Chi v NSW Legal Services Commissioner [2025] NSWCATOD 103;

s 277(1)(h) of the Uniform Law. The Law Society (through the Professional Conduct Committee or PCC) formed the view that the complaint required no further investigation. 4. By emails to the OLSC on 3 December 2024 and 24 February 2025 (review requests), the Applicant asked the Commissioner to conduct an internal review of the Law Society's decision to close the Applicant's complaint (Law Society decision). 5. The Commissioner refused the review requests, under s 313(1) of the Uniform Law, as she did not consider it appropriate to conduct an internal review of the Law Society decision.

1. The Applicant and the Commissioner participated in the hearing on jurisdiction on 7 August 2025.
2. In addition to the Administrative Review Application, the Applicant relies on written submissions dated 17 July 2025 and further written submissions handed up at the hearing on jurisdiction (without objection from the Commissioner) as supplemented by oral submissions.
3. The Commissioner relies on written submissions on jurisdiction dated 31 July 2025, as supplemented by oral submissions at the hearing.

1. The Applicant had an opportunity at the hearing to identify the specific statutory provisions in the Uniform Law, the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (Application Act), the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (NCAT Act), or any other Act, which confers jurisdiction on NCAT to hear and determine the Administrative Review Application.
2. The Applicant says that the Commissioner's decision to take no further action is final in nature, and has direct legal consequences, effectively extinguishing his ability to have serious allegations of professional misconduct by the lawyers the subject of the complaint properly investigated.
3. The Applicant contends that s 9 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW) (ADR Act) provides NCAT with jurisdiction to review a decision of the Commissioner to close a complaint under s 277(1)(a) of the Uniform Law. The Applicant says he is an "interested person" within the meaning of s 4 of the ADR Act because he is directly and adversely affected by the decision to close his complaint about the three lawyers, asserting that he is entitled to apply for administrative review under the enabling legislation. While not clear from his submissions, it seems that he relies on the ADR Act as the "enabling legislation". The applicant says that the failure of the Commissioner to investigate his allegations is a denial of procedural fairness, a failure to consider probative evidence and an improper exercise of power contrary to the Uniform Law.
4. The Applicant sought orders for a declaration that NCAT has jurisdiction under the ADR Act and the NCAT Act to review the decision made by the Commissioner under s 277(1)(a) of the Uniform Law and for the Administrative Review Application to proceed to a hearing on the merits.

1. Firstly, the Commissioner notes that, under s 313(1) of the Uniform Law, the Commissioner may, at her absolute direction, conduct an internal review of the decisions of the Commissioner (or her delegate) but only if she considers it appropriate to do so. It is noted that there is no requirement for the Commissioner to undertake an internal review. Clause 4 of the Administrative Decisions Review Regulation 2024 (NSW) (ADR Regulation) expressly excludes any decisions made by the Commissioner under the Uniform Law, or the Application Act, from "internal review" as that term appears in s 53 of the ADR Act (see s 53(11)(b)).
2. Second, the Commissioner submits that NCAT has no jurisdiction to determine the Administrative Review Application. In her written submissions, the Commissioner refers to provisions in the NCAT Act (ss 28 and 30), the ADR Act (ss 7, 9 and 55), and to s 314 of the Uniform Law, relevant to the conferral of jurisdiction on NCAT. The Commissioner contends that three things are required for NCAT to have jurisdiction, under s 314 of the Uniform Law, to conduct an administrative review of a decision made by the Commissioner:

(1) a decision made under s 299 of the Uniform Law; and/or

(2) a decision made under s 290 of the Uniform Law (compensation order for more than $10,000); and

(3) the applicant seeking review is the "respondent lawyer" (as referred to in s 314(1)), not the complainant.

1. The Commissioner says that, here, the complainant is not a person entitled under enabling legislation, relevantly the Uniform Law, to make an application to NCAT for an administrative review of the Commissioner's decision to close the complaint. That decision was made pursuant to s 277(1)(h) and not

ss 299 or 290 of the Uniform Law, and accordingly NCAT has no jurisdiction to determine the Administrative Review Application.

