1. The applicant is assisted in these proceedings by Ms Yvonne Morris of Joondalup Occupational Therapy Services, who acts in the combined capacity of occupational therapist, support coordinator, and representative. The clinical opinions in the applicant's submissions are expressed in her professional capacity and are described as the product of multiple in-home occupational therapy assessments and direct observation of the applicant's functional limitations in his home environment.
2. The Respondent submits that Ms Morris' clinical opinions should be given little or no weight by reason of her dual role as advocate and treating clinician. That combination of roles gives rise to a real potential for conflict of interest and unconscious bias, which I keep in mind. However, I am prepared to give weight to Ms Morris's clinical observations, principally because the Respondent elected to proceed to determination on the papers and did not seek to cross-examine her. Having made that forensic choice, it is not open to the Respondent to urge that her clinical findings be effectively discarded. I have, in any event, considered whether her conclusions are supported by independent evidence.
3. In that regard, the applicant has filed a medical certificate from Dr Joyce of Stirling Lakes Medical Centre dated 16 March 2026, responding directly to the Respondent's complaint about the absence of independent clinical evidence. Dr Joyce, the applicant's treating general practitioner, confirms that the applicant has had hemiplegia since ten-years-old and has more recently developed knee and hip arthritis, such that his mobility and ability to open his front gate is now compromised, which places him at high risk of falls, and that provision of an automatic gate would be an excellent preventative measure.
4. The Respondent submits, fairly, that Dr Joyce does not address the specific risk involved in the gate task or explain why it cannot be managed by other means. Nevertheless, Dr Joyce's confirmation that the applicant's gate operation is now physically compromised and gives rise to a falls risk is clinical evidence that is, overall, consistent with Ms Morris' opinion. I accept it as such.
5. I also note that the Respondent's material omits any countervailing clinical evidence. I proceed based on the evidence as it stands. However, as I will endeavour to explain, my decision turns on the proper construction of sch 2 of the National Disability Insurance Scheme (Getting the NDIS Back on Track No.1) (NDIS Supports) Transitional Rules 2024 (Cth) (Transitional Rules) and whether the proposed gate is an 'NDIS Support' or not.

1. The Tribunal has jurisdiction to review the applicant's SoPS pursuant to s 100(6) of the NDIS Act. In conducting the review, my function is to arrive at the correct or preferable decision based on the material before me.
2. The central issue is whether the supports requested by the applicant should be funded as reasonable and necessary supports.
3. Whilst the concept of a 'reasonable and necessary support' is not confined to s 34 of the NDIS Act, s 34(1) sets out the criteria of which I must be satisfied before a support can be funded.[2] If the Tribunal is not positively satisfied of any one of these criteria, the support cannot be included in the applicant's SoPS and the claim for that support must be rejected.[3]
4. A participant's plan should, so far as reasonably practicable, be individualised and be directed by the participant.[4]
5. Section 33 of the NDIS Act provides that the plan must include the participant's statement of goals and aspirations, and a SoPS prepared with the participant and approved by the respondent. It is noted that the statement of goals and aspirations is a statement by the participant and does not require the approval of the respondent.
6. The phrase 'reasonable and necessary supports' is not defined in the NDIS Act, but its meaning can be determined with the assistance of the provisions at ss 33 and 34 of the NDIS Act. As Mortimer J (as her Honour then was) said in McGarrigle:[5]

