Criminal law - Sentencing - Appeal against sentence - Totality principle - Possession of methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply - Possession of MDMA with intent to sell or supply - Unlicensed possession of firearms and ammunition - Possession of large amounts of cash reasonably suspected of being unlawfully obtained - Offender involved in successful commercial enterprise in supplying drugs

Firearms Act 1973 (WA), s 19

Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA), s 6(1)(a)

Bees v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 202

Birch v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 101

Chadburn v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 216

Giglia v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 9

Jneid v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 67

Leckie v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 91

Rinaldi v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 48

Roffey v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 246

Tricoli v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 74

Wilson v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 82

1. This is an appeal against the sentences imposed on the appellant, following his pleas of guilty, for 11 offences, resulting in a total sentence of ten years' imprisonment, with eligibility for parole. The offences were committed on three separate occasions over a period of between six and seven months, and included two counts of possession of a prohibited drug (methylamphetamine and MDMA respectively) with intent to sell or supply, six counts of the unlicensed possession of firearms and ammunition, and three counts of possession of large amounts of cash reasonably suspected of having been unlawfully obtained. (The individual sentences are set out later in these reasons.)
2. The appeal notice contains two grounds of appeal. However, counsel for the appellant conceded[1] that ground 2 should be understood as providing particulars of the error alleged in ground 1, and not as a stand-alone ground of appeal. Ground 1 contends, in effect, that the total effective sentence imposed infringed the first limb of the totality principle.
3. The appellant requires leave to appeal.[2] His application for leave to appeal was referred to the hearing of the appeal.[3]
4. For the reasons set out below, leave to appeal should be refused and the appeal should be dismissed.

1. The appellant was convicted on his pleas of guilty of the 11 offences (namely counts 1, 2 and 4 - 12 on the indictment) on the first day of trial. He pleaded not guilty in relation to a further offence (count 3 on the indictment) and was acquitted of that offence following trial.
2. The 11 offences to which the appellant pleaded guilty, the applicable maximum penalty, and the sentence imposed for each offence, are set out in the table below.

Firearms Act 1973 (WA) ss 19(1)(c), 19(1ab)(a)(ii) Possession of a firearm without a licence or permit while carrying money equal to or more than the prescribed amount

_Criminal Code (_WA) s 417(1) Possession of stolen or unlawfully obtained property

Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA) s 6(1)(a) Possession of a prohibited drug (methlyamphetamine) with intent to sell or supply

Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA) s 6(1)(a) Possession of a prohibited drug (MDMA) with intent to sell or supply

Criminal Code (WA) s 417(1) Possession of stolen or unlawfully obtained property

Firearms Act 1973 (WA) ss 19(1)(c), 19(1ac)(b) Possession of a firearm without a licence or permit where the firearm was a handgun

Firearms Act 1973 (WA) ss 19(1)(c), 19(1ad) Possession of ammunition without a licence or permit

Criminal Code (WA) s 417(1) Possession of stolen or unlawfully obtained property

Firearms Act 1973 (WA) ss 19(1)(c), 19(1ac)(b) Possession of a firearm without a licence or permit where the firearm was a handgun

Firearms Act 1973 (WA) ss 19(1)(c), 19(1ad) Possession of ammunition without a licence or permit

Firearms Act 1973 (WA) ss 19(1)(c), 19(1ad) Possession of a firearm without a licence or permit

1. The total sentence imposed was 10 years' imprisonment. The sentence was backdated to commence on 28 October 2015. The appellant was made eligible for parole. A declaration was also made, following the appellant's conviction on counts 4 and 5, that he was a drug trafficker.

