason to wait in this case. The Plaintiff relied, in part, on the fact that throughout the remainder of 2024 and late into 2025, the Plaintiff and her husband were involved in parallel legal matters involving the police, the Defendant, and the Defendant's partner. This provides, in my view, an adequate explanation, on its own, for the delay.

69. There is no doubt that the proceedings arise in the context of; allegations and cross-allegations, of neighbourhood disputes, breaches of confidentiality, manipulation, and intimidation.

70. I accept entirely that the Plaintiff was deeply troubled by the defamatory statements. The difficulty for the Plaintiff is that there is no reliable evidence that anyone else (other than her husband) was.

Summary of Findings

132. I make the following findings:

133. The Plaintiff has failed to satisfy me on the balance of probabilities that the statement made by the Defendant upon which she sues has caused any serious harm to her reputation.

134. There is no evidence that any neighbour, including those identified by the Plaintiff in her Statement of Claim, heard the statement being made.

135. There is no direct evidence that those who may have heard the words said (a matter which is itself particularly speculative) believed the imputation that the Plaintiff is a paedophile or any imputation pleaded as a result.

136. There is some circumstantial evidence that after the incident in which police were called and the statement was made, neighbours were less inclined to engage with the Plaintiff than before. Whilst it could be argued that this was as a result of the statement being made, where the Plaintiff bears the onus to prove that it is more likely than not that this is the case, in the absence of any direct evidence of that, and where the only direct evidence was that one neighbour fell out with the Plaintiff for other reasons, I am not prepared to draw that conclusion in the absence of witnesses the Plaintiff could have, but did not, call. Indeed, the Plaintiff made the concession that those witnesses would not have assisted her case, so decided not to call them. This is particularly so where, even if I was to accept the late evidence presented by the Plaintiff and draw inferences in her favour (which I am not prepared to do for the reasons given), the evidence equally and persuasively shows that the Plaintiff’s neighbours had good reason to preserve the sanctity of their homes and peaceful occupation by siding with the Defendant and shunning the Plaintiff.

137. There is no doubt that the Plaintiff’s feelings were seriously hurt and that her mental health has suffered as a result. However, this is not a relevant consideration in assessing harm to reputation. The Plaintiff did not satisfy me of the serious harm element of her cause of action for defamation. She did not establish that the publication of defamatory matter about her has caused, or is likely to cause, serious harm to her reputation.

Orders

133. I make the following orders:

134. The Plaintiff has failed to establish serious harm as required as an element of her cause of action by s 10A of the Act.

135. The Plaintiff’s claim is dismissed.

136. The remaining orders sought in the Defendant’s Notice of Motion are unnecessary and are dismissed.

137. Subject to Order (5), the Plaintiff is to pay the Defendant’s costs of the proceedings.

138. The parties have liberty to apply in respect of any variation to the costs order.

139. That liberty is to be exercised within seven (7) days.

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Amendments

19 October 2026

Amendment to the spelling of the Defendant's name