Section 13 expressly indicates that a 'support' might be a service, or it might be an activity. In my opinion, although s 14 (which deals with funding by the Agency of others to assist the participant rather than the Agency assisting the participant directly) is expressed purposively, its subject matter is also 'support' - whether by way of services of activities or any other matter that assists a person with disability in a way that is consistent with the general principles set out in s 4. The word 'support' must be given a broad construction in this context, and there is no need for the purposes of this proceeding to seek to give it any comprehensive meaning. Rather, the point to be made is that it is a practical description of the means by which a person with disability is assisted. It is not intended, in my opinion, to encompass funding, especially because what s 14 contemplates is that the Agency will 'fund' a support. The Agency cannot 'fund' funding. > > ... > > Whether a support is 'reasonable' requires a different assessment to whether a support is 'necessary'. Again, it is not necessary in the context of this proceeding to be definitive about the nature and extent of the meaning of the phrase, or its components. It is enough to observe that using the concept of necessity would appear to tie one aspect of the CEO's assessment to an evaluation of the kinds of factors set out in ss 34(1)(a), (b) and (d). The word 'reasonable' would appear to be directed at factors such as those set out in s 34(1)(c) and (f). That is not to say the meaning of each word is exhausted by the factors set out in s 34(1): rather, it is to illustrate the different work that each concept does as an adjective in the phrase 'reasonable and necessary supports'.

7. In WRMF,[6] the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made the following observations about the meaning of 'reasonable and necessary supports':

[T]here is no doubt that the contextual use of the phrase in this Act links it to public funding to be provided to a participant. In that context, the phrase connotes supports which meet a threshold which justifies - by reference to the context, objects and guiding principles of the Act and the facts of the case - the expenditure of public funds for that support, for a particular participant. As we have already explained, the phrase also needs to be understood taking into account what has qualified a person as a participant, and the links between a person's impairment and their full participation in the community, in the same variety of ways as persons without a disability might choose to participate.

8. Section 34(1), as amended by the Transitional Rules with effect from 3 October 2024, requires the CEO to be satisfied of all of the following in relation to each support:

(aa) the support is necessary to address needs of the participant arising from an impairment in relation to which the participant meets the disability requirements (see section 24) or the early intervention requirements (see section 25);

(a) the support will assist the participant to pursue the goals, objectives and aspirations included in the participant's statement of goals and aspirations;

(b) the support will assist the participant to undertake activities, so as to facilitate the participant's social and economic participation;

(c) the support represents value for money in that the costs of the support are reasonable, relative to both the benefits achieved and the cost of alternative support;

(d) the support will be, or is likely to be, effective and beneficial for the participant, having regard to current good practice;

(e) the funding or provision of the support takes account of what it is reasonable to expect families, carers, informal networks and the community to provide;

(f) the support is an NDIS support for the participant.

Note: For the purposes of paragraph (aa):

(a) the time at which the disability requirements or the early intervention requirements need to be met is the time the CEO decides to approve the statement of participant supports; and

(b) a participant's disability support needs arising from an impairment in relation to which the participant meets the disability requirements or the early intervention requirements may be affected by a variety of factors, including environmental factors or the impact of another impairment in relation to which the participant does not meet either of those requirements.

1. The criteria are expressed conjunctively, that is all of them must be satisfied in order for a support to be 'reasonable and necessary'.[7] If any single criterion is not met, the support cannot be funded, regardless of how well it fares against the other criteria[8] or how beneficial the support would be for an applicant.
2. Section 31(2) provides that the National Disability Insurance Scheme rules may prescribe methods or criteria to be applied, or matters to which the CEO is to have regard, in deciding whether or not they are satisfied as mentioned in any of ss 34(1)(aa)-(f).
3. The National Disability Insurance Scheme (Supports for Participants) Rules 2013 (Cth) (Support Rules) provide further matters to which regard must be had when determining whether the criteria in s 34(1) of the NDIS Act are satisfied.

The Transitional Rules and the s 34(1)(f) gateway

1. The Transitional Rules expressly exclude certain supports from being considered NDIS supports. In McGarrigle, Mortimer J (as Her Honour then was) observed:[9]

The [Transitional Rules] are an important element of the legislative scheme, introducing the ability to modify the operation of ss 33 and 34 by, for example, excluding certain kinds of supports from inclusion in participant plans. It is through the Rules that the executive is able to implement...some policy decision-making about the nature and extent of supports to be provided or funded.

