1. The [Respondent] is a member of the Western Australia Police Force, being employed as a patrol and inquiry officer. At the time these offences occurred, the [Respondent] was rostered at the Perth Police Station, where her primary role was as a property exhibits officer.
2. By virtue of her employment, the [Respondent] has access to the police computer system, which is a secure system requiring password entry.
3. Police officers are only authorised to access this system for purposes that are directly related to their work. Access to the system for any purpose that is not directly related to their work is strictly prohibited.
4. The [Respondent] accessed three different restricted-access computer systems without authorisation: the Incident Management System (IMS); the Police Custody Program; and Briefcase.
5. In relation to the first system, IMS is the most commonly-used police computer system, which records incidents, property, actions of interest to police and any related persons, vehicles, locations, and property.
6. As part of her normal duties as property exhibits officer, the [Respondent] was required to access IMS. However, the [Respondent] was only authorised to use IMS for work-related duties.
7. In order to access IMS, all users must acknowledge an express warning in the following terms:

Information contained within the Western Australia Police Computer Systems is confidential, must not be disclosed to unauthorised persons under any circumstances, and not be accessed for personal reasons.

1. In relation to the second system, the Police Custody Program contains information about persons in the custody of police.
2. The [Respondent] was not generally required, as part of her normal duties, to access the Police Custody program.
3. In order to access the Custody Program, all users must acknowledge an express warning in the following terms:

The information from the system now available to you is confidential and must not be disclosed to unauthorised persons under any circumstances, nor are you authorised to access such information for personal reasons. Unauthorised access or use of this system and of the information contained within may result in criminal and/or disciplinary actions.

1. In relation to the third system, Briefcase is the system used by police for creating prosecution briefs, managing prosecutions, currently before the courts, and recording results of all police prosecutions.
2. The [Respondent] was not generally required, as part of her normal duties, to access Briefcase.
3. In order to access Briefcase, all users must acknowledge an express warning in the following terms:

The information from the system now available to you is confidential and must not be disclosed to unauthorised persons under any circumstances, nor are you authorised to access such information for personal reasons.

4 The 11 charges arose from access by the respondent to the IMS, the Police Custody Program or Briefcase on 11 occasions between 25 June 2012 and 6 August 2013. Each access was not authorised and was not related to any of the respondent's work duties, role or function. Charges 1 to 5 related to accessing IMS and viewing information relating to Tome Velkovski, the respondent's husband. The information related to Mr Velkovski's criminal history and involvement, as a victim, in an alleged criminal offence. The respondent also viewed information regarding Vasil Velkovski, her brotherinlaw. Charge 6 was that the respondent accessed IMS and viewed information relating to Tome Velkovski and Peco Velkovski, her brotherinlaw. Charge 7 was that the respondent accessed the Police Custody Program and viewed information regarding Vasil Velkovski, including his lockup assessment and his current location. Charge 8 was that the respondent accessed Briefcase and viewed information regarding Vasil Velkovski, including pending criminal charges and the statement of material facts for those charges.

5 The prosecutor submitted that charge 9 was a very serious offence. It involved accessing IMS and Briefcase and viewing information regarding Vasil Velkovski, including pending criminal charges and the statement of material facts for those charges. The prosecutor said that this related to an incident where Vasil Velkovski had been arrested in relation to a domestic violence charge. The respondent informed the corrections officer who prepared the presentence report that the records she accessed related to a domestic incident between her sisterinlaw and her brotherinlaw and said that she did this as she did not want her sisterinlaw to tarnish her name within the police force.

6 Charge 10 is that the respondent accessed IMS and viewed information relating to an investigation undertaken in 2006 in which her husband was an alleged offender. The respondent accessed another person and her husband's name came up on a screen amongst 54 other mentions as an associate of that person. Charge 11 was that the respondent accessed IMS and Briefcase and viewed information regarding Vasil Velkovski, including pending criminal and traffic charges and details of persons protected by violence restraining orders (VROs) to which Vasil Velkovski was subject. On the hearing of this appeal the appellant submitted that charge 11 is of particular concern because the respondent accessed information about witnesses and persons protected by restraining orders against her brotherinlaw.

7 The magistrate obtained a presentence report, to which I have already referred. The report stated that whilst the respondent presents as suitable for community based sanction, such an outcome may be of little benefit. The respondent presented three written references.

