austlii:tas/TASCAT/2026/7
General information, not legal advice.
TASCAT
2026-01-22
Original judgment source is linked above.
CL v The Trustee for Kent Relocation Group Pty Ltd [2026] TASCAT 7
The Trustee for Kent Relocation Group Pty Ltd as Trustee for Dace Trust t/a Kent Moving and Storage (Employer)
1. The worker's section 86(4) referral is referred back to a conciliator for continuation of the conciliation process under Div 2 of Part V of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988.
Workers compensation - Cessation of payments by certificate - Whether certificate is valid - Sufficiency of grounds - Delay in preparation and service of certificate - Whether documents should be annexed to certificate
Mark Alan Gardner v Hansen and Yuncken (Tasmania) Pty Ltd [1996] TASSC 113;
J T Hiscutt & Sons v Moore [2000] TASSC 125;
Emmanuel Klonaris and Mary Klonaris Trading As Cut Price Frozen Foods v Rodney Paul Farrow [1995] TASSC 144;
Guthrie Pty Ltd Trading As Australian Weaving Mills v Dean Selwyn Sherriff Judgment [1994] TASSC 25;
Osborne v EST Hotel Enterprises Pty Ltd (1992) 1 Tas R 318;
Richard John Jones v D L and J L Jones [1996] TASSC 140
86. Cases in which employer may terminate or reduce payments > > (1) Except in pursuance of a determination made by the Tribunal under section 88 (2) , an employer may, subject to this section, terminate or reduce a weekly payment made to a worker only where - > > (a) the payment is in respect of total incapacity and the worker has returned to work; > > (b) the worker is in receipt of the weekly payment in respect of partial incapacity and is receiving weekly earnings in excess of the amount upon which the amount of such weekly payment was determined; > > (c) a medical practitioner who has examined the worker has certified that, in his opinion, the worker has wholly recovered or substantially recovered from the effects of the injury in respect of which the payment is being made or that the worker's incapacity is no longer due, wholly or substantially, to that injury; or > > (d) . . . . . . . . > > (e) a worker's entitlement to weekly payments has expired as provided by section 69B(2E) . > > (2) A certificate referred to in subsection (1) (c) shall specify the grounds upon which the opinion expressed in it is given. > > (3) An employer who, for the reasons specified in subsection (1) (c) , (d) or (e) , intends to terminate or reduce a weekly payment made to a worker shall cause to be served on the worker - > > (a) a notice of his intention to terminate the weekly payment being made to the worker, or to reduce that payment by the amount specified in the notice at the expiration of a period of 10 days from the day on which the notice was served on the worker; and > > (b) where the employer's intention to terminate or reduce is based on a certificate referred to in subsection (1) (c) , a copy of that certificate. > > (3A) A notice referred to in subsection (3) (a) is to contain a statement informing the worker of the worker's right to refer the termination or reduction of the weekly payments to the Tribunal for determination. > > (4) A worker who has been served with a notice under subsection (3) (a) and who wishes to dispute the termination or reduction of the weekly payments being made to him may within a period of 60 days from the date on which the weekly payments were terminated or reduced, refer the matter to the Tribunal for determination. > > (5) An employer who terminates or reduces a weekly payment otherwise than in accordance with this section is guilty of an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding 20 penalty units.
3.8 [the worker] was pushing a tool chest full of tools, weighing an estimated 150kg, up a ramp with two other people. As they lifted then the chest, she felt pain in her lower back and left hip. She informed her coworkers and tried to take a break, but the pain persistent, so she continued working in pain. Upon returning to the warehouse, she experienced pain and paraesthesia in her left lower limb and left hip pain. She informed her boss and then loaded 32 heavy boxes into a truck, had a long drive to Fentonbury from Bridgewater, and unloaded the boxes at the destination before going home. > > 3.9 She returned to work the next day before attending a GP. The first GP did not handle workers compensation, so she was given a normal medical certificate. She continued working without restrictions despite the pain. She later saw a different GP who provided a work cover certificate and referred her to physiotherapy. Eventually, a left hip labral tear, bone bruising, and femoral hernia were diagnosed. An orthopaedic surgeon has suggested some injections, but it is unclear what the target is (presumably the hip). A general surgeon has suggested mesh repair.