2. The Transitional Rules introduced an important element to the s 34(1)(f) gateway. Schedule 1 identifies supports that are NDIS supports for the purposes of s 10(1) of the NDIS Act. Schedule 2 identifies supports that are not NDIS supports. I must be satisfied that a support is capable of being an NDIS support before assessing the remaining criteria. If the support cannot satisfy the gateway, it cannot be funded regardless of any other considerations.
3. The operation of schs 1 and 2 was considered in detail by Senior Member French in FSWN and National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIS) [2025] ARTA 114 (FWSN). In this regard, I note that Senior Member French observed at [43]-[44]:

[43] Having regard to the provisions of the principal Act as amended, the Transitional Rules, and the Supports Rules, the structure of the enquiry involved in this review involves two stages and the following steps:

Stage 1 Ascertain if the requested support is an 'NDIS' Support as defined. This inquiry is focused on the support, not the participant.

Step 1: Determine if the requested support is of a character that falls within the scope of a category of support specified in column 1 of the Table to Schedule 2 of the Transitional Rules by reference to the description of supports that fall within the scope of that category contained in column 2 of the Table.

If the answer to that question is 'yes', then stage 1 is complete. The requested support is not an NDIS Support and cannot be approved for inclusion in a SoPS because of s 34(1)(f) (subject to a replacement support determination being made, as to which see following).

If the answer to that question is 'no', then proceed to step 2 of stage 1:

Step 2: Determine if the requested support is of a character capable of falling within the scope of a category of support specified in column 1 of the Table to Schedule 1 of the Transitional Rules by reference to the description of supports that can fall within the scope of that category contained in column 2 of that Table.

If the answer to that question is 'no', then the requested support will not be an NDIS Support and cannot be approved for including in a SoPS because of s 34(1)(f).

If the answer to that question is 'yes', then the requested support will be an NDIS Support that is capable of being approved for inclusion in a SoPS by operation of s 34(1)(f), and stage 2 of the enquiry is reached.

Stage 2: Ascertain if the requested support satisfies each of the other criteria specified in s 34(1)(aa) to (e) and the associated Supports Rules. There is some overlap of the stage 1 and 2 enquiries. However, in my opinion stage 2 is primarily a participant focused enquiry. That is, it seeks to establish the benefit of the support to the participant. To the extent that stage 2 also requires examination of the efficacy of the support per se it adds nothing to the outcome of the stage 1 enquiry in my opinion.

[44] The question of whether a requested support is, or is not, an NDIS support is a mixed question of fact and law. The issue of fact to be determined is whether the requested support falls within a category of items specified in column 1 of the Tables to Schedules 1 and 2 of the Transitional Rules. If it does, it will either be, or not be, an NDIS support by operation of law.

[45] It is important to observe that in the scheme of the Transitional Rules it is not sufficient to find that a support is not excluded as a NDIS Support by operation Schedule 2. It must also be found to be included as a NDIS Support by Schedule 1. That is, both Schedules have work to do in determining what is not a NDIS Support. To illustrate this point using absurd examples, a giraffe, hot-air balloon, and space craft are not excluded as NDIS supports by Schedule 2, but they are incapable of falling into any of the categories of NDIS Supports in Schedule 1. They are therefore not NDIS Supports by operation of Schedule 1, rather than Schedule 2.

