CJY18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2026] FedCFamC2G 477

1. On 3 March 2017, the Department wrote to the applicant requesting further documentary evidence of identity, nationality or citizenship pursuant to s 91W(1) of the Act within 28 days (Further Information Request).
2. On 18 May 2017, the Department invited the applicant to attend an interview on 7 June 2017 to discuss the Visa application.
3. On 6 June 2017, Mr Boulous emailed the Department to provide further information regarding the applicant and his Visa application. Relevantly, Mr Boulous notified the Department that the applicant had previously provided an Iraqi document that was not genuine.
4. On that same day, the Department replied to the email from Mr Boulous seeking confirmation of the name of the applicant's sister who resided in Australia and requesting that the applicant bring with him any original identification documents from Iraq to the interview being held on the subsequent day.
5. On 7 June 2017, the applicant attended the interview. The interview was abandoned part way through. On 12 July 2017, the applicant attended a rescheduled interview. At the interview, the applicant confirmed that he had provided an identity document that was not genuine, expanded further on his claims and provided original identity documents in response to the Further Information Request. The applicant's representative also provided a verbal submission.
6. On 12 July 2017, the Department sent an email to Mr Boulous allowing seven calendar days in which to provide further information for consideration, in particular translations to the applicant's Citizenship Certificate and residency card (July 2017 Email).
7. On 30 November 2017, the Department sent a follow up email to Mr Boulous identifying that no further material had been provided by the applicant and again requested translations of the applicant's identity documents (November 2017 Email).
8. On 7 December 2017, Mr Boulous provided a translation of the applicant's Iraqi Citizenship Certificate to the Department.
9. On 15 December 2017, the Delegate refused to grant the applicant the Visa.
10. Om 20 December 2017, the Delegate's decision was referred to the Authority for review.
11. On 23 January 2018, the Authority affirmed the Delegate's decision to refuse the applicant the Visa. On the same day, the Authority sent a copy of its decision and reasons to the applicant's postal address.

1. The Authority issued its statement of decision and reasons on 23 January 2018 (Authority Decision).

1. At paragraph [3] of the Authority Decision, the Authority stated that it had regard to the material referred to it by the Secretary under s 473CB of the Act. The Authority noted that no further information was obtained or received.

1. At paragraph [4] of the Authority Decision, the Authority summarised the applicant's claims for protection.
2. At paragraph [5] of the Authority Decision, the Authority accepted that the applicant is of Arab ethnicity, Shia faith and an Iraqi national. The Authority also accepted that he grew up in Nasiriyah, completed his schooling up until year 12 until he withdrew due to poor health and that he was married on 25 November 2010.
3. At paragraphs [6] - [9] of the Authority Decision, the Authority noted the applicant's inconsistencies in relation to his claims for protection due to his medical condition. The Authority was prepared to accept that the applicant was diagnosed with a pituitary tumour in 2002 and had received surgical intervention in Australia. Despite this, the Authority noted that the applicant had not provided medical evidence in support of the current or ongoing effect, if any, of his condition. As a result, the Authority could not be satisfied that the applicant required ongoing medication or treatment, nor that such treatment would not be available in Iraq, or that the consequence of him not receiving adequate treatment would be death, as claimed.
4. At paragraphs [10] - [17] of the Authority Decision, the Authority considered the applicant's claims in relation to his wife, her family and their connections to Hezbollah as well as other military groups and his employment with the US base camp. Again, the Authority expressed its concern regarding the applicant's credibility on account of the inconsistencies and changes in his evidence. The Authority would not accept that these inconsistencies were a result of the applicant's poor memory or medical conditions. Instead, the Authority made a number of findings including that:

(1) the applicant was not employed at Camp Talil base at any time while it was occupied by US forces and therefore this could not have been used as a basis for his wife's family demanding a divorce;

(2) it rejected the applicant's claim regarding the incident whereby Hezbollah militia fired shots into his family home as it had not been mentioned in the Visa application, and found that the applicant was of no interest to Hezbollah or any other militia groups prior to his departure from Iraq in 2013;

(3) it did accept that the applicant was briefly detained by the Mehdi Army, but noted that, on the applicant's own admission, he did not have any further trouble with this group; and

(4) noting that the Visa application stated the applicant was already divorced, it rejected the claim made at the Visa interview that the applicants' former wife's family were taking legal action for divorce and that he would be unable to pay them if they won.