8 The magistrate's sentencing remarks included the following. The respondent pleaded guilty but it was a very late plea and the prosecution case was very strong. The respondent should receive a 5% discount for the guilty plea. The respondent has no previous convictions. Aggravating features include the number of the offences over a period of just under 14 months, that three accesses related to pending criminal charges and two accesses involved personal details of witnesses and protected persons in a VRO respectively. A sentence of imprisonment was not required. There appears to be little need for personal deterrence but there is a need for general deterrence.

9 The magistrate imposed a global fine of $3,000. The magistrate then considered whether to make a spent conviction order. The magistrate considered that the respondent is unlikely to commit such an offence again and that the respondent is of previous good character and therefore the discretion to make a spent conviction order was enlivened. In the exercise of her discretion the magistrate decided not to make a spent conviction order because the offences are so serious that it is appropriate that convictions be recorded against the respondent's name.

10 The notice of appeal was filed six days out of time. The grounds of appeal are:

1. The learned magistrate erred in fact in finding that there was no need for personal deterrence.
2. The learned magistrate erred in law in considering improper mitigating factors, namely the:

(a) lack of purpose in the accesses; and

(b) limited quantity of information accessed.

1. The sentence imposed by the learned magistrate was manifestly inadequate, having particular regard to the:

(a) seriousness of the offending;

(b) need for personal deterrence; and

(c) standards of sentencing customarily observed in respect of the offence.

11 The State initially submitted that s 41(4)(b) of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) has abrogated the common law principles that were once applicable to State appeals against sentence with the effect that this appeal falls to be decided in accordance with the general principles that relate to the hearing of appeals against sentence. The respondent submitted that appeals against sentence by the State must be treated differently to appeals by an offender and that the established common law principles for consideration in State appeals against sentence do apply in Western Australia except for any consideration of double jeopardy which is excluded by s 41(4)(b). In further submissions the State elaborated upon the principles that inform the exercise of the court's power in relation to State appeals against sentence. The State submitted that the relevant principles are:

1. In both State and offender appeals the court's discretion under s 14(1) of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (CAA) to allow an appeal is enlivened if the appellant establishes that the sentence is erroneous lenient or excessive.
2. In deciding whether or not to allow an appeal and in any resentencing the court may, subject to s 41(4)(b) CCA, take into account any relevant matter that has occurred between the time of sentencing and when the appeal is heard (see also 14(5) CAA).
3. The mere fact that the offender may again be sentenced for the offence is an irrelevant consideration pursuant to s 41(4)(b).
4. In a State appeal against sentence, having regard to the purpose of State appeals, the court has a residual discretion to decline to allow an appeal against a sentence that is erroneously lenient at the time of the hearing of the appeal.
5. The circumstances in which a court could exercise the residual discretion include:

(a) delay in the hearing and determination of the appeal;

(b) the imminent or past occurrence of the offender's release on parole or unconditionally; and

(c) the effect of re-sentencing on progress towards the offender's rehabilitation.

1. The residual discretion is unlikely to be exercised in circumstances where it is necessary to allow the appeal to ensure that proper standards of sentencing for the offence are maintained, or the sentence imposed was:

(a) clearly manifestly inadequate; or

(b) so far outside the range of sentencing as to constitute an affront to the proper administration of justice.

12 I accept and adopt that statement of relevant principles with one qualification. The statement of principle 6 appears to be based on statements of McLure P in The State of Western Australia v Munda [2012] WASCA 164 [41] and [248] [251]. On appeal to the High Court in Munda v The State of Western Australia [2013] HCA 38; (2013) 302 ALR 207, the plurality at [70] referred to the words of McLure P that 'save where parity considerations arise, the residual discretion is only likely to be exercised if the error has not resulted in a manifestly inadequate sentence'. Their Honours noted that in Green v The Queen [2011] HCA 49; (2011) 244 CLR 462, French CJ, Crennan & Keiffel JJ referred to circumstances in addition to considerations of parity which might create injustice if a State appeal against sentences is allowed. Those circumstances were said to include 'delay in the hearing and determination of the appeal, the imminent or past occurrence of the respondent's release on parole or unconditionally, and the effect of resentencing on progress towards the respondent's rehabilitation'. Their Honours observed that the conduct of the Crown might also be relevant, for example, if the Crown were to seek on appeal a higher sentence than that which it had successfully sought at first instance. Their Honours concluded:

To the extent that McLure P's observations suggest a more confined view of the scope of the discretion, they are unduly narrow [73].