1. I am not bound by the approach articulated by Senior Member French in FSWN, but I respectfully agree with it as consistent with the text, context, and purpose of the NDIS Act and the Transitional Rules. I adopt and apply it in this proceeding.
2. In YCTK and Chief Executive Officer, National Disability Insurance Agency [2025] ARTA 536 at [25], Senior Member Clues found that the phrase 'supports that are generally not NDIS supports', in relation to sch 2 of the Transitional Rules, does not operate to confer a general discretion on the Tribunal to treat the requirements of schs 1 and 2 as guidance or as a list that can be departed from if the Tribunal considers it fit to do so. I respectfully agree and adopt that conclusion. Indeed, I consider that the inclusion of the word 'generally' in the heading reflects the availability of a participant to apply for, and obtain, a replacement support determination.[10] Such an approach, in my view, is consistent with the requirement to construe schs 1 and 2 harmoniously.[11]
3. Additionally, the Transitional Rules provide a definition of 'standard item' in r 4(1). A support is a 'standard item' if it has not been modified or adapted to address a participant's functional impairments. The Guidance and Appeals Panel of this Tribunal has confirmed, in Hyde,[12] that this assessment must be made with specific reference to the particular participant's functional impairments. An item that is specifically manufactured for, or that has been modified or adapted to address, a participant's functional impairments is not a 'standard item' and may fall within Schedule 1, notwithstanding that it might superficially resemble a standard household product.[13]
4. The Transitional Rules also define a 'standard item' in r 4(1). A support is a standard item if it has not been modified or adapted to address a participant's functional impairments. As presently understood, having regard to the majority decision of the Guidance and Appeals Panel in Hyde[14], this assessment must be made with specific reference to the participant's functional impairments. An item specifically manufactured for, or modified or adapted to address, a participant's functional impairments is not a standard item and may fall within sch 1.
5. Rule 7 of the Transitional Rules creates a mechanism by which the CEO may determine that a support otherwise excluded under sch 2 should be treated as though it were not so excluded (a replacement support determination). That power is conferred upon the CEO, not the Tribunal, and is conditioned on there being a request for a determination about a replacement support. It is not a matter I can determine in this proceeding.

1. The Respondent submits that the need for the gate does not arise from the applicant's impairment but from a preference to retain a front boundary gate rather than leave it open or have it removed. I do not accept that framing, and I consider it has limited analytical utility in cases such as this. Taken to its logical extreme, it would characterise the desire to have a front door, or a lock on that door, as a preference rather than a need. The note to s 34(1)(aa) expressly recognises that a need arising from an impairment may be one affected by the participant's environment. The relevant question is not whether the gate exists because the applicant chose to retain it, but whether his inability to safely operate it arises from his impairments.
2. I am satisfied that it does. The gate has been a feature of the applicant's property for many years. He was previously able to operate it independently. His current inability to do so is not a product of choice but a product of the progressive deterioration of his physical condition, comprising the combination of his longstanding hemiplegia and the more recent development of arthritis as confirmed by Dr Joyce. The barrier arises from the interaction between his impairments and the physical environment, which is precisely the kind of casual connection s 34(1)(aa) contemplates and requires.
3. I am satisfied that the need for automation is causally related to the applicant's physical impairments, consistently with the approach in Chief Executive Officer of the National Disability Insurance Agency v Eastham [2026] FCA 147 at [84]. The criterion in s 34(1)(aa) is met.

1. The criteria in ss 34(1)(a), (b), and (e) are not substantively contested, and on the material before me I am satisfied they are met. Safe and independent access to and from his home bears directly on the applicant's goals and social participation. There is no basis to suggest that this is a support that families, carers, or informal networks could reasonably be expected to provide.

1. In relation to the present review application, whether s 34(1)(f) is satisfied is determinative of the review application.
2. Section 34(1)(f) requires that the support be 'an NDIS support'. A support is not an NDIS support if it is listed in column 2 of sch 2 to the Transitional Rules. Item 1(c) of sch 2 provides that standard gates are not an NDIS support. Schedule 1 of the Transitional Rules lists supports that are NDIS supports. Item 22 of sch 1 includes building modifications enabling independent access. Item 4 of the Transitional Rules defines a 'standard item' as one that is not modified or adapted to address the functional impairments of the participant.
3. I accept the applicant's submission that an automated driveway gate of this kind would, in principle, fall within Item 22 of sch 1 of the Transitional Rules as a building modification enabling independent access, on essentially the same basis that the Respondent approved the motorisation of the garage roller door. The gate forms part of the same access pathway between the street and the dwelling. The automation of the roller door and the automation of the gate address successive points of the same physical access barrier. There is, in that sense, a principled analogy between the two.
4. However, schs 1 and 2 must be read together, harmoniously, as part of a coherent scheme.[15] Where a support is expressly identified in sch 2 as not being an NDIS support, that exclusion is not displaced by the fact that it might otherwise fall within a category in Schedule 1.[16]
5. The roller door was approved, on the respondent's case, as a building modification under Item 22 of sch 1 because, as modified to secure safe access, it was not properly characterised as a 'home improvement' or 'standard renovations' within Item 1(e) of sch 2. Neither party has sought to put the correctness of that decision directly in issue in the present proceedings.

