Clancy & Alcott [2026] FedCFamC1F 126 (27 February 2026)

(a) Assaulting, harassing or molesting the mother in any way;

(b) Contacting the mother by any means (including in person, in writing, by telephone or by any form of electronic communication), or physically approaching the mother, for any reason, except in accordance with Order 5 of the orders made 25 February 2026, or if leave is granted under Section 102QAG of the Act but only until such time as the father receives notice that the mother is legally represented;

(c) Assaulting, harassing or molesting X in any way;

(d) Initiating contact with X by any means (including in person, in writing, by telephone or by any form of electronic communication), or physically approaching X, for any reason, except in accordance with Order 5 of the orders made 25 February 2026;

(e) Entering, remaining or being within 100 metres of the mother and X's home situated at F Street Suburb G;

(f) Entering, remaining or being within 100 metres of the maternal grandparent's home situated at H Street Suburb J [...].

1. Pursuant to section 68C of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), if a police officer believes on reasonable grounds that the father has breached the injunction created by Order 1 above by causing or threatening to cause bodily harm to any or all of the Protected Persons, or harassing, molesting or stalking that Person(s), the police officer may arrest the father without warrant.

1. The final orders made 25 February 2026 remain in full force and effect and are to be read in conjunction with these orders made 27 February 2026.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Clancy & Alcott has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. These are the third set of parenting proceedings between the applicant mother, Ms Alcott ("the mother") and the respondent father, Mr Clancy ("the father"). There is one subject child of the relationship, X born 2013 ("[X]") who is currently 12 years of age.
2. The previously appointed Independent Children's Lawyer (ICL) was re-appointed in these current proceedings on 13 December 2024 to represent the best interests of X.
3. To the parties' credit, at the end of the evidence, the parties reached agreement in respect of all matters other than the form of agreed injunctions. The mother sought the injunctions be made for the personal protection of the mother and X and for an order to be made pursuant to s 68C of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"). The father sought the injunctions be made pursuant to s 68B but not to be for the personal protection of the mother and X and consequently for there to be no application of s 68C.

