Clough v Hinchinbrook Shire Council [2026] QCAT 123

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 20, s 23

Cutbush v Scenic Rim Regional Council (No 2) [2019] QCATA 167

Nguyen v Gold Coast City Council Animal Management [2017] QCATA 121

Thomas v Ipswich City Council [2015] QCATA 97

Winika v Moreton Bay Regional Council [2015] QCAT 436

[1] In this proceedings Robert Jason Charles Clough ("the Applicant") seeks a review of the decision of the Hinchinbrook Shire Council ("the Council") made on 17 April 2025 to issue a Destruction Order in respect of the Applicant's dog "Alfie".

[2] The Applicant is the owner of two dogs, Hugo and Alfie. Both dogs are desexed male American Bulldogs. The Applicant resides in Ingham, Queensland.

[3] On 15 March 2025, at around midday, the Applicant was in the Ingham Showgrounds metal detecting with the two dogs which were at that time unleashed.

[4] Ms Jennifene Grant and her son Mr Dalton Grant were cleaning the Poultry Pavillion at the Ingham Showgrounds when they were menaced by Hugo and Alfie, although they were able to deter the dogs with a pressure cleaner and a shovel. They called Mr Brett Grant who was nearby. When Brett Grant attended at the Poultry Pavillion with the President of the Ingham Showgrounds, Wayne Forden, they saw the Applicant and Mr Forden called out to him to enquire if he owned "them dogs". As he did so, about five dogs, including Hugo and Alfie, appeared from behind a fallen tree. Hugo and Alfie charged at Brett Grant and Wayne Forden, chasing them to their vehicle. The Applicant tried to call the dogs back, but to no avail.

[5] Wayne Forden got into his ute, but Brett Grant was trapped and then attacked by the two dogs, each of which bit him on the legs multiple times causing him to fall to the ground.

[6] One dog appeared to be trying to drag Brett Grant toward a nearby shed and the other savagely bit him on the arm. Wayne Forden tried to distract the dogs by sounding the vehicle's horn and then by driving the vehicle into one of them. At about the same time, the Applicant had run toward the vehicle and had jumped upon the dog that had been struck by the vehicle. The other dog continued to attack Brett Grant. Mr Dalton Grant arrived and he punched the dog that was attacking his father, causing it to release Brett Grant who was then dragged to the safety of the vehicle by his son.

[7] Wayne Forden called "000" and drove Brett Grant to the Ingham Hospital. He was later transferred to Townsville Hospital by ambulance to undergo surgery to his wounds and was an inpatient for the next five days. He was in a leg splint for 10 weeks. He has ongoing difficulties with his legs and arm including difficulty walking and trouble sleeping because of the trauma.

[8] The Council seized Hugo and Alfie at about 1:45pm on 15 March 2025 and has held them since that time.

[9] On 26 March 2025 the Council issued the Applicant with a Notice of a Proposed Dangerous Dog Declaration relating to Hugo and Alfie in reliance upon Chapter 4 of the Animal Management (Cats and Dogs) Act 2008 (Qld) ("the Act"). The Applicant was invited to make written representations to show why the proposed dangerous dog declarations should not be made, but no submission was received within the timeframe provided for.

[10] On 16 April 2025 the Council made dangerous dog declarations in relation to both Hugo and Alfie and then on 17 April 2025 it made a destruction order in relation to both dogs. Notices of those decisions having been made were served upon the Applicant.

[11] On 28 April 2025, the Council received correspondence from the Applicant titled, "A reply to the destruction order put on my boys, dogs Hugo, Alf". The Applicant described the dogs as being "protective" of his family, but suggested they had been provoked by his neighbours. He acknowledged that they were undertrained and had been unleashed at the time that they attacked Brett Grant. It really was no more than a plea for mercy on behalf of the dogs.

[12] The Council treated that correspondence as an application for general review of the destruction orders relating to Hugo and Alfie.

[13] On 2 May 2025 the Acting Chief Executive Officer of the Council conducted an internal review and confirmed the Dangerous Dog Declarations and the Destruction Orders that had been made. Notice of that outcome was given to the Applicant on the same day. That Notice served as a review notice for the purpose of s 187 of the Act.

