What happened

This judgment records a post-judgment correction and variation process in a family law property matter. The primary judgment and orders were handed down on 31 January 2020. Those reasons and orders identified funds held in trust accounts and made orders for distribution, but the orders addressed only funds in the J Lawyers trust account. The reasons, however, had recorded that both the J Lawyers trust account ($180,020.67) and the BB Lawyers trust account ($222,689.40) formed the pool of property available for division (see Reasons, CONSIDERATION [3] and the recitation of the respondent's contentions). In short, the judge intended to divide the totality of both trust accounts (aggregate $402,710.07) 65% to the respondent and 35% to the applicant, but the expressed formal orders dealt only with one account.

On 13 February 2020 the intervenor's solicitors alerted the court to the omission. The parties were called back to court (19 February 2020 hearing). The intervenor sought correction of the orders and reasons under Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) rr 17.02 and 17.02A, arguing the orders did not reflect the court's intention and the reasons were mistaken in not addressing the BB Lawyers trust funds. The respondent opposed only on the ground the judge was functus officio; the respondent also indicated intention to appeal but had not filed an appeal (see CONSIDERATION [4], [5], [6]).

On 24 February 2020 Justice Wilson accepted the intervenor's submissions. He held the orders of 31 January 2020 did not reflect his intention and that Rule 17.02(1)(e) authorised variation where an order does not reflect the court's intention. He also accepted Rule 17.02A allowed correction of reasons issued by mistake. He rejected the functus officio bar on two grounds: (i) the Rules use language authorising variation 'at any time'; and (ii) the doctrine must yield to the statutory grant of continuing power as a matter of statutory construction (see CONSIDERATION [6]-[7]). He therefore varied the orders and corrected the reasons, specifying the precise variations and the arithmetic (65% of $402,710.07 = $261,761.54; 35% = $140,948.52), ordered payment to the respondent and to J Lawyers (payment of the intervenor's unpaid fees $133,765.39 from the trust accounts by enforcing an equitable charge over the applicant's share), and ordered the small remaining balance paid to the applicant (see Orders and CONSIDERATION where the textual amendments are enumerated).

Why the court decided this way

Two discrete rule-based powers governed the outcome.

Rule 17.02 (orders): The judge treated this as the primary vehicle for correcting orders that did not reflect his intention. Rule 17.02(1)(e) explicitly permits variation or setting aside where an order does not reflect the court's intention; the rule is expressed to operate 'at any time'. Justice Wilson found the orders as pronounced did not reflect his clear intention to divide the combined trust funds. Because one of the specific grounds in r 17.02(1) was made out (the order did not reflect the court's intention), the rule authorised him to vary the orders to give effect to that intention (CONSIDERATION [2]-[5]; key quotation at CONSIDERATION [2]).
Rule 17.02A (reasons): The judge relied on r 17.02A as the route to correct textual mistakes in the reasons. He identified specific paragraphs and words in the original reasons that were wrong by omission or misdescription, for example, changing references from 'trust account' to 'trust accounts', and correcting arithmetic references (CONSIDERATION 5-(xii)). Because r 17.02A authorises correction of reasons where they were issued by mistake, the judge made the enumerated textual corrections.

The functus officio objection was answered principally by statutory construction. The judge observed the doctrine of functus officio concerns the finality of judicial acts and has roots in res judicata, but where a statutory rule plainly confers power to vary orders and reasons 'at any time' the court's function cannot be treated as spent. He cited authorities explaining that functus officio is to be understood against the statutory grant of power (CONSIDERATION 7-(iii)). Thus the express 'at any time' language in rr 17.02 and 17.02A overcame the functus officio bar.

Finally, the remedial outcome tracks the judge's stated intention and arithmetic: the combined trust funds are divided 65%/35% between respondent and applicant; the intervenor's equitable charge is enforced against the applicant's share to satisfy unpaid fees; and a small residual is paid to the applicant (Orders).

Before and after state of the law

Before: The doctrine of functus officio and the related doctrine of res judicata have long operated to limit a court's power to vary its final conclusive judgments on the merits. Authorities such as R v Moodie; Ex parte Mithen and Kawasaki have described functus officio as the court's function being spent, and have characterised the limits of post-judgment variation in those doctrinal terms.

