Criminal Law - Appeal and new trial - Appeal against sentence - Grounds for interference - Sentence manifestly excessive or inadequate - Aggravated armed robbery involving actual and threatened violence.

Respondent: Acting Director of Public Prosecutions

Judgment Number: [2015] TASCCA 5

1. On 5 March 2015, an appeal by the appellant against her sentence was dismissed. These are my reasons for forming the view that I did on that day.
2. The appellant pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated armed robbery on 23 June 2014. A pre-sentence report was sought and she was remanded in custody to await that report. On 4 August 2014 she was sentenced to serve a term of two years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of one year. The sentence was backdated to 23 June. The learned sentencing judge also made an order that the appellant be subject to 12 months' probation on release from custody. On 8 September 2014, an appeal against that sentence was filed. The sole ground of appeal is that the sentence was manifestly excessive. For reasons which have not been explained the appeal has only now come on for hearing at a time when the appellant has served nearly nine months of the 12 month non-parole period.

1. The comments on passing sentence of Pearce J set out the facts which gave rise to the charge against the appellant and his reasons for imposing the sentence that he did. Those comments were in the following terms:

"Samantha Ashley Chevoux pleads guilty to aggravated armed robbery. She is jointly charged with a male co-accused who I will call W. In late 2012 or very early 2013 the defendant met the complainant, Paul Thorp. Not long afterwards she, without justification, formed the impression that Mr Thorp was responsible for vandalism at the house she was then living in at Mayfield. She told W, whom she had met only weeks earlier, of her problem. On 25 January 2013, encouraged by W, and motivated by retribution and an irrational desire for some sort of compensation, she sent a message on social media to Mr Thorp inviting him to her house. She lured him inside. He was followed in by W who then struck him to the head with a baseball bat. W demanded Mr Thorp's keys and mobile phone, then struck Mr Thorp's wrist with the bat, told him to sit on the floor and tapped him several times on the head with the bat. He was told not to move and that everything would be all right if he 'played his cards right'. The defendant tied a scarf around Mr Thorp's head and tied his hands with rope. She then placed a belt round his neck and pulled it tight. Mr Thorp was then kicked and punched while he could feel the bat against his head. Both W and the defendant told Mr Thorp he would be 'chopped into bits, put in a wheelie bin and set alight'. W poured either conditioner or dishwashing liquid into Mr Thorp's mouth. When Mr Thorp freed his hands from the rope the defendant then put handcuffs on him which quickly broke. Mr Thorp was then forced to sign the transfer document on the registration papers for his vehicle and a forged receipt. He was led to the car and told to duck down in the rear. His wallet and personal cards were taken. He was driven around by W and the defendant who jointly threatened to kill his dog, to shoot him, put him in a hole and chop him into small pieces. More threats followed. He was blindfolded, his shoes were taken, and he was driven around for a further hour. He was eventually put out near Evandale but told that the defendant and the W would be back in one hour to check on him. After waiting 45 minutes he walked for two hours to the Launceston Airport where he reported what had occurred to a staff member and the police were called.

The following day W and the defendant were intercepted at Wynyard driving Mr Thorp's car. Mr Thorp's wallet was found in the vehicle. The defendant was interviewed by the police on 27 January 2013. She gave a false account of what had happened thereby foregoing any claim to genuine remorse.

The defendant is now almost 24. She has had a traumatic past. Her father took his own life when she was six. Her step father died three years later. She has been subjected to abusive relationships with men and has abused illicit drugs. All of these issues have, in turn, contributed to long-standing mental health issues, social isolation, a chaotic lifestyle and homelessness. She fell into bad company. She was using amphetamines on an almost daily basis during the period leading up to this crime, at least some of which were supplied by W.

Despite all this she has from time to time held employment. Her relationship with her mother has recently improved and is now close and supportive. The defendant has a four-year-old son, born when she was 18, who has severe autism and until her remand in custody she played an important role in his care. The defendant's mother now cares for him. Largely motivated by the situation in which she now finds herself she stopped using drugs in mid-2013 and expresses a desire to address her drug and mental health difficulties by continued treatment. She has no prior convictions for violence. She has a prior conviction for stealing and drug offences but they are minor. At the time of committing this crime she was subject to an undertaking to be of good behaviour imposed by a magistrate on a stealing charge. In November 2013 she was sentenced to community service for offences of dishonesty and breaching bail committed after this crime. Some mitigation arises from her plea of guilty, although it was not at a particularly early stage.

