Clyne, Peter v Senator the Hon Gareth Evans, Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Australia & Anor [1984] FCA 284

PETER CLYNE v. SENATOR THE HON. GARETH EVANS, ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (First Respondent) AND THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Second Respondent).

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. NSW G235 of 1984 )

On appeal from a single Judge of the Federal Court of Australia

SENATOR THE HON. GARETH EVANS, ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

AND: THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Second Respondent ORDER

JUDGES MAKING ORDER: McGreqor, Fisher and Neaves JJ. DATE OF ORDER: 14 September 1984

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. NSW G235 of 1984 ) GENERAL DIVISION )

On appeal from a single Judge of the Federal Court of Australia

BETWEEN : PETER CLYNE Appellant AND: SENATOR THE HON. GARETH EVANS.

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

PETER CLYNE (appellant) has appealed from part of the

judgment of a member of this Court given on 16 July 1984 whereby

his application, brought pursuant to the Administrative Decisions

(Judicial Review) Act 1977 (the Judical Review Act) to review a

decision of SENATOR THE HONOURABLE GARETH EVANS, ATTORNEY-GENERAL

FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (the Attorney-General), was dismissed. The said decision was one wherein the Attorney-General declined to consider the appellant's application that a certain prosecution should be discontinued. THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (The

Director of Public Prosecutions) was Joined as a second

It appears from the Reasons for Judgment of the primary Judge that in December 1982 an information was laid by an officer of the Australian Taxation Office, alleging that the appellant

had. contrary to the Banking (Foreign Exchange) Requiations made

a false statement to an officer of the Reserve Bank of Australia. Committal proceedings in respect of the alleqed offence commenced before a Stipendiarv Magistrate at the Court of Petty Sessions in Sydnev on 4 July 1983. and continued thereafter on various days in dJulv and October and on 25 January 1984. On 26 idem the

During the course of the committal proceedings, an application was made to this Court for review of various decisions by the learned Magistrate which application was rejected, the rejection being confirmed on appeal: see Clyne v. Scott (1983) 52 ALR 405. A further unsuccessful application was

made for review of the decision to commit; see Clyne v. Scott, 28

On 27 January 1984 following committal for trial the

appellant wrote to the Attorney-General stating that he was preparing submissions in respect of an application that no indictment should be filed. On 5 March 1984 the Director of

Public Prosecutions Act 1983 came into effect. Mr. Ian Temby of

Queen's Counsel, the first Director, took up his appointment on that day. On 13 March 1984 the submission letter referred to

was forwarded to the Attorney General. It was supplemented by a

Attornev-General, a letter was written to fhe appellant

"As this matter falls within the statutory responsibility of the Director of Public Prosecutions. the Attorney-General has asked me to refer your request to him for his consideration. This has been done. You will hear from the Director in due course."

On 10 April 1984, the Director of Public Prosecutions

wrote to the appellant in respect of his letters of 13 March and 2 April as follows, inter alia - ""T have considered the matters raised in vour letters but I have concluded that your trial on the charge against Regulation 42 of the Banking (Foreign Exchange) Regulations should proceed."

Thereafter the appellant wrote requesting a reference to "the

statutory provisions (if any) whereby a decision whether or not a

nolle prosequi is to be filed no longer falls within the ambit of

decisions that have to be made by the Attorney-General". On 10

May 1984, the Director of Public Prosecutions replied, inter

"Since the commencement on 5 March of this year of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act, 1983, I have been responsible for matters relating to the conduct of prosecutions for offences against the law of the Commonwealth. Pursuant to my functions under subsection 6(1) of the Act I am carrying on the prosecution of you for an offence against Regulation 42 of the Banking (Foreign Exchange) Regulations and I considered your request that no Bill of Indictment be signed charging you with that offence, in accordance with my powers under subsection 9(4) of the Act.