1. The circumstances of the offences, as set out by the learned sentencing judge, were as follows.
2. During the afternoon of 14 April 2015, the appellant was riding his motorcycle and was stopped by police, having initially sought to evade them. The backpack he was carrying contained a loaded 9 mm Desert Eagle pistol, and $31,180.05 cash. In addition, the appellant was found to be carrying two Blackberry phones, a mobile phone and a smoking implement. His possession of the pistol, and the cash, were the subject of counts 1 and 2 respectively on the indictment.
3. The appellant was released on bail. On 10 September 2015, while on bail for counts 1 and 2, the appellant committed the next group of offences. They were as follows.
4. At about 10.45 pm, the police air wing saw a motorcycle travelling at excessive speed along the Mitchell Freeway. The motorcycle was eventually tracked to a property in Scarborough where the appellant lived. Police went to the home to locate the motorcycle rider, and were admitted to the house by the appellant's flatmate. Following a search of the house, the police located large quantities of drugs, cash and a loaded handgun.
5. The police found a total of 28.54 grams of methylamphetamine - comprising three separate quantities of 4.43 g, 17.9 g and 4.24 g, each with a purity of between 82% and 83%, and three further quantities of methylamphetamine of between 0.27 g and 0.97 g each - located in six separate locations in the house. Five quantities of methylamphetamine were located in a room in the house which was set up as a music room, and one was located inside a helmet in the garage. The appellant's possession of methylamphetamine was the subject of count 4 on the indictment.
6. In addition, the police found 313.82 g of MDMA powder in a vacuum sealed bag located in a backpack in the garage. That quantity of MDMA was found to be of 84% purity. A further 0.82 g of MDMA was found in a hollowed-out blowtorch in the music room. The appellant's possession of MDMA was the subject of count 5 on the indictment.
7. Another room at the house had been set up as a drug preparation area, and in that room the police found scales, clipseal bags and a spoon, as well as a monitor for a CCTV surveillance system that had been installed at the house. Other indicia of the appellant's drug-dealing were also found at the house, including a number of mobile phones and Blackberries.
8. Count 6 on the indictment pertains to a total of $198,450.50 in cash, which was found in six locations around the house - in a couch in the music room, in the hollowed-out blowtorch in the music room, in a backpack in the music room, in a pair of shoes in the music room, and in two backpacks in the garage.[4]
9. Police found a loaded Walther .22 handgun, with 10 live rounds of ammunition, in the drawer of a bathroom connected to the master bedroom at the house. The appellant did not have a licence to possess that firearm or ammunition. His possession of the firearm and ammunition was the subjects of counts 7 and 8 in the indictment.
10. The appellant was not located at the house during the police search on 10 September 2015. Before he could be apprehended, he jumped the rear fence and fled.
11. On 28 October 2015, police returned to the appellant's house and executed a search warrant. The appellant was present on that occasion and was arrested. A further four charges were laid against the appellant as a result of the search of the house on that day. Those charges were as follows.
12. The police located $11,223.55 in cash in two locations in the house, namely $9,793.55 in a backpack inside a drawer in the garage, and $1,430.00 in a pocket of a motorcycle jacket which was located in the garage. The appellant's possession of that cash was the subject of count 9 on the indictment.[5]
13. A Browning 9 mm semi-automatic handgun was located behind the kickboard of some cabinets in a walk-in wardrobe located in the master bedroom of the house. The appellant's unlicensed possession of that handgun was the subject of count 10 on the indictment.
14. A magazine containing 11 rounds of ammunition was located next to the handgun. The appellant's unlicensed possession of that ammunition was the subject of count 11 on the indictment.
15. The police also located a dismantled Beretta semi-automatic 12 gauge shotgun, wrapped in a towel. The appellant's unlicensed possession of that shotgun was the subject of count 12 on the indictment.
16. Various items consistent with the appellant's drug-dealing were also found in the house on this occasion, including three Blackberries and two mobile phones.