Subsequently, in The State of Western Australia v Thompson [2014] WASCA 108, McLure P, after stating that there is a residual discretion to decline to allow a State appeal, said:

Broad consistency with sentences customarily imposed in this State mandates the conclusion that the only appropriate sentencing option in this case is a term of imprisonment. A fine is so far outside the range of a sound exercise of the sentencing discretion as to constitute an affront to the proper administration of justice. Further, there is nothing in the facts or circumstances of this appeal that would require or justify this court exercising the residual discretion to decline to allow the State appeal [40].

13 An appellate court may not substitute its own opinion for that of the sentencing judge merely because it would have exercised the discretion differently: Lowndes v The Queen [1999] HCA 29; (1999) 195 CLR 665 [15]. This court can only intervene if the appellant demonstrates that the court at first instance made a material error, either express or implied.

Appeal ground 1: Finding there was no need for personal deterrence

The humiliation of appearing before a court and the impact upon [the respondent's] employment ... are such, I believe, as to result in there being no need for personal deterrence.

The appellant says that the magistrate erred in finding there was no need for personal deterrence. The magistrate's bases for finding there was no need for personal deterrence were either contrary to the evidence or made in the absence of supporting evidence. Furthermore, there was clear and compelling evidence that a specific personal deterrence was warranted.

15 The appellant says that the mere fact of public humiliation in appearing before a court cannot negate the need for personal deterrence. Further, there was no evidence before the magistrate that the respondent had personally experienced any particular humiliation as a result of being charged and brought before the court.

16 Where a person suffers personal humiliation as a result of being brought before a court and convicted, that might deter them from committing further offences. However, it cannot be assumed that every person brought before a court and convicted will suffer personal humiliation such that they will be deterred from committing further offences of a similar nature. There must be evidence that the person has suffered personal humiliation or evidence from which that might be inferred. There was no such evidence before the magistrate in this case.

17 The effect of a conviction upon a person's employment might deter them from future offending. However, there was no evidence before the magistrate that the charges against the respondent had had any detrimental effect upon her employment or that her convictions were likely to have any such impact upon her employment. The evidence before the magistrate was that the respondent had been informed that she would not be removed from the Police Force and would receive a promotion. She had never been stood aside or stood down over the offences. The presentence report contained information from the Police Ethical Standards Unit that unless a sentence of imprisonment was imposed the respondent's matter had been fully dealt with from an internal disciplinary process. In her sentencing remarks the magistrate observed that the respondent was still employed as a police officer and had been promoted since the offences.

18 The respondent submits that there was other evidence before the magistrate to enable her to conclude that there was no need for personal deterrence. First, the respondent submitted there were uncontested submissions by the respondent that her computer access would be likely to be monitored as a result of the charges. That is not quite what was submitted to the magistrate. Counsel for the respondent submitted to the magistrate that the fact that the respondent had never been stood aside or stood down and is not going to lose her job but has been given an Assistant Commissioner's warning shows the attitude of the police to the circumstances of the offending and the faith placed in her by her senior officers. Counsel submitted that that showed what the police service thinks about the respondent committing further offences in the future and said 'she hasn't, and she won't, and the police obviously are keeping an eye on [the respondent] because of these charges' (ts 13). Further, counsel said '[the respondent] will continue to be monitored in her role as a police officer. She's not going to be losing her job, she's told. This investigation will be on her file forever with her career with WA Police and she won't be able to escape it. She knows she will lose her job if she commits an offence like this again' (ts 16). That is not evidence that the Police Force was or would monitor the respondent's computer access. Furthermore, the fact that the respondent's convictions would be on her file must be seen in the context that she had previously received verbal guidance about breaches of WA Police policy regarding the use of restricted access systems which did not deter her from committing these offences.

19 Secondly, the respondent says that observations on the attitude of the police to the lack of ongoing risk was material entitling the magistrate to make her finding. There was no evidence of the attitude of the police towards the risk of future offending by the respondent. There was evidence that the respondent remained in her employment and had received a promotion but no evidence of any assessment or observations by the Police Force of the risk of future unauthorised access by the respondent to the restricted police computer systems.

20 The third factor pointed to by the respondent is the belief of the respondent that she would lose her career with WA Police if she was to reoffend. This again must be seen in the context that prior to committing these offences the respondent had received verbal guidance about breaches of WA Police policy regarding the use of restricted access systems and that each time the respondent had accessed the restricted access systems she had received an express warning that information was not to be accessed for personal reasons and when she had accessed the Police Custody Program she had received an express warning that unauthorised access or use of the system may result in criminal or disciplinary actions.