Does Item 1(c) of sch 2 exclude 'standard gates' or 'gates' generally`?

1. It is the gate, not the roller door, that falls to be considered in the context of this review application. That requires me to determine whether the gate falls within the express exclusion in Item 1(c) of sch 2, which, on the applicant's construction, identifies 'standard gates' as supports that are not NDIS supports.
2. The applicant's case proceeds on the premise that Item 1(c) operates only to exclude a gate that is properly characterised as 'standard,' and that the question for the Tribunal is whether the gate sought has been modified or adapted to address the applicant's functional impairments so as to fall outside the definition of 'standard item' in Item 4.
3. That premise has a flaw. It assumes that the word 'standard' where it appears at the commencement of Item 1(c), qualifies each of the nouns that follow it, including 'gates'. In my view, that is not the correct construction. Item 1(c) excludes 'gates' generally, irrespective of whether they are capable of being characterised as standard or non-standard. That is, Item 1(c) will always exclude a gate, regardless of the modifications or adaptations that are made to it.
4. The flaw in the applicant's case is the assumption that Item 1(c) only operates to exclude a standard gate and does not exclude 'gates' more broadly. That is, as I will explain, Item 1(c) operates to exclude 'gates' generally, irrespective of whether they are capable of being characterised as 'standard' or 'non-standard' as the case may be.
5. The starting point is the express text of Item 1(c) of sch 2 of the Transitional Rules, which provides that the following are not an 'NDIS support' for the purposes of s 34(1)(f) of the NDIS Act:

(c) standard home security and maintenance costs, fencing, gates, and building repairs.

6. As a matter of orthodox statutory interpretation, a modifier qualifies only the word it directly precedes unless a contrary intention is clearly indicated. The structure of Item 1(c) does not disclose any such contrary intention. Each noun in the list is separated by commas and a conjunction, indicating that 'fencing,' 'gates,' and 'building repairs' are to be read as distinct categories. The modifier 'standard' attaches to 'home security and maintenance costs' and does not travel further down the list.
7. That conclusion is supported by the observations of Deputy President Dordevic in TMCP by his nominee TMCP(N) and Chief Executive Officer, National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIS) [2026] ARTA 446, the Deputy President observed:

[202] ...The proper approach, as a matter of orthodox statutory interpretation and ordinary grammatical rules, is that a modifier only qualifies the word it directly precedes unless a contrary intention is clearly indicated. The structure of this clause does not indicate that such an intention is present; certainly, an ordinary reading of each noun in the list does is not clearly indicate such an interpretation. Each noun in the phrase is separated by commas and a conjunction which indicates that the noun 'fencing' is to be read as a distinct category. > > [203] Item 1(e) supports such a construction, as it reads: > > (e) standard home repairs, home improvements, standard renovations and maintenance; > > [204] I am persuaded that had the legislature intended that the modifier 'standard' was apply to all nouns in the list, it would not have been necessary to refer to 'standard renovations' and already listing 'standard home repairs'. > > [205] I conclude that the modifier 'standard' does not apply to the noun 'fencing' in Item 1(c). It so follows that I am not required to consider whether the diplomat fencing is 'standard' fencing. Fencing, whether it be considered standard or non-standard, is not an NDIS support.