[14] On 8 May 2025 the Applicant filed an Application to Review a Decision in the Tribunal, but it does not contain any clear ground for review.

[15] The Council submits, and the Tribunal accepts, that there are two issues to be determined:

(a) whether the dangerous dog declaration made in relation to the dog Alfie should be set aside or confirmed; and

(b) whether the destruction order made in relation to the dog Alfie should be set aside or confirmed.

[16] The Tribunal's review jurisdiction is conferred by s 188 of the Act. It is to review the decision by way of a fresh hearing on the merits and is to produce the correct and preferable decision.[1] The Tribunal may:

(a) confirm or amend the decision; or

(b) set aside the decision and substituted its own decision; or

(c) set aside the decision and return the matter for reconsideration to the Council, with the directions the tribunal considers appropriate.

[17] Directions for the filing of material were made by Member Katter on 14 July 2025, but the Applicant did not file any evidence or any submissions in reply to the Council's preliminary submissions.

[18] The Applicant did attend the hearing in person and he stated that he accepted that it was appropriate that the dogs Hugo and Alfie were declared dangerous dogs. He did not seek to have that aspect of the Council's decision making interfered with. He did oppose the making of the destruction order and sought a review of that decision.

(a) the Applicant's letter received by the Council on 28 April 2025;

(b) the Application to Review a Decision filed on 8 May 2025;

(c) the s 21 QCAT Act Material filed by the Council on 11 August 2025;

(d) the Statement of Reasons;

(e) the Council's bundle of evidence filed 10 September 2025;

(f) the Council's written submissions filed 22 September 2025; and

(g) the concessions made by the Applicant in respect of the dangerous dog declarations.

[20] In the absence of any further evidence or submissions by the Applicant, and having regard to his concession in relation to the dangerous dog declaration, the Tribunal finds that:

(a) the dogs Hugo and Alfie were unrestrained at the Ingham Showgrounds on 15 March 2025;

(b) the dogs Hugo and Alfie both attacked Brett Grant at the Ingham Showgrounds on 15 March 2025, each of them caused Brett Grant injuries that, separately, amounted to grievous bodily harm and thereby amounted to a serious attack for the purpose of s 89 of the Act;

(c) the Council had authority and a proper basis to propose to declare the dogs, Hugo and Alfie, as dangerous dogs under the Act;

(d) the reason Hugo and Alfie were proposed to be declared dangerous dogs was because they had both seriously attacked Brett Grant on 15 March 2025 causing him grievous bodily harm; thereby satisfying the relevant criteria prescribed by s 89(2)(a) and 89(6) of the Act;

(e) the Applicant does not dispute that Hugo and Alfie attacked Brett Grant on 15 March 2025, in fact his letter of 28 April 2025 and the content of his Application to Review a Decision filed in the Tribunal at the very least impliedly accept that they did so;

(f) Hugo and Alfie pose a very real risk to the health and safety of the community.

The Animal Management Act and the Making of Declarations

[21] The purpose of the Act is to provide effective management of regulated dogs and promote responsible ownership.[2] That is achieved by imposing obligations on particular persons to exercise effective control of dogs in particular circumstances and ensure dogs do not attack or cause fear.

[22] Chapter 4 of the Act contains provisions under the heading "Regulated dogs". The purpose of Chapter 4 is to:

(a) protect the community from damage or injury, or risk of damage or injury, from regulated dogs; and

(b) ensure regulated dogs are -

(i) not a risk to community health or safety; and

(ii) controlled and kept in a way consistent with community expectations and rights of individuals.

(a) a declared dangerous dog; or

(b) a declared menacing dog.

[24] A declared dangerous dog is a dog declared under s 94 of the Act to be a dangerous dog.[4]

[25] Any local government may declare a particular dog to be a declared dangerous dog, however, such a declaration can only be made if the dog:[5]

(a) has seriously attacked, or acted in a way that caused fear to, a person or another animal; or

(b) may, in the opinion of an authorised person having regard to the way the dog has behaved towards a person or another animal, seriously attack, or act in a way that causes fear to the person or animal.