1. Since separation, there has been a significant and long procedural history whereby the parties have been in and out of proceedings given the various applications before the Court. This is the third set of substantive parenting proceedings between the parties in relation to X. As noted by the ICL, the parties have been through multiple iterations of applications in the Court for all but the first 17 months of X's young life. During this period, X's time with the father was sporadic and irregular as set out in detail below.
2. The parties commenced their relationship in November 2010 and separated on a final basis in 2012. They never lived together or married.
3. The parties entered into a Parenting Plan post-separation in November 2013 which provided for X to live with the mother and spend time with the father from 11.00 am to 12.00 pm each Monday, Thursday and Sunday. During this time, an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (ADVO) was in place for the protection of the mother from the father for a period of 12 months.
4. The father commenced the first set of substantive proceedings in August 2014. The parties then attended a mediation on 22 December 2014 and reached an agreement, providing for X to spend time with the father for two hours each Monday, Thursday and each alternate Sunday. This parenting agreement was in place and adhered to until February 2016 after which X's time with the father ceased. A further ADVO was then in place for the protection of the mother against the father for a period of 12 months.
5. On 24 August 2015, final orders were made by consent for X to live with the mother and all applications to be dismissed.
6. From November 2016, another further ADVO was made against the father for the protection of both X and the mother for a period of six months.
7. In December 2016, X commenced treatment with her current treating clinical psychologist, Ms K.
8. On 9 February 2017, the father filed his second Initiating Application. Thereafter, the parties and X undertook family therapy to reintroduce the father to X from October 2018 after not spending time with the father since February 2016. X commenced spending supervised time with the father in April 2019.
9. In 2019, X was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and Oppositional Defiance Disorder (ODD). Ms K confirmed in oral evidence that X no longer has a diagnosis of Generalised Anxiety Disorder but that she currently has social anxiety and separation anxiety.
10. In April 2020, X's time with the father again ceased due to COVID-19.
11. On 14 September 2020, final consent orders were made which provided for the mother to have sole parental responsibility for X, for her to live with the mother and spend time with the father in a graduated regime, from supervised time initially to unsupervised daytime time only on the last Saturday of each month for six hours. Time with the father has not progressed from supervised to unsupervised time and has not extended beyond four hours of time.
12. Due to time with the father not commencing pursuant to the final orders, the father filed the first contravention application on 29 December 2020 which was dismissed with a costs order made against him. The father appealed this decision which was again dismissed with a further costs order made against him. The father accepted in oral evidence that he has not paid these costs orders.
13. On 18 August 2021, consent orders were made varying the final orders to provide for a progression of X's time with the father to be supervised initially and then unsupervised on the last Saturday of each month for six hours thereafter. X then recommenced time with the father in accordance with these orders after time ceased during COVID-19 in 2020.
14. During 2022, the father filed an additional three contravention applications as well as recommencing substantive proceedings with a third Initiating Application. X did not spend time with the father between June 2022 and May 2023.
15. On 25 May 2023, X recommenced spending time supervised with the father at L Contact Centre until the supervision service indicated in October 2023 that they would no longer provide their services to the family.
16. Between January and March 2024, X spent time with the father on three separate occasions supervised by M Contact Centre for not longer than three hours on each of these occasions. It was not until December 2024 that X's time with the father resumed, again supervised by M Contact Centre. In the intervening period, the father filed his fifth contravention application, and the mother commenced these current substantive proceedings. The mother was found to have, on her own admission and without reasonable excuse, failed to place her name on the waitlist at N Contact Centre. That contravention application was otherwise dismissed.
17. The last time X spent time with the father was 29 December 2024.
18. In August 2025, the Family Report prepared by Ms O, Court Child Expert dated 3 July 2025 was released. Ms O recommended for the mother to have sole parental responsibility in relation to X and for X to live with the mother and spend no time with the father.
19. The matter was listed for final hearing before me from 23 to 26 February 2026. On the second last day of trial being 25 February 2026, the parties reached an agreement and final orders were made providing for the mother to have sole decision-making authority in relation to X, for X to live with her and spend no time with the father and for the father to be permitted to forward letters, photos, gifts and cards to the mother for X. The father also consented to a harmful proceedings order pursuant to s 102QAC of the Act so as to prohibit him from instituting further proceedings under the Act without the leave of the Court and for the mother to be notified only if leave is granted by the Court to institute proceedings. Other ancillary orders were made for the mother to travel internationally with X and apply for her passport. The parties also consented to no order as to costs.

1. The father ultimately consented to all final orders sought by the mother other than whether the injunction was for the personal protection of the mother and X or made as s 68B injunctions in aid of the parenting orders otherwise made by consent.
2. The ICL's position was neutral. He did not support either parties' application and said it is about finding a balance between what both parents can live with noting that the balance of the orders were made by consent. The ICL did express some trepidation about imposing a s 68C order, given that triggering a power of arrest outside of the laws of NSW would be a "very strong remedy." However, the ICL also acknowledged the mother's mental health vulnerabilities and the submission that such orders would give the mother some comfort.
3. These are the reasons for judgment in relation to the remaining issue in dispute.

1. Orders in respect of children are informed by Pt VII of the Act. The meaning of a parenting order is defined at s 64B of the Act. The paramount consideration in determining what parenting orders should be made is, pursuant to s 60CA of the Act, the best interests of X.
2. Section 60B of the Act outlines the objects and principles underlying Pt VII, being to ensure that the best interests of children are met, including by ensuring their safety, and to give effect to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
3. Section 60CC(2) identifies the matters that the Court is to take into account in determining what is in the best interests of a child.
4. The Court must, pursuant to s 60CC(2A), consider any history of family violence, abuse, or neglect involving the child or a person caring for the child, and any family violence order that applies or has applied to the child or a member of the child's family.
5. The Court must, pursuant to s 60CG consider the risk of family violence and to the extent it is possible to do so consistently with the child's best interests being the paramount consideration, ensure that the order is consistent with any family violence order and does not expose a person to an unacceptable risk of family violence.
6. I am satisfied the parenting orders the parties consented to are in the best interests of X and that they ensure her safety. Accordingly, those consent orders were made on a final basis on 25 February 2026.