In relation to the question you have asked in the sixth paragraph of your letter, I draw your attention to paragraph 10(1)(d) of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act. That paragraph provides, in effect, that my powers and functions under that Act do not affect the powers of the Attorney-General under section 71 of the Judiciary Act. 1903 to decline to proceed further in the prosecution of a person under commitment upon a charge of an indictable offence against the laws of the Commonwealth. However the Attorney-General has stated to me that he would wish me to determine nolle prosequi and no bill applications that are addressed to him. The Attorney-General further

stated that he would consider such applications addressed to him following an earlier refusal by me

On 17 May 1984 the appellant wrote again to the Director of Public Prosecutions. in effect, stating that the Attorney-General retained a duty, pursuant to s.71 of the Judiciary Act 1903 himself to consider an application that no bill be filed. Mandamus proceedings were commenced against the Attorney-General. However, on 4 July 1984, when they were called

on for hearing, the appellant sought and was granted leave to

file ain Court an application pursuant to s.5 of the Judicial

Review Act for anorder of review of the decision of the

Attorney-General. The mandamus proceedings were, it seems, not pressed before the learned primary Judge who dismissed the application. The appellant did not appeal against his decision as to mandamus but sought, when opening this appeal, to file an amended Notice of Appeal "to keep the question open". This Court

Sections of the Judiciary Act 1903, to which reference

"69. (1) Indictable offences against the laws of the Commonwealth shall be prosecuted by indictment in the name of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth or of such other person as the Governor-General appoints in that behalf.

(2) Any such appointment shall be by commission in the King's name, and may extend to the whole Commonwealth or to any State or part of the Commonwealth.

(3) Any person committed for trial for an offence against the laws of the Commonwealth may at any time within fourteen days after committal and before the jury 15 sworn apply toa Justice in Chambers or toa Judae of the Supreme Court of a State for the appointment of counsel for his defence. If it be found to the sastisfaction of the Justice or Judge that such person is without adequate means to provide defence for himself, and that it is desirable in the interests of justice that such an appointment should be made, the Justice or Judge shall certify this to the Attorney-General, who may if he thinks fit thereupon cause arrangements to be made for the defence of the accused person. Upon committal the person committed shall be supplied with a copy of this sub-section.

71. When any person 18 under commitment upon a charge of an indictable offence against the laws of

the Commonwealth, the Attorney-General or such other person as the Governor-General appoints in

that behalf may decline to proceed further in the prosecution, and may, 1f the person is in custody,

by warrant under his hand direct the discharge of the person from custody, and he shall be discharged

The Director of Public Prosecutions (Consequential Amendments) Act 1983. the relevant provisions of which came into force on 5 March 1984, amended s.71 by adding at the end thereof

(a) affects the power under sub-section 9(4) of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 of the Director of Public Prosecutions; or

(b) affects, or shall be taken to have affected, the power under sub-section 8(2) of the

Special Prosecutors Act 1982 of a Special Prosecutor."

Sections of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983

"B. (1) In the performance of the Director's functions and in the exercise of the Director's powers, the Director 1s subiect to such directions or quidelines as the Attorney-General, after consultation with the Director. gives or furnishes to the Director by instrument in writing.

sub-section (1), directions or guidelines under that sub-section may -

(a) relate to the circumstances in which the Director should institute or carry on prosecutions for offences;

direction or furnishes a guideline under sub-section (1), he shall -

(a) as soon as" practicable after the time that is the relevant time in relation to the

instrument containing the direction or guideline, cause a copy of the instrument to be published in the "Gazette": and

9. (1) For the purposes of the performance of his functions, the Director may prosecute by indictment in his official name indictabie offences against the laws of the Commonweaith, but nothing in this sub-section prevents the Director from prosecuting an offence against a law of the Commonwealth in any other manner.

on indictment for an offence against a law of the Commonwealth, the indictment shall be signed -

authorized by the Director, by instrument in writing, to sign indictments.

(3) For the purposes of the performance of his tunctions, the Director may take over a prosecution on indictment for an offence against a law of the Commonwealth, being a prosecution instituted by another person (other than the Attorney-General or a Special Prosecutor).