3.10 On days off, [the worker] feels okay, but if she exerted herself the day before, the pain could increase. The main pain is in the groin, with some left lower backpain and some left SIJ pain.
4.1 [the worker] has a normal gait and is able to walk on her heels, but walking on her toes caused left "hip pain". She can squat normally but states it feels weak in the left quadriceps. She has normal lumbar flexion, lateral flexion, extension, rotation, and extension quadrants. However, her left hip is painful with all movements, particularly FABER and FADIR tests, which were quite painful. There was spinal and bilateral paraspinal tenderness but no spasms. She has normal tone, power, sensation, reflexes, coordination, and balance. The SLR test was negative. There was no SIJ involvement or gluteal insertion involvement. The femoral hernia was not examined as it was clear from the ultrasound scan that it is present.
(a) [the worker] has wholly or substantially recovered from the effects of the injury she suffered at work on 15 November 2023; and
(b) any incapacity that [the worker] presently suffers from is no longer due, wholly or substantially, to the injury suffered at work on 15 November 2023.
(a) the history provided by [the worker] at the examination on 30 April 2024;
(b) my clinical observations and examination of [the worker] on 30 April 2024; and
(c) review of the documents referred to at paragraph 6 above.
5 It has been judicially determined that to satisfy the statutory requirements, the certificate must clearly, unambiguously and unequivocally comply with the statutory requirements which I have set out. See Gibsons Ltd v Jeffrey (1993) 2 Tas R 375; Osmond v Kemp & Denning Ltd A44/1993. A certificate will be ambiguous if it does not clearly identify the injury in respect of which weekly payments are being made, and relate that injury to any claimed recovery or ongoing incapacity. See Osmond v Kemp & Denning Ltd (supra) at 4 - 5.
6 The requirements of a valid certificate were examined by the Full Court of this Court in Gardner v Hansen and Yuncken (Tasmania) Pty Ltd [1996] TASSC 113; (1996) 6 Tas R 248. In my judgment in that case, I reviewed most of the authorities in this Court that had dealt with this issue. There is no need to refer to them again. The Act prescribes no formal requirements for a certificate. Provided the certificate:
14... It is not the function of the Tribunal to examine the reasoning of the certifier and subject it to legal analysis. The Act, s86(1)(c) and (2) does not provide that the grounds must stand up to scrutiny and legal analysis. If grounds are given and they relate to the opinion and can be understood, then the certificate complies with the statutory prescription enacted by subs(2). It may be that the grounds are so unclear or so ambiguous or so unrelated to the opinion that it might be said that the certificate did not comply with the Act, but that cannot be said about this certificate.
15 In Papadopoulos v South Australia 47 SAIR (Pt 2) 317 at 324, Haese J said:
"All that I am concerned with is whether there appears in the document under challenge a statement of the grounds upon which the opinions certified are based. To my mind if the certified opinion is clear (which it is), unless the stated grounds are so incomprehensible, incompatible with the opinion, irrational upon their face or totally lacking in relevance to the opinion certified (bearing in mind that it is a medical opinion) so as not to constitute grounds supportive of the certificate to which they relate, then it is not for the Court to enter upon a minute scrutiny of the semantics employed in the statement of such grounds."
"... whilst, in certain cases, the statement of grounds of the opinion of the medical practitioner might, by its very nature, necessarily be so inconsistent with the certification as to invalidate it (eg, by indicating that the medical practitioner has, for example, directed his mind to the wrong injury or that the certification is in relation to total recovery whereas the grounds unequivocally show that there is only partial recovery), in general it is not the province of the Court under this Section to go behind the basic certification and consider the reasonableness or otherwise of the grounds which lead to the certification. ..."