The defendant committed a very serious crime. Although she did not intend that the victim would suffer serious physical harm, and he in fact suffered no serious or lasting physical injury, a victim impact statement indicates he continues to suffer from psychological symptoms including panic attacks, anxiety and sleep disturbance, which have had, and continue to have, a profound impact on his life. That is hardly surprising. She and W submitted him to a violent and terrifying ordeal extending over a period of hours. He thought he was going to die. This was a planned undertaking even if some of what occurred was conceived as it progressed. Although she may have been encouraged by W and she did not strike the victim with the bat or pour substances in his mouth, the defendant played an active and knowing role in the joint enterprise. On the facts given to me I would regard the level of her criminality as less than that of her co-offender but marginally so. She joined in the violence and the threats of violence used before and after the stealing to obtain or prevent resistance to the stealing. The serious nature of her criminal conduct requires a significant sentence of imprisonment, all of which is to be immediately served.

Samantha Chevoux, you are convicted. You are sentenced to a term of imprisonment of two years from 23 June 2014. I order that you be eligible for parole after having served 12 months of that sentence. I make a probation order for 12 months from you release with special conditions that you must attend educational and other programs, undergo assessment and treatment for alcohol or drug dependency, submit to testing for alcohol or drug use and submit to medical, psychological or psychiatric assessment or treatment as directed by a probation officer. You will pay the victims of crime compensation levy of $50 within 28 days of your release."

1. Counsel for the appellant does not submit that there was any specific error in the sentence imposed. It was submitted that the nature of the sentence imposed in the circumstances of this case reveals error in the exercise of the learned sentencing judge's discretion. It was submitted that the personal circumstances of the appellant were not given sufficient weight, and that that resulted in a sentence greater than was required to mark the public's condemnation of this crime. It was also submitted the crime was not committed against the public at large which might have resulted in a need for greater condemnation.
2. Counsel submitted that there were a number of mitigating factors. These were:
   • the appellant did not actually strike the complainant with a baseball bat;
   • the appellant was only 24 years old at the time of the offending;
   • the appellant had some minor convictions for stealing and drug offences but none involving violence;
   • the appellant had had a difficult and traumatic life, involving the suicide of her father, domestic violence and abuse of drugs;
   • the appellant had longstanding mental health issues including significant anxiety and depression;
   • the appellant had experienced periods of homelessness, social isolation and a chaotic lifestyle;
   • in the period leading up to the offending, the appellant had been using methyl amphetamine daily which was being supplied by her co-accused;
   • after the crime was committed, the appellant obtained housing, undertook counselling and had expressed a strong desire to address her drug and mental health issues. She continued to see a psychologist while in custody;
   • the appellant had a four year old child with severe autism. She had sole custody of the child and had received special training to assist with managing his home and school life;
   • the appellant was remorseful; while her plea of guilty had not been an early one, it had obviated the need for the complainant to give evidence on a trial;
   • the appellant had in the past had some work and had recently been accepted into the university to study psychology.

1. Counsel for the respondent submitted that no error had been demonstrated in the exercise of the sentencing discretion in this case. There were, it was argued, a number of aggravating factors. These were:
   • the appellant had deliberately lured the complainant to her unit for the specific purpose of exacting retribution and compensation for what she perceived to have been damage the complainant had caused to her property;
   • the events took place over some hours culminating in the complainant being placed in a car, blindfolded and driven around for over an hour before being left in a car park. The complainant thought he was going to die;
   • the violence was committed over an extended period of time, far longer than was needed to achieve the stated purpose;
   • the violence used included the use of a baseball bat, kicking, punching, tying up and blindfolding, and the use of handcuffs. It also included pouring a substance into the complainant's mouth.
2. The complainant did not suffer any residual physical injuries but did suffer ongoing emotional harm. He experienced a loss of trust, irritability, a preference to be alone, panic attacks and paranoia. He had ceased the studies he was doing and was having counselling. It was also submitted this was a planned undertaking.
3. As to the mitigating factors outlined by counsel for the appellant, it was accepted the appellant was a relatively young offender and had an autistic child. It was noted the child was now in the care of his maternal grandmother.
4. Counsel for the respondent also noted that the plea of guilty was a late one and that there was a lack of remorse evidenced by the appellant's initial false account to police. Counsel for the respondent in his written submissions indicated that another factor to be considered was that the appellant had shortly before this offending been placed on probation following a stealing matter. In fact she was not. On 12 December 2012, the appellant was convicted of stealing and released on her undertaking to be of good behaviour for a period of 12 months. The offending the subject of this appeal occurred about six weeks later. It was not until the appellant was dealt with for a breach of that undertaking as a result of further offending on 14 November 2014 that she was placed on probation. With respect in my view the difference means nothing in the context of this appeal.