(a) a person is under commitment, or has been indicted, on a charge of an indictable offence

(b) the prosecution for the offence was instituted, has been taken over or is being carried on by the Director.

the Director may decline to proceed further in the prosecution and may, 1f the person 183 1n custody, by warrant signed by the Director, direct the discharge of the person from custody, and where guch a direction 1s aiven, the person shall be discharged accordingly.

appointed by the Governor-General or of a Special Prosecutor to prosecute by indictment

in his own name indictable offences against the laws of the Commonwealth;

Act 1903 of the Attorney-General or of a person appointed by the Governor-General;

Counsel in this matter have presented their arguments orally but supported by written submissions summarising or. in some instances, developing areas of their argument. Accordingly,

it is not necessary to attempt fully to recapitulate them here.

The appellant's submissions included that s.71 of the Judiciary Act involved a duty upon the Attorney-General to consider the application that he should decline to proceed further in the prosecution: that s.71 is a reproduction of the common law into statute form: that under the common law the Attorney-General would have had a duty to consider an application 1f one were made either, after committal, that he should decline to present an indictment: or, 1f an indictment is signed or pending, that he should enter a nolle prosequl. He submitted that the form of s.71 implied that the Attorney-General has a duty to consider any application by an accused person in that regard; that it is a statutory duty and that there is a correlative right in a person under commitment to require him so

to do; that the Attorney-General's declining or refusing to

consider the application was itself a decision, and wrong in law. He referred to Ex parte Newton (1855) 4E & B 869 (Newton), particularly at pp.871, 872: Ex parte Costello (1868) I R. 2 C.L. 380 (Costello): Ex parte Blackburn [1956] 1 W.L.R. 1193

(Blackburn): The King v. Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Ozone Theatres (Aust.) Ltd. (1949) 78

C.L.R. 389 (Ozone): Barton v. The Queen (1980) 147 C.L.R. 75

(Barton): Lamb v. Moss 49 ALR 533. If, as the argument ran, s.71 is merely an expression of the common law then, said the appellant, the Attorney-General has a duty which is referable now to 3.71 of the Judiciary Act. He said the disinclination of the Attorney-General to deal with the matter was. in effect, a refusal to do so. In terms of s. 5(1)(4) of the Judicial Review Act, he submitted that 1t was a decision which was contrary to

Senior counsel for the respondents submitted that s.71 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (as amended) 1s a statutory expression of the common law prerogative power of the Attorney-General to decline to proceed further in indictable prosecutions. He referred to Barton per Gibbs A.C.J. and Mason J. at p.94; Stephen J. at p.103: per Murphy J. at p.107; per Aickin J. at

p.109; per Wilson J. at p.109; Req. v. Comptroller-General of

Patents C18993 1Q.B. 909 at p.914; London County Council v. Attorney-General £19023 A.C. 165 at pp.168-169. Neither s.71 nor

the general law impose a correlative duty on the Attorney-General

to consider any application made to him not to proceed further in

an indictable prosecution. A fortiori is this so when the legislative scheme gives a concurrent power to another authority, in this case the Director of Public Prosecutions to decline to proceed further in the prosecution; see s.9(4) of the Director

of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 and s.22 of the Director of

Public Prosecutions (Consequential Amendments) Act 1983. There

1s no express duty to consider any application and there is nothing in the language of s.71 to cast upon the Attorney-General any obligation to consider whether to decline to proceed further in a particular case. The implication of such a duty is made more difficult by the fact that s.71l applies not only to the Attorney-General but also to other persons appointed by the

He submitted that the appellant must establish in the

first instance the existence of a decision reviewable under s.5

of the Judicial Review Act. In this case, he said, the decision

of the Attorney-General had been to refer the application to the Director of Public Prosecutions. This was not a decision made "under an enactment". It was made pursuant to ae policy. Alternatively, if what the Attorney-General did constituted a decision made "under an enactment" (1.e. under s.71), it was not made in contravention of any ground specified in s.5(1) of the

Finally, he said there was no call for the Court at

first aimstance, or this Court, to exercise its discretion to

review the matter. given that the Director of Public Prosecutions has considered the appellant's application; nor had the appellant made any subsequent application to the Attorney-General in accordance with the policy expressed in the Director of Public Prosecution's letter of 10 May 1984. He referred to Lamb v. Moss (supra); Sankey v. Whitlam (1979-80) 142 C.L.R. 1 at p.26. The primary Judge, he submitted, had made no error of law in declining to exercise his discretion to review the decision in