1. Injunctions are not defined as parenting orders and are not governed by the paramountcy principle. Rather, injunctions are informed by the best interests of the child and can be made in aid of a parenting order per Hedlund & Hedlund [2021] FedCFamC1A 84; (2021) 64 Fam LR 458 ("Hedlund") below.
2. As set out by the Full Court in Hedlund:
   1. Although in defining a parenting order, s 64B(2)(i) includes orders in relation to "any aspect of the care, welfare or development of the child", and although s 68B conditions the power to grant such injunctions on whether the court considers it "appropriate for the welfare of the child", authority has distinguished between s 68B orders and parenting orders, and in particular, determined that s 68B is informed by the best interests of the child, but not governed by the paramountcy principle. This operates as a sharp distinction between s 68B injunctions and parenting orders, pointing away from the application of s 65H.
   2. In Flanagan and Handcock (2001) FLC 93-074, Kay and Holden JJ identified that the primary judge's indication that the paramountcy principle applied to s 68B was incorrect, although the issue was not expressly subject to a ground of appeal in the case (at [18]). Justice Finn expressed some doubt that the application of the paramountcy principle to s 68B was legally incorrect, emphasising the uncertain state of authority on the question (at [48]-[53]).

116 In EJK v TSL [2006] FamCA 730; (2006) FLC 93-287, Holden, Coleman and Boland JJ observed:

1. Under the present legislation, in contrast to the Act prior to the introduction of the Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth) ("the Reform Act"), not all orders made under Part VII are subject to the "best interests" test, for example, the power to make orders in respect of child maintenance and/or injunctions concerning a child (see Bennett v Bennett [2001] FamCA 462; (2001) FLC 93-088 and Flanagan and Handcock (2001) FLC 93-074, and in the High Court S258/2000).

2. In Bennett v Bennett [2001] FamCA 462; (2001) FLC 93-088, Ellis, Finn and Guest JJ drew a distinction between the power to grant a s 68B injunction and the power to make a parenting order, with the Full Court there observing that:

3. ... [T]he current power in s 68B to grant an injunction in relation to a child is not subject to the express legislative requirement that the court must regard "the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration", and in this regard is to be contrasted with the powers, for example in s 65E to make a parenting order, or in s 67ZC to make an order in relation to the welfare of a child.

4. It was not argued in this appeal that such long-standing authority should be rejected, and accordingly it should be accepted that an injunction made under s 68B of the Act is not a "parenting order" as defined in s 64B of that Act.

5. The issue then remains as to whether the injunctions, absent the application of s 65H, have the ongoing impermissible effect as argued by the father.

6. Although the injunctions are not expressed as specifically ending on the children each attaining their adulthood, there is good reason to consider that such an effect should be necessarily implied in construing the orders.

7. In Anderson v Hassett [2007] NSWSC 1310 at [11]-[15], Brereton J, in considering the obligations imposed by orders, observed that:

11. ... [I]t is permissible to resort to its context, for example any reasons for judgment ... and in particular the other orders made at the same time.

1. Noting that the proper construction of orders is a question of law, Basten JA in Wende v Horwath (NSW) Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 170; (2014) 86 NSWLR 674 at [64] set out the following approach:

64. In order to construe an order, a court should:

(a) identify the statutory power under which the order was made (to avoid a construction leading to invalidity);

(b) address the language used, to identify a plain meaning if one is available;

(c) if latent ambiguity is alleged, refer to the reasons for judgment and the application to which the order responded;

(d) in the event of ambiguity (or other uncertainty), not resolved by reference to the reasons for judgment and the terms of the application, look to the submissions and (possibly) other material before the judicial officer on the application.

1. The s 68B orders are here made in respect of the children the subject of the parenting orders and, consequentially their mother. They are made in aid of the orders that provide for no contact with the father. The parenting orders that the injunctions are in aid of will cease to operate on the children becoming adult, pursuant to s 65H of the Act. The necessary implication is that the s 68B orders, made for the welfare of the children, and made in aid of the parenting orders, also lapse in the same manner.
2. It is these matters that set out the relevant context for understanding the duration of the injunctive orders. That context points to the cessation of the injunctions when the children become adults. That conclusion is fortified by consideration of avoiding a construction that leads to invalidity. Here there is a strong argument that the extension of the injunctive relief into the adulthood of the children ranges beyond the power conferred by s 68B of the Act. The corollary is that, where available, a construction should be preferred that avoids such extension. Consistent with the context identified above, that construction is one that relies upon a necessary implication that the injunctions will not continue indefinitely, but will lapse on the ending of the parenting orders that they support.