8. Whilst I am not bound by the observations of Deputy President Dordevic, I respectfully agree with them. The reasoning is an application of orthodox statutory interpretation and ordinary grammatical rules, and it applies with equal force to the noun 'gates' as it does to 'fencing.' I also agree with the Deputy President that the use of 'standard' twice in Item 1(e), where the drafter has deliberately distinguished 'standard home repairs' from 'standard renovations,' is a particularly powerful textual indicator that, where the drafter intended the modifier 'standard' to qualify a noun, that intention was expressed directly. The absence of any repetition of 'standard' before 'gates' in Item 1(c) supports, textually and contextually, the construction that I have adopted.
9. I therefore find that Item 1(c) of sch 2 operates to exclude gates generally, irrespective of whether a particular gate might be characterised as standard or non-standard. The gate sought by the applicant is expressly excluded by Item 1(c). It is not an NDIS support for the purposes of s 34(1)(f) of the NDIS Act.
10. That finding is sufficient to dispose of the review application. Once the requested support is excluded by operation of Item 1(c) of sch 2, the criterion in s 34(1)(f) cannot be satisfied, and it becomes unnecessary to determine whether the support is otherwise reasonable and necessary within the meaning of s 34(1).
11. In the event that I am wrong in that conclusion, and the word 'standard' does, on its proper construction, qualify the word 'gates' in Item 1(c), I would, in any event, not accept the applicant's submission that the gate he seeks is 'not standard.' My reasons for that alternative conclusion are set out below.

1. The applicant submits that the gate is not standard because it has been configured to address his functional impairments in three respects: remote operation from within his vehicle or scooter, eliminating the need to dismount; GSM mobile phone control, enabling operation without fine motor manipulation of a manual latch; and a solar power supply, removing any need to physically manage or replace batteries. The applicant submits that a person without his impairments would not need these features for these reasons, and that the adaptation is real even if it is less conspicuous than the adaptation in Hyde.
2. The contrast with Hyde is instructive. In Hyde, the majority found the gate system was not a standard item because it had been adapted to address the applicant's vision impairment through bespoke elements, namely sensor beams to prevent the gate closing on her and a custom annunciation system, that would not be present in a standard system and would not be required by a person with non-impaired vision. Those elements represented changes to the item itself, directed specifically at a functional impairment.
3. There is nothing analogous here. The gate has not been altered in any structural or design respect. That is, I find no element of it has been engineered to address the applicant's hemiplegia or limited mobility. The features selected exist in the standard catalogue and serve purposes that, whilst no doubt useful for a person in the applicant's position, are not disability specific.
4. In my view, the applicant's submissions and case conflates two distinct questions: whether the applicant's need for the gate is necessitated by his functional impairments, and whether the gate itself has been modified or adapted to address his functional impairments. The definition of standard item looks to the latter question. It asks whether the item has been changed or tailored to address the participant's functional impairments. That is a question directed at the nature of the item, not at the reason the participant has acquired, or proposes to acquire, it.
5. Having considered the decision in Hyde, I am satisfied that irrespective of whether I approach the analysis:

(a) by asking whether the automatic gate has been 'modified' or 'adapted', in the sense that it has undergone a change or alteration from its original state, to address a participants function impairment;[17] or > > (b) by asking whether the automatic gate has been 'modified' or 'adapted', in the sense that it has been made suitable, to address the functional impairments of the relevant participant;[18]

the result is the same. That is, I am not satisfied that the gate has been modified or adapted, in either relevant sense, to address the applicant's functional impairments.