1. At paragraphs [19] - [26] of the Authority Decision, the Authority considered whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution and considered relevant country information. The Authority noted that the information before it did not indicate that a Shia Muslim would be targeted in Iraq on the basis of being Shia, nor that the applicant would be targeted by Shia militants for failing to fight against ISIS. It also considered whether the applicant faced a real chance of serious harm as a result of sectarian violence in Iraq and the security situation generally. It found that although sectarian violence, including sporadic terror attacks, was present in the southern provinces, the country information indicated that the risk was predominantly borne by those actively involved in such militia groups, rather than ordinary civilians. Accordingly, the Authority was not satisfied that the applicant faced a real chance of serious harm from Shia militias, Sunni groups or otherwise arising from sectarian violence, nor was it satisfied that the applicant would be harmed should he return to Iraq on the basis of having sought asylum. The Authority was not satisfied that the applicant faced a real chance of serious harm should he be required to return to Iraq finding that the applicant did not meet the requirements of s 5H(1) of the Act and consequently did not meet s 36(2)(a) of the Act.
2. At paragraphs [27] - [31] of the Authority Decision, the Authority considered whether the applicant would suffer significant harm pursuant to s 36(2A) of the Act. The Authority largely relied on its refugee protection findings in finding that the applicant was not owed complementary protection. Moreover, the Authority again considered the applicant's evidence pertaining to his medical condition and ultimately could not be satisfied that there would be a real risk that he would suffer significant harm on account of his medical condition, nor would the applicant be deprived of his life or subjected to torture or be intentionally inflicted with cruel treatment or punishment.
3. Accordingly, the Authority was not satisfied that the applicant met the criteria in ss 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Act and thereby affirmed the Delegate's decision not to grant the applicant the Visa.

1. Section 477(1) of the Act requires that an application to this Court be made within 35 days of the date of the migration decision.
2. The Authority Decision was made on 23 January 2018. An application for judicial review of that decision in this Court was therefore required to be filed by 27 February 2018. The Application for judicial review was not filed until 10 May 2018.
3. Accordingly, the Application was filed 72 days after the expiry of the statutory timeframe.

Should the Court be satisfied to make an order extending time?

1. Section 477(2) of the Act allows the Court to grant an extension of the 35-day period within which an application must be made if the Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make such an order.
2. The Act does not specify any criteria which must be satisfied to establish that it is in "the interests of the administration of justice" to grant an extension.
3. The principles regarding an application under s 477(2) were considered in BTI15 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 49. In that decision, Jagot and Halley JJ found that the Court has an obligation "to evaluate all of the relevant circumstances and to decide if the Court is satisfied that the extension of time is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice". Further, they identified that whilst the matters to which regard may be had are not expressly confined by the Act, the following are usually relevant when considering an extension of time - although it is noted that this list is not exhaustive:

(1) the extent of the delay and the explanation for it;

(2) any prejudice to the respondent if an extension were granted;

(3) the impact on the applicant if the time was not extended;

(4) the interests of the public at large; and

(5) the merits of the substantive application.

1. In the Amended Application filed 12 September 2025, the applicant specified the following grounds as to why it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time, in the following terms (without alteration):
   1. The applicant was not advised by his previous migration agent, acting for him at the time of the IAA decision that he could seek judicial review.
   2. The applicant made an application promptly when he became aware he could seek judicial review.
   3. The delay is short.
   4. The prejudice to the applicant is significant.

1. The applicant contends that the delay is modest, being just over two months and the explanation is reasonable in the circumstances. The applicant submits that the delay arose because Mr Boulous failed to advise him of his judicial review rights. The applicant contends that this claim is credible on its face and corroborated by the fact that Mr Boulous was later disciplined for not dissimilar conduct. At the hearing, it was submitted that the applicant's explanation was "broadly plausible".
2. The Minister contends that the explanation is insufficient as there is no evidence that Mr Boulous was acting for the applicant before the Authority. The Minister contends that all communications from the Authority, including its notification of its decision, were sent to the applicant directly.
3. The Court has, in other cases, described a delay of 74 days as "substantial" and a delay of 54 days as likely to be fatal to an application for an extension of time where there is no reason for the delay: WZASQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCCA 1726 at [14]; and WZANW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FMCA 1075 at [28].
4. Typically, the longer the delay, the more persuasive the explanation needs to be: Tran v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2014] FCA 533 (Tran) at [38]. The absence of any satisfactory explanation of itself may be a sufficient basis to refuse an extension of time in a case of long delay: Tran at [38]. In Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; (2022) 96 ALJR 819 (Katoa) the majority observed that "if the delay is lengthy and unexplained, the applicant may be required to show that their case is strong or even "exceptional": Katoa at [18].
5. In an affidavit filed by the applicant on 12 September 2025, the applicant gave the following evidence to provide an explanation for the delay (without alteration):

...

Extension of Time

1. On or about 23 January 2018, the Immigration Assessment Authority ("IAA") affirmed the decision made by the delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs in relation to my Temporary Protection (Subclass 785) visa.

2. At that time, I was represented by a solicitor, Mr Hany Boulous ("Mr Boulous"), who had conduct of my case.

3. I was never advised by Mr Boulous of the IAA decision dated 23 January 2018. At no stage did he communicate to me that the IAA had finalised my matter or that an adverse decision had been made. I do not recall receiving the decision in the post.