1. The various considerations set out in s 60CC(2) are non-hierarchical and non-exhaustive. The consideration of safety in s 60CC(2)(a) requires analysis of allegations of risk of harm and is informed by the established case law.
2. Per Isles & Nelissen [2022] FedCFamC1A 97; (2022) FLC 94-092 ("Isles & Nelissen"), the task of assessing risk is an evidence-based analysis following the consideration of the factual circumstances, including historical conduct. Findings of past conduct will assist in the prospective assessment as to whether there is a possibility of harm arising in the future.
3. The Full Court identified in Isles & Nelissen (quoting Austin J in Fitzwater & Fitzwater [2019] FamCAFC 251; (2019) 60 Fam LR 212 at [138]) that the consideration of risk "is a predictive exercise and while it is, naturally enough, liable to be influenced by factual findings about past events, the contemplation of risk entails the foresight of possible harm."
4. Their Honours made the following observations:
   1. The assessment of risk is an evidence-based conclusion and is not discretionary. The statement to the contrary by the Full Court in Bant & Clayton [2019] FamCAFC 198; (2019) FLC 93-924 at [52] is rejected as being incorrect. Sometimes it can be difficult to discern the difference between the exercise of discretion and an evaluative judgment (Edwards v Noble (1971) 125 CLR 296 at 304), though a discretionary decision is one in which no single factor or combination of considerations will necessarily dictate the result (Norbis v Norbis [1986] HCA 17; (1986) 161 CLR 513 at 518). The finding about whether an unacceptable risk exists, based on known facts and circumstances, is either open on the evidence or it is not. It is only the overall judgment, expressed in the form of orders made in the children's best interests, which entails an exercise of discretion. That discretionary judgment is influenced by the various material considerations enumerated within s 60CC of the Act, of which the evidence-based finding made about the existence of any unacceptable risk of harm is but one.
5. The Full Court in Eastley & Eastley [2022] FedCFamC1A 101; (2022) FLC 94-094 ("Eastley") articulated the relevant test in respect of the determination of future risk:
   1. There could be no error in abstaining from making a definitive factual finding when the primary judge explained why he was not convinced on the balance of probabilities the incident occurred ... However, the primary judge's enduring suspicion the incident might have occurred ...was still legitimately available to take into account as part of the matrix of evidence upon which the finding of "unacceptable risk" was premised. It is well accepted that an accumulation of factors, not individually proven on the balance of probabilities, can still be enough to demonstrate the existence of an unacceptable risk of harm to children.
6. In determining the question of risk, it is necessary to consider the cumulative effect of the whole of the evidence rather than merely dealing with each allegation in an isolated fashion. The Full Court held:
   1. The first point to be made is that the law did not require the primary judge to assess the potency of the risk of harm posed to the children by reference to the evidence concerning individual events in isolation from the remainder of the evidence. On the contrary, the primary judge was required to assess the level of risk posed to the children on the whole of the evidence, since the strength of the evidence lies in its cumulative effect, much like how the strength of rope derives from the combination of its individually weaker strands (Transport Industries Insurance Co Ltd v Longmuir [1997] 1 VR 125 at 127-130 and 141; Savage v Lunn [1998] NSWCA 203; J.D Heydon, Cross on Evidence (LexisNexis Australia, 13th edition, 2021) at [1110] and [9040]).
7. To make orders that are in the best interests of the children and promote the safety of the children and each person who has care of the children, the Court must undertake an assessment of their safety in the individual circumstances of each case.
8. If a Court determines that there is an unacceptable risk of harm on the evidence, consideration as to whether risk to the child's safety is capable of amelioration is required to be considered for orders to be made in the best interests of the children. That is the Court is to assess whether that risk "is able to be sufficiently managed or ameliorated": Blinko & Blinko [2015] FamCAFC 146 at [83], referring to Russell & Close (Unreported Full Court, 25 June 1993) ("Russell & Close").
9. The parties agreed to orders that the father spend no time and only be permitted to forward letters, photos, gifts and cards to the mother for X. Implicit in these orders is the recognition that X and the mother's safety are best promoted by such orders.