First it will be convenient to make reference to the

Newton concerned a motion for a rule nisi to order the Attorney-General to issue his fiat for a writ of error ina case in which the applicant had been convicted at the Central Criminal Court onan indictment for an assault. The Attorney-General, having heard the application, had refused the fiat. It was held that the Court had no jurisdiction to review that decision. The appellant, however, relied on passages in the iudgments of Lord Campbell C.J. and Earle J. The former at p.871, and referring

"If he refused to hear and consider the application for a fiat, we should compel him by mandamus to hear and consider it: but when he has heard and considered, and refused, we cannot interfere. The Attorney-General may be made responsible in

"I think the duty cast by the law on the person filling the office of Attorney-General is to consider and decide in each case whether the fiat ought to be granted."

Costello was a case in which an application had been made under a_ statutory provision providing for an application to

be made to the Attorney-General for a fiat for a writ of error. The application had been refused and, although 1t was argued that the Attorney-General had a duty to entertain the application, the

lackburn concerned an application for a certificate

which would have entitled the applicant to appeal to the House of

Lords. When this was refused the applicant sought mandamus to compel the Attorney-General to issue the certificate. In refusing the application Singleton L.J.. with whom Morris and

"I feel that no one would doubt that when there is an application, by a person who has been convicted and whose appeal against conviction has been dismissed by the Court of Criminal Appeal, fora certificate from the Attorney-General under that subsection, 1t 18 the duty of the Attorney-General to consider the application. Parliament entrusted the granting of or the refusal of a certificate under that subsection to the Attorney-General, and, of course, he would consider 1t, and consider 1t in view of the terms of the subsection."

"I assume. for this purpose, that there 1s, or would be ina proper case, a right to an order of mandamus against the Attorney-General if he refused to consider an application pr>2perly made under section 1(6) of the Act of 1907. I assume it without deciding the matter."

"The real point in this case is, as it seems to me, that the applicant is seeking to reopen his

original application, and he is asking the Attorney-General to consider either the old

Court to consider directing the Attorney-General to

We consider that the statements upon which the appellant relied in Newton, Costello and Blackburn were made in the context of the circumstances which the Court was then considering. They were not concerned with putting an end to a prosecution. Those cases dealt with the exercise of a power to grant a fiat fora writ of error or a certificate enabling the person aggrieved to exercise a legal right expressly conferred upon him by statute, a right that was exerciseable by him subject only to obtaining the fiat of the Attorney-General or a certificate. The passages cited were obiter;: but attributing some persuasive force to them, the cases are clearly distinguishable from that at present

under consideration. This is particularly so because of the

legal right, referred to in those cases, conferred on the person

aggrieved once the fiat or certificate was granted. If the Attorney-General did not in such circumstances consider the application for a fiat or certificate the legal right of the applicant to proceed upon a writ of error or to appeal would have been frustrated. Here no legal right of any kind is conferred on the appellant, either absolutely or subject to the intervention of the Attorney-General, to have the prosecution proceed no

We agree, with respect, that the Attorney-General in England could exercise a discretion to decline to proceed further upon a prosecution or to bring it to an end after an indictment had been signed. We do not stay to consider whether the entering of a nolle prosequi put an end to the prosecution forever; or whether later there could have been a fresh prosecution on the same charge; see Goddard v. Smith (1704) 6 Mod.261 per Powell J.

at p.262: The Law Officers of the Crown (Edwards) p.229. But

what was conferred on the Attorney-General was an unfettered discretion, the exercise of which could not be compelled by an accused, though the Attorney-General may have had to answer to

Parliament for the manner of its exercise; see The Law Officers

"Another case in which the Attorney-General 15 pre-eminent 1s the power to enter a nolle prosequi in a criminal case.....the Attorney-General alone has power to enter a nolle prosequi, and that power is not subject to any control."