4. In early 2018, I attempted to contact Mr Boulous on numerous occasions to seek an update about the status of my case. Despite my repeated efforts, including phone calls, Mr Boulous did not respond to me and provided no information about the outcome of my matter.

5. As I could not obtain any information from Mr Boulous, I became increasingly concerned and decided to seek alternate legal representation.

6. In or about April 2018, I retained a new solicitor, Ms Layla, of Madison Marcus Lawyers.

7. Upon reviewing my file, Ms Layla informed me that the IAA had made a decision on 23 January 2018. This was the first time I became aware that a decision had been made by the IAA.

8. I was shocked and distressed to learn that such an important decision had been made without my knowledge, and that my former lawyer had failed to notify me despite my repeated attempts to contact him.

9. Immediately upon advising me of the IAA decision, Ms Layla took steps to file an appeal application on my behalf.

10. As soon as I became aware of the IAA decision through my new solicitor in May 2018, I acted promptly and instructed her to lodge the appeal application without delay.

...

1. In a further affidavit of the applicant filed the morning of the hearing on 28 September 2025 (Further Affidavit), the applicant gave the following further evidence (without alteration):

...

Extension of Time

1. I do not have a clear memory of the events relating to my delay in filing because of the passage of time. I wish to clarify that I am confused about some of the details, but I have done my best to set out the true events as I recall them.

2. I was unable to read my first affidavit in English as my English reading ability is very limited. My solicitor read and explained the contents of the affidavit to me in Arabic. However, for this affidavit I have had an interpreter read it back to me as well as my solicitor. I have always had limited capacity to read and write English from when I entered Australia until now.

3. I want to clarify paragraph [4] of my affidavit. I do not know if Mr Boulous was still formally representing me during the time of the IAA review or at the time the IAA made its decision. Prior to the refusal of my visa, I was represented by Mr Boulous. Mr Boulous attended my SHEV interview with me and told me that my visa had been refused in late 2017. Following the refusal of my Temporary Protection (Subclass 785) visa, Mr Boulous advised me that I required a more experienced migration practitioner to assist. Mr Boulous advised me that he would contact Mr Ford and provide him with all relevant information about my matter. Mr Boulous did not provide me with contact details for Mr Ford. I thought there was an arrangement between Mr Boulous and Mr Ford. I did not understand the nature of that arrangement. I continued to contact Mr Boulous if I had questions about my case after the visa was refused by the Delegate. What I meant when I said Mr Boulous was representing me at the time, was that was still the person I contacted about my case.

4. My previous affidavit at paragraph [5] and [6] remains correct but needs clarification. It is true that Mr Boulous did not advise me about the outcome of the IAA review affirming the delegate's decision. I also do not recall receiving the decision in the post but I received notification of the review in English at Court Book 179 - 180. I called Mr Boulous many times after my visa was refused and in early 2018. I want to clarify that he did answer some of my phone calls to advise me there were no updates.

5. I do recall Mr Ford contacting me in early 2018 requesting payment of $1,500.00 for his work. This was the only time I spoke to Mr Ford. I paid by bank transfer from my Westpac account. I no longer have access to that account. On 26 September 2025, I contacted Westpac by telephone with the assistance of my solicitor Mr Lababidi. I was informed that a transaction for $1,500.00 had been made to Sabelberg Morcos Lawyers, now known as Madison Marcus Lawyers, in or around March 2018.

6. After I spoke to Mr Ford, I continued to call Mr Boulous and Mr Ford about my case. Mr Ford never answered my calls. Mr Boulous also never answered any of my calls during this period.

7. I spoke with a friend Mohammad Al Saidi who advised me to contact Ms Layal at Sabelberg Morcos Lawyers, as she was employed there at the time and might be able to assist me.

8. In around April or May 2018, Ms Layal reviewed my file. She was the first person who I recall advising me of the negative IAA decision and that I could appeal it to the Court. Ms Layal took steps to help me file an application on my own behalf. After Ms Layal told me to do an appeal, I tried to do an appeal for myself as soon as possible.

...

1. The Minister did not object to the receipt of the Further Affidavit nor did the Minister cross-examine the applicant as to the matters contained in either affidavit.
2. In addition, the applicant's solicitor, Mr Lababidi, also filed a further affidavit on 29 September 2025 in relation to the applicant's explanation for the delay in filing. Mr Labadidi's evidence is as follows (without amendment):