1. The appellant did not contend that in some way the making of a probation order made the appellant's sentence manifestly excessive. She did submit that the making of a probation order which overlapped a likely period of parole was probably superfluous. However, it was that part of the sentence by which a period of imprisonment was imposed which was under challenge.
2. There can be little doubt that the crime of aggravated armed robbery is a serious one. As to the possible sentencing range for such a crime, Porter J summarised his examination of past sentences at [26] in Braslin and Cowen v Tasmania [2010] TASCCA 1, when he said:

"What then, in terms of a broad range, can be made of the statistics? In Sentencing in Tasmania 2nd ed (above) at 332, for the period 1990 - 2000, the tables of single count sentences show the maximum custodial sentence for aggravated armed robbery as five years, whilst that for armed robbery is eight years. The author notes at 333 [12.107], that for young offenders (18 - 21), no single sentence exceeded three years. In relation to aggravated armed robbery, since the time of the tables to the date of these crimes, there have been a few sentences of more than five years. At the highest end of the scale, there are two sentences of 10 years' imprisonment imposed on co-offenders, but which also related to a number of other offences of dishonesty. There is a third such term, but in that case someone was shot. There is one sentence of nine years' imprisonment - (a regular repeat offender) - two of eight years imposed on recidivist co-offenders, and one of 7½ years. For aggravated armed robbery and armed robbery there are 16 sentences of between three and six years, mostly in the lower end of that range, and almost invariably involving commercial premises, relatively large sums of money, and offenders with significant criminal histories. This is somewhat inconclusive but might suggest that a more punitive approach to this type of crime has been taken in this decade, compared to the last. I should note that at the other end of the scale, there have been four community service orders, of between 56 and 80 hours."

1. While Wood J in DPP v Harris [2012] TASCCA 11 at [16] sounded a note of caution about how prior sentences should be considered in the context of an appeal against sentence, they generally provide a useful identification of factors relevant to sentence for particular crimes. In the present case, there were a number of factors present which required the learned sentencing judge to give serious consideration to a significant sentence. The crime involved a premeditated plan to lure the complainant to a private home for the purpose of exacting retribution and compensation for perceived wrongs, the complainant was subjected to actual and threatened violence over a number of hours, there were threats to kill, and the complainant had every reason from the circumstances in which he found himself to believe the threats might be carried out. While the appellant's role in the actual violence was limited, she stood by and encouraged the co-accused to engage in it. She made no attempt to stop the violent behaviour. She remained a willing party to all events. There is no suggestion at any time she attempted to perhaps seek help.
2. Further, when the appellant was spoken to by police she lied about the way in which she came to have the complainant's car and denied the asserted events. She maintained the complainant had voluntarily sold his car.

1. It is accepted that for a young woman with a limited offending history and the appellant's personal circumstances, the sentence imposed upon the appellant might have been perceived to be a significant one. However, that is not a basis upon which an appellate court should interfere with a sentence. The sentence imposed was one open to the learned sentencing judge to mark the seriousness of the offending, and the minimum period to be served before being eligible for parole clearly reflected the various mitigating factors put before the Court. I was not persuaded that the appellant had demonstrated error on the part of the learned sentencing judge, and the foregoing are my reasons for joining in the dismissal of this appeal.

1. I have read the reasons for judgment of both Tennent and Estcourt JJ. I agree with what each of my colleagues has written. Those reasons reflect the view I took when I joined in the making of the order dismissing the appeal.

1. The appellant has appealed against a sentence imposed on her by Pearce J on 4 August 2014.
2. The appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of aggravated armed robbery and was sentenced by the learned sentencing judge to a term of two years' imprisonment with an order that she not be eligible for parole until she had served twelve months of that sentence.
3. The notice of appeal contains one ground only, namely that the sentence was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances of the case.