1. At the time of these offences, the appellant was 31 years of age. He was 33 years of age at the date of sentencing.
2. The appellant is the youngest of three children. Following the separation of his parents when he was a toddler, he maintained a close relationship with his mother and his mother's subsequent partner, who became his step-father and who the appellant regarded as his father. Overall, his childhood was stable, secure, loving and happy.
3. The appellant completed Year 10 at school. He achieved reasonable grades and excelled in sport. After leaving school, he commenced (but did not complete) an apprenticeship and worked for a few years in the building industry. He later worked as a production driller in the mining industry.
4. The appellant commenced the use of amphetamines in a social context when he was about 18 years of age. By the age of 21 years, he had begun using methylamphetamines. He quickly developed a regular drug habit and commenced dealing in drugs to support that habit.
5. At the time of sentencing for the present offences, the appellant had a number of prior criminal convictions, including for possession of prohibited drugs with intent to sell or supply, possession of smoking utensils, receiving stolen property offences, and firearms and weapons offences. In 2007, the appellant was convicted of a number of offences in the District Court including possession of methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply. He was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment.
6. Following his release on parole, the appellant moved to Queensland and obtained employment in the mining industry. He remained drug-free for five years while working there.
7. In about 2011 or 2012, the appellant's step-father was diagnosed with cancer. The appellant moved back to Western Australia to be with him and support him during his illness. At that stage, the appellant had been in a relationship for around five years, but his partner did not wish to move to Western Australia and their relationship ended at that point. The appellant has no children.
8. The appellant's step-father died within six months of his diagnosis with cancer. The loss of his step-father, and the loss of the support of his partner, saw the appellant relapse into drug-use. He soon became involved in selling drugs again to fund his habit and to generate income to support his lifestyle.
9. While engaged in drug-dealing, the appellant distanced himself from his mother, but since his arrest for these offences, he has reconnected with his family. He remains close to his mother and siblings, and to his step-brother, and has their support. After his release from prison, the appellant plans to return to Queensland in order to be close to his mother and those of his siblings who reside there.
10. A pre-sentence report and a psychological report which were prepared for the appellant's sentencing for these offences indicated that the appellant's offending related to his use of illicit substances and his need to fund that use through drug-dealing. His relapse to drug-use, which led to the present offences, was considered to have been a response to stressful periods in his life and his difficulty in coping with those events. However, the appellant admitted that he had turned to drug-dealing not only to fund his habit, but to generate income to support a comfortable lifestyle.
11. The sentencing judge was provided with 11 character references which had been provided for the appellant. These appear to have been prepared by family members and friends of the appellant, and referred to his sound family values, strong work ethic, the impact of his step-father's death, and the appellant's commitment to rehabilitating himself whilst in prison and upon his release.