17 In The State of South Australia v Migliore (1982) 49 SAIR (Pt 2) 190 at 195 and 196, Lee J expressed agreement with the statement of Haese J in Papadopoulos v South Australia (supra) and continued:
"... I think that it is sufficient in most cases to enquire first whether the purported grounds are in truth reasons for the opinion and not merely a restatement of the opinion itself and second whether the grounds relate to and are consistent with the opinion."
14. Whilst a "certificate does not require a statement of the stages in the intellectual processes which led to the final opinion" (per Green CJ in Guthrie v Sherriff (supra) at 406) a statement of the grounds must in truth be grounds and not a mere restatement of the opinion (South Australia v Migliore (1982) 49 SAIR 190 at 196; Osmond v Kemp and Denning (supra) at 5) and must be supportive of the opinion to which it relates (Papadopoulos v South Australia (1980) 47 SAIR 317 at 324).
In my view the proper meaning of the expression "incapacity is no longer due, wholly or substantially, to that injury" is that the incapacity is then wholly or substantially the result of a cause other than the relevant injury. Before it is appropriate to terminate a weekly payment under s 86(1)(c) it must be possible to ascribe as the entire or substantial cause of the incapacity a matter or matters other than the compensable injury.
6. Despite the way in which the learned Commissioner expressed himself in that passage, it is clear that he proceeded upon the basis that, in order to satisfy the requirements of s86(1)(c), a certificate must be to the effect that at the time of the relevant examination the worker had recovered from the effects of the injury to the requisite degree. The appellants' submission that thereby the learned Commissioner proceeded upon an erroneous basis is well founded. There is no requirement that the certificate must speak of a state of affairs existing at the time that the examination occurs. The certificate speaks as of the date upon which it is given.
7. The proposition that a certificate pursuant to s86(1)(c) must certify to a state of affairs existing as at the time that it is given appears to be clearly established by the decision of the Full Court in Guthrie Pty Ltd v Sherriff [1994] TASSC 25; (1994) 3 Tas R 399. Two members of the Full Court (Crawford J at 412 - 413 and Zeeman J at 418 - 419) expressly held to that effect and the third member of the court, Green CJ, appears to have assumed that to be the position. Provided that the worker has been examined by the medical practitioner giving the certificate and that examination has a sufficient connection with the opinions expressed in the certificate (see Hennessy v The Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd [1926] HCA 32; (1926) 38 CLR 342 at 350; Guthrie Pty Ltd v Sherriff (supra) at 421), it may rely on any relevant material going to the state of affairs existing as at the time at which the certificate is given. The learned Commissioner erred by holding that a certificate is to speak of the state of affairs existing as at the time of the examination.
a) Claim Form dated 17 November 2024; > > b) Initial workers compensation medical certificate dated 16 November 2023; > > c) Incident report dated 15 November 2023; > > d) Initial notification of injury report dated 16 November 2023; > > e) Section 33A notice of right to make Workers compensation claim dated 16 November 2023; > > f) Letter from Mr Rob Bohmer to GIO dated 4 March 2024 regarding insurance approval request for surgery; > > g) Bundle of Workers Compensation Medical Certificates; > > h) Non-workers compensation medical certificate dated 21 November 2023;
j) MRI Report left hip report dated 4 January 2024; > > k) Ultrasound left Groin dated 14 February 2024;
m) Bundle email correspondence between Rehab, GIO and Employer from 25 January 2024 to 5 March 2024; > > n) Document titled 'Back Pain' from Queensland Health; > > o) Return to Work and Injury Management Plan No. 7; > > p) GP records from Kutalayna Health.
Those responsible for preparing certificates for the purposes of s86(1)(c) should bear in mind what the law requires of such a certificate and refrain from including irrelevant material resulting in the certificate containing much more than a statement of an opinion and the reasons for the opinion.
CL
The Trustee for Kent Relocation Group Pty Ltd [2026] TASCAT 7
(1992) 1 Tas R 318
(1993) 2 Tas R 375
(1996) 6 Tas R 248
(1994) 3 Tas R 399
(1926) 38 CLR 342