1. The following statement of the facts of the case is taken from the comments on passing sentence of the learned sentencing judge:

"Samantha Ashley Chevoux pleads guilty to aggravated armed robbery. She is jointly charged with a male co-accused who I will call W. In late 2012 or very early 2013 the defendant met the complainant, Paul Thorp. Not long afterwards she, without justification, formed the impression that Mr Thorp was responsible for vandalism at the house she was then living in at Mayfield. She told W, whom she had met only weeks earlier, of her problem. On 25 January 2013, encouraged by W, and motivated by retribution and an irrational desire for some sort of compensation, she sent a message on social media to Mr Thorp inviting him to her house. She lured him inside. He was followed in by W who then struck him to the head with a baseball bat. W demanded Mr Thorp's keys and mobile phone, then struck Mr Thorp's wrist with the bat, told him to sit on the floor and tapped him several times on the head with the bat. He was told not to move and that everything would be all right if he 'played his cards right'. The defendant tied a scarf around Mr Thorp's head and tied his hands with rope. She then placed a belt round his neck and pulled it tight. Mr Thorp was then kicked and punched while he could feel the bat against his head. Both W and the defendant told Mr Thorp he would be 'chopped into bits, put in a wheelie bin and set alight'. W poured either conditioner or dishwashing liquid into Mr Thorp's mouth. When Mr Thorp freed his hands from the rope the defendant then put handcuffs on him which quickly broke. Mr Thorp was then forced to sign the transfer document on the registration papers for his vehicle and a forged receipt. He was led to the car and told to duck down in the rear. His wallet and personal cards were taken. He was driven around by W and the defendant who jointly threatened to kill his dog, to shoot him, put him in a hole and chop him into small pieces. More threats followed. He was blindfolded, his shoes were taken, and he was driven around for a further hour. He was eventually put out near Evandale but told that the defendant and the W would be back in one hour to check on him. After waiting 45 minutes he walked for two hours to the Launceston Airport where he reported what had occurred to a staff member and the police were called.

The following day W and the defendant were intercepted at Wynyard driving Mr Thorp's car. Mr Thorp's wallet was found in the vehicle. The defendant was interviewed by the police on 27 January 2013. She gave a false account of what had happened thereby foregoing any claim to genuine remorse."

1. On passing sentence the learned sentencing judge, after summarising the circumstances of the crime, said:

"The defendant is now almost 24. She has had a traumatic past. Her father took his own life when she was six. Her step father died three years later. She has been subjected to abusive relationships with men and has abused illicit drugs. All of these issues have, in turn, contributed to long-standing mental health issues, social isolation, a chaotic lifestyle and homelessness. She fell into bad company. She was using amphetamines on an almost daily basis during the period leading up to this crime, at least some of which were supplied by W.

Despite all this she has from time to time held employment. Her relationship with her mother has recently improved and is now close and supportive. The defendant has a four-year-old son, born when she was 18, who has severe autism and until her remand in custody she played an important role in his care. The defendant's mother now cares for him. Largely motivated by the situation in which she now finds herself she stopped using drugs in mid-2013 and expresses a desire to address her drug and mental health difficulties by continued treatment. She has no prior convictions for violence. She has a prior conviction for stealing and drug offences but they are minor. At the time of committing this crime she was subject to an undertaking to be of good behaviour imposed by a magistrate on a stealing charge. In November 2013 she was sentenced to community service for offences of dishonesty and breaching bail committed after this crime. Some mitigation arises from her plea of guilty, although it was not at a particularly early stage.

The defendant committed a very serious crime. Although she did not intend that the victim would suffer serious physical harm, and he in fact suffered no serious or lasting physical injury, a victim impact statement indicates he continues to suffer from psychological symptoms including panic attacks, anxiety and sleep disturbance, which have had, and continue to have, a profound impact on his life. That is hardly surprising. She and W submitted him to a violent and terrifying ordeal extending over a period of hours. He thought he was going to die. This was a planned undertaking even if some of what occurred was conceived as it progressed. Although she may have been encouraged by W and she did not strike the victim with the bat or pour substances in his mouth, the defendant played an active and knowing role in the joint enterprise. On the facts given to me I would regard the level of her criminality as less than that of her co-offender but marginally so. She joined in the violence and the threats of violence used before and after the stealing to obtain or prevent resistance to the stealing. The serious nature of her criminal conduct requires a significant sentence of imprisonment, all of which is to be immediately served."