1. I, Ahmad Lababidi, declare and affirm:

2. I am the solicitor for the Applicant in these proceedings.

3. I have acted for the Applicant since 7 August 2025

1. I make this affidavit from my own personal knowledge and belief except where I state otherwise.
2. I speak Arabic. I read the Applicant's first affidavit to him in Arabic. I believed he understood me and that the affidavit reflected his instructions. I did not record in the jurat that I had interpreted because I assumed the Applicant could also read the affidavit in English, as he speaks some conversational English and has messaged me in English before. I had sent the affidavit to him in English and assumed he had read it, and my explanation in Arabic was to confirm his comprehension. I now understand he did not read the affidavit in English. I should have asked directly whether he had read it and disclosed my role in interpreting in the jurat or affidavit. I apologise for that oversight.
3. The Applicant had previously mentioned to me on or about 3 September 2025 that he had some engagement from a Ford lawyer, who I had assumed was Carina Ford Lawyers, in late 2017. I had not understood that firm to have acted for him nor their conduct to be relevant to the delay in 2018.
4. On the morning of 26 September 2025, the applicant clarified he had spoken to a male lawyer named Ford sometime between the delegate's decision and filing in Court.
5. On 26 September 2025, I contacted Carina Ford of Carina Ford Immigration Lawyers. I provided the applicant's details which included his full name, date of birth, his department reference number, IAA reference number and a signed authority by him. They had no record of having assisted him.
6. Later that day I identified records online of a Hugh Ford who had been a migration lawyer.
7. I asked the Applicant if the Ford he was referring to was Hugh Ford and he said yes.
8. I have since identified a decision by the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal concerning a Mr Hugh Ford Council of the Law Society of the Act v LP 202012 (Hugh Ford) (Occupational Discipline) [2024] ACAT 11. Paragraph 2 of that decision sets out that Mr Hugh Ford practiced as a solicitor and represented himself as a migration lawyer between 1 July 2011 and 21 June 2018.
9. I understand that Mr Hugh Ford is no longer practicing. I have checked the register in Victoria and New South Wales and no Hugh Ford is listed. I have not identified current professional contact details for Mr Ford.

1. The Minister did not object to the receipt of this further affidavit nor did the Minister cross-examine Mr Lababidi as to the matters contained in the affidavit.
2. I do not consider that the applicant has provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay.
3. Firstly, there is no evidence before the Court that Mr Boulous represented the applicant at any time before the Authority. The evidence before the Court establishes that all communications from the Authority, were sent to the applicant directly. The applicant conceded this in his oral submissions. In his Further Affidavit the applicant "clarifies" his earlier evidence that Mr Boulous was representing him before the Authority. The applicant's evidence in the Further Affidavit is that he does not know if Mr Boulous was representing him before the Authority but says that Mr Boulous was the person he contacted about his case. I do not consider this to be a clarification. It is inconsistent with his earlier evidence.
4. Secondly, there is no dispute that communications from the Authority were sent to the applicant at his correct postal address. On 20 December 2017, the Authority sent to the applicant an acknowledgement of referral letter (20 December Letter). That letter includes the following:

It is important that you:

...

• advise us in writing if you wish to appoint a person to receive correspondence on your behalf or act as your representative (to do this, visit www.iaa.gov.au and obtain form F2);
• act quickly in your dealings with us (as we aim to complete the review within six weeks); ...

1. Attached to the 20 December Letter was a fact sheet which contained the following:

...

...Any new information we have not requested must be given to us within 21 days of your case being referred to us by the department.

...

You can provide a written submission on:

• why you disagree with the department's decision, and

• any claim or matter you presented to the department that was not considered.

Your submission should be no longer than 5 pages and given to us within 21 days of your case being referred to us by the department.

...

If you appointed another person to receive correspondence from the department, that appointment does not apply to the IAA review. If you want another person to receive correspondence from us on your behalf, you will need to advise us of their name and contact details.

...

1. The fact sheet was also provided in Arabic. In addition, the Authority's practice direction was also attached to the 20 December Letter and reiterated the above information. The applicant's evidence is that he received this correspondence.
2. Accordingly, the applicant was advised in his own language that Mr Boulous' representation would not continue before the Authority, of the need to advise the Authority of the name and address of any person whom the applicant wished to receive correspondence on his behalf, of the requirement to provide any new information within 21 days and of the timeframes within which the Authority aimed to complete its review. Further, the applicant deposes that following the Department refusing his visa Mr Boulous informed him that a more experienced migration practitioner (Mr Ford) was required, which is inconsistent with the applicant believing that Mr Boulous was continuing to have conduct of the matter before the Authority.
3. Thirdly, the applicant's evidence is that Mr Ford contacted him in early 2018 requesting payment. His further evidence is that he paid $1,500 to Sabelberg Morcos Lawyers in or around March 2018. I accept the Minister's submission that this would suggest that the contact was made in or around March 2018, a significant period after the Authority's decision.
4. Fourthly, the Authority Decision was sent to the applicant's postal address, which is the same address to which the 20 December Letter was sent. The applicant does not contend that the decision was not sent to him, that it was undelivered or that he did not receive it. Indeed, at hearing he conceded that the Authority Decision was posted to his postal address. Rather, his evidence is that he does not recall receiving the Authority Decision. There is simply no explanation for this; most particularly in circumstances where the applicant concedes he received the 20 December Letter and both that letter and the Authority's decision were posted to the same address. I note that this is also the address for service included on the applicant's initial Application for judicial review and is also the address included on the applicant's affidavit filed in support of that Application. Further, attached to the letter enclosing the Authority Decision was a fact sheet that informed the applicant that he could apply for judicial review within 35 days. As this was sent by one of the methods prescribed in s 473HB of the Act, being by prepaid post to the last address for service of the recipient provided to the Authority, the applicant was deemed to have received it seven working days after the date of the letter.
5. In light of all of the above, I do not consider that the applicant has provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing. This weighs against the grant of an extension of time.