1. Counsel for the father contended that because the father consented to s 68B injunctions being made which are very significant injunctions, that the Court would not characterise the injunctions as being made for the personal protection of the mother and X. In support of this position, it was contended that the absence of any criminal conviction against the father overall was a factor indicating against the necessity of a personal protection order.
2. It was acknowledged that the father had breached the 2016 ADVO (being the third ADVO in place for the protection of the mother) and that he entered a plea of guilty for the breach. However, it was submitted on behalf of the father that this was a minor breach, no conviction was recorded and he received the benefit of a s 10 non-conviction bond for 12 months. The fact remains that the father breached the order and communicated with the mother at that time when he sent the mother a text message saying "[w]ould you please stop watching Land Girl on Netflix and start watching Ep 2 of the Secret River" as the mother was watching "Land Girl". This conduct caused the mother to feel terrified as though the father was monitoring her in some way.

1. Counsel for the father submitted that the breach of the 2016 ADVO was almost 10 years ago and that the father is simply not a person "who would attract a personal protection order" in light of the seriousness of the powers to arrest that flow from a personal protection order being made. It was contended that there is no evidence before the Court indicating any breaches since almost 10 years ago which was as above, "very minor" in nature at the time.
2. On or about the end of June 2013, the father threatened to burn the mother's house down having said to the mother over the phone "I fucking hate you. I'll never forgive you for this. I fucking hate you. I fucking hate you. I'm going to burn your house down." The mother's evidence was that she was terrified and hung up the phone immediately. She made a statement to the police who applied for the first ADVO against the father on her behalf. It was submitted that whilst this incident was conceded by the father, this occurred 13 years ago and that on the father's evidence, this occurred at a time of high emotion following the breakdown of the relationship. Given the time that has passed and the timing of this occurring, it was submitted that the Court ought to conclude this is not sufficient to ground the making of the personal protection order.
3. Since that time, two further ADVOs were made, each without admission, the second in October 2013 following the father's refusal to leave the mother's home and the third ADVO in February 2016 following the father's public posts on the public daycare forum.
4. Despite the ADVOs being made without admission, it was not in dispute that the father made the serious threat to burn the mother's house and made the public posts denigrating the mother and daycare. The conduct and behaviour of the father directed at the mother had a serious and ongoing impact on the mother.

1. It was submitted by counsel for the father that by virtue of the orders already consented to and the very nature of the suite of orders, being that the father has agreed to spend no time with X and that the restraints and injunctions be made, the interests of X are well taken care of and acknowledge the mother's mental health such that the orders provide a great sense of comfort to the mother and accordingly does not warrant a personal protection order being made.
2. Further, it is acknowledged that the father has consented to a harmful proceedings order under s 102QAC of the Act. This operates as a protection from the mother being exposed to systems abuse or having to deal with a total of five unmeritorious contravention applications since the making of the final orders between 2020 and 2024 that are in effect, an abuse of process. The fact that the father is restrained from commencing any proceedings and that the mother is protected from knowing about any application absent the leave of the Court, operates as a safety net for the mother such that a personal protection order may not thus be warranted as she will be protected.
3. Counsel for the father further contended that the best way for the mother to feel safe is for time to pass and for her to realise that the father has not contacted X or breached the orders given the consent orders made.
4. Counsel for the mother submitted that the injunctions, without being made for the personal protection of the mother and X is insufficient protection from the father. It was contended that the fact that the father agreed to the injunctions but opposed to them being made for personal protection only increases the mother's anxiety, given the lack of trust she has in the father and such a strong objection being made gives her no comfort.
5. The harmful proceedings orders do operate as a means to protect the mother from coercive control by systems abuse of the filing of unmeritorious contraventions or further proceedings, however a breach of the injunctions would still require the mother to take action, in this court or in the State courts to seek sanctions and remedy.