[26] The term "seriously attack" means:[6]

(a) in relation to a person - attack the person in a way that causes the death of, or grievous bodily harm or bodily harm to the person; or

(b) in relation to an animal - attack the animal in a way that causes the death of the animal or maims or wounds the animal.

[27] Grievous bodily harm is defined in s 1 of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) as:

(a) the loss of a distinct part or an organ of the body; or

(b) serious disfigurement; or

(c) any bodily injury of such a nature that, if left untreated, would endanger or be likely to endanger life, or cause or be likely to cause permanent injury to health; whether or not treatment is or could have been available.

[28] The terms of s 89 of the Act clearly give rise to a discretion on the part of the Council whether or not to propose the making of a dangerous dog declaration.

[29] Having embarked upon that course and given the Applicant a notice under s 90 of the Act of its intention to make a regulated dog declaration, the Council was then required by s 94(2) to make the dangerous dog declaration unless:

(a) it withdrew the proposed declaration notice under s 92 of the Act; or

(b) evidence or representations made by the Applicant in response to the notice of its intention to make a regulated dog declaration meant that the Council was no longer satisfied that the grounds for making a regulated dog declaration existed.

[30] As the Applicant provided no evidence or written representations to show why the proposed declaration should not be made, the Council was left in the position of being required to make the regulated dog declaration.

[31] The Tribunal is satisfied that the delegated person on behalf of the Council appropriately made the dangerous dog declaration in relation to the dog Alfie and that was the correct and preferable decision. It will be confirmed.

[32] In terms of making the destruction order in relation to the dog Alfie, the Council relies upon s 127AA(2) of the Act which provides that if a dog is a regulated dog or a prohibited dog and it has seriously attacked a person or an animal, the authorised person must make a destruction order in relation to the dog.

[33] The difficulty with that provision is that it plainly requires the relevant dog to have been a regulated dog at the time that it seriously attacked a person. There is a temporal aspect in the criteria. Alfie was not a regulated dog when he attacked Brett Grant, so the mandatory destruction required by s 127AA(2) of the Act does not apply.

[34] The Council argued that s 127A of the Act applied because a regulated dog declaration had been made, but a s 95 information notice about that decision had not given to the Applicant. On 17 April 2025 it gave the Applicant a concurrent notice of a regulated dog declaration and destruction order being made for the dog, Alfie. That was an appropriate course to take, but it did not carry with it the mandatory destruction of the dog that the Council contends for.

[35] Section 127A of the Act provides that "an authorised officer may make a destruction order for the dog". That introduces a discretion requiring the decision maker to take into account factors including those identified in Thomas v Ipswich City Council[7] where the QCAT Appeal Tribunal said in relation to a destruction order:

It is clear that the AM Act is primarily directed towards the effective management and responsible ownership of dogs and that the destruction of a dog is a 'last resort.' It is generally where the mechanisms in the Act for management fail, or are ineffective, that destruction arises. The essential question is whether the dog constitutes, or is likely to constitute, a threat to the safety of other animals or to people, by attacking them or causing fear, to the extent that the threat may only be satisfactorily dealt with by the destruction of the dog.

[36] That was echoed in Winika v Moreton Bay Regional Council[8] where the Tribunal said:

A decision to destroy a dog is major one and it should not be made unless there is no other way to ensure that the community is protected from the risk of harm.

[37] The approach taken by the Council, clear from the first paragraph on page 2 of its destruction order, was that it was mandatory that a destruction order be made. The Council maintained that to be the case.

[38] I find that was the wrong approach. The Respondent should have given the Applicant notice of the proposal to make a destruction order and to set out the reasons why the Council considered that the management provisions contained within the Act were unlikely to satisfactorily mitigate the risks that the dog Alfie posed to community safety.