After (as applied in this judgment): Wei & Wei (No. 2) reaffirms that where Rules made under statute, here rr 17.02 and 17.02A, expressly confer continuing power 'at any time' to vary orders or reasons, the functus officio doctrine does not prevent the exercise of those powers. The decision emphasises the primacy of the explicit rule text and statutory construction over a categorical application of functus officio. Thus the case stands for the proposition that formal finality yields to clear rule-based correction powers, including where the correction is necessary to reflect the judge's intention or to fix mistakes in reasons.

Caveat: this is an application of existing principles rather than a radical change in doctrine. Justice Wilson explicitly frames his reasoning in terms of statutory construction and prior authorities (see CONSIDERATION [7]).

Key passages with plain-English translation

Key passage (CONSIDERATION [2]):
- Text: "Rule 17.02 is concerned with varying orders... Rule 17.02(1)(e) provides that an order may be varied or set aside if, relevantly, the order does not reflect the intention of the court... the court may vary or set aside an order at any time..."
- Plain-English translation: If a judge's formal order does not match what the judge meant to order, the Family Law Rules allow the judge to change or cancel that order, and the Rules say this can be done at any time.
Key passage (CONSIDERATION [3]):
- Text: "Here, it was my intention to make orders under s 79 of the Family Law Act in relation to the totality of money in trust... I intended to order the whole of the money in trust to be disbursed..."
- Plain-English translation: The judge states clearly he intended to split the money in both trust accounts between the parties in the stated proportions, but only included one account in the final orders by mistake.
Key passage (CONSIDERATION [6]):
- Text: "It was said that I was functus officio and therefore could not make the correct orders. I do not agree for at least two reasons... both Rule 17.02 and Rule 17.02A are expressed to have the temporal limitation 'at any time'... No timing constraint exists on varying or setting aside the orders..."
- Plain-English translation: The judge rejects the argument that he can't change his own orders because a legal rule prevents it. He says the Family Law Rules explicitly let him change orders or reasons at any time, so the usual finality rule does not stop him.
Key passage (CONSIDERATION [5] and subparagraphs):
- Text: The judge lists precise textual corrections to the reasons (replace amounts, change singular 'trust account' to plural 'trust accounts', insert a paragraph about distribution of residual funds).
- Plain-English translation: The judge not only made a high-level ruling but specified exactly how the written reasons and orders should be amended to fix the mistake.

What fact patterns trigger this precedent

A post-judgment discovery that the formal orders or the written reasons omit or misdescribe assets or other items actually considered by the court and intended to be dealt with.
Situations where the judge's oral or written reasons show a clear intention as to disposition (including arithmetic), but the formal orders fail to reflect that intention due to omission, clerical error, or similar mistake.
Cases in which the correction required is textual or restorative (i.e., giving effect to the judge's intention) rather than a re-hearing of contested factual issues or a substantive re-assessment of rights on the merits.
Cases where no appeal has been filed or provisional steps in appellate process do not preclude 'at any time' correction under the Rules.

The precedent is less apt to apply where the correction would amount to re-opening contested findings on the merits or where variation would conflict with an appeal or final determination by a superior court.

How later courts have treated it

This judgment itself led to an updated reasons document titled Wei & Wei (No 3) [2020] FamCA 98 (see CONSIDERATION 5 and footnote). Within the text before me there is no citation of subsequent external decisions treating Wei & Wei (No. 2). The present decision stands as an instance of applying rr 17.02 and 17.02A to correct orders and reasons. To determine how appellate courts or later courts have treated the principles as applied here would require searching subsequent reported decisions, which are not contained in this judgment. The judge's approach is closely tied to the express 'at any time' language of the Rules and to established authorities discussing functus officio as a matter of statutory construction, so later courts considering identical factual and procedural matrices would likely examine that statutory text and the nature of the correction sought.