Personal protection order does not bring "anything extra"

1. It was contended that the order being made as a personal protection order does not bring "anything extra" in relation to the best interests of X. I reject that submission. A personal protection order has the effect in the event of a breach (which a police officer believes on reasonable grounds to have occurred), of immediate consequences including the power of arrest without warrant. The absence of such immediate consequence means that in the event of such a breach, the mother would either have to take steps to apply for yet another ADVO for her protection against the father as contended by the father's counsel or commence contravention proceedings to seek sanctions. It is without contention that the mother's mental health is at risk of further deterioration impacting on her capacity to care for X if she continues to be exposed to ongoing litigation with the father, whether in this Court or another. This is clearly not in X's best interests. Ms O opined that:
   1. ...If [the mother's] mental health is not effectively managed, [X's] emotional wellbeing may be at risk. Additionally, the stress of ongoing litigation may further impact [the mother's] ability to provide the consistent and stable support [X] needs during this critical time.
2. Avoiding the necessity for the mother to commence further proceedings in the event of a breach, does in fact bring something extra to X's best interests; it brings consequence for a breach and finality of proceedings.
3. If the father does not breach the injunctions, there will be no consequence. If he breaches the injunctions, there should be a consequence, and it should not fall on the mother to commence further proceedings to bring about a sanction given the deleterious impact on the mother of ongoing or further proceedings.

Mother is highly anxious and may make unfounded allegations to the police

1. It was also contended on behalf of the father that in circumstances where the mother is a highly anxious person, the mother might, as a consequence of her anxiety and other mental health conditions, think something has occurred and that the father has breached the orders and be in touch with the police about the father, causing further trouble between the parties rather than protection or her sense of safety.
2. I reject this submission. There is no evidence the mother has ever made an allegation without substance to the police about the father. I accept the mother has made physical and sexual allegations about the father which are disputed by him, however, the complaints made by the mother to the police of the threat to burn her house and the posts on the daycare website he made were admitted. Further, in order for the police to exercise power under s 68C, the police themselves must believe on reasonable grounds that the father breached the injunction.

FACTORS IN SUPPORT OF A PERSONAL PROTECTION ORDER

1. Counsel for the mother submitted that it is appropriate for these injunctions to be made under s 68B for the personal protection of the mother and X as it would give the mother the sense of safety and security that she needs in order to be the best parent she can be for X.
2. It was the mother's uncontested evidence that she experiences significant physical and mental health difficulties. Her evidence was that due to the father's abusive and threatening behaviour towards her over the years, she feels "frozen" in his presence.
3. The mother was cross examined over two days by counsel for the mother. She presented at times as a vulnerable witness becoming visibly distressed, and as submitted by her counsel, appearing to take deep breaths and having her hand to her chest to try to regulate herself following questions about the concept of having future interactions with the father.
4. Counsel for the mother referred to the decision of Russell & Close, quoted in Re Andrew [1996] FamCA 43; (1996) FLC 92-692 at 83,200 where their Honours stated:

In upholding children's rights to protection from sexual, psychological or emotional harm the Court must take into account any anxiety on the part of the primary caregiver concerning the child's exposure to potential harm where such anxiety is likely to impact adversely on that parent's care-giving ability.

In taking into account the belief of the custodial parent of abuse by the non-custodial parent of the children and the effect of such belief on that parent as primary caregiver of the children and consequent harm to the children, a subjective test is employed. However, it must be shown that such belief on the part of the custodial parent is genuinely held. Where it appears on the whole of the evidence that such belief is entirely irrational and baseless, the genuineness of the subjective belief of the custodial parent will clearly be open to doubt.

1. It was contended on behalf of the mother that the Court would be satisfied that the mother's fear and anxiety is genuine and also based on real experience, such that making a personal protection order for the mother and X is appropriate and necessary to give the mother a sense of safety, security and stability that would ultimately benefit X given the mother's vulnerabilities. It is not in X's best interests for the mother's vulnerabilities to manifest in any form of regression in self-care of the mother herself or in her capacity to care for X. It was submitted that ultimately, orders that enhance the mother's sense of safety benefit X. I accept these submissions.