1. In Braslin and Cowen v Tasmania [2010] TASCCA 1 at [31]-[34], Porter J said of the approach of this Court to sentencing appeals of this type:

"31 For the purposes of this case, I think it is desirable to traverse some well-travelled territory, and to again note the role of this Court on an appeal against sentence. 'The Court of Criminal Appeal has no charter to tinker with sentences. It sits to rectify genuine error'; Aherne v R 20/1982 per Nettlefold J at 3. In accordance with the traditional formula as set out in House v R [1936] HCA 40; (1935) 55 CLR 499, it needs to be established that by reason of its severity, the sentence is unreasonable or plainly unjust so as to give rise to the inference that there has been a failure to properly exercise the discretion. As Kourakis J said in A, MC v Police [2008] SASC 279; (2008) 102 SASR 151 at [88], 'An appeal ground that a sentence is manifestly excessive is really a convenient alternative expression of the complaint that the sentence is by reason of its severity, unreasonable or plainly unjust.'

32 In Dinsdale v R [2000] HCA 54; (2000) 202 CLR 321, Kirby J (with whom Gummow and Gaudron JJ agreed) stated at [58]:

'The necessity to show error in such a case is fully accepted by courts deciding appeals against sentence. Indeed, it is commonly referred to by the Court of Criminal Appeal of Western Australia. Because the imposition of a sentence involves the exercise of judgment and evaluation upon which minds can differ, it bears close similarities to the making of a discretionary decision. Like such a decision, if properly imposed, a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal merely because the appellate court would have reached a different result had the responsibility of sentencing belonged to it. As in the case of appellate review of a discretionary decision, a brake is imposed upon undue appellate disturbance of primary decisions (and unwarranted appeals seeking that relief) by the necessity to identify an error that justifies and authorises appellate intervention. Such an error may involve the adoption by the primary judge of an incorrect principle, giving weight to some extraneous or irrelevant matter, failing to give weight to some material considerations, or a mistake as to the facts.' [References omitted]

33 Later, in Wong v R (above) at [58] Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ said:

'Reference is made in House to two kinds of error. First, there are cases of specific error of principle. Secondly, there is the residuary category of error which, in the field of sentencing appeals, is usually described as manifest excess or manifest inadequacy. In this second kind of case appellate intervention is not justified simply because the result arrived at below is markedly different from other sentences that have been imposed in other cases. Intervention is warranted only where the difference is such that, in all the circumstances, the appellate court concludes that there must have been some misapplication of principle, even though where and how is not apparent from the statement of reasons.'

34 In Dinsdale (above) at [6], Gleeson CJ and Hayne J said that: 'inadequacy or excess is, or is not, plainly apparent'. ...".

1. In Director of Public Prosecutions (Acting) v Pearce [2015] TASCCA 1, a case involving a sole ground of appeal that the sentence was manifestly inadequate, Pearce J, with whom Blow CJ and Porter J agreed, said at [8]:

"As in all such appeals as this, it is necessary to refer to the principles which limit the circumstances in which intervention of an appellate court is justified. The court sits to correct material error: Dinsdale v The Queen [2000] HCA 54; (2000) 202 CLR 321 per Kirby J at [57]-[60]. Where no specific error is alleged, this Court must be persuaded of error of the second type referred to in House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505, that is, that the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge is 'unreasonable or plainly unjust'. It is not to the point that the sentence may be regarded by some as too lenient or too harsh. It must be established that the sentencing order is so manifestly wrong that it could only be the result of some undefinable error in the exercise of the judicial discretion: Bresnehan v The Queen [1992] TASSC 55; (1992) 1 Tas R 234 at 242. A court of criminal appeal may not substitute its own opinion for that of the sentencing judge merely because the appellate court would have exercised its discretion in a manner different from the manner in which the sentencing judge exercised his or her discretion: see Lowndes v The Queen [1999] HCA 29; (1999) 195 CLR 665 at [15], and the other cases referred to by this Court in Director of Public Prosecutions v CSS [2013] TASCCA 10. Sentencing judges should be 'accorded a wide measure of latitude': Postiglione v The Queen [1997] HCA 26; (1997) 189 CLR 295 per Kirby J at 336. Excess or inadequacy is either apparent or it is not: Dinsdale v The Queen (above) at [6]. In considering that question regard is to be given to all the matters that are relevant to determining the sentence: Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; (2010) 242 CLR 520 at 539."

