1. Date the service was provided 2. Professional: the name of the professional who delivered the service (s 33(1) claimed);

1. Narrative; a short description of the professional service provided on the date (the contents of the column claimed exempt under s 32 and when names appear s 33(1) claimed);

1. Hours (claimed exempt under ss 34(1))(b) and 34(4)(a)(ii)); 2. Rate: the relevant hourly rate (claimed exempt under ss 34(1))(b) and 34(4)(a)(ii)); and 3. Value: the amount charged (claimed exempt under ss 34(1))(b) and 34(4)(a)(ii)).
2. The last page of the tax invoice is a remittance advice page, facilitating payment by the client. The total amount invoiced is claimed exempt under ss 34(1))(b) and 34(4)(a)(ii).
3. The Department had, as required under the FOI Act, consulted with Maddocks. Maddocks replied that it opposed release of information in the invoices which it regarded as commercial in confidence to it, the disclosure of which would expose it unreasonably to disadvantage.

1. As with page 1 of the L&R Invoices, I affirm the Department's exemption decisions.

1. The names appearing in this schedule as exempt under s 33(1); 2. The record of work done as recorded in the narrative column (the equivalent to the professional services column in the Maddocks invoices) is exempt under s 32 and the names are exempt under s 33(1);

1. The information in the hours, rate and value columns is exempt under s 34(1)(b); and

1. For the above reasons, I regard the total amount chargeable which appears on this page as exempt under s 34(4((a)(ii).

1. For the reasons given above, I have affirmed the Department's decision with respect to the other Maddocks invoices. There is no need here to provide the individual document numbers as used in this case.

Document 2 - Department of Education and Training - Legal Service Order

1. A Legal Service Order (LSO) is a document whereby the Department engages a legal practice, a member of the Legal Services Panel, to provide legal services to the Department. It is used to accept a legal service providers standing offer to provide legal services to a government agency.
2. Document 2 is the LSO whereby the Department engaged Lander and Rogers to provide services with respect to a matter concerning Dr Chopra.
3. Returning to the discussion of exemption under s 32, I have affirmed all redactions made by the Department to this document, as exempt under that section.
4. It is enough to say that the exempt text contains a confidential communication between the Department as client and its potential legal adviser made for the dominant purpose of obtaining legal advice for the dominant purpose of pending litigation.
5. Given this exemption, I do not consider other exemptions claimed.

1. For the same reason, redactions made by the Department concerning Documents 7, 30, 31, 42 and 43 (LSOs engaging Maddocks) are exempt under section 32.

1. As is evident from the text of the email, already released to Dr Chopra, the email is requesting action to correct a fee estimate, there being a mistake due to administrative error, for a legal service provider matter, where Dr Chopra is a party.
2. The administrative mistake does not appear to result from the nature of the particular legal proceeding, nor the involvement of Dr Chopra.
3. The Department has redacted from the email the names of the sender and the recipients and the financial figures which relate to the nature of the mistake.
4. For the reasons given above, I affirm the Department's decision to redact the names.
5. I regard the financial figures which appear in the email indicating how the figures should be changed, as exempt under s 34(4)(2)(a)(ii) as their release would likely expose the Department unreasonably to disadvantage, given the likelihood that Dr Chopra would in some way attempt to harness them in his campaign against the Department.

1. This letter of advice and estimate of costs from Lander and Rogers to the Department concerning a legal proceeding in which Dr Chopra was a party has been partially released to him.
2. I have affirmed the Department's decisions to redact;

1. Names under s 31(1) - see reasons above; 2. Most of the text of the letter as it is legal advice from Lander and Rogers to the Department, exempt under s 32;

1. A table showing possible stages in the legal proceeding and cost estimates concerning potential fees to be charged by Lander and Rogers and estimate of counsel's fees - exempt under s 32(1), on the same reasoning that such exemption applies with respect to tax invoices; and

1. Other monetary estimates appearing in the document as exempt under s 34(1)(b), on the same basis that the exemption applies to other information provided in the tax invoices.

1. This email chain of communication between the Department and one of the legal firms involves detailed communications in the running of a legal proceeding. It is wholly exempt under s 32, under the principles set out above.

1. This email traverses issues of a report on a directions hearing at VCAT, fee estimates and legal advice.

1. I have affirmed the Department's decisions to redact;

1. Names under s 31(1) - see reasons above; 2. Most of the text as it is legal advice from Lander and Rogers to the Department, exempt under s 32;

1. A table showing possible stages in the legal proceeding and cost estimates concerning potential fees to be charged by Lander and Rogers and estimate of counsel's fees - exempt under s 32(1), on the same reasoning that such exemption applies with respect to tax invoices; and

1. Other monetary estimates appearing in the document is exempt under s 34(1)(b), on the same basis that the exemption applies to such information provided in the tax invoices.

1. This email chain of communication between the Department and one of the legal firms involves detailed communications in the running of a legal proceeding. It is wholly exempt under s 32, under the principles set out above.

1. Dr Chopra sought to invoke the public interest override under s 50(4) of the FOI Act.
2. Section 50(4) says:

On the hearing of an application for review the Tribunal shall have, in addition to any other power, the same powers as an agency or a Minister in respect of a request, including power to decide that access should be granted to an exempt document (not being a document referred to in section 28, section 29A, section 31(3), or in section 33(1) where the Tribunal is of opinion that the public interest requires that access to the document should be granted under this Act.

1. The High Court of Australia has said decision-makers must be satisfied to a high threshold that the public interest requires release of the document: see Osland v Secretary to the Department of Justice [2010] HCA 24.
2. The evidence in this case does not lead me to be satisfied that the high threshold has been met. While much evidence has been given in this case concerning Dr Chopra's views as to how he has been unfairly treated by the Department related to his employment and his FOI requests, further release of the text in the documents in question appears to be of no utility to his concerns. Returning to the theme that FOI proceedings must not be allowed to be used as some form of Royal commission, the various avenues for the making of complaints provided by the Victorian Government are the appropriate avenue for any complaint.

1. For completeness, I record that at times in this case Dr Chopra sought to invoke the rarely used and little-known s 61 of the FOI Act.
2. Section 61 requires VCAT to, at the end of proceedings under the FOI Act, if, in VCAT's opinion, there is evidence that an officer of an agency has been guilty of a breach of duty or of misconduct in the administration of the Act and that the evidence is, in all the circumstances, of sufficient force to justify it in doing so, bring the evidence to the notice of the responsible Minister of the relevant agency, the principal officer of the relevant agency or a municipal Council, as the case may be.
3. On the evidence in this case, there is no basis for making such a referral.

1. At the very end of this hearing, Mr Batskos for the Department sought orders, whatever my decision, that costs be reserved and there be liberty to apply.
2. With Dr Chopra continuing to talk over me and Mr Batskos, a result Dr Chopra said of him being treated unfairly concerning the making of submissions, it was not possible to explore the reasons for the application.
3. While I doubt the utility of explicitly making those two orders, where silence in the orders concerning costs would have in any case left cost applications able to be made, cost orders being vanishingly rare in FOI cases at VCAT, in my view no disadvantage arises from making the order.

[1] Subject to the operation of s 61 of the FOI Act described below.

1. [2] The term "client professional privilege" is a reference to Part 3.10, Division 1 of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic). As Nekvapil describes in Victorian Administrative Law, [FOI.32.40], there are minor differences between the scope of client legal privilege and legal professional privilege. They are not material here.