Still-open questions

Limits of 'at any time': Although the Rules say 'at any time', questions remain about practical limits. For example, how should courts approach corrections where appeals have been instituted, or where third parties have acted in reliance on the original orders? The judgment notes no appeal had been filed, but does not test a contested appellate or reliance environment.
What changes amount to permissible correction versus impermissible rehearing: The decision draws a line by treating this correction as giving effect to the judge's intention and correcting mistakes. In more complex cases, distinguishing a permitted correction from an impermissible re-litigation of substantive matters could be contested.
Interaction with res judicata and finality in other statutory contexts: The judge emphasises statutory construction; however, the balance between finality and rule-based correction may play out differently in other courts or subject areas where the enabling statute or rules lack the same 'at any time' language.
Procedural safeguards and the appropriate process: The judgment accepted submissions and corrected reasons on prompt notice. Institutions may want clearer internal practice directions on how to raise and process such corrections and on whether parties should be given particular opportunities to be heard before corrections are made.

Final note and disclaimer: This deep dive explains the judgment Wei & Wei (No. 2) [2020] FamCA 96 as it presents the court's reasoning about rr 17.02 and 17.02A, functus officio, and correction of reasons and orders. It is legal information only, not legal advice. I can make mistakes. Before you rely on, act on, or deploy any part of this analysis or any draft derived from it, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.

Judgment (70 paragraphs)

[1]

Wei & Wei (No. 2) [2020] FamCA 96 (24 February 2020)

[2]

[2020] FamCA 96

[3]

FAMILY LAW - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - Rule 17.02 and Rule 17.02A - functus officio - doctrine considered - not functus officio.

[4]

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 79

[5]

Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth), rr 17.02, 17.02A

[6]

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 368(2A)

[7]

Chhor v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 2135

[8]

Comptroller-General of Customs v Kawasaki Motors Pty Ltd (No.1) [1991] FCA 519; (1991) 32 FCR 219

[9]

DJL v The Central Authority [2000] HCA 17; (2000) 201 CLR 226

[10]

Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic (1990) 21 FCR 193

[11]

R v Moodie; Ex parte Mithen (1977) 17 ALR 219

[12]

KR Handley, Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th ed, 2009)

[13]

Osborne, A Concise Law Dictionary (Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed, 1964)

[14]

Thomas Penberthy Fry, 'The Finality of Judicial Decisions' [1952] UQLawJl 2; (1956) 2 University of Queensland Law Journal 9

[15]

(1) the sum of $261,761.54 being 65% of the amount in the trust accounts is to be paid forthwith to the respondent.

(2) The applicant is entitled to 35% of the sum in trust, namely $140,948.52.

(3) The sum of $140,948.52 referred to in paragraph 2 above is subject to an enforceable equitable charge in favour of J Lawyers Pty Ltd.

(4) The sum of $133,765.39 is to be paid forthwith from the trust accounts to J Lawyers Pty Ltd.

(5) The balance of the sum in trust after payment to the respondent of $261,761.54 and after payment to J Lawyers Pty Ltd of $133,765.39 (the balance being $7,183.13) is to be paid forthwith to the applicant at her last known address.

(6) This proceeding is otherwise dismissed.

[16]

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court's records.

[17]

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Wei & Wei has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

[18]

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

[19]

On 31 January 2020 I handed down reasons in this proceeding.
On 13 February 2020 the solicitors for the intervenor emailed my chambers informing me that my reasons were defective for failing to make orders in relation to funds in trust held by BB Lawyers in the sum of $222,689.40. I required the parties to appear on 19 February 2020, which they did.
Mr Gerard Holmes of counsel for the intervenor argued that Rule 17.02 enabled my orders made 31 January 2020 to be corrected. Rule 17.02A enables my reasons handed down on 31 January 2020 to be corrected at any time.
The intervenor advanced several contentions in support of its application. After a searching discussion with Mr Holmes the following is a fair distillation of the matters canvassed -

[20]

the total of the joint funds held in the two trust accounts (namely that of J Lawyers and BB Lawyers) was $402,710.07; 2. the unpaid fees due to the intervenor were $133,765;

[21]

the intervenor could only be partially satisfied pursuant to the orders made on 31 January 2020 whereas it could be wholly satisfied in respect of unpaid and owing legal fees if orders were made for funds to be disbursed aggregating $133,765 from both trust accounts;