The first instance of the exercise of the power was in the sixteenth century in the reian of Charles II: see per Holt

C.J. in Goddard v. Smith (supra) at pp.261-262. In the exercise

of his discretion he acted as "representative of the Crown" per Cockburn C.J. in R. v. Allen (1862) 1B & 5 850 at p.854. In that case, as reported in 9 Cox C.C. 120. indictments had been moved into the Court of Queen's Bench by certiorari: but when a rule was applied for that the defendant come in and plead, it was discovered he had not entered into any recognizances, and that

the Attorney-General had entered a nolle prosequi. Cockburn C.J.

"Upon what ground do you ask us to interfere with the undoubted right of the Attorney-General to enter a nolle prosequi?"

"Upon the ground that the Attorney-General has acted on an ex parte application. The Attorney-General has no power to enter a nolle prosequi without calling before him and hearing all

the parties." Blackburn: J. said - "It will be difficult to show that this Court has

power to interfere with the prerogative right of the Crown as exercised by the Attorney-General."

The court was unanimous in refusing the application. At p.122,

Crompton J., at the end of a very short judgment said -

"I think the Attorney-General can interfere in any public prosecution whenever he pleases, and all the 'cases referred to are clearly distinguishable from such an one as this."

"IT am of the same opinioh. This particular branch of the Prerogative 1s entrusted to the Attorney-General who, on his own responsibility, determines whether the prosecution shall go on or not."

The unfettered nature of the power to enter a nolle

prosequi also receives support inR. v. Comptroller-General of

Patents C1899} 1 Q.B. 909 per A.L. Smith L.J. at p.914;

speech of Viscount Dilhorne in Gouriet v. Union of Post Office

We may mow turn to the Australian authorities to which

In Ozone the question at issue concerned a refusal by the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration to

consider an application for an order altering the basic wage applying in certain States to the industry concerned. The High Court was asked to grant a writ of mandamus addressed to that

Court commanding it to hear the application. The Court said at

"Apart, however, from this 1mperative requirement, what s.25 does is to create a jurisdiction in the court, and where such a jurisdiction is created for the public benefit or for the purpose of conferring rights or benefits upon persons the court upon an application properly made is under a duty to exercise its jurisdiction and 1s not at liberty to refuse to deal with the matter: Rv. The Tithe Commissioner for England and Wales (In the Matter of Great Hale Tithes) ((1849) 14 Q.B. 459); Julius v. The Right Rev. The Lord Bishop of Oxford (1880) 5 App. Cas.214). Where a court or a public officer wrongly refuses jurisdiction the exercise of the jurisdiction can be commanded by a writ of mandamus. The writ may 1ssue whenever there 1s a specific legal right to require the performance of a statutory duty, and no specific leqal remedy 1s

provided for enforcing that right: Rv. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue; In re Nathan ((1884) 12 Q.B.D. 461). The writ goes only in

order to compel the performance of a_ public duty and, in the case of a court or other body which is under a duty to hear and determine a matter, the tenor of the writ will require the hearing and determination of the matter, and not the decision of the matter in any particular manner. The Arbitration Court in determining a dispute is not exercising a judicial power, but 1t 1s performing a public duty imposed upon 1t by statute."

That case, therefore, was concerned with a legal duty imposed by

statute; the Arbitration Court had refused jurisdiction: it was

required to exercise that jurisdiction. There is no parallel in

In Barton v. The Queen (1980) 147 C.L.R. 75 it was held

that a decision of the Attorney-General for New South Wales under s.5 of the Australian Courts Act 1828 to present an ex officio indictment 1s not examinable by the courts. At pp.90-91 in the judgment of Gibbs A.C.J., as he then was. and Mason J., it was

"The decisions in Prosser and in the later case of Req. v. Allen (1862) 1 B&S 850 that the courts cannot review the Attorney-General's exercise of the prerogative power to enter or refuse a nolle prosequ1, are in conformity with the principle that the courts cannot examine the exercise by the Attorney-General of his common law power to grant or refuse a fiat in connection witha relator action. (London County Council v. Attorney-General (€19027 A.C. 165, at pp.168-169,170)); Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers (£1978) A.C. 435, at p.488); Reg. v. Labouchere ((1884) 12 Q.B.D. 320)."