The sentence imposed and the reasons given by the learned sentencing judge

1. The learned sentencing judge clearly, and correctly, regarded the appellant's offending as very serious.
2. Having regard to the facts concerning the offences, and to the evidence the appellant gave at trial (including his admission that he had been dealing in pound amounts of MDMA and ounce amounts of methylamphetamine), the learned sentencing judge concluded that the appellant was a high level drug dealer, as well as a drug user.
3. The learned sentencing judge found that the appellant had been engaged in his drug dealing activities for 18 months prior to his apprehension in October 2015. Her Honour concluded that the drug dealing business in which the appellant was engaged was a commercial enterprise, and a successful one, which had enabled him to support a comfortable lifestyle. The learned sentencing judge noted that in the course of his trial, the appellant had admitted that, in addition to the cash which was the subject of the charges to which he had pleaded guilty, he had made $90,404.50 profit in the six months from April 2015 to October 2015.
4. The learned sentencing judge found that the appellant's involvement in the distribution of drugs was substantial. Her Honour concluded that the appellant's capacity to obtain unlicensed firearms was evidence of his level of participation in the drug trade.
5. The learned sentencing judge found that the appellant's conduct in dealing in drugs was persistent, and that his apprehension in April 2015 had not deterred him from engaging in that conduct. The learned sentencing judge also regarded the appellant's repeated firearms offences as very serious, and his repetition of those offences as a particularly grave matter.
6. The learned sentencing judge concluded that the appellant's continued offending while on bail for the first two charges was an aggravating factor.
7. The learned sentencing judge also regarded the appellant's possession of a loaded handgun in public as a serious aggravating matter. Her Honour concluded that the appellant's possession of guns while participating in drug dealing activities was especially serious, given the inherent dangers involved in that criminal activity. The learned sentencing judge noted that the appellant had admitted that he had the handguns because he wanted to be able to protect his drug dealing business from competitors.
8. The learned sentencing judge had regard to the appellant's circumstances, which are set out above. Her Honour accepted that the appellant was remorseful for his conduct, and that he had accepted responsibility for his offending, without seeking to minimise or justify his conduct.
9. In addition, the learned sentencing judge concluded that the appellant had good prospects for rehabilitation. Her Honour took into account the fact that the appellant had the support of his family; that while in prison, he had undertaken training in another trade, which was evidence of his forward planning for the future and a positive form of risk-management; and that he was willing to undertake treatment for substance abuse, all of which meant that his risk of future offending was reduced.
10. Although her Honour took into account the various mitigating factors to which we have referred, she concluded that those mitigating factors warranted less weight in view of the importance of general and personal deterrence in sentencing for drug offences of the kind involved here. Her Honour also noted that the appellant's repeated possession of firearms warranted a deterrent sentence as well.
11. The learned sentencing judge took into account that the appellant entered pleas of guilty in respect of each of the 11 offences on the first day of trial, and had made some admissions at the time of his initial arrest in April 2015. However, the learned sentencing judge noted that the State's case against the appellant was very strong, and to some extent his plea of guilty reflected the strength of the State's case. Nevertheless, the learned sentencing judge determined to give the appellant a discount of 5% for his pleas of guilty.
12. In determining the sentence which should be imposed, and in addition to having regard to the gravity of the offending involved, to the statutory maxima, and to the aggravating and mitigating factors to which we have referred, the learned sentencing judge also expressly had regard to both limbs of the totality principle. In imposing the total effective term of imprisonment of 10 years' imprisonment, her Honour indicated that she had substantially reduced the sentences she would otherwise have imposed for counts 6 and 10 in order to give effect to issues of totality.

Principles in relation to appeals against sentence

1. The only ground of appeal pursued at the hearing of the appeal was that the total sentence imposed infringed the first limb of the totality principle. The appellant does not allege any express error on the part of the learned sentencing judge. No challenge was made to the individual sentences imposed. The subject of the appeal was the total term of imprisonment of 10 years, which was said to offend the first limb of the totality principle.
2. The principles applicable to sentencing appeals are well established. They were set out in Wilson v The State of Western Australia[6] and have been repeated and endorsed in many subsequent cases. It is unnecessary to set those principles out here.
3. The totality principle comprises two limbs. The first limb of the totality principle requires that the total effective sentence imposed on an offender who has committed multiple offences must bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality involved in all of the offences, viewed in their entirety and after having regard to all relevant circumstances, including those referrable to the offender personally (and including, for example, the desirability of accommodating any prospects of rehabilitation), and the total effective sentences imposed in comparable cases.[7] The second limb is that the Court should not impose a sentence which is 'crushing', in the sense that it destroys any reasonable expectation of a useful life after release. An aggregate sentence may be inappropriately long under the first limb, even if it cannot be described as 'crushing'.[8]
4. The practical effect of the application of the totality principle is ordinarily to arrive at a total effective sentence which is less than that which would have been arrived at merely by adding up all of the terms appropriate for the individual sentences.[9] The severity or leniency of an individual sentence will nevertheless be relevant in evaluating whether the total effective sentence infringes the first limb of the totality principle.[10]
5. In order to demonstrate that the total effective sentence was excessive because it breached the first limb of the totality principle, an appellant must demonstrate that the sentence imposed was not commensurate with the overall criminality involved in the offences, viewed in their entirety, and having regard to all of the circumstances, including the offender's personal circumstances.