[22]

the orders made on 31 January 2020 only addressed recourse to the funds in the trust account of J Lawyers the effect of which was to meet only part of the intervenor's unpaid fees; 2. the obvious intendment of the court in making orders and in handing down the reasons on 31 January 2020 was to satisfy J Lawyers in full in its unpaid fees; and 3. under Rule 17.02 of the Family Law Rules I had power to vary the orders made on 31 January 2020 because those orders do not reflect the intention of the court and under Rule 17.02A of the Family Law Rules I had power to vary my reasons made on 31 January 2020 where those reasons were issued by mistake.
On behalf of the respondent Dr Matta contended that having handed down reasons on 31 January 2020 I was functus officio and had no power to do as the intervenor urged. He said the relief sought by the intervenor went beyond the correction of clerical errors. That said, Dr Matta said he had no application for orders because he said (perfectly politely I hasten to add) the respondent intends to appeal every aspect of my reasons and orders.

[23]

In my judgment and for the reasons that now follow it is appropriate to vary my orders made on 31 January 2020 pursuant to Rule 17.02 and to vary my reasons also dated 31 January 2020 so that the intervenor forthwith appropriates the whole of its unpaid fees of $133,765 from the funds in the J Lawyers Trust account and so much as may remain unpaid, from the funds in the BB Lawyers Trust account with the balance of the funds in the BB Lawyers Trust account being disbursed to the applicant.

[24]

In paragraph 17 of the 31 January reasons I recorded the respondent's contentions about the property in Australia available for division. It is as well to record that entire paragraph -
1. In paragraph 29 of his 28 June 2019 affidavit the husband recorded what he said was the entirety of the property between the applicant and the respondent as at the date of the making of his affidavit. He divided the property there listed into property in Australia on the one hand and property in China on the other. He provided no documentary verification of the property recorded in the table. At all events he stated that in Australia, the property of the parties was made up of the following -

[25]

a) $180 020.67 being money held in trust by J Lawyers he said was owned jointly by the husband and wife;

[26]

b) $222 689.40 being money held in trust by BB Lawyers he said was owned jointly by the husband and wife; and

[27]

c) $177 734 described simply as F Pty Ltd he said was owned solely by the husband.

[28]

As appears, that paragraph recorded the respondent's contentions. It is relevant to observe that nowhere in the transcript of the trial of this proceeding was there mention of funds in the BB Lawyers Trust account. In paragraph 142 of the reasons of 31 January 2020 I narrated matters arising from the respondent's second affidavit. It is as well to record that paragraph -
1. The respondent made a second affidavit, it being dated 20 September 2019. Some of the more important matters that emerged from that affidavit may be relevantly distilled as follows -

[29]

a) Johns J made orders in the nature of partial property settlement orders in June 2017 pursuant to which the applicant received $140 000 and the respondent received $70 000;

[30]

b) Z has been in the respondent's sole care since January 2019;

[31]

c) the applicant relocated to China permanently in August 2018;

[32]

d) the respondent asserted that more than 60% of the couple's assets are in China;

[33]

e) the sum of $180 020.67 is held on trust by J Lawyers;

[34]

f) the sum of $222 689.40 was held in trust by BB Lawyers;

[35]

g) the applicant is employed in City DD on a monthly salary, so he said, of AUD $3 086.42;

[36]

h) according to a business valuation of F Pty Ltd prepared on 11 March 2019 by Mr QQ of RR Accountants, the total shareholder equity is in the negative amount of $67 316;

[37]

j) following the ATO's assessment of capital gains tax on the sale of the Suburb B property, the respondent paid his assessment to the ATO of $93 125 and the applicant should have paid an equivalent sum to the ATO but if she failed to do so and instead transferred that money to China, the respondent will have no way to recover the funds;

[38]

k) the applicant failed to disclose important documents; and

[39]

l) the respondent deposited $245 050 to F Pty Ltd, as recorded in that company's books and records.