Referring to s.5 of the Australian Courts Act, they said at

"The provision made by s.5 1s very different from an ordinary administrative discretion conferred by statute. The section 1s a self-contained provision the scope of which 1s unaffected by other provisions in the statute. It imposes no duty on the Attorney-General to consider whether a prosecution shall be instituted. All that the relevant part of the section does is to indicate the mode in which a criminal prosecution shall be instituted, i.e. by information in the name of the Attorney-General or other officer duly appointed for the purpose. The provision does not limit or restrict the Attorney-General in any way in the consideration which he may give to a particular case. And because the lanquage leaves' the Attorney-General at large in deciding what course he shall take, 1t makes his decision immune from

"All this indicates that Parliament intended to give the Attorney-General for the Colony the

unexaminable discretion possessed by the Attorney-General in England acting on behalf of the Crown."

In our opinion Barton reinforces the extent of the authority and freedom from compulsion vested by the common law in the Attorney-General as "a representative of the Crown" when exercising powers such as those conferred by ss.69 and 71 of the Judiciary Act. As was said in Barton by Gibb A.C.J. and Mason J.

at p.90, speaking of the conclusion in Req. v Prosser (1848) 11

Beav.306 that the prerogative power to enter a nolle prosequi was

".,,there is no reason to doubt that the conclusion

These extracts cannot determine the matter conclusively against the appellant but they highlight the difficulty in

finding in the statute a relevant "duty" imposed upon the

In our opinion it 1s not possible to discern in s.7la legally enforceable duty in the Attorney-General to receive and consider representations made by or on behalf of a person committed for trial that no further proceedings be taken against

him. It follows that the section confers no right on an accused

person to require the exercise of the power conferred by the

It was conceded by the appellant that the language of the section does not expressly impose sucha duty on the Attorney-General or confer such a right on a person committed for trial. Both the duty and the right were said to arise by implication, the foundation of that implication being the duty which, it was argued, the common law imposed on the Attorney-General. The statute was said to reinforce the common law and should be read as importing that duty. It was also said that, the statutory provision being for the benefit of a limited class of persons, viz. those committed for trial upon a charge of an indictable offence against a law of the Commonwealth, 1t should be considered as conferring on that limited class a right to make application to the Attorney-General and to insist upon

the performance of the duty that was said to be imposed upon him.

It may well be that s.71 of the Judiciary Act, like s.5

of the Australian Courts Act considered in Barton. 1s to be

construed against the background of the vorerogative and common law powers of the Attorney-General. But so to construe it provides no support to the appellant's arqument that the Attorney-General is under a legally enforceable duty to consider an application by a person committed for trial that no further proceedings be taken against him. The authorities upon which the

appellant founded his argument, and which have been examined

above, will not sustain the proposition which the appellant sought to draw from them. They do not establish that at common law the courts would intervene to require the Attorney-General to consider whether a prosecution should be brought to an end. Indeed, as the examination of the authorities which we have made discloses, the circumstances in which the courts would intervene depended upon the establishment of a legally enforceable right in the applicant. It is the absence from the statute of any such legally enforceable right in the appellant in this case which is decisive of the question which now arises for decision. Apart altogether from this difficulty, it 1s also to be borne in mind

"Tt is astronq thing to read into an Act of Parliament words which are not there, and in the absence of clear necessity it is a wrong thing to fo."

See per Lord Mersey in Thompson v. Gonld & Co. £19103 A.7. 409 at

We should add that the question whether, in the event of the Attorney-General making a decision whether or not to accede to representations made to him that a vrosecution should not proceed further, that exercise of power involves a decision which is reviewable under the Judicial Review Act does not arise in the

present proceedings and we express no opinion upon it.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - Judicial Review - Appointment of Counsel

and Solicitors for defence of indicted person under Judiciary Act 1903 s.69(3) - meaning of "cause arrangements to be made".

B.J. MAHER v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1975; s.5, Judiciary Act 1903; 5.69.

Local Government Board v. Arlidge £19153 A.C. 120 Re Matthew Forrest £19123 V.L.R. 466