Does NCAT have jurisdiction to decide the Administrative Review Application?

1. NCAT's first duty is to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in relation to an application, whether or not a respondent applies for the matter to be dismissed. To put it another way, a decision which concerns whether NCAT has jurisdiction to deal with a matter is not dependent on an application having been made for summary dismissal.
2. NCAT is a tribunal with limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction and functions are derived from the NCAT Act, enabling legislation and legislative instruments beyond its enabling legislation, as well as regulations and statutory rules. NCAT cannot exercise jurisdiction beyond that set out in statute, other than its anterior jurisdiction to decide whether proceedings brought before it are within its limited jurisdiction (Citta Hobart Pty Ltd v Cawthorn (2022) 276 CLR 216; [2022] HCA 16 at [62]- [63]).
3. Under s 28(1) of the NCAT Act, NCAT has "such jurisdiction and functions as may be conferred or imposed on it by or under [the NCAT Act] or any other legislation". NCAT's jurisdiction includes "the administrative review jurisdiction of the Tribunal": s 28(2). Section 30, which is headed "Administrative review jurisdiction", states at s 30(1) that the ADR Act provides for the circumstances in which NCAT has administrative review jurisdiction over a decision of an administrator. An administrator, in relation to an administratively reviewable decision, is the person or body that makes, or is taken to have made, the decision under enabling legislation. Section 7 of the ADR Act defines an "administratively reviewable decision" and s 9 stipulates the circumstances in which administrative review jurisdiction is conferred on NCAT.
4. I recently considered the operation of ss 28 and 29 of the NCAT Act in the different context of an application to review a decision of the Law Society under s 100 of the Uniform Law, in Shapkin v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [2025] NSWCATOD 66 at [40]- [43], [52]-[62] (Shapkin). I raise this to emphasise the confined administrative review jurisdiction under the Uniform Law, and specifically that NCAT does not have jurisdiction to determine matters in and of itself by operation of ss 28 or 29 of the NCAT Act, or any "general jurisdiction" without that jurisdiction being conferred by enabling legislation: see Shapkin at [53]-[54]. I note the following comment regarding jurisdiction as it applies generally to the current proceedings:

"[43] NCAT has jurisdiction to decide applications brought before it under the Uniform Law, the Application Act and the NCAT Act only where such authority is conferred expressly on NCAT..."

1. Where NCAT's administrative review jurisdiction is engaged, NCAT also has jurisdiction to make ancillary and interlocutory decisions, and to exercise other functions conferred or imposed by the NCAT Act, the ADR Act or enabling legislation in connection with the conduct or resolution of administrative review proceedings: NCAT Act, s 30(2).
2. Under s 55(1) of the ADR Act, an application to NCAT for administrative review of an "administratively reviewable decision" may only be made by an "interested person", defined in s 4 of that Act to mean "a person who is entitled under enabling legislation to make an application to the Tribunal for an administrative review under this Act of an administratively reviewable decision".
3. In circumstances where NCAT's administrative review jurisdiction is engaged, the default position in s 55(3) of the ADR Act is that a person entitled to bring a review must seek internal review first (subject to s 55(4)). However, there is no such requirement in respect of decisions by the Commissioner (and in respect of decisions of the Law Society Council and the Bar Council) made under the Uniform Law and the Application Act: ADR Act, s 53(11)(b); ADR Regulation, cl 4.
4. In summary, NCAT has jurisdiction to decide applications brought before it under the Uniform Law, the Application Act, the ADR Act and the NCAT Act only where such authority is conferred expressly on NCAT. In relation to the legislative scheme governing the conduct of lawyers and legal practitioners, for the purposes of the NCAT Act and the ADR Act, the "enabling legislation" means the Uniform Law and the Application Act.
5. Here, the Commissioner treated the Applicant's complaint as a disciplinary matter in relation to the lawyers concerned: Uniform Law ss 277 and 276. The Law Society (under delegation from the Commissioner) determined to close the complaint under s 277(1)(h) of the Uniform Law. The Commissioner declined to conduct an internal review, under s 313(1) of the Uniform Law, of the Law Society decision to close the complaint.
6. In the Administrative Review Application, the Applicant asked NCAT to review the decision of 28 May 2025 by the Commissioner to decline to conduct an internal review. However, at the hearing on jurisdiction the Applicant says it is the decision to close the complaint under s 277 which he challenges. It is noted that the Applicant refers to closure of the complaint under s 277(1)(a), however the complaint was closed under s 277(1)(h). Nothing turns on this for present purposes.
7. It is not clear which decision is the subject of the Applicant's challenge, ie whether he seeks an administrative review of the Law Society decision on 12 December 2024 to close the complaint under s 277(1)(h) of the Uniform Law, or the Commissioner's decision to refuse to conduct an "internal review" of that closure decision under s 313(1) of the Uniform Law. Nonetheless, we do not think this is material for present purposes because NCAT does not have jurisdiction to conduct a review of either of those decisions.
8. Section 314 of the Uniform Law provides as follows:

314 Right of appeal or review of decisions of local regulatory authority

(1) A respondent lawyer or a legal practitioner associate of a respondent law practice may, in accordance with applicable jurisdictional legislation, appeal to the designated tribunal against, or seek a review by the designated tribunal of, a determination of the designated local regulatory authority under--

(a) section 290, in relation to a compensation order for more than $10 000; or

(b) section 299.

(2) The designated tribunal may make any order it considers appropriate on the appeal or review.

(3) It is intended that jurisdictional legislation may provide a right of appeal against or a right of review of the designated tribunal's decision.

1. By virtue of the Application Act at s 11(3) and Table 2, the "designated tribunal" is NCAT in respect of s 314 of the Uniform Law. The "designated local regulatory authority" is the Commissioner in respect of Chapter 5 (which includes s 314) of the Uniform Law (s 11(1) and Table 1).
2. Section 126 of the Application Act states:

126 Right of review by NCAT about certain determinations of local regulatory authority in consumer and disciplinary matters

(1) This section deals with proceedings contemplated by section 314(1) and (2) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) in relation to a determination of a local regulatory authority relating to--

(a) a compensation order for more than $10,000 in a consumer matter, or

(b) a disciplinary matter.

(2) A respondent lawyer or a legal practitioner associate of a respondent law practice may apply to NCAT for an administrative review under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 of a determination of the designated local regulatory authority under--

(a) section 290 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) , in relation to a compensation order for more than $10,000, or

(b) section 299 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW).

1. It is apparent from the legislative provisions reproduced above that only a "respondent lawyer" or "legal practitioner associate of a respondent law practice" may bring administrative review proceedings against a decision of the designated local regulatory authority (relevantly, the Commissioner or delegate). In this context, the "respondent lawyer" is the lawyer who is the subject of a complaint. It is not the complainant.
2. It is noted that s 127 of the Application Act contemplates that rights of administrative review by NCAT may be provided by regulation. Section 127 is in the following terms:

127 Local regulations may provide rights of review

The local regulations may provide that an application may be made to NCAT for an administrative review under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 of a specified decision or class of decisions made by a specified person or body in the exercise of functions conferred or imposed by or under -

(a) this Act or the local regulations, or

(b) the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW), or

(c) the Uniform Rules as they apply in this jurisdiction.

1. There is nothing contained in "local regulations" that would enable NCAT to decide the Administrative Review Application (for definition of "local regulations", see Application Act, s 3(1); s 166).
2. We agree with the Commissioner's submissions about NCAT's lack of jurisdiction to hear and determine the Administrative Review Application. In the circumstances of this matter, the decisions of the Commissioner (and of the Law Society) are not decisions which attract NCAT's administrative review jurisdiction.

1. The Commissioner initially sought costs, noting s 60(3)(c), (e) and/or (g) of the NCAT Act. That costs application is not pressed.

(1) The correct name of the Respondent is the NSW Legal Services Commissioner.

(2) The administrative review application lodged with the Tribunal on 13 June 2025 is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

(3) No order as to costs.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.