1. The mother has been engaging with Ms Q, Clinical Psychologist since in or about May 2016 after being referred for counselling through Victim Services, NSW. During the course of these proceedings, Ms Q has prepared several reports. In the latest report dated 14 January 2026, Ms Q opined that the mother is diagnosed with Complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Generalised Anxiety Disorder, Panic Disorder and Major Depressive Disorder.
2. Ms Q opined in her report dated 11 September 2024 that:

[The mother's] fear for her daughter's safety and for her own safety overwhelms her to the point she is temporarily unable to function. Furthermore, I have witnessed [the mother] presenting with extreme terror at the potential danger she believes [the father] poses to [X] and to herself. This fear results in panic attacks, extreme distress, at times marked dissociation and regression, and self-reporting a decreased capacity to self-care, organise her time, manage home commitments and care for her daughter, [X]. The timing of these symptoms indicate contact with [the father] is a reliable trigger for an exacerbation of PTSD symptoms for [the mother]. PTSD symptoms also include flashbacks of the violence, nightmares, hypervigilance, dissociation, feelings of worthlessness, insomnia, low mood, anxiety, panic, emotional dysregulation and low self-confidence.

1. Ms Q has observed a direct relationship between the mother's mental health presentation and the recency of contact from the father, being an increase in her symptoms particularly following correspondence with the father, his legal team or following supervised visits between the father and X as well as a decrease in the intensity and frequency of symptoms with an absence of contact from the father and the legal matters.
2. Ms Q opined that if contact with the father is not ceased completely, it is difficult to envisage psychological recovery for the mother from the impacts of the trauma she has suffered. This is a significant consideration in support of making the injunctions in the terms sought by the mother.

1. Ms O opined that if the mother's mental health is not effectively managed, X's emotional wellbeing may be at risk. Ms O also observed that the mother acknowledged that when her mental health and chronic pain are impacting her wellbeing, she finds parenting more challenging. I accept her opinion.

Conclusion on mother's mental health vulnerabilities

1. I am satisfied the mother has engaged consistently with therapeutic supports and that she continues to demonstrate a commitment to coping with and managing the considerable difficulties she has faced as observed by Ms O in her report at paragraph 91.
2. I give considerable weight to the importance of the mother's continual management of her mental health vulnerabilities and the flow on effect to X's safety and her developmental, psychological and emotional needs as her sole primary carer.

1. Counsel for the mother meticulously took the father through the history of his behaviour from 2013 to the present time highlighting the extent of the deficit in his insight as to the impact of his own conduct on both the mother and on X. This evidence included the threat to burn down the mother's home in 2013 and other conduct leading to the ADVOs being sought by the mother, the father's multiple complaints about Ms K, the father's conduct in posting denigrating comments about X's preschool on the daycare website, and the filing of multiple contravention applications in circumstances where he knew or ought to have known prior to filing that the respective contraventions were without merit, and the father's ongoing failure to pay the costs orders that flowed from the dismissal of his unmeritorious contravention applications on two separate occasions.
2. I accept that each of the examples the father was taken to illustrates the extent of the deficit of his insight as to the impact of his behaviour on the mother and her parenting capacity.
3. The mother's counsel submitted that the father showed very little insight into the impact of his behaviour on others, consistent with the opinions of Ms O where she opined that:
   1. ... his insight into the potential impact of his own behaviour on [X] appeared limited. Rather than considering how his actions may have contributed to the current difficulties in their relationship, he tended to externalise blame, primarily attributing [X's] reluctance to form relationship with him to [the mother] and her alleged influence on [X]. This limited reflective capacity and tendency to deflect responsibility raises concerns about [the father's] ability to parent [X] in a way that is emotionally safe and attuned to her developmental needs.

...

1. [The father] demonstrated some insight into his past behaviours and acknowledged the likely impact these may have had on [the mother]. However, he appeared to provide limited insight into how his behaviours may have affected [X] and offered minimal reflection on how her current responses towards him might be shaped by her lived experiences. Instead, [the father] continued to express resentment towards [the mother], placing blame on her for supervised contact not occurring and for the lack of progression in his relationship with [X]. Rather than demonstrating an understanding of the factors that may influence decisions around supervised contact, such as [X's] emotional safety, readiness, and past exposure to alleged conflict, [the father] appeared to externalise blame, focusing primarily on what he perceived as an interference by [the mother]. As such, [the father's] response may reflect a limited capacity to consider the broader emotional and developmental needs of [X] in the context of the family's history.

1. The father conceded that the orders he sought were unlikely to ever be able to be implemented and were aspirational and symbolic. This concession at that time illustrates he was focused on his needs rather than X's needs and that he had little regard to the impact of his application and the proceedings on the mother.