1. Counsel for the appellant submitted that there was no specific error made by the learned sentencing judge, but that there were significant personal circumstances which, although having been taken into account, were not given sufficient weight, and resulted in a sentence greater than that which was required to mark the condemnation of the crime committed. Counsel adumbrated the following matters:
   • The appellant did not strike the complainant with a baseball bat. The appellant has stated that the appellant did not intend to "inflict any actual serious physical harm" upon the complainant.
   • The appellant is now 24 years old.
   • Her prior convictions showed a history of some minor convictions for stealing and drug offences.
   • The appellant has had a difficult and traumatic life. When the appellant was 6, her father committed suicide. The appellant had also been subject to assault, in the form of "significant levels of family violence", and had abused illicit drugs.
   • These issues have contributed to long-standing mental health issues, including significant anxiety and depression, "periods of homelessness, social isolation, and chaotic lifestyle".
   • In the period leading up to the crime, the appellant was using methamphetamine daily, some of which was supplied by the co-accused "at no cost to her".
   • Since the crime was committed, the appellant had shown significant reformation. The appellant was residing in Housing Services accommodation. The appellant had undertaken counselling, and had expressed a strong desire to continue treatment to address her drug and mental health problems. The appellant continued to see a psychologist whilst in custody.
   • The appellant has a 4 year old son "who is a significant dependent" and has severe autism. The appellant has full custody of the child and "has been given special training by St Giles" to assist him better manage at school and at home.
   • The appellant was remorseful for her actions. The appellant pleaded guilty resulting in the victim not having to go through the court process.
   • The appellant had previously been employed, and at the time of disposition was looking for part-time work.
   • The appellant had "also been accepted into the University of Tasmania to study a psychology degree".
2. There is nothing particularly remarkable in those matters and, even giving them the fullest weight they deserve, excess cannot, in my view, be said to be plainly apparent.
3. As noted by Pearce J, with whom Blow CJ and Porter J agreed, in Director of Public Prosecutions (Acting) v Foster [2015] TASCCA 2 at [12], sentences for armed robberies and aggravated armed robberies have been the subject of a number of recent appeals to this Court, including Braslin and Cowen v Tasmania (above); DPP v Burns [2012] TASCCA 11; Director of Public Prosecutions v Harris [2013] TASCCA 5, and Director of Public Prosecutions v CSS [2013] TASCCA 10, and those authorities emphasise the seriousness of the crimes, with armed robbery being one of the more serious crimes.
4. In Braslin and Cowen v Tasmania, Porter J observed at [26]:

"26 ... In Sentencing in Tasmania 2nd ed (above) at 332, for the period 1990 - 2000, the tables of single count sentences show the maximum custodial sentence for aggravated armed robbery as five years, whilst that for armed robbery is eight years. The author notes at 333 [12.107], that for young offenders (18 - 21), no single sentence exceeded three years. In relation to aggravated armed robbery, since the time of the tables to the date of these crimes, there have been a few sentences of more than five years. At the highest end of the scale, there are two sentences of 10 years' imprisonment imposed on co-offenders, but which also related to a number of other offences of dishonesty. There is a third such term, but in that case someone was shot. There is one sentence of nine years' imprisonment - (a regular repeat offender) - two of eight years imposed on recidivist co-offenders, and one of 7½ years. For aggravated armed robbery and armed robbery there are 16 sentences of between three and six years, mostly in the lower end of that range, and almost invariably involving commercial premises, relatively large sums of money, and offenders with significant criminal histories. This is somewhat inconclusive but might suggest that a more punitive approach to this type of crime has been taken in this decade, compared to the last. I should note that at the other end of the scale, there have been four community service orders, of between 56 and 80 hours."

1. In Pickett v Tasmania [2014] TASCCA 1, I observed at [8]:

"It is also of interest to note that the Tasmanian Sentencing Advisory Council in its consultation paper on Sex Offence Sentencing, released in April 2013, states that between 2001 and 2011, 85% of sentences for a single offence of the less serious crime of armed robbery (that is, not aggravated armed robbery), in Tasmania involved an immediate custodial sentence. The median sentence of imprisonment, that is, the sentence which falls in the middle of the range of sentences, for a single offence of armed robbery is stated to have been two years, the minimum was two months three weeks, and the maximum six years."

1. It is clear, in my view, that taking all matters into account the sentence of two years' imprisonment was well within range.
2. For these reasons I joined in the making of the order dismissing the appeal.