21 The respondent also points to evidence that the offender was extremely remorseful for the offending and that she had learned from her mistakes. Finally, the respondent said that the presentence report states that the respondent 'appears to have a number of protective and positive factors in place and has been issued with a formal warning within her workplace'. The protective and positive factors are not elaborated upon and there is no evidence of any measures taken by the respondent to ensure that she does not reoffend.

22 The appellant submits, and I accept, that there is compelling evidence of a need for personal deterrence. First, the offending involved the respondent accessing three separate WA Police operated restricted access computer systems for personal purposes. Secondly, the respondent accessed the restricted access computer systems on 11 separate occasions over a 13 month period. The number of separate accesses and the period over which they occurred prevent the accesses being seen as an aberration or a lapse in judgment. Thirdly, the respondent committed the offences despite: (a) being warned before each access of the IMS and Briefcase systems that the system must not be accessed for personal reasons and acknowledging that warning in order to access the system; (b) being warned before accessing the WA Police Custody Program that the system must not be accessed for personal reasons and that unauthorised access of the system may result in criminal and/or disciplinary charges, and acknowledging that warning in order to access the system; and (c) having been subject to disciplinary proceedings in relation to breaches of WA Police policy regarding the use of restricted access systems in 2006 for which she received verbal guidance as part of which she was taken through all the relevant statutory provisions and the WA Police policies regarding the limits of her authorisation.

23 I find that the magistrate erred in finding that there was no need for personal deterrence. There was no evidence in support of the two factors which the magistrate found gave rise to there being no need for personal deterrence. Further, there was clear and compelling evidence that personal deterrence was warranted. Ground 1 succeeds.

24 Ground 2 is that the magistrate erred in law in considering improper mitigating factors, namely the lack of purpose in the accesses and the limited quantity of information accessed.

25 The magistrate did not expressly state that either of those matters was a mitigating factor. The appellant says that it is to be inferred from the magistrate's reasons that she took those matters into account as mitigating factors. I do not agree.

26 The structure of the magistrate's sentencing remarks is as follows. First, she outlines the facts relating to each unauthorised access. Then the magistrate refers to authorities concerning matters relevant to a sentence for unlawful use of a computer contrary to s 440A of the Criminal Code. Her Honour referred to the judgment of Wheeler JA in Hull v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 194, where her Honour said:

The three factors which are most likely to be of importance, in the usual run of cases, would be the nature of the information to which access was gained (that is, factors such as its personal sensitivity, or the potential public mischief stemming from access), the quantity of information the subject of the access, and the purpose of the offender in gaining access [5].

27 The magistrate's remarks concerning the purpose of a respondent in gaining access and the quantity of information the subject of the access must be seen in that context. That is, her Honour was considering them as factors going to the seriousness of the offence not as mitigating factors.

28 The way in which the magistrate referred to the purpose of the respondent in gaining access and the quantity of information accessed by the respondent might reasonably be read as treating those matters as mitigating factors. Therefore, leave to appeal will be granted in relation to ground 2 but the ground does not succeed.

29 Ground 3 is that the sentence imposed by the learned magistrate was manifestly inadequate.

30 A claim of manifest inadequacy is a claim that the sentencing court has made an implied material error of fact or law. The sentence must be shown to be unreasonable or unjust, it being outside the range of a sound sentencing discretion: The State of Western Australia v Baldini [2015] WASCA 39 [17] [18], McLure P, Buss and Mazza JJA agreeing. In The State of Western Australia v Vartolo [2015] WASCA 53 [47], Mazza JA, with whom McLure P and Buss JA agreed, said that the orthodox approach to the question of manifest inadequacy is to examine the individual sentence, having regard to the maximum sentence for the offence, the gravity of the offending conduct in the scale of seriousness, sentences imposed in other appellate cases and the personal circumstances of the offender.

31 The maximum penalty for an offence against s 440A(3)(c) of the Criminal Code is imprisonment for 2 years, although the maximum summary conviction penalty is imprisonment for 12 months and a fine of $12,000. It should be recognised that the statutory maximum for the offence is a sentence of imprisonment for 2 years notwithstanding that when dealt with in summary jurisdiction the maximum is reduced: Wiltshire v Mafi [2010] WASCA 119 [26] (Pullin and Buss JJA and Mazza J), citing Miller J in Johnson v Hayter [2001] WASCA 118 [10].