1. Counsel for the appellant contended that the sentence imposed failed to reflect the overall criminality of the appellant's conduct, and that the overall criminality involved did not justify a sentence of more than 8.5 years.[11]

Comparison with Rinaldi v The State of Western Australia

1. The first, and primary, basis for the ground of appeal relied on the sentence imposed in Rinaldi v The State of Western Australia.[12] Counsel for the appellant submitted that Rinaldi involved offences which were broadly similar to this case. He submitted that while the offender in Rinaldi was in possession of nearly three times as much MDMA as was possessed by the appellant in this case, the sentence imposed for the possession of MDMA in Rinaldi was 18 months' imprisonment,[13] in contrast to the sentence of 5 years' imprisonment imposed on the appellant for count 5 (which concerned the MDMA).
2. Whether a sentence offends the totality principle is not answered simply by reference to other cases, let alone just one case. That is because no two cases are ever precisely the same. Consequently, the identification of cases which, on a broad comparison, appear to involve similar offending but different sentences, will not suffice to demonstrate error. All of the relevant circumstances of a case need to be assessed to permit any useful comparison.[14]
3. Because each case turns on its own particular facts and circumstances, comparative cases provide only general guidance, and any such guidance is flexible rather than rigid.[15] Reference to other cases may also be of use because those cases may stand as yardsticks against which to examine the sentence which was imposed.[16]
4. Rinaldi is not an apt comparator to this case. In Rinaldi, the offending was discovered when police officers executed a search warrant at the offender's house. The police discovered a wine cellar accessed via a trap door in a passageway in the house. Inside the cellar, and in the house, they discovered a large quantity of drugs, including MDMA, methylamphetamine and cocaine, unlicensed firearms and large quantities of ammunition and cash.
5. The offender was convicted of 39 offences. Those offences included three counts of possession of prohibited drugs (namely MDMA, methylamphetamine and cocaine) with intent to sell or supply. The offender was found to be in possession of 881.01 g of MDMA in powder or tablet forms, with purities which varied between 25% and 73%. The offender had possession of a total of 1,650.67 g of methylamphetamine with purities varying between 45% and 77%. In addition, the offender was found to be in possession of 7.29 g of cocaine in powder and tablet forms with a purity of about 68%.
6. The unlicensed firearms found at the house comprised five rifles, one shotgun and eight handguns. The firearms offences comprised eight counts of possession of unlicensed firearms in circumstances where the person in possession also had three or more firearms; three counts of possession of unlicensed firearms in circumstances where the person in possession had three or more firearms and the number or identification mark on the firearms had been removed; and three counts of possession of an unlicensed handgun or prescribed firearm, in circumstances where the person in possession had three or more firearms. Some of the firearms were located with compatible magazines loaded with ammunition. In total, 2,386 rounds of ammunition of various types and calibres were found in the house. The offender was also charged with 21 counts of possession of unlicensed ammunition and one count of possession of an unlicensed GPS jamming device.
7. In addition, the police found a total of $337,220 in cash, which was accepted came from drug trafficking and dealing in unlicensed firearms.
8. The offender was 37 years of age at the time of the offending. He had had a traumatic childhood. Although he had a strong work ethic and had been employed for much of his adult life, he was an illicit drug user whose drug use increased after his marriage broke down. He had a minor criminal history. The learned sentencing judge accepted that the offender was genuinely remorseful and had insight into his offending and intended to change his life.
9. The offender pleaded guilty to all counts on the first day of trial, although a trial of issues was required, for sentencing purposes. The learned sentencing judge gave a reduction of 5% for the late pleas of guilty.
10. The total sentence imposed by the learned sentencing judge was 14 years' imprisonment and the appellant was made eligible for parole. The appeal against sentence was dismissed.
11. One of the grounds of appeal in Rinaldi was that the overall sentence imposed breached the first limb of the totality principle.[17] The Court regarded the offender's overall criminality as extremely serious. The Court concluded that, whilst he was not directly involved in the sale of drugs, firearms and ammunition, the offender voluntarily participated in what was clearly a large scale commercial enterprise aimed at distributing into the community a large quantity of dangerous illicit drugs and firearms.
12. Rinaldi has some broad similarities to the present case. The offender was charged with possession of prohibited drugs with intent to sell or supply, and with firearms and ammunitions offences, he was found to be involved in a large scale commercial drug dealing operation, and he had possession of a large amount of cash at the time of his arrest. He was given only a small discount for most of the offences with which he was charged because of his late plea of guilty. He did not have the benefit of youth. He had a strong work ethic, a good employment history, was genuinely remorseful and wanted to change his life.
13. However, there are also significant differences between Rinaldi and the present case. In Rinaldi, a very significantly higher quantity of methylamphetamine was located in the offender's possession - 1,650.67 g of mid to high purity - as compared with the 28.54 g of high purity methylamphetamine possessed by the appellant. In Rinaldi, a much larger quantity of MDMA was also involved: 881.01 g, but in both powder or tablet forms, and with purities varying between 73% and 25%. In contrast, in this case, the appellant had possession of 313.82 g of MDMA, although it was all in a powdered form of a very high purity.
14. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the sentence imposed in this case did not adequately reflect:

the manifestly worse offending in Rinaldi, which included a later plea of guilty, less than full acceptance of the facts alleged by the prosecution ..., the inordinate amount of firearms found in conjunction with the drugs, the long period of time over which the offences had apparently occurred and the amounts of illegal drugs in question.[18]

He submitted 'that the 4 year difference between the sentence imposed in Rinaldi and the sentence imposed on the appellant does not represent a fair or accurate assessment of the differing criminality in the two respective cases'.[19]

1. It is true that in Rinaldi the offender had possession of far greater quantities of methylamphetamine and MDMA than in the present case. However, while the quantity of drugs involved is a matter of importance in assessing the overall criminality of offending of this kind, it is not the 'be all and end all'.[20] Other matters will also be relevant in sentencing for dealing or trafficking in dangerous drugs, such as the nature and level of the offender's participation in drug dealing, whether the offending was committed for commercial or personal gain, and the degree of purity of the drugs involved.[21]
2. Two significant features of this case, not present in Rinaldi, significantly increase the overall criminality of the appellant's offending. First, in Rinaldi, while the offending occurred in the context of a commercial drug dealing operation, nevertheless the charges against the offender all arose from his conduct on one occasion. In contrast, the appellant was charged with offences committed on three separate occasions, committed over a period of between six and seven months. Some degree of accumulation of the sentences imposed was therefore warranted. Secondly, and more significantly, the appellant committed offences on two separate occasions while he was on bail for the charges the subject of counts 1 and 2. The fact that he was on bail did not dissuade the appellant from the continuation of his drug dealing activities. Nor did the fact that the police had searched his home on 10 September 2015, and located and seized drugs, firearms and ammunition, and cash, dissuade the appellant from continuing to engage in the same conduct, for which he was arrested and charged in late October 2015. The appellant's continued determined offending, over a period of six to seven months, meant that the overall criminality of his offending was of a very serious kind, and was far more serious than the individual offences, considered in isolation, would otherwise have indicated. The appellant's continued offending elevated the significance of personal deterrence as a major sentencing consideration.

The criminality of the offending, having regard to the quantity of drugs

1. Another, related, contention advanced by counsel for the appellant in support of the ground of appeal was that the authorities supported the conclusion that a total sentence of 10 years would only be imposed for the possession of drugs in quantities of kilograms, rather than grams, as had been involved in this case.[22]
2. The authorities indicate that sentences of 10 years or more have been imposed for charges arising from a single occasion of possession of very large quantities of prohibited drugs, especially methylamphetamine, with the intent to sell or supply.[23] However, that does not mean that a total sentence of 10 years or more could not properly be imposed for multiple counts of the possession of lesser quantities of prohibited drugs with intent to sell or supply, committed on different occasions. As we have already observed, the quantity of the drugs involved is not the only determinant of the overall criminality involved. All of the factors involved in a particular case require consideration in determining the overall criminality involved.