[40]

That was the second mention of BB Lawyers and it came from contentions advanced by the respondent.
Both counsel focused on what each said was a factual finding about the sum of $222,689.40 held by BB Lawyers Trust that emerged in paragraph 152(f) of my 31 January reasons. On behalf of the intervenor, Mr Holmes contended that the express mention in that paragraph of the sum of $222,689.40 in BB Lawyers Trust supported the intervenor's contention that it was intended by me to address that sum but that the orders made, in addressing only the J Lawyers Trust account, did not correctly reflect the intention of the court. Conversely, Dr Matta submitted that the factual finding in paragraph 152(f) of my reasons represented a finding of fact about which there was no uncertainty, mistake or clerical error yet having made that factual finding I erred in not dealing with the division of that asset being $222,689.40 in the BB Lawyers Trust.
Both counsel agreed that my reasons of 31 January 2020 should have, but failed to, address the money in the BB Lawyers Trust account.

[41]

No dispute arose that it is erroneous to speak of the "inherent jurisdiction" of the Family Court of Australia because it is a statutory court exercising powers conferred by statute being "powers expressly or by implication conferred by the legislation which governs it": DJL v The Central Authority.[1] In that case Kirby J spoke of the permissible metes and bounds of powers once the slip rule is enlivened. However, at paragraph 93 of that case Kirby J was addressing order 31 rule 6 of the Family Law Rules 1984 and this case falls to be decided by a consideration of two different rules, namely Rule 17.02 of the Family Law Rules in relation to varying the orders and Rule 17.02A of the Family Law Rules in relation to varying reasons. Each requires separate consideration as each applies to a different aspect of the court's function (orders on the one hand and reasons on the other).
Rule 17.02 is concerned with varying orders. In this case that is a reference to orders 1 to 5 that I made on 31 January 2020. Rule 17.02(1)(e) provides that an order may be varied or set aside if, relevantly, the order does not reflect the intention of the court. The rule expressly provides that the court may vary or set aside an order at any time so long as one of the eight factors recorded in the subparagraphs to Rule 17.02(1) is enlivened.
Here, it was my intention to make orders under s 79 of the Family Law Act in relation to the totality of money in trust. That was in reality the entirety of the property that fell for division. The total sum in trust exceeded $400,000. I intended to divide that entire sum as to 65% to the respondent and as to 35% to the applicant. In arithmetical terms, 65% of $402,710.07 was $261,761.54 and 35% of $402,710.07 was $140,948.52. I intended to order the whole of the money in trust to be disbursed in those arithmetical amounts. Rather than including the total balances in both trust accounts, I made orders only in relation to the amount in the J Lawyers Trust account. The orders I made on 31 January 2020 do not reflect my intention, therefore. The amount in the BB Lawyers Trust account should have been disbursed as well.

[42]

There is a rule that, if a final and conclusive judgment or decree given by a judicial tribunal as to the merits of a case exhausts, in the absence of an order to the contrary by a superior tribunal, its powers and jurisdiction in respect of that case, it is functus officio. This rule as to functus officio is of importance mainly if an attempt is made to induce the tribunal to vary or rescind in whole or in part, at its own discretion and on its own initiative, any final and conclusive judgment which it may have given as to the merits of a case.[7]

[43]

In a later passage of the same article, the learned author wrote the following -

[44]

For a judicial tribunal to become functus officio it must have delivered a valid judgment or decree of a final and conclusive nature. A res judicata must have come into existence.[8]

[45]

In its more modern emanation, the doctrine has been said to be preferable to the description or consequence of the performance of a function having regard to the statutory power or obligation to perform that function. So much was said by the High Court of Australia in R v Moodie; Ex parte Mithen[9] (Stephen, Murphy and Aicken JJ). The Federal Court held to like effect in Comptroller-General of Customs v Kawasaki Motors Pty Ltd (No.1).[10] The concept underlying the doctrine of functus officio has been described in terms equating to the statutory function as having been spent and that the issue is in reality a matter of statutory construction of the statute that confers the power in issue. That was the view of Gummow J in Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic.[11]
When analysed in terms of the statutory function of the judge having been spent by the handing down of reasons, in my view the entitlement conferred by Rules 17.02 and 17.02A of the court at any time to vary or set aside those orders reveals that the statutory function is not spent and that, as a matter of statutory construction, power exists to do as the intervenor seeks.
In short, I am not functus officio.
The orders made on 31 January 2020 should be varied or set aside and new orders substituted for them.
As to Rule 17.02A, my reasons can be varied or set aside at any time where they were issued by mistake. My reasons contained the mistake that I did not address the funds in the BB Lawyers Trust account whereas I should have done so having identified those funds as property in paragraph 152(f) of my reasons. Specifically, the following paragraphs of my reasons require correction by reason of the mistake I made about the totality of the trust funds in this case. The specific variations are as follows -