1. There were a number of examples of the father minimising his own conduct and its impact on the mother and X. Following the incident where the father threatened to burn the mother's house down, he sent an apology to the mother "for all the things that have hurt you or your family through any mode of communication - be they text, spoken or otherwise". In oral evidence, the father accepted he was apologising for other times he was frustrated and saying things out of anger. However, he was unable to recall any specifics of what he may have said to the mother.
2. The father gave contradictory evidence in relation to an incident between the parties, particularly the act of frustration of whether he was punching his forehand with the phone in his hand as alleged by the mother, and as she reported to Ms O. In the father's affidavit, he stated that he "merely tapped my phone which was in my hand on my hand which was an act of frustration", however in oral evidence, he stated that he made a gesture with the phone and demonstrated that he was waving the phone in his hand near his head. When asked whether he was waving his phone near his head or tapping his phone, he said he thought it hit his hand. In this instance, the father minimised and downplayed his behaviour.
3. Other examples including the father's confrontational text exchange with Ms P's communication about how X was feeling after her last visit, the complaint to the Health Care Complaints Commission (HCCC) about Ms K's offer to communicate with the proposed supervision agency, the father's inability to modify his own conduct in his repeated verbal expression of love to X even after she had on a number of occasions, expressed her discomfort at him telling her "I love you", the confrontational email communication with M Contact Centre where the father alleged the supervision agency was profiteering from vulnerable parents and engaging in unethical price gouging and the threat to call his barrister when advised by the supervisor that X was distressed and refusing to attend a visit.
4. In her report, Ms O stated that the father expressed a willingness to attend and participate in a Men's Behaviour Change Program, but at the time of the report, it remained unclear as to why he has not yet engaged with such a program. In oral evidence, he stated that the behaviour he was thinking he wanted to change was to be "less reactive and to be more aware of his emotional responses" to benefit his parenting. However, the father gave evidence that he did not enrol in the program because based on his own research, he thought it could be better facilitated through a mental health plan. There was no evidence of the father's engagement with therapy. If the father had engaged in some form of therapy which would assist the Court in finding that his expressions of frustration or reactivity were now more controlled, it was encumbered on the father to present that evidence which he did not.
5. The father's lack of engagement with any form of behaviour change, although accepting its potential benefit, in my view also supports the orders being sought in the form by the mother.

1. The father had previously consented to injunctions in the same form in the past. The nature of the injunctions are such that they could not be inadvertently breached by him as they require the father to not assault, harass or molest the mother or X, initiate contact with the mother or X and enter and being within 100m of two specified addresses.
2. The father consented to the injunctions being made, however not the potential consequences that may flow from breaching the injunctions. If he breaches these orders, it will be by his deliberate conduct. It is my view that in such an event the consequences should flow immediately given the seriousness of the impact of such conduct on the mother and X.
3. As above, the father conceded in oral evidence that two previous costs orders have been made against him, both of which he has failed to comply with. In the event of a breach the mother should not be put to the financial burden of incurring further legal costs in seeking sanctions for a breach, particularly noting she is not presently receiving child support and meets the entire burden of support of X.

1. On balance, the factors in support of making of the personal protection injunctive orders outweigh the factors lending against the personal protection order. I put greater weight on the mother's mental health vulnerabilities and the extensive history between the parties involving many years of litigation and uncertainty for X as to her living arrangements, and ultimately the negative flow on effect of these factors on X and her mother as X's primary caregiver.
2. These orders are made in aid of the parenting orders for no time with the father and are necessary as part of the consideration of X's best interests, and whilst the injunctive orders are not governed by her best interests, they certainly are a consideration because of the mother's mental health vulnerabilities as X's primary carer.
3. I am satisfied that the making of the s 68B injunctions for the personal protection of the mother and X is necessary to promote the safety of X and the mother, as X's primary caregiver and as the person who has parental responsibility and sole decision-making authority for X.
4. I make the personal protection orders accordingly.

1. The ICL made an application for costs. The father is legally aided. I accept that the mother has the sole care of X and would suffer financial hardship if an order were made for her to contribute to the ICL's costs. I decline to make such an order.

I certify that the preceding eighty-seven (87) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Curran.