[39] The failure to give the Applicant any notice of the intention to make a destruction order was a denial of natural justice. It is not sufficient to say that the Applicant had been given the opportunity to be heard, because the only notice that he had been given in advance of a decision being made about his dog Alfie was that it might be declared a dangerous dog. That would have attracted the more stringent conditions for the keeping of a regulated dog, but the Applicant seems to have been accepting of that outcome, yet he is clearly opposed to the destruction of the dog. In support of that, it is noted that the Applicant's letter received by the Council on 28 April 2025 suggested that he had raised, strengthened and double fenced his yard and that it was likely his daughter "would take Alf to be with her."

[40] In circumstances where the Council had made its decision to make a destruction order in relation to the dog Alfie on a basis which was wrong at law, and the Applicant had not been given a proper opportunity to be heard on the discretionary factors which would be taken into account in considering a destruction order, I invited the Council to reconsider its decision, pursuant to s 23 of the QCAT Act on the basis that it would first give the Applicant a written statement of the factors that it said supported the making of a destruction order and the opportunity to be heard in relation to that.

[41] When the hearing resumed on 5 March 2026 the Tribunal was informed that on 2 February 2026 the Respondent had given the Applicant a document setting out the factors it said supported the making of a destruction order and on 20 February 2026 the Applicant had provided his response which included photographs and receipts to show that he had made a concerted effort to construct an enclosure that would satisfy the requirements for the keeping of a dangerous dog. I have had regard to both documents.

[42] Having considered the Applicant's response, the Respondent confirmed its original decision for reasons that can be summarised as:

(a) the serious nature of the attack that occurred on 15 March 2025;

(b) the size, musculature, breed and continuing significant level of aggression shown by Alfie while in the Respondent's care which indicates that he is likely to attack a human or an animal again and that such an attack is likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm;

(c) the level of aggression shown by the dogs means that their behaviour cannot be modified through training; and

(d) the enclosure constructed by the Applicant was incomplete, but was also significantly non-compliant with the requirements of Schedule 1 of the Act.

[43] In relation to the last point, I note from the Applicant's response on 20 February 2026 that:

(a) the fencing material that he used was 1800 mm high wire mesh which means it could be climbed by a child and was not, therefore, child proof as required;

(b) he stated that he turned that mesh down and in toward his house as a means of ensuring the dogs could net get under the fence, although I note that would have the effect of reducing the height of the fence below the minimum 1800 mm;

(c) he had constructed the fence around most of the permitter of his property although there was a section at the rear which had a concrete wall which required work to increase the height to 1800 mm, although I also note that this means the public would have to enter the enclosure in order to gain access to the dwelling, the enclosure would be opened to enable vehicle access and egress, and the gates were not self-closing and self-latching as required;

(d) he had purchased a single kennel, and when questioned about that he stated that it was his intention that the dogs would sleep inside the house, which is why he had fenced the whole perimeter of the property;

(e) muzzles had been purchased, although no photographs were provided to give an idea of their likely effectiveness and durability.

[44] In Nguyen v Gold Coast City Council Animal Management,[9] the Appeal Tribunal said:

[31] ...the essential question is whether the dog can be controlled taking into consideration the threat, or likely threat, to the safety of other animals or to people by attacking them or causing fear, posed by the dog.

[32] Determining whether a dog can be controlled will require a consideration by a decision-maker of a range of matters which might include:

a) The relevant history of the behaviour of the dog giving rise to the consideration of the making of a destruction order;

b) Any other relevant history of the behaviour of the dog, including the circumstances giving rise to the declaration that the dog was a regulated dog;

c) The current behaviour of the dog including whether the behaviour of the dog has been, and/or could be, modified through appropriate training;

d) The arrangements for the dog at its place of residence including the security of any enclosure and whether any interaction by the dog with persons, including household members and other persons entering upon the property, post a threat of harm to such persons;

e) The risk the dog poses to community health or safety including the risk of harm to people and other animals outside the place of residence of the dog;

f) Compliance by the owner of the dog with any permit conditions imposed as a result of the dog being declared a regulated dog;

g) Whether the owner of the dog demonstrates insight into and understanding of the dog's behaviour and has acted appropriately to mitigate any risk posed by the dog to people or animals;

h) The rights of individuals including the owner of the dog.