[46]

paragraph 4 second sentence under the heading "synopsis" presently states an amount of "$61,344.70". That amount should be "$140,948.52"; 2. paragraph 152(y) the words "Suburb B property money in J Lawyers Trust account" should read "Suburb B property money in BB Lawyers Trust account";

[47]

paragraph 155 presently reads "In real terms, that resulted in the only asset in Australia being the proceeds in the J Lawyers Trust account." That sentence should read "In real terms, that resulted in the only assets in Australia being the proceeds in the BB Lawyers Trust account and the J Lawyers Trust account.";

[48]

paragraph 215 second sentence the words "J Lawyers Pty Ltd" should read "BB Lawyers"; 2. paragraph 231 third sentence presently reads "Applying the arithmetic previously calculated, 35% of the sum held in trust is $61 344.70". That sentence should read "Applying the arithmetic previously calculated, 35% of the total sum held in the two trust accounts ($402,710.07) is $140,948.52"; 3. paragraph 231 sixth sentence presently reads "However, the sum in trust will not satisfy the entirety of the sum adjudged payable in favour of the respondent as well as the full sum claimed by the applicant". That sentence should be deleted. 4. paragraph 231 seventh sentence presently reads "As to the latter, the intervenor's claim I sand always has been derivative in nature". That sentence should read "As to the latter, the intervenor's claim always has been derivative."; 5. paragraph 231 eighth sentence presently reads "The intervenor obtains a claim in debt in persuasion over the whole amount the applicant owes it". That sentence should read "The intervenor obtains a claim in debt in priority over the whole amount the applicant owes it."; 6. paragraph 231 tenth sentence, after the comma, "in the trust account" should read "in the trust accounts" and the words "in that trust account" should read "in those trust accounts"; 7. paragraph 231 eleventh sentence the words "in the trust account" should read "in the trust accounts"; 8. paragraph 231 twelfth sentence, the words "of the trust account" should read "of the trust accounts";

[49]

paragraph 235(a) should be replaced with the following -

[50]

"the sum of $261,761.54 being 65% of the amount in the trust accounts is to be paid forthwith to the respondent";

[51]

paragraph 235(b) should be replaced with the following -

[52]

"I declare that the applicant is entitled to 35% of the sum in trust, namely $140,948.52";

[53]

paragraph 235(c) should be replaced with the following -

[54]

"I declare that the sum of $140,948.52 referred to in the preceding alphabetical subparagraph is subject to an enforceable equitable charge in favour of J Lawyers Pty Ltd";

[55]

paragraph 235(d) should be replaced with the following -

[56]

"I order the sum of $133,765.39 be paid forthwith from the trust accounts to J Lawyers Pty Ltd"; and

[57]

In addition, the following paragraph should be added to reflect the distribution of the balance in the trust accounts to the applicant after payment has been made to J Lawyers Pty Ltd from the applicant's share of the trust funds -

[58]

"The balance of the sum in trust after payment to the respondent of $261,761.54 and after payment to J Lawyers Pty Ltd of $133,765.39 (the balance being $7,183.13) is to be paid forthwith to the applicant at her last known address."

[59]

The amendments above have been incorporated into the reasons in this case, in a fresh document called Wei & Wei (No 3).[12]

[60]

I certify that the preceding twenty-four (24) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Wilson delivered on 24 February 2020.

[61]

[1] [2000] HCA 17; (2000) 201 CLR 226.

[62]

[2] [2017] FCCA 2135.

[63]

[3] Osborne, A Concise Law Dictionary (Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed, 1964).

[64]

[4] (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th ed, 2009).

[65]

[5] The Honourable Mr Justice Handley, Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th ed, 2009) paragraphs 27.01 - 27.04.

[66]

[6] [1952] UQLawJl 2; (1956) 2 University of Queensland Law Journal 9, 13.