The question is whether the informant is "the collector" within the meaning of that section. The section occurs in Part XIV. of the Act, which is headed "Customs Prosecutions," and deals entirely with customs prosecutions. The object of the section is to define the person in whose name customs prosecutions are to be instituted. To support the right of the present informant to prosecute, reference was made to the interpretation clause, sec. 4, by which it is provided that, except where otherwise clearly intended, "Collector includes the Comptroller and any Collector of Customs for the State and any principal officer of customs doing duty at the time and place and any officer doing duty in the matter in relation to which the expression is used." The words "in relation to which the expression is used," obviously qualify the words "time and place," as well as the words "the matter." The contention was put as high as this, that the officer of customs who may institute a prosecution is any officer of customs doing duty in the matter of the prosecution. If we read into sec. 245, the words which, it is said, may be substituted for the words "in the name of the Collector," the section would run, "in the name of the officer doing duty in the prosecution," i.e., in the name of the person who is laying the information. That is, in effect, that any officer of customs may lay an information, provided he is authorized to do so in the course of his duty. Now, the object of the section being to define who is to be the prosecutor, if it was intended that any officer may prosecute, what would have been easier than to say so? It seems very improbable that the legislature could have intended that the word "Collector" should mean "any officer." On reference to the Statute, it will be seen that the word "Collector" is used throughout it in connection with acts to be done in relation to the administration of the law, which cannot be performed in person by the Collector for the State, and which must, therefore, be performed by deputy. The extent of the deputation may vary in different cases. Such acts may be done by the officer doing duty in the particular matter. Practical illustrations of this are found in various sections. Thus, by sec. 37, "Entries shall be made by the delivery of the entry by the owner to the Collector." The interpretation clause is obviously intended to enable the word "Collector" in that section to be interpreted as "the officer to whom is assigned the duty of receiving entries." Similarly as to sec. 38, "Any person making an entry shall if required by the Collector answer questions," &c., and sec. 39, "Entries shall be passed by the Collector signing the entry." There are scores of such instances of the use of the word "Collector," and, I think, in all of them relating to matters of the administration, the word is used as meaning the Collector or his deputy. But Part XIV. of the Act does not relate to the administration of the Act, but to proceedings in Courts of law. It declares the mode and form in which those proceedings are to instituted. As to one provision in that Part, viz., sec. 260, which provides that "The gaoler of any gaol to which any person has been committed for non-payment of any penalty shall discharge such person ... (ii.) on a certificate by the Collector that the penalty has been paid or realized," it is very hard to suppose that that means that any officer of customs may sign a certificate and procure the release from prison of a person who is there for what may be a felony. Sec. 214 provides that "Whenever information in writing has been given on oath to the Collector that goods have been unlawfully imported undervalued or entered or illegally dealt with ... the owner shall immediately upon being required so to do by the Collector produce and hand over to him all books and documents relating to the goods," &c. It may be doubtful whether "Collector" there extends beyond the Collector for the State. In sec. 245 it is clear that the interpretation of "Collector," as the Collector for the State, or his deputy, is applicable, and gives a sensible meaning to the section, whereas, if the interpretation clause is applied literally, it makes the section insensible. The object being to say in whose name a prosecution is to be instituted, the section, on the suggested interpretation, would proceed to say "in the name of the person who institutes it." We should not, unless compelled, construe the Act as merely enacting futilities. We think, therefore, that he application of the interpretation clause is excluded by the context, and that the intention of sec. 245 is that the word "Collector" should mean the Collector for the State. The principal objection urged against that construction was that the Collector of Customs for Victoria could not take advantage of the section, so far as it authorizes prosecutions in Courts of summary jurisdiction to be instituted in his name, because, by sec. 8 of the Victorian Justices Act 1890, informations are required to be signed by the informant personally. It is to be observed that sec. 245 only requires prosecutions to be instituted in the name of the Collector. It does not require any particular person to lay the information personally any more than it requires the Minister to go into Court to institute the prosecution. There is nothing in the Customs Act to say that the power conferred on the Collector cannot be exercised by some other person for and on behalf of the Collector. It is a general rule of law that what a person may do himself, he may do by an agent. In In re Whiteley Partners, Ltd., 32 Ch. D., 337, which was the case of a memorandum of association, signed by one person in the name of another, without a power of attorney, Bowen, L.J., at p. 340, says: - "In every case when an Act requires a signature it is a pure question of construction on the terms of the particular Act whether its words are satisfied by signature by an agent. In some cases on some Acts the Courts have come to the conclusion that personal signature was required. In other cases on other Acts they have held that signature by an agent was sufficient. The law on the subject is thus summed up by Blackburn, J., in Reg. v. Justices of Kent, L.R., 8 Q.B., 305, 307: No doubt at common law, where a person authorizes another to sign for him, the signature of the person so signing is the signature of the person authorizing it; nevertheless there may be cases in which a Statute may require personal signature. Quain, J., then says, We ought not to restrict the common law rule, qui facit per alium facit per se, unless the Statute makes a personal signature indispensable. Archibald, J., says, I think this case comes within the common law rule, qui facit per alium facit per se, and there is nothing in the Statute to qualify the operation of that maxim. It is easy to understand that there may be cases in which a different construction must be put on particular Statutes."