[33] The decision maker must also take into account the purposes of the Act generally, the purpose of Chapter 4 specifically and how the Act states those purposes are to be achieved. As the appeal tribunal said in Thomas any decision must be made in the context of the legislative scheme, and specifically Chapter 4 of the AM Act in which the protection of the community is clearly given a higher priority than the individual rights of dog owners.

[45] In Cutbush v Scenic Rim Regional Council (No 2)[10] the Appeal Tribunal said it was appropriate for the above matters in Nguyen to be taken into consideration as well as taking in the likelihood of the dog owner complying with a dangerous dog declaration.

[46] While the Applicant should be commended for the efforts that he has made and the expense that he has gone to in order to save his dogs, the proposed enclosure is so seriously deficient from the standards that would be required to keep these dogs that it raises a real concern about the Applicant's insight into the risk that they pose.

[47] The Applicant is not a young man, he appears frail and he has previously been unable to recall and restrain these dogs. I consider that there is no real likelihood that he could control one, let alone both of them if they attacked him in the enclosure or if they attacked a visitor to the house or if they did manage to escape from his property or his vehicle.

[48] His purchase of muzzles is evidence of his intention, or at least desire, to take these dogs out of the enclosure to other places which would also be of great concern. Even if muzzled, these are likely to be menacing dogs, but with no evidence as to the effectiveness and durability of the muzzles, I am not at all satisfied that they would be effective.

[49] In all of the circumstances I am satisfied that:

(a) the dogs Hugo and Alfie were unrestrained at the Ingham Showgrounds on 15 March 2025;

(b) the dogs Hugo and Alfie both attacked Brett Grant at the Ingham Showgrounds on 15 March 2025, each of them caused Brett Grant injuries that, separately, amounted to grievous bodily harm and thereby amounted to a serious attack for the purpose of s 89 of the Act;

(c) the Council had authority and a proper basis to propose to declare the dogs, Hugo and Alfie, as dangerous dogs under the Act;

(d) the reason Hugo and Alfie were proposed to be declared dangerous dogs was that they had both seriously attacked Brett Grant on 15 March 2025 causing him grievous bodily harm; thereby satisfying the relevant criteria prescribed by s 89(2)(a) and 89(6) of the Act;

(e) the Applicant accepts that Hugo and Alfie attacked Brett Grant on 15 March 2025 and that they were appropriately declared to be dangerous dogs;

(f) Hugo and Alfie continue to pose a very real risk to the health and safety of the community through their size and level of aggression;

(g) the Applicant has been unable to make suitable arrangements for keeping Hugo and Alfie in a way that would control them adequately and thereby reduce the risk that they pose to the safety of the community;

(h) the Applicant is unlikely to be able to make suitable arrangements for the keeping of Hugo and Alfie in a way that reduces the risk they pose to the safety of the community, in large part because he lacks insight into how dangerous they are and how serious the risk is if they were to attack again;

(i) the Applicant is unlikely to be capable of controlling one, let alone two of these dogs if they decided to attack him or another person in his property or if they managed to escape; and

(j) the threat that Alfie poses may only be satisfactorily dealt with by the destruction of the dog.

[50] In all the circumstances, I consider that the correct and preferable decision is that:

(a) the dog Alfie is declared a dangerous dog;

(b) a destruction order is made in respect of the dog Alfie.

[51] The Dangerous Dog Declaration made by Hinchinbrook Shire Council on 16 April 2025 and confirmed on 2 May 2025 in respect of the dog "Alfie" is confirmed.

[52] The Destruction Order made by Hinchinbrook Shire Council on 17 April 2025 and confirmed on 2 May 2025 in respect of the dog "Alfie" is confirmed.

[1] Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s 20 ("QCAT Act").

[7] [2015] QCATA 97.

[8] [2015] QCAT 436, [15].

[9] [2017] QCATA 121 ("Nguyen").

[10] [2019] QCATA 167.