Other contentions as to the criminality of the offending in this case

1. In his written submissions, counsel for the appellant submitted that the total sentence imposed breached the first limb of totality principle for four additional reasons, namely:[24]

(a) The appellant was not the ultimate beneficiary of most of the cash the subject of the possession of unlawfully obtained property charges;

(b) The appellant never used any of the firearms/ammunitions for sinister purposes;

(c) The appellant was a user/dealer and was dealing drugs in order to finance his own significant drug addiction;

(d) The appellant was clearly not at the top of the chain [or] hierarchy.

1. The contention at (a) does not advance the appellant's case, for three reasons. First, the learned sentencing judge did not make a finding as to whether the appellant was the ultimate beneficiary of most of the cash the subject of counts 2, 6 and 9. Secondly, the learned sentencing judge sentenced the appellant on the basis that he profited from his drug dealing activities. Her Honour noted that his success in his drug dealing was evidenced by his possession of items such as a trail bike, a quad bike, and a soundproof music room with DJ equipment. Her Honour also relied on the appellant's admission that he had made $90,404.50 in profit, in addition to the amounts seized by the police, in the six months from April to October 2015. Finally, even if most of the cash seized was owed to the appellant's supplier, that merely confirmed his substantial drug dealing activities, and in no way mitigated the seriousness of his offending.
2. The contention, at (b), that the appellant did not use the firearms or ammunition for 'sinister' purposes, must be rejected. The appellant accepted that he had possession of firearms because he wanted to protect his drug business from competitors, and his possession of a loaded handgun, while engaged in his drug dealing activities, was consistent with that purpose. The possession of a firearm during drug dealing activities carries with it an inherent risk that the firearm may be used to inflict very serious injury or even death.
3. The contention, at (c), that the appellant was dealing in drugs in order to finance his own drug addiction, must be rejected. The learned sentencing judge noted that the appellant admitted that he engaged in drug dealing in order to finance his comfortable lifestyle, as well as to fund his drug habit. She found that he had been engaged in drug dealing for 18 months prior to his apprehension in October 2015, and that his drug dealing business was a commercial enterprise, and a successful one.
4. Finally, in so far as the appellant contends, at (d), that he was not 'at the top of the chain [or] hierarchy', the learned sentencing judge did not sentence the appellant on that basis. Rather, he was sentenced on the basis that he was a 'high level drug dealer' who had a substantial involvement in the distribution of drugs. Counsel for the appellant accepted that that characterisation was justified.[25]