32 In Inglis v Pinch [2016] WASC 30, Pritchard J considered an appeal against sentence by a police officer who had been convicted of having accessed the Incident Management System of the WA Police contrary to s 440A(3)(c) of the Criminal Code. Her Honour said:

The maximum penalties which apply to the offence created by s 440A indicate that Parliament viewed this offence as a serious one. Even in those cases where (as here) the offence is dealt with summarily, the maximum penalty is imprisonment for 12 months and a fine of $12,000. That is not surprising. The use of a password to restrict access to a computer system ordinarily reflects the fact that the nature of the information accessible using that computer system, or the functions performed using that system, are such that they should not be available to the community generally, whether for reasons of privacy, confidentiality, security, or safety, for example [27].

33 A fine of $3,000 was imposed on the respondent as a global penalty. The magistrate gave the respondent a 5% discount from the amount imposed for a guilty plea. Taking into consideration this 5% discount makes a total fine of $3,150. Dividing this amount by the 11 offences means that the respondent received an effective fine for each offence of $286. That is approximately 2.3% of the jurisdictional limit.

34 In considering where this case fits on the range of seriousness for offences of this kind three important factors in this case are the nature of the information to which access was gained, the quantity of information the subject of access and the purpose of the offender in gaining access: See Hull v The State of Western Australia [5] (Wheeler JA).

35 Consideration of the nature of the information to which access was gained directs attention to factors such as the personal sensitivity or the potential public mischief stemming from access. The information accessed in this case was sensitive personal information. In relation to charge 11 it included information regarding the respondent's brotherinlaw including pending criminal charges and details of persons protected by violence restraining orders to which he was subject. In relation to charge 9 the information included information regarding the respondent's brotherinlaw including pending criminal charges and the statement of material facts for those charges. In relation to the other charges the information included information relating to the respondent's husband's criminal history, the criminal history of her brotherinlaw and information regarding her brotherinlaw including his 'lock up assessment'.

36 In relation to the quantity of information the subject of the accesses, the magistrate described the quantity of information accessed to be relatively limited except in relation to the pending criminal charges. I would not characterise the information accessed in relation to any of the charges as limited. It was not, for example, limited to the name and address of the owner of a particular vehicle as in Hull v The State of Western Australia or the vehicle registration of the offender's own vehicle as in Inglis v Pinch. The information accessed in relation to each charge extended to the respondent's husband's or brotherinlaw's criminal history and involvement, as a victim, in an alleged criminal offence. The information in relation to charges 9 and 11 was more extensive.

37 In considering the purpose of the respondent gaining access in the course of considering where this case fits in the range of seriousness of offences of this kind, questions of whether the respondent gained a benefit for, or caused a detriment to, any person may be put to one side, since, if those factors were present, those considerations would have put the offence into a more serious category for sentencing purposes: Criminal Code s 440A(3)(a) and (b).

38 The respondent offers no satisfactory explanation of her purpose in accessing the information. She said she remembers accessing the records related to a domestic incident between her sisterinlaw and brotherinlaw and claimed that she did this as she did not want her sisterinlaw to tarnish her name with the Police Force. That is not a benign purpose. In relation to the remaining accesses, the respondent's counsel submitted to the magistrate that she 'doesn't recall any of those accesses' and 'she can't provide an explanation' (ts 10). Counsel then suggested 'It would seem by the facts, and having reviewed the evidence, that there is nothing perhaps more than idle curiosity in looking that - information report, and checking the progress of it, perhaps making sure it was closed' (ts 10). The presentence report says that the respondent indicated that she has not had any prior experiences of failing to remember her actions or events.

39 Having regard to all of the circumstances, including the nature and quantity of information accessed and the purpose of the respondent in gaining access, the seriousness of the offending is in the upper midrange of the scale of seriousness for offences of this kind.

40 Next, I consider sentences imposed in other appellate cases and the standard of sentencing customarily observed with respect to offences of this kind. The State submitted that there are now six appellate decisions involving offences against s 440A of the Criminal Code, the most recent of which is Inglis v Pinch in which Pritchard J considered Casilli v Wehman [2014] WASC 319; Hull v The State of Western Australia; Rhattigan v Forbes [2009] WASC 368 and Taylor v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 72. In Inglis v Pinch Pritchard J said:

The appellate decisions in relation to s 440A(3) illustrate that the offence under s 440A may be committed in a wide range of circumstances. However, the limited number of decisions means that it is not yet possible to identify a range of sentences customarily imposed for offences under s 440A(3)(c) [69].