1. The features on which the applicant relies are standard options available from Western Automative to any customer and would clearly be options that are of interest to persons who do not share the applicant's functional impairments or are completely free from any impairments. Remote operation of a gate from within a vehicle is convenient for any person. Mobile phone control is similarly a general convenience, useful, for instance, for any household with one or more drivers. A solar motor and battery have practical and financial benefits that are general in character. None of these features has been engineered, designed, or otherwise changed to address the applicant's specific functional impairments. There is nothing about the configuration of the gate as quoted that makes it structurally or functionally different from a gate any member of the public might purchase from the same supplier.
2. That the applicant selected these standard options because they happen to suit his functional needs does not transform them into modifications or adaptations as anticipated by the Transitional Rules. The evidence otherwise does not satisfy me that the automatic gate has otherwise been made suitable to address the applicant's functional impairments.
3. It follows that I am satisfied that the proposed gate is a standard gate and is therefore within Item 1(c) of sch 2 of the Transitional Rules on either construction adopted in Hyde. The effect of that conclusion is that the proposed gate is excluded from being a NDIS Support and, accordingly, cannot satisfy s 34(1)(f) of the NDIS Act.

1. For the reasons I have indicated above, the criterion in s 34(1)(f) of the NDIS Act is therefore not satisfied. The gate is not an NDIS support, and accordingly, s 34(1)(f) is not (and cannot be) satisfied.
2. I am not satisfied that the criterion in s 34(1)(f) of the NDIS Act is met in relation to the gate. The proposed gate is a 'gate' within Item 1(c) of sch 2 of the Transitional Rules. As such, it is not an NDIS support for the purposes of s 34(1)(f) of the NDIS Act. Accordingly, it is not (and cannot be) a reasonable and necessary support within the meaning of s 34(1) of the NDIS Act. As such, it cannot be included in the applicant's SoPS.

I certify that the preceding 70 (seventy) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of General Member F Robertson

.....................[SGD]...................................................

[1] Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth), s 106(2).

[2] Public Trustee (SA) (as litigation representative for Isherwood) v National Disability Insurance Agency (No 2) [2023] FCA 852; (2023) 182 ALD 259, [17]-[24].

[3] National Disability Insurance National Disability Insurance Agency v WRMF [2020] FCAFC 79; (2020) 276 FCR 415, [201] (WRMF).

[4] National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth), s 31.

[5] McGarrigle v National Disability Insurance Agency [2017] FCA 308, [88], [91] (McGarrigle).

[6] National Disability Insurance Agency v WRMF [2020] FCAFC 79; (2020) 276 FCR 415.

[7] NNFXT by his nominee, QKMBR and Chief Executive Officer, National Disability Insurance Agency (Guidance and Appeals Panel) [2026] ARTA 308, [129]

[8] NNFXT by his nominee, QKMBR and Chief Executive Officer, National Disability Insurance Agency (Guidance and Appeals Panel) [2026] ARTA 308, [129].

[10] See, in this regard, NNFXT by his nominee, QKMBR and Chief Executive Officer, National Disability Insurance Agency (Guidance and Appeals Panel) [2026] ARTA 308, [133].

[11] Chief Executive Officer of the National Disability Insurance Agency v Eastham [2026] FCA 147, [113].

[12] Hyde; Chief Executive Officer, National Disability Insurance Agency and (Guidance and Appeals Panel) [2025] ARTA 2597 (Hyde).

[13] Hyde; Chief Executive Officer, National Disability Insurance Agency and (Guidance and Appeals Panel) [2025] ARTA 2597.

[14] Hyde; Chief Executive Officer, National Disability Insurance Agency and (Guidance and Appeals Panel) [2025] ARTA 2597, [136].

[15] Chief Executive Officer of the National Disability Insurance Agency v Eastham [2026] FCA 147, [113].

[16] Chief Executive Officer of the National Disability Insurance Agency v Eastham [2026] FCA 147, [114].

[17] Hyde; Chief Executive Officer, National Disability Insurance Agency and (Guidance and Appeals Panel) [2025] ARTA 2597, [24] (Deputy President Dordevic).

[18] See Hyde; Chief Executive Officer, National Disability Insurance Agency and (Guidance and Appeals Panel) [2025] ARTA 2597, [124] (Senior Members Bean and Shepherd).