1. The appellant has not demonstrated that the sentence imposed by the learned sentencing judge was not commensurate with the overall criminality of the appellant's offending, in all of the circumstances, for the following reasons.
2. First, the offences of possession of prohibited drugs with intent to sell and supply, were, of themselves, very serious, having regard to the quantity and purity of the drugs involved. In addition, the MDMA was found in a powder form, which suggests that it could be cut and pressed into tablets or put into capsules for wider distribution. While the appellant was only to be punished for the offences to which he pleaded guilty on the indictment, his offending conduct was properly regarded as all the more serious when viewed in the surrounding context, to which we have referred at [72] - [75]. The amount of cash, the firearms and ammunition, and the appellant's admissions, confirmed that he was engaged in a successful and profitable drug dealing business. The appellant's ability to obtain firearms of the kind involved here, especially in the short space of time between 10 September 2015, and his apprehension on 28 October 2015, also suggested a high level of involvement in drug-dealing.
3. Secondly, the offences of possession of unlicensed firearms and ammunition were, of themselves, very serious offences. The appellant's possession of the handguns was especially serious, because of the capacity to conceal them. Count 1 was a particularly serious instance of that conduct, because the appellant had a loaded handgun, in his backpack, together with cash, which suggests that he took the gun with him when he was engaged in drug-dealing activities. As we have already mentioned, he admitted that he had possession of the handguns to protect his drug business from competitors. The seriousness of that conduct was exacerbated by the inherent risk of injury or death generated by carrying firearms in such circumstances.
4. Thirdly, the offences were not committed in an isolated incident of criminal conduct and could not be characterised as an aberration. Instead, the 11 offences were committed on three occasions over a period of six to seven months.
5. Fourthly, the offences committed on 10 September 2015 and 28 October 2015 were committed whilst the appellant was on bail for the offences in counts 1 and 2, with which he was charged on 14 April 2015. Furthermore, within six weeks after police seized the drugs, cash, firearms and ammunition from his home on 10 September 2015, the appellant was found in possession of another handgun, a shotgun, ammunition, and cash. That suggested that the appellant's drug dealing activities continued unabated, despite the search of his home on 10 September 2015. The appellant's offending in these circumstances showed a complete disregard for the law, and demonstrated a high degree of persistence in continuing with his offending conduct. These aspects of his conduct added to the overall criminality of his offending.
6. Fifthly, there were few mitigating factors. The appellant was not a person of prior good character. He was not youthful or inexperienced. While he had shown remorse and had good prospects for rehabilitation, in cases of the present kind, matters personal to an offender, although not to be ignored, carry less weight because the major sentencing considerations for offences of dealing or trafficking in dangerous drugs of addiction are personal and general deterrence.[26] Further, given the matters to which we have referred, this was a case in which the significance of personal deterrence as a sentencing consideration was particularly elevated.
7. In our view, the total effective sentence of 10 years' imprisonment bears a proper relationship to the overall criminality involved in all of the offences, viewed in their entirety, and after having regard to all relevant circumstances.
8. The appeal did not have a reasonable prospect of succeeding. Consequently, leave to appeal should be refused and the appeal should be dismissed.
9. We would make the following orders:
   1. Leave to appeal is refused;
   2. The appeal is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

[2] Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) s 27(1).

[3] Order made on 15 November 2017 by Mazza JA.

[4] A further $69,700 in cash was located among some clothing in the laundry of the house, but the appellant denied that he was in possession of that cash, and the sentencing judge sentenced the appellant on count 6 without regard to that quantity of cash.

[5] A further sum of $25,000 in cash was located in a cooler bag under a bench in the garage, but the appellant denied that he knew about that cash and the sentencing judge sentenced the appellant on count 11 without regard to that quantity of cash.

[6] Wilson v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 82 [2] (McLure P & Owen JA).

[7] Bees v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 202 [74] (Buss P).

[8] Birch v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 101 [30]; Roffey v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 246 [24] - [25].

[9] Bees v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 202 [75] (Buss P); Roffey v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 246 [26] (McLure JA, Steytler P & Miller JA agreeing).

[10] Bees v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 202 [75] (Buss P); Giglia v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 9 [40] (Owen JA, McLure P & Pullin JA agreeing).

[12] Rinaldi v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 48.

[14] Birch v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 101 [33].

[15] Bees v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 202 [68] (Buss P).

[16] Birch v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 101 [34]; Tricoli v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 74 [5].

[17] The other ground was that the sentencing judge should have regarded the plea of guilty in respect of five counts as having been made at the earliest opportunity (those counts having been the subject of ex officio charges) with the result that a reduction of 25% should have been given for those offences. That ground was upheld, but this Court nevertheless concluded that having regard to all of the relevant circumstances, it would have not have imposed different sentences for those counts.

[20] Birch v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 101 [38].

[21] Bees v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 202 [67] (Buss P).

[23] See, for example, Chadburn v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 216 and the cases discussed therein at [48] - [58].

[26] See, for example, Jneid v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 67 [81]; Leckie v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 91 [29].