1. The Minister properly contends that it would not suffer any particular prejudice, other than as to costs, if an extension of time were granted.
2. However, the mere absence of prejudice is not sufficient to justify a finding in favour of an extension of the time for filing: SZTRY v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6].
3. The applicant contends that the prejudice to him is significant.
4. I assess this as a neutral consideration.

1. There is a public interest in ensuring that decisions of the Executive are made lawfully. The merits of the substantive grounds relied upon by the applicant, which are considered below, will of course be relevant to this. However, it has also been recognised that there is a public interest in the finality of administrative decisions: Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex Parte Marks [2000] HCA 67; 177 ALR 491 at [15] - [17].
2. As to the impact upon the applicant, if the extension of time is refused then the Authority Decision will stand. Although an alternative route of review might be available, under s 476A(3)(a) of the Act, the refusal of an explanation for an extension of time forecloses any right of appeal: MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; (2015) 242 FCR 585 at [65].
3. I accept the impact on the applicant is significant in that he would be returned to his country of nationality which is a circumstance he says he fears and that this is a matter weighing in favour of the grant of an extension of time.

1. The Amended Application contains the following two grounds of judicial review:
   1. The IAA acted unreasonably and fell into jurisdictional error by failing to consider, and/or failing to exercise, its power under s 473DC to get new information, and/or by irrationally concluding that the applicant had not provided medical documents to the Delegate.

Particulars

1. The audio recording of the SHEV interview demonstrates that the applicant provided, or at least attempted to provide, medical documents to the Delegate.

b. The IAA listened to the audio of the SHEV interview.

1. The IAA accepted that an inability to access necessary medical treatment could, depending on circumstances, give rise to a claim of significant harm.
   1. The IAA rejected the applicant's claim under the refugee and complementary protection criteria on the basis that he had not provided medical evidence of his condition.
   2. It was legally reasonable for the IAA not to exercise s473DC, or consider exercising s 473DC to get new information regarding the material provided or evidence given at the SHEV interview, or regarding the applicant's medical condition.
   3. If the IAA failed to recognise that the applicant had provided, or at least attempted to provide, medical documents and/or documents to the Delegate, or failed to suspect this was so, its reasoning was irrational, illogical and/or legally unreasonable.
2. The IAA failed to consider, critical country information concerning barriers to accessing medical care in Iraq.

Particulars

1. The UK Home Office Report: Country Policy and Information Note v 4.0, June 2017, was before the IAA.
2. The UK Home Office indicated that access to medical care in Iraq may be contingent on possession of appropriate documentation.
3. The IAA made no reference to the UK Home Office Report when considering barriers to medical care.
4. The report was critical and significant, as the applicant had claimed to require health care, and it raised a clear potential barrier to access.
5. Had the IAA considered this material, it may have been more likely to exercise its power under s 473DC to obtain new information from the applicant about his health condition and whether he held a national ID card or CSID.

1. At the hearing, the applicant contended that given the confined point at issue it was appropriate for the Court to consider the merits of the grounds of review in full, rather than impressionistically. I accept as submitted by the parties that this is a circumstance in which it is appropriate for the Court to engage in more than an impressionistic assessment of the merits and proceed on that basis: Katoa at [18].

1. The Authority's decision was made under Part 7AA of the Act. It is useful to first set out that statutory context as it was at the relevant time.
2. Part 7AA of the Act provided a fast-track review process in relation to certain protection visa decisions. Part 7AA established: "a scheme of review which is intended by the Commonwealth legislature to be undertaken with some degree of expedition." CRW16 v Minister for immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 710 at [21].
3. Section 473DA provided as follows:

(1) This Division, together with sections 473GA and 473GB, is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to reviews conducted by the Immigration Assessment Authority.

(2) To avoid doubt, nothing in this Part requires the Immigration Assessment Authority to give a referred application any material that was before the Minister when the Minister made the decision under section 65.