41 The magistrate referred to the personal circumstances of the respondent. She was previously of good character and had good antecedents prior to the offending. However, those matters do not carry great weight in the circumstances of this case. In Inglis v Pinch Pritchard J said of the appellant in that case:

While Mr Inglis was of previous good character, and had good antecedents, that is hardly surprising for a person who is a serving police officer. The impact of those good antecedents, however, is in my view largely ameliorated by the fact that Mr Inglis was only able to commit the offences by virtue of his position as a police officer, in the course of which he was given access to the IMS database.

In addition, in my view, when an offence under s 440A is committed by a person who is given access to a restricted-access database in the course of their employment, as is the case in relation to police officers who have access to the IMS database, the sentence imposed should reflect the need for general deterrence as well as personal deterrence [63] [64].

42 Having regard to the maximum sentence for the offence, the gravity of the offending conduct in the scale of seriousness, the need for personal and general deterrence and notwithstanding the personal circumstances of the respondent the sentence imposed by the magistrate is excessively lenient; it falls outside the range that is reasonably available in the sound exercise of the sentencing discretion. Ground 3 is made out.

43 As I have set out earlier in these reasons, the court has a residual discretion to decline to allow an appeal against sentence that is erroneously lenient at the time of the hearing of the appeal. There are no circumstances which justify the exercise of the residual discretion in this case.

44 The appeal was lodged six days out of time. The delay is explained by James Bennett, a solicitor employed by the State Solicitors Office, and Emma Bartlett, a prosecutions clerk at the State Solicitors Office, in affidavits sworn by them on 4 March and 8 March 2016 respectively. In essence, the delay resulted from delay in obtaining the transcript of the proceedings before the magistrate and a certified copy of the prosecution notice. Counsel for the appellant recognised that the delay by the State in commencing an appeal is unsatisfactory. However, the delay was relatively short and caused no prejudice to the respondent. The time for commencing the appeal should be extended to the date on which the application for leave to appeal was lodged.

45 I am satisfied that each ground of appeal has a reasonable prospect of success and hence leave shall be given to appeal on each of the grounds in the amended notice of appeal.

46 Grounds 1 and 3 of the appeal are made out. The appeal should be allowed and the sentence imposed by the magistrate should be varied by imposing a new sentence in substitution for that imposed by the magistrate.

47 The court must not impose a sentence of imprisonment on an offender unless it decides that the seriousness of the offence is such that only imprisonment can be justified or the protection of the community requires it: Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 6(4). The offences are serious but not so serious that only imprisonment can be justified. The protection of the community does not require imprisonment. Furthermore, it would be inappropriate to impose imprisonment where the prosecutor did not submit to the magistrate that the seriousness of the offence or the protection of the community required imprisonment.

48 I have set out earlier in these reasons the statutory penalty for the offences and the circumstances of the commission of the offences. There are a number of aggravating factors. First, the repeated offending. There were 11 offences over a 13 month period. This was not an aberration or an isolated error of judgment. Secondly, the information accessed was sensitive. The respondent accessed information about criminal investigations in which her husband and brotherinlaw were either victims or offenders. In charges 7, 8, 9 and 11 the respondent accessed information about criminal investigations where the respondent's brotherinlaw was the offender. In charge 11 the respondent accessed information about witnesses and persons protected by restraining orders against her brotherinlaw. That is particularly sensitive information. Thirdly, the offences were a significant breach of trust. The respondent was ordinarily authorised to access the three police databases. That made the offences more difficult to detect because access to the system will not generally be considered unusual. It was only because of another enquiry, which did not have the respondent as the primary person of interest, that this offending was detected.

49 The principle mitigating factors are that the respondent was of previous good character and pleaded guilty. For the reasons given by the magistrate a discount in the order of 5% is appropriate for the plea of guilty.

50 Charge 11 was the most serious offence. Charge 9 was also a very serious offence. Taken on their own a fine of at least $3,000 would have been an appropriate penalty for each of those offences. A fine of at least $1,000 would be appropriate for each of the other offences taken in isolation. However, the effect of the totality principle requires the court to review the aggregate sentence and consider whether the aggregate is just and appropriate. The court must look at the totality of the criminal behaviour and determine what is the appropriate sentence for all the offences. Having regard to that consideration, the appropriate global sentence for all the offences is a fine of $8,000.