1. Division 3 of Part 7AA (together with ss 473GA and 473GB) were therefore taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice rule in relation to a review conducted by the Authority pursuant to s 473DA(1). Section 473DA(1) left no room for the operation of common law rules of procedural fairness: BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 29; [2019] HCA 34 (BVD17) at [31], [33].
2. Section 473CA required the Minister to refer the decision to the Authority for review as soon as reasonably practicable. Section 473CB required the Secretary to assemble and provide review material to the Authority. Section 473CB(2) provided that the review material must be given to the Authority at the same time as the referral or as soon as "reasonably practicable".
3. Section 473DB was headed "Immigration Assessment Authority to review decisions on the papers". Section 473DB(1) provided that the Authority must review a decision by considering the "review material" without accepting or requesting new information or interviewing the applicant, subject to the exceptions in Part 7AA. Section 473DB(2) provided that the Authority "may make a decision on a fast track reviewable decision at any time after the decision has been referred to the Authority". Section 473DD provided that the Authority must not consider new information unless one of the conditions in s 473DD was satisfied. The Authority also had the power to obtain new information pursuant to s 473DC.
4. The combined effect of s 473DA(1), s 473DB(1) and s 473DA(2) is that the Authority is required to conduct a review of the Delegate's decision on the papers and the common law rules of procedural fairness do not govern the way in which reviews are conducted under Part 7AA. There is no requirement for the Authority to invite an applicant to appear before it to give evidence and present arguments and the Authority must review the fast track reviewable decision by considering the review material provided to it without requesting or accepting new information and without interviewing the applicant: DGZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 12 at [75].
5. Section 473FA provided that the Authority in carrying out its function must "pursue the objective of providing a mechanism of limited review that is efficient, quick, free of bias and consistent with Division 3".

1. By Ground 1 the applicant contends that it was unreasonable for the Authority not to seek further information from the applicant about his medical documents.

1. At the hearing, following the provision to the applicant of a higher quality recording of the Delegate's interview, it was agreed between the parties that during the Delegate's interview the applicant provided medical documents to the Delegate. It was further agreed that the Delegate then asked Mr Boulous if he planned on providing submissions as to the health issues of the applicant, to which he responded in the affirmative. It was agreed that the Delegate then returned the documents to the applicant suggesting to Mr Boulous that he go through them and find the relevant documents and provide submissions and translations. Accordingly, it was agreed that medical documents were not reviewed or retained by the Delegate and that Mr Boulous undertook to identify the relevant documents and provide submissions, but did not do so (other than providing a translated copy of the applicant's Citizenship Certificate). Accordingly, it was no longer pressed by the applicant that the Delegate failed to retain a copy of documents or that the Delegate had before them information which was not before the Authority.

1. The relevant principles are not in dispute and were helpfully summarised in the Minister submissions, which I adopt.
2. In determining whether in a particular case a statutory discretion has been exercised unreasonably in the legal sense, close attention must be given to the scope and purpose of the statutory provision which confers the discretion and other related provisions; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30 at [12]; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 297 ALR 225 at [74]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11 at [62] and [70]. The exercise of discretion in s 473DC(1) must be read with s 473DC(2) which provides that the Authority does not have a duty, among other things, to get or request new information. The statutory scheme contemplated by Pt 7AA is one of limited review on the papers with a default position of not accepting or requesting new information pursuant to s 473DB(1): APH17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 23 at [60].
3. There is nothing in the Act that requires the Authority to give reasons for the exercise or non-exercise of its discretionary powers under Pt 7AA of the Act. That the Authority did not mention, in this case, the discretion conferred by s 473DC does not support the drawing of an inference that the exercise of the discretion was not considered by it: BVD17 at [40].

1. It is useful to set out in detail relevant findings of the Authority.
2. At paragraph [4] of the Authority Decision, the Authority summarised the applicant's claims and included the following:

...The applicant claims:

• He suffers from a medical condition for which he received treatment in Iran in 20212 and at the Austin Hospital in Australia. He needs to take ongoing medication which is not available in Iraq. Should he return to Iraq he would die within three to four days due to the lack of treatment....

1. At paragraph [9] of its decision the Authority said:

Although I accept that the applicant was diagnosed with a pituitary tumour in 2002, he has now apparently received surgical intervention. He has presented no medical evidence in support of his case. There is no medical evidence relating to the current or ongoing effect, if any, of his condition. There is no medical evidence before me as to his specific medication requirements. Due to this I cannot be satisfied that the applicant requires ongoing medication or any other treatment, or that such treatment would be unavailable in Iraq, or that the consequences of him not receiving optimum treatment would be death as claimed. The applicant has provided no evidence on the effect of any thyroid dysfunction and I cannot be satisfied that this condition causes him impairment or that it requires ongoing treatment.

1. In relation to the definition of "refugee" in s 5H(1) of the Act and the criteria in s 36(2)(a), the Authority said at paragraph [23]:

It is further submitted that on return to Iraq the applicant would be unable to access the medication required for his medical condition and would die within a few days. There is no medical evidence before me relating to his ongoing treatment needs. The referred information does not support the contention that medical treatment is lacking in Iraq however even if this were the case he has not claimed, and there is no information before me to suggest, that any inability to access such treatment as he might need would be due to his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. I conclude that he does not have a well-founded fear of persecution on this basis.

1. In relation to the complementary protection assessment and the definition of "significant harm" in s 36(2A) of the Act, the Authority said at paragraph [30]:

As to his medical condition, country information indicates that in recent years the state has made significant investments in hospitals, but many primary health care facilities remain under-resourced. I accept that, depending on the circumstances, inability to access medication or other medical treatment can potentially amount to significant harm in the relevant sense, however I am not satisfied that is the case here. While the applicant has referred to ongoing hormone treatment including growth hormone, and oral medication as well as regular injections, he has provided no further detail, and no supporting medical evidence relating to either his medical condition or his ongoing treatment needs, therefore his treatment needs are unclear. I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Iraq, there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm as defined because of his medical condition coupled with under-resourced health care facilities. In particular, I am not satisfied that there is a real risk that he will be arbitrarily deprived of his life, or subjected to torture or to intentionally inflicted cruel or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

(Footnotes omitted).

1. The applicant submitted that in light of the transcript of the Delegate's interview, the July 2017 Email and the November 2017 Email, the Authority knew, or should reasonably have known, that medical evidence about the applicant's future treatment needs was missing. The applicant submitted that the absence of these documents left a "significant gap" in the review material, in circumstances where the Authority repeatedly said that it could not understand the applicant's treatment needs, the consequences of not receiving that treatment and whether the applicant could receive that treatment in Iraq because there was no medical evidence. It was further submitted that at paragraph [30] of its decision, the Authority "leaves open a potential complementary protection claim that... could have been made out by medical evidence." For these reasons the applicant submits that the Authority's failure to exercise its discretion under s 473DC was legally unreasonable.
2. I reject those submissions.
3. Firstly, the Authority's actions must be considered in the statutory context: specifically, that the scheme was a fast track review process, providing a limited review (which permitted the Authority to conduct a review based on the review materials only) and which is to be conducted efficiently and quickly.
4. Secondly, I consider it was reasonable for the Authority not to exercise its discretion in s 437DC, or alternatively to decide not to exercise its discretion to obtain medical documents from the applicant, in circumstances where the applicant had already been provided with an opportunity to provide those documents and had undertaken to do so, along with submissions.
5. Thirdly, this was reiterated to the applicant in the July 2017 Email, which provided as follows:

Further to your client's TPV interview this morning, I am allowing 7 calendar days in which to provide further information for consideration...

1. Whilst there is no specific reference to medical documents in this paragraph, I accept the Minister's submission that in circumstances where this matter was specifically raised at the interview and the applicant's representative agreed to provide further information, the first paragraph clearly includes those documents. That this is so is supported by the reference to identity documents in the second paragraph of the July 2017 Email. In oral submissions the applicant conceded that the first paragraph clearly included the medical documents.
2. Fourthly, despite allowing a significantly longer period that seven days, no further medical information was provided to the Delegate on the applicant's behalf.
3. Fifthly, it was not the responsibility of the Delegate to follow up the non-provision of the medical information and submissions, most particularly when the applicant's representative had undertaken to do so. It is the applicant's responsibility to provide sufficient evidence to establish his claims and the Minister does not have responsibility or obligation to specify or assist in specifying any particulars of the applicant's claim or assist in establish his claim: ss 5AAA(2) and (4). The applicant also conceded this at the hearing.
4. Sixthly, I accept the Minister's submission that in circumstances where the applicant, through his representative, had clearly undertaken to provide these documents but had not, it was open for the Authority to find that no documents had been provided by the applicant to support his claims about any ongoing medical treatment he required and the consequences of not receiving that treatment. Even though the Authority doubted these claims, it nevertheless found at paragraph [23] of its decision that there was no basis to conclude medical treatment was lacking in Iraq, or if it was, that any inability to access such treatment would be due to the applicant's religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. This provided an alternative basis for the Authority to reject this claim in relation to the refugee criteria in s 36(2)(a). There was nothing said during the Delegate's interview to suggest that the medical documents contained any information to the effect that an inability to access medical care in Iraq would be on the basis of a Convention ground. The applicant's evidence on this issue had not contained any suggestion that he would face harm on a Convention basis in relation to this claim. There was therefore no reason for the Authority to consider whether to invite the applicant to provide further information on this issue.
5. Seventhly, I also accept the Minister's submissions in relation to the complementary protection criterion. At paragraph [30] of its decision, the Authority found that in recent years Iraq had made significant investments in hospitals. It accepted that many primary healthcare facilities remained under-resourced and that, depending on the circumstances, inability to access medication and other treatment could potentially amount to significant harm. However, the Authority did not accept that was the case in the present circumstance. In addition to its concerns about the applicant's ongoing treatment needs, the Authority was also not satisfied there was a real risk he would be arbitrarily deprived of his life, subjected to torture or to intentionally inflicted cruel or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. A key component to the IAA's reasoning was that any harm would lack the necessary intention. Further, I accept the Minister's submissions that the applicant was already on notice from the Delegate's decision that an issue arose as to whether there was any intention to inflict pain or suffering due to any inadequacy of medical treatment. This was relevant to whether any harm amounted to significant harm. The applicant could have provided new information to the Authority on this issue but did not do so. In circumstances where the applicant had indicated he would provide a submission and relevant documents about his health issues but had not, and was on notice from the Delegate's decision that an issue arising in the review was whether any harm he would face was intentional, it was reasonable for the Authority to consider the applicant already had an opportunity to provide further information on this claim and there was no need for the Authority to exercise its discretionary power in s 473DC to provide the applicant with a further opportunity. This is particularly so when the statutory context is considered.
6. I consider the above provides a basis upon which the Authority may have decided not to exercise its discretion, or consider exercising its discretion, and that it was within the Authority's decisional freedom not to take any further steps to obtain further medical documents from the applicant. No legal unreasonableness arises.
7. Accordingly, Ground 1 discloses no jurisdictional error on the Authority's behalf.

1. By Ground 2 the applicant contends that the Authority fell into error by failing to consider relevant sections of the 'UK Home Office Country Policy and Information Note Iraq: Return/Internal relocation v 4.0 (June 2017)' (UK Report) concerning barriers to accessing medical care in Iraq without a national identity card or CSID. The applicant contends that the Authority should have specifically considered paragraphs [3.3.1] - [3.3.5] of the UK Report.
2. Paragraphs [3.3.1] - [3.3.5] of the UK Report provide as follows:

3.3 Documentation

3.3.1 The Civil Status ID (CSID) and the Iraqi Nationality Certificate (INC) are key documents which establish a person's identity. The CSID enables a person to access services such as financial assistance, employment, education, housing and health. A person whose return is feasible but who does not have a CSID or cannot obtain one, and does not have support from family or friends, is likely, upon return, to face destitution amounting to a breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

3.3.2 A CSID can be obtained in the UK through the Iraqi Embassy if a person has a current or expired passport and/or the book and page number for their family registration details. Otherwise, a power of attorney can be provided to someone in Iraq to obtain a CSID for them.

3.3.3 If a person is unable to obtain a CSID in the UK and their return is feasible, they may be able to obtain it from the Civil Status Affairs (CSA) office in their home governorate using a current or expired Iraqi passport, or the page and volume number of the book holding their or their family's information, which is likely to depend on whether they have a family member who can vouch for them.

3.3.4 It will be more difficult for a person to obtain a CSID if they are from one of the areas to which a person cannot relocate because Article 15(c) harm is occurring. Alternative CSA offices for Anbar and certain parts of Ninewah governorate have been established in government-controlled areas where a person may be able to obtain a replacement CSID.

3.3.5 If refused, a claim is unlikely to be certifiable as 'clearly unfounded' under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

1. The applicant submits that when the Authority came to assess healthcare in Iraq in paragraphs [23] and [30] of its decision, the Authority was required to assess not only whether healthcare was available but whether the applicant could access it.
2. I reject those submissions.
3. Firstly, at hearing the applicant conceded that at no time had he made a claim that he could not obtain the relevant identity documents to allow him to access healthcare in Iraq.
4. Secondly, as also conceded by the applicant at hearing, the Authority found that there was no medical evidence relating to the applicant's ongoing treatment needs and on this basis was able to conclude that s 36(2)(a) and s 36(2)(A) were not met.
5. Thirdly, the applicant's evidence was that he had family living in Iraq and there was no evidence to suggest that his family would not be able to assist in him obtaining a CSID if required. The UK Report identifies multiple ways in which a CSID can be obtained and provides that a person may face destitution if they, relevantly, cannot obtain one and do not have any family support.
6. Accordingly, the issue of the applicant's ability to access healthcare was not an issue that arose on the material before the Authority and the referred paragraphs of the UK Report were not required to be considered by the Authority. Further, even if, contrary to my conclusion, this material was required to be considered by the Authority, any such failure was not material. The Authority made alternate findings in relation to both the refugee and the complementary protection criteria. Accordingly, the information in the UK Report could not realistically have resulted in a different outcome: LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; 418 ALR 152 at [7], [14].
7. Ground 2 therefore discloses no jurisdictional error on the Authority's behalf.

1. The application in this case is 72 days outside the statutory timeframe. The Court may only grant an extension of the time within which the Application was to be made if satisfied such extension is in the interests of the administration of justice.
2. Weighing all of the considerations above and with particular reference to the merits of the substantive Application, I do not consider that it is in the interests of the administration of justice that time be extended within which the applicant can make the Amended Application.

1. Accordingly, the Amended Application is dismissed.
2. The Minister seeks that the applicant pay its costs in the amount of $4,553.02. I note that this is in accordance with sch 2 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) for a proceeding concluded at an interlocutory hearing. I shall order accordingly.